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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is the first in-depth English study of East Germany’s Union of the 
Consumer Co-operatives (Konsum).  It explores the roles of this organization, while alluding to 
the nature of power relations, Soviet-style socialism, and the tensions between the progressive 
discourse and the totalitarian elements of socialism in East Germany.  The aim of this 
dissertation is to augment the historiography of the Soviet Occupation Zone (Sowjetische 
Besatzungszone, SBZ – 1945 to 1949) and the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik, DDR – 1949 to 1990) by examining the ways in which the Konsum 
contributed to the highly modern and totalitarian aspirations of the Socialist Unity Party 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED – 1946 to 1990).  In examining the SED’s 
ability to use the Konsum to infuse ideology into everyday life, this study provides new 
understandings of the ways in which the party’s actions affected its citizens, and the ways in 
which citizens responded to, averted, and manipulated the SED’s politicization of their daily 
lives.  In other words, the Konsum became a junction between the citizenry and the state.  To this 
end, the study has drawn attention to the state’s incursion into the mundane aspects of everyday 
life in the realms of education, work, and consumption.  To substantiate this examination, I have 
referred to numerous archival sources and interviews with East Germans associated with the 
Konsum.  Thus, the core contribution of this dissertation rests in the blending of archival 
material, secondary sources, and interviews in light of the ideas associated with the concepts of 
attempted totalitarianism, modernism, individual agency, and selective participation.  Moreover, 
this research and source analysis presents a novel departure from the secondary sources cited in 
this work by illustrating the possible motivations for certain actors, whether state authorities or 
individuals, to make ideological statements and employ specific types of behaviour.   
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1949 until the first free elections on 18 March 1990) were elected on a 
slate called the National Front.   
 
New Course Policy reversal of the Building of Socialism, which was implemented in 
July 1953.  It entailed a relaxation of the collectivization of agriculture, the 
end of the persecution of church members, and the elimination of 
restrictions on private business owners.  
 
Ostalgie A term derived from the German words Ost (east) and Nostalgie 
(nostalgia) referring to nostalgia for certain aspects of life, most notably 
consumer culture, in the former East Germany. 
 
“Party of the new type”    Party based on the CPSU model  
 
SAPMO-DDR Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganizationen der DDR – The 
archive of parties and mass-organization of the DDR housed in Berlin 
Lichterfelde  
 
SBZ  Sowjetische Besatzungszone – Soviet Occupied Zone in Germany, 1945 to 
1949 (See also SBZ/DDR) 
 
SBZ/DDR A term used in this dissertation to describe the period of Soviet occupation 
from 1945 to 1949 and the lifespan of the DDR from 1949 to 1990  
 
SED  Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of 
Germany) 
 
Selective Participation The process by which East Germans negotiated with and 
 participated in state structures to further their own interests. 
 
SMAD  Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland (Soviet Military 
Administration in Germany) 
 
SPD  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of 
Germany)  
 
SSC Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz – the Chemnitz Branch of the Saxon 
State Archive 
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SSL  Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Leipzig – Leipzig branch of the Saxon State 
Archive  
 
Stasi  Staatssicherheitsdienst (East German ministry for state security or MfS)  
 
SWA  Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv is a regional archive in Leipzig, which 
houses the files of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig from 1884 to 1990 
and the files of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Zwickau from 1873 to 1990 
 
TSM   Thüringisches Staatsarchiv Meiningen 
 
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 
VDK/VdK Verband deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften was the centralized 
administrative organ responsible for the Consumer Co-operatives of the 
DDR.  It was founded in 1949 in East Berlin.  The VDK was to act as a 
counterpart to the West German Zentralverband der deutschen 
Konsumgenossenschaften (ZdK).  The VDK had to ensure that the goals of 
the centralized plans were fulfilled.  In 1972, the VDK underwent a name 
change: Verband der Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR (VdK).  By 
1989, the VdK administered 198 consumer co-operatives with 4.6 million 
members.  It survived the fall of the DDR and became the Konsumverband 
in 1999 and in 2008 the Zentralkonsum.    
 
Verkaufsgespräch Sales pitch 
 
Volkskammer  East German Parliament  
 
VoPo   A colloquial abbreviation for the Volkspolizei (People’s Police) 
 
VP    Volkspolizei (People’s Police)  
 
Wende  The process of change from socialism to capitalism in East Germany in 
the years 1989 and 1990   
 
ZK Zentralkomittee (Central Committee or CC) 
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1. Introduction 
 
Through the improved fulfillment of the wishes of our consumers, friendlier service, and better-
informed customer consultations, the Konsum had the potential to make the face of socialism in 
East Germany more attractive to citizens. 
- The administrative branch of a co-operative in Leipzig.1 
 
The superiority of socialism will be proven not by the over-fulfillment of economic plans, but 
through quality consumer goods and tasteful consumption. 
- SED Secretary Walter Ulbricht in Berlin in 19592 
 
 
Illustration 1: A Konsum shop window in Schwerin (circa 1950s) promoting the foreign politics of the Soviet 
Union as the guarantor of peace and independence of all peoples3 
                                                
1 SWA: U64/240, Erklärung des Genossenschaftsrates des Verbandes der Konsumgenossenschaften der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, de. 25. Oktober 1989, 2.  
2 Der Handel im Siebenjahrplan der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und seine Aufgaben zur weiteren 
Verbesserung der Versorgung der Bevölkerung, Berlin 1959, S.4., as quoted in Annette Kaminsky, Illustrierte 
Konsum-geschichte der DDR (Erfurt: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Thüringen, 1998), 25. 
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The focus on a central institution of East German society, the Union of the Consumer Co-
operatives of the DDR (Konsum), is pivotal to a comprehensive understanding of the economic, 
social, cultural, political, and gender history of the Soviet Occupation Zone (Sowjetische 
Besatzungszone, SBZ) and the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische 
Republik, DDR).  It is important for the reader to understand that that the terms SBZ and DDR 
represent not only a singular geographical space, but also temporal periods.  The SBZ, as seen in 
the map below, was the area of Germany occupied by the Soviet armies from May 1945 to 
October 1949.  The SBZ then became a state commonly referred to as East Germany on 7 
October 1949 until its official disbandment and absorption into West Germany in October 1990.  
At times, I use the acronym SBZ/DDR, which represents the combined temporal period from 
1945 to 1990, but the singular geographical space seen in Map 1.      
 
 
Map 1: SBZ/DDR in central Europe4 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
3 AKB: FA 10 - Schaufenster und Fassadengestaltung zu gesellschaftlichen Höhepunkten und politischen 
Themen, Image 457, Konsum-Genossenschaftsverband - Bezirk Schwerin - Agitation und Werbung (date not given 
- probably the 1950s). 
 4 East Germany, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:East_Germany_1956-1990.svg (August 2012). 
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The Konsum was a massive organization, which served multiple societal and ideological 
functions in the DDR.  Its omnipresence is evidenced by an outlet in nearly every town and 
village for a total of 21,000 retail outlets, 544 department stores, 399 stores that sold agricultural 
goods, as well as production factories and restaurants.  By 1988, these Konsum locations served a 
membership of around 4.6 million and employed a combined (mostly female) 287,000 workers.5  
In 1990, East Germany had a population of just over 16 million; this means that the Konsum 
employed roughly one out of every fifty working adults.  Such an extensive network of members 
and employees ensured that the Konsum was a useful communications network for the ruling 
party of East Germany – Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED 
– 1946 to 1990).  In addition, the Konsum provided its members, especially in the countryside, 
with cultural activities, such as musical performances, fashion shows, and so on.  To serve its 
employees, the Konsum operated a network of schools, and provided educational courses that 
ranged from basic co-operative principles to the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.  The 
Konsum also conducted foreign policy on behalf of the SED.  Hence, the Konsum became a 
conduit for promoting the East German state narrative and foreign policy ambitions to other co-
operative organizations and states from around the world.  Furthermore, the Konsum served basic 
propaganda functions via its – at times – politically charged advertisements and publishing 
network.  While conducting these economic and political functions, the Konsum became a 
junction between state and citizenry; what is more, it left behind a massive paper trail, providing 
a unique vantage point into the ways in which both were reacting to and trying to influence each 
other.  I use this evidence to make a novel contribution to the historiography of East Germany.  
                                                
5 Andreas Herbst, Winfried Ranke, and Jürgen Winkler, "Verband der Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR 
(VDK)," in So funktionierte die DDR, Bd. 2: Lexikon der Organisationen und Institutionen (Hamburg: Reinbek, 
1994), 1113.   
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1.1. Thesis  
 
My argument has five primary components.  First, I investigate the ways in which the 
Konsum functioned as a political and economic tool of the SED.  Various sources (interviews 
and secondary literature) claim that the Konsum was an independent and private enterprise in 
contrast to a state-owned enterprise.6  In fact, following the demise of the East German state, the 
Konsum was labelled a private and membership owned enterprise.  This recognition enabled the 
Konsum to avoid being privatized like other East German industries (the Konsum in post-DDR 
years will be discussed in the conclusion).  Be that is it may, the Konsum functioned as a de facto 
state-owned enterprise (Volkseigene Betrieb), since it was funnelling a substantial amount of its 
profits back to the régime.7  Indeed, on the basis of my research in various archives throughout 
the former East Germany, I suggest that this organization wholeheartedly supported the political 
and economic system of the SED in the party’s attempt to build a socialist society.8  
Nevertheless, I also maintain that the Konsum had some latitude and independence in devising 
and implementing state plans.  What is more, the Konsum had a voluntary membership base, 
with some functioning membership democracy within its lower levels through elected consumer 
committees.  Hence, there is evidence of some pluralism in the lower levels of the system.9   
Second, I maintain that the Konsum functioned as a political mass-organization.  The 
term mass-organization fits within the historical contexts of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, 
and East Germany, and refers to various political, educational, and economic organizations with 
large memberships.  Normally, the qualifications for joining were low, since their purpose was to 
                                                
6 Wilhelm Kaltenborn, Genossenschaftsrecht und Modernisierung: 130 Jahre Gesetzgebung im Wandel der 
Zeit (Berlin: Verband der Konsumgenossenschaften, 1997), 1. 
7 Mustafa Haikal, Gute Geschäfte: Die Geschichte der Leipziger Konsumgenossenschaft (Faber & Faber, 
2009), 155-61. 
8 LAB: C Rep. 901 Nr. 328, Vertreterwahlen 1950. 
9 Peter Grieder, "In Defence of Totalitarianism Theory as a Tool of Historical Scholarship," Totalitarian 
Movements and Political Religions 8, no. 3-4 (2007): 564. 
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inculcate the ideology of the party to the millions of members within the mass-organization and 
by extension wider segments of the population.  The most influential of the East German mass-
organizations were the Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend, FDJ) and the Free German 
Trade Union Federation (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB).  Both had memberships 
reaching into the millions.  As was the case for the FDJ and FDGB, the SED attempted to have 
the Konsum function as a mass-organization and as a robust political instrument by 
indoctrinating its employees (with a special focus on young and female workers), members, and 
consumers by virtue of inculcating SED ideology in Konsum workplaces, Konsum shops, and 
Konsum schools.  More specifically, I base this argument on the Konsum’s close contact with 
East Germans on a near daily basis.   
Third, the Konsum, although conceived in the early years of the DDR as a carrier of SED 
communications and slogans, became over time a two-way communications apparatus with 
information moving in both directions.  Specifically, it promulgated Soviet and SED ideology, 
particularly to targeted societal groups: youth, women, families, and rural residents.  The 
Konsum inculcated these societal elements with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour that 
were required for their integration into the emerging East German state.  Again, as opposed to 
the Konsum being just a “transmission-belt” of state communications (one-way), I contrast and 
moderate this discussion of top-down communications by exploring how East Germans 
communicated through the Konsum (bottom-up and two-way).  The Konsum had to help 
integrate these groups into the socialist project.  With women, this meant affording them the 
“proper” forms of gender categorization, namely employed, politically active, and educated 
mothers, which was in binary opposition to unemployed housewives.   Ultimately, an important 
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(or intended) function of the Konsum was to integrate women into the world of work and 
politics. 
Fourth, the SED, for its part, used the Konsum to communicate to East Germans the 
legitimacy of their state through daily interactions with customers, consumers, and members in 
the thousands of consumer co-operative retail outlets.  Specifically, the Konsum used 
consumerism as a means to promulgate official state narratives portraying the DDR as a modern, 
collectivist, socialist, and consumer society.  The opposite often occurred, however.  By 
comparison to the abundant consumer culture of West Germany, the highly politicized, corrupt, 
and generally disappointing consumption experience in the Konsum retail outlets made the face 
of socialism unattractive for its millions of members and consumers.     
Fifth, the East German secret police or Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit, MfS, commonly known as the Stasi) permeated all aspects of the East German 
economy and the country’s consumer culture.  Because consumerism intersected with culture, 
economics, and socio-political factors, it became a crucial link between the Stasi and society.  
Moreover, consumption was always a complex negotiation between the party leadership, various 
governmental and economic apparatuses, and the population.10  However, according to historians 
Burghard Ciesla and Patrice G. Poutrus, consumption needs were always secondary and only 
received attention when it became necessary to deal with supply shortages, or in crisis situations 
that were no longer “manageable.”11  When such a crisis situation occurred, the Stasi would have 
to intervene and put out the flames.  To illustrate this point, I examine the relationship between 
the Stasi and the Konsum.  Every aspect of consumption in the DDR was inherently political, 
                                                
10 Philipp Heldmann, Herrschaft, Wirtschaft, Anoraks: Konsumpolitik in der DDR der Sechzigerjahre 
(Gèottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004), 9-10. 
11 Burghard Ciesla and Patrice G.  Poutrus, "Food Supply in a Planned Economy: SED Nutrition Policy 
between Crisis Response and Popular Needs," in Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of 
the GDR, ed. Konrad Hugo Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 145. 
7 
 
 
 
right down to the provision of (or failure to provide) meat, toys, and toilet paper.  Ultimately, 
consumption became a politicized test of the régime's claim to be a successful socialist state.  For 
this reason, the Stasi not only monitored, but also defended the interests of the consumers 
subscribing to the socialist consumer aesthetic.  Therefore, the fifth part of my thesis is the idea 
that the Stasi was intervening in economic affairs and conflating consumer satisfaction with 
security.  
1.2. Structure and organization  
This dissertation is structured thematically and is broken down into four overarching 
parts, which are further broken down into chapters, sections, and sub-sections.   
Part I includes two chapters that flesh out several of the themes put forward in the 
introduction.  Chapter 2 examines the DDR’s economic and political developments within the 
broader context of the Stalinization of East Germany and the Cold War; thus, it provides the 
reader with a historical orientation by which to navigate and understand various themes that are 
discussed in the subsequent chapters.  Chapter 3 focuses on the re-establishment of consumer co-
operatives immediately following the end of the Second World War.  This chapter clearly 
defines the Konsum’s new political and economic roles under SED hegemony. 
Part II also examines in more detail the régime’s strategies to utilize the Konsum for its 
own ends, and it is framed around the overarching theme of persuasion.  In other words, these 
chapters chart how the government ceaselessly sought to persuade citizens to its domestic and 
international point of view through education and consumerism.  Chapter 4 deals with the 
Konsum’s political role as a mass-organization and the ways in which it targeted various societal 
groups.  Chapter 5 continues with this theme of persuasion and discusses the international role of 
the Konsum.  This chapter demonstrates how wider (Cold War) historical events were reflected 
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in the documents the Konsum produced.  Chapter 6 explores Konsum education.  It establishes 
that improving the educational level and competence of its own members, as well as validating 
their loyalty to the SED, became the primary preoccupation of the Konsum schools.  Chapter 7 
describes the ways in which the Konsum was used as a means to communicate with the citizenry 
by way of consumption and shop window displays in Konsum stores.  This chapter shows that 
the Konsum was a central junction between state and citizenry, and that it was in these stores that 
the SED tried extensively to convince and persuade East Germans that their socialist state was 
worth having and keeping.  Again, the common thread tying these chapters together is the notion 
of persuasion to the SED’s socialist set of values, social identity, and way of life.   
Though Part II is primarily from the perspective of the state (top-down), Part III 
(Chapters 8 and 9) takes a bottom-up perspective and is largely concerned with the idea of 
rejection, providing a counterpoint to the preceding four chapters.  Thus, Chapter 8 examines 
East Germans’ daily interactions with the Konsum and the ways in which the population 
navigated the state-controlled consumer culture.  In this section, I rely on the idea of selective 
participation as a conceptual cornerstone to illustrate that East Germans negotiated with state 
structures to further their own materialistic interests.  Chapter 9 continues to explore how 
individuals engaged with the Konsum from the vantage point of Konsum employees and the ways 
in which customers and sales staff interacted with and tried to influence each other to their 
respective advantage.   
Part IV consists of a conclusion and bibliography.  The conclusion reiterates the main 
arguments of this work and briefly describes what happened to the Konsum following the demise 
of the East German state.  It closes with a brief discussion of the lessons learned while writing 
this dissertation, and potential avenues for further research.    
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Three appendixes supplement the text.  The first is a collection of maps.  The second 
introduces and is a first step towards an examination of the presidents of the Konsum.  The third 
appendix gives the reader a better sense of the interview process by outlining the general 
questions given to the interviewee.     
While this dissertation is structured around an examination of different aspects of the 
Konsum, it is primarily about the integration of women into socialism, consumerism, and the 
state-citizen relationship in the DDR. To put it another way, the Konsum was a special node or 
junction through which consumption, gender, socialism, and Stasi surveillance along with other 
aspects of East German socialism converged (see diagram below).  
Table 1: The Konsum as a junction and a vehicle of historical analysis 
 
 
Konsum	  
Poli+cs	  
Educa+on	  and	  
Work	  
Gender	  
A6tempted	  	  	  
Totalitarianism	  
Selec+ve	  
Par+cipa+on	  Consump+on	  
and	  the	  
Command	  
Economy	  
Stasi	  
Propaganda	  /	  
Adver+sing	  
GDR	  Language	  
Co-­‐opera+ves	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1.3. Concepts and régime-descriptors 
The following sub-sections explore three main conceptual components that are 
continually referred to and utilized throughout this dissertation.  These key ideas include: 
discourse, the consumer-tactician, attempted totalitarianism, selective participation, modernism, 
and gender categorization.  These concepts reflect the tensions and contradictions of everyday 
life, namely the possibilities of high levels of individual agency within totalitarian state 
structures.  The ways in which the state used totalitarian methods and means (e.g., deep incursion 
into and close observation of the lives of citizens) to achieve modernist and progressive ends 
(female participation in state structures and governance) was also something of a contradiction.  
These contradictions are especially evident in the discussions about state-citizenry relations in 
the realms of education, work, and consumption.  For this reason, I use the term junction to 
describe the Konsum because I perceive it as a space in which propaganda, consumption, 
discourse, gender, and ideology converged.   
1.3.1. Discourse 
 
Discourse is language that takes shape in relation to the dominant power base.  It consists 
of linguistic and knowledge systems determining what can be said and who has the authority to 
say it.  At its most basic, discourse is a system of inclusion and exclusion.  Philosopher and 
social theorist Michel Foucault states, “In a society such as our own we all know the rules of 
exclusion.  The most obvious and familiar of these concerns what is prohibited.  We know 
perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak of anything, 
when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of just anything.”12  Although 
best known for his studies on social institutions, most notably psychiatry and the prison system, 
                                                
12 Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language (1971)," in Critical Theory Since 1965, ed. Hazard 
Adams and Leroy Searle (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986), 149. 
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as well as his histories on sexuality, Foucault’s works on power and discourse – though not 
directly related – are applicable to a study on East Germany.   
The DDR, like all societies, had its system of discourses and “régimes of truths.”13  
Foucault argues: 
Each society has its régime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of 
disclosure which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances 
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.14   
 
Within this contextualization, this dissertation deals with the language of the SED.  As will be 
seen in later chapters, East Germans learned to use and manipulate the systems of discourse to 
their advantage.  Nevertheless, they had to adhere to the rules in order to avert the life-
threatening aspects of the régime.15   
1.3.2. The consumer-tactician 
 The Konsum produced goods, physical spaces, and discourse under the supervision of the 
SED.  Therefore, the consumer in the DDR was required to do more than simply consume 
products; rather, consumers became “consumer-tacticians” by navigating everyday life in the 
DDR and, as will be seen in later chapters (see especially section 8.2), in ways that were never 
fully intended by the régime.  To formulate and qualify my use of the construct of the consumer-
tactician, I draw heavily on the analysis of Michel de Certeau, a French Jesuit and scholar.  Like 
de Certeau, I treat the consumer as a tactician of everyday life.  In the DDR, the consumer had to 
navigate a range of state-controlled representations.  Although directly referring to Manhattan of 
the 1980s, the following quotation by de Certeau is also applicable to the DDR or any urbanized 
                                                
13 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977, trans. Colin 
Gordon, et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 131. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Foucault, "Discourse on Language," 149. 
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space for that matter: “urban space, the products purchased in the supermarket, the stories and 
legends distributed by the newspapers, and so on” are all expressions of state power.16  This was, 
in other words, consumption “disseminated and imposed by the ‘elites.’”17  Yet, consumers made 
“innumerable and infinitesimal transformations of and within the dominant cultural economy in 
order to adapt it to their own interests and their own rules... the tactics of consumption, the 
ingenious ways in which the weak make use of the strong, thus lend a political dimension to 
everyday practices.”18  This political dimension meant that consumers had to employ the 
established discourses found on television, in newspapers, and in advertisements of the SED-
state to carry out their interests that were separate from those of the régime.  Therefore, the 
everyday practice of consumption in the DDR became a tactical deployment of “clever tricks, 
knowing how to get away with things, ‘hunter’s cunning,’ maneuvers, polymorphic simulations, 
joyful discoveries, poetic as well as warlike.”19  
1.3.3. Attempted totalitarianism  
 
The concept of totalitarianism has constantly come in and out of fashion within academic 
debates and the historiography of East Germany.  In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Hannah 
Arendt expanded the concept of totalitarianism in her classic, The Origins of Totalitarianism.  
Arendt applied totalitarian theory to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and characterized a 
totalitarian régime as a state resorting to an all-pervasive terror to impose total control over 
society.  For Arendt, a totalitarian society is defined by the revolutionary or radical aspects of the 
régime, which are based on a single (all-encompassing) ideology and a constant mobilization of 
the masses.  In her words: “totalitarian movements are mass-organizations of atomized, isolated 
                                                
16 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkely: University of 
California Press, 1984), xii. 
17 Ibid., xiii. 
18 Ibid., xiv-xvii. 
19 Ibid., xix-xx. 
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individuals.  Compared with all other parties and movements, their most conspicuous external 
characteristic is their demand for total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of the 
individual member.”20   
Totalitarianism, according to historian Fulbrook, served the Cold War purpose of 
combining the histories of the Soviet Union under Stalin and Germany under Hitler into a single 
narrative. 21  This conceptualization of totalitarianism, therefore, served specific political 
purposes in the Cold War era and became an instrument for West German politicians and 
academics to de-legitimize and describe the Soviet Union and the new East German state.  
However, with the onset of Ostpolitik (a thawing in East-West relations in the early 1970s), a 
number of scholars dropped this term in favour of new conceptualizations of comparison, namely 
the perception that Hitler’s Germany was chaotic and polycentric.  By the 1980s, the concept of 
totalitarianism appeared to be outmoded and unfashionable within academic and political circles.  
Yet, as the severity of the crimes of the Communist states and the omnipresence of their security 
apparatuses were revealed after the fall of the Wall and the opening of the East German archives, 
the term totalitarianism became resonant again, although it currently competes with other 
régime-descriptors, such as modern and participatory (see section 1.3.5).22   
In a 1999 publication, historian Jürgen Kocka endorses the basic tenets of totalitarianism 
when applied to Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, but he argues that it is not applicable to the 
DDR.  In his words, “with this definition Arendt most definitely had Hitler’s Germany and 
Stalin’s Soviet Union in mind; her analysis ‘fits’ these two systems extremely well, and 
                                                
20 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New with added prefaces. ed. (San Diego: Harcourt, 
1994), 323. 
21 Mary Fulbrook, "The Limits of Totalitarianism: God, State and Society in the GDR," Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society 7(1997): 25-27. 
22 Ibid. 
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continues to do so to this day.”23  In his view, however, the DDR cannot be considered 
completely totalitarian, as it became less brutal after the death of Stalin in 1953.  Simply put, the 
régime, although maintaining its dictatorial and Soviet methods of rule, did not unleash the same 
degree of violence and terror, as did Nazi Germany or the USSR under Stalinist rule.  Instead, 
the DDR collapsed bloodlessly.24  However, while Kocka is correct in that the DDR never 
unleashed the mass violence of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, classical attributes of Hanna 
Arendt’s totalitarian model are clearly identifiable in the DDR, especially the notion that these 
states were able to heavily influence and control (although not completely) the lives of citizens.  
The régime used co-operatives in an effort to carry out one primary totalitarian aspiration: to 
infiltrate and observe the lives and behaviours of its consumers, members, and employees.  For 
this reason, totalitarianism is a pertinent régime-descriptor for this East German state, as well as 
a useful concept and tool of scholarly analysis for helping explain and describe certain aspects of 
the East German régime and the Konsum.25  
Further to Arendt’s use of totalitarianism, Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski 
broaden the definition of a totalitarian régime by identifying six interrelated features: a single 
mass party typically led by a dictator; a totalizing and revolutionary ideology; a system of terror 
directed at specific “enemies of the régime;” complete control of the propaganda apparatus; a 
weapons monopoly; and a centrally controlled economy.26  Friedrich and Brzezinski define 
totalitarianism as the state’s successful control and planning of all areas of life on the basis of a 
binding ideology via a modern technical and organizational means.  They state:  
                                                
23 Jürgen  Kocka, "The GDR: A Special Kind of Modern Dictatorship," in Dictatorship as Experience: 
Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. Konrad Hugo Jarausch (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 23. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Grieder, "In Defence of Totalitarianism," 565. 
26 Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Praeger, 1965), 22. 
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[Totalitarianism] is a theory that centres on the régime’s efforts to remould and transform 
the human beings under its control in the image of its ideology.  As such, it might be 
called an ideological or anthropological theory of totalitarianism.  The theory holds that 
the “essence” of totalitarianism is to be seen in such a régime’s total control of the 
everyday life of its citizens, of its control, more particularly, of their thoughts and 
attitudes as well as their activities.27 
    
My interpretation of totalitarianism in the context of the DDR is similar to Friedrich’s 
and Brzezinski’s, yet slightly more nuanced.  In my view, the SED often used totalitarian means 
that resulted in some progressive ends, namely to bring about high levels of female education 
and employment.  Thus, the term totalitarian is useful for a historical study of the DDR, for it 
denotes the politicization of everyday life and the notion that the state attempted to infuse 
ideology into every aspect of citizens’ experiences and activities.  The word “attempt” is 
important, since total control of the régime over its population is an impossible goal – even in the 
most extreme cases of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin.  Still, the SED’s style 
and system of rule carried totalitarian overtones, especially in the state’s infancy from about 
1945 to 1955.  Clearly, totalitarianism cannot explain every facet of life in the DDR; however, 
by using it I hope to emphasize that the SED effectively politicized – or to use Soviet 
terminology, democratically centralized – every aspect of the Konsum and the ways in which it 
communicated and interacted with its employees and members.  
 Historian Gary Bruce, while reviewing Andrew Port’s Conflict and Stability in the 
German Democratic Republic,28 argues that the current historiographical trend is moving away 
from emphasizing the “totalitarian” aspects of the régime.  According to Bruce, historians are 
now focusing on the more positive and participatory aspects of the dictatorship.  He puts it this 
way:  
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28 Andrew I. Port, Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Victims of the Stasi may rightly be insulted by the fact that these works almost always 
contain a clause like “not discounting the suffering of those affected by the Stasi” before 
commenting on some other aspect of the régime.  We must not ignore that the trend of 
downplaying repressive measures in the DDR has established itself…  The pendulum, 
which has swung far from the very real, very harmful, very controlling aspects of the 
régime, must start to swing back.29   
 
Fulbrook has challenged Bruce’s pendulum metaphor.  She stresses that East German 
historiography should move in a direction avoiding discussion of totalitarian aspects.  In the 
following quotation, she gainsays Bruce:   
The character and development of the ruling communist party, and the structures of 
power and repression in the Stasi, has been the subject of intensive analysis.  But the 
ways in which the system was carried and sustained from within, by lower-level 
functionaries and ordinary people, has to date received less attention than they arguably 
deserve.  These, too, were key elements in the “normalization of rule” in the middle 
decades of the DDR’s history; and the erosion of this system was a significant factor in 
the de-legitimisation that preceded the more dramatic events of 1989.30   
 
Concepts like totalitarianism and normalization are useful when studying a specific subject and 
for striking a certain tone with the reader.  For example, totalitarianism helps define the 
politicization of daily life and the attempts by the state to penetrate deeply into every aspect of 
citizens’ experiences and activities.  Undoubtedly, term selections, as well as an author’s 
vernacular, establish the tone and feel of a piece of work.  For instance, normalization 
(Fulbrook), which is analogous to totalitarianism in some sense, sounds less hard-hitting than 
totalitarian (Bruce).  My use of the term totalitarian purposefully strikes a weightier tone by 
encapsulating the ambitions and ends of the hyper-intrusive East German surveillance state.  
Both Fulbrook and Bruce are quoted throughout this work and neither is right nor wrong; rather, 
each approach is useful at certain analytical junctures. 
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and Society in the GDR, 1961-1979: The "Normalization of Rule"?, ed. Mary Fulbrook (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2009), 26. 
17 
 
 
 
 Prominent historian and Hitler biographer Ian Kershaw argues that totalitarianism can be 
used to understand the aspirations of the ruling power.  Kershaw points out, “The totalitarianism 
concept always held that there were special features – unprecedented inroads into society [and 
individual lives] through new techniques of mass mobilization and new levels and types of 
repression – which distinguished it from other categories of modern dictatorship.”31  Within 
totalitarian régimes, Kershaw argues that there was a “total claim” made by the rulers on the 
ruled.  In his view, “the régime seeks through a varied combination of manipulation and terror to 
homogenize and mobilize the population in the interests of revolutionary goals... and [allows] no 
space for any alternative; totalitarian régimes try ‘to win soul as well as body.’”32  Kershaw’s 
framework is applicable to this study in the context of the Konsum, since it describes the SED 
state by identifying its deep infiltration into all aspects of life while simultaneously trying to win 
the support of the populace (the soul and body as in Kershaw’s definition) by means of 
consumption, education, and employment.  Of course, the SED’s totalitarianism was neither 
complete nor successful; for this reason, this dissertation speaks in levels of individual agency, 
acquiescence, and negotiation. 
My utilization of totalitarianism as a concept has a few primary purposes.  First, it 
describes a hyper-intrusive state attempting to control and monitor all aspects of life.  Second, 
totalitarianism reflects the style of blanket-surveillance (flächendeckend) that was systemic and 
endemic in the DDR.33  This surveillance and paranoia will be explored in later sections on the 
Stasi.  Third, the state and the Stasi had the power to influence and control citizens’ life 
opportunities, such as acceptance into university or career advancement.  As historian Gary 
                                                
31 Ian Kershaw, "Totalitarianism Revisited: Nazism and Stalinism in Comparative Perspective," Tel Aviver 
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32 Ibid., 30. 
33 Gary Bruce gives uses a similar approach to totalitarianism.  See Gary Bruce, The Firm: The Inside Story 
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Bruce posits, “totalitarianism must be understood not as a state consistently exerting control over 
individuals, but doing so when it needed to.”34  Ultimately, the aim of this intervention and 
intensive socialization through the educational system, mass-organizations, media, and 
advertising was the engendering of the “socialist personality,” i.e., an individual that embodied 
the values of the SED: non-egoism, collectivism, non-materialism, care for others, concern about 
social justice, and a commitment to progress.35  Fourth, the Konsum became a totalitarian space 
in which employees were both propaganda targets all the while being trained to become 
propagandists themselves (transmission-belts).  These workers were under constant surveillance 
and pressure to conform to various political demands, such as joining the party, partaking in 
political meetings, undergoing Marxist-Leninist educational courses at Konsum schools, and 
proselytizing customers to the political slogans of the GDR.  Yet, there was much more to the 
SED-state than simply repression and the state exercising leverage over its citizens; there were 
also elements of participation that can be construed as elements of a nascent civil society and, of 
course, the mitigation of totalitarianism.   
1.3.4. The appropriation of totalitarianism and selective participation 
 To distinguish between the aspirations of the SED and the realities of life as reflected in 
the primary research conducted for this dissertation, I rely on the concept of selective 
participation as a conceptual counterweight to totalitarianism.  This approach illustrates that East 
Germans determined the ways in which they wanted to participate within state structures to 
further their own interests.  This conceptual framework suggests that the DDR was comprised of 
individuals, who were free to make decisions about how they participated in society, as well as 
the state’s political structures (including the régime’s repression apparatus).  For that reason, 
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totalitarianism was never complete, yet the population had to internalize and appropriate the 
antifascist state narrative in order to “participate.”36  By examining this participation, it will 
become evident that in spite of the DDR’s blatant democratic shortcomings, citizens were able to 
influence party-state policies and take part in the wider construction and development of their 
society.  As a result, the relationship between the state and the people was not clearly delineated.  
Indeed, over a period of forty years, this relationship matured and mutated.  For Fulbrook, “The 
vast majority of East Germans were caught up in a system in which they had to participate; and 
by virtue of their participation, they were themselves changed.  It was thus, in the end, a 
dictatorship sustained by the actions and interactions of the vast majority of the population.”37  
 To make a more overarching argument about the East German appropriation of 
totalitarianism, I maintain that there was a dynamic process in which East Germans developed 
effective ways of influencing the power structures of the régime to meet their needs, while 
staying within the confines of the SED state and ideology.  In many ways the aim of this 
dissertation is also to give an alternate view of life and society in the East German dictatorship 
that demonstrates the tensions between attempted totalitarianism and selective participation.  
This unique approach allows for wide-ranging deductions and generalizations to be made 
towards larger questions and themes in regards to the régime’s totalitarian aspirations in ordinary 
affairs, such as work, consumption, and associational life in East Germany.  Despite the 
constrained and politicized character of their activities, the Konsum did preserve niches where 
citizens could take semi-autonomous actions to meet their own needs and aspirations.38  
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East Germans reacted to the politicization of their daily lives and to state intrusion into 
their private spheres or niches with a mix of conformity, individual agency, and selective 
participation.39  Selective participation is a term that describes the ways in which citizens 
negotiated and responded to the ideological demands of the state in order to create individual 
space and personal opportunities.  Rather than emphasizing popular resistance, selective 
participation promotes the notion that individuals – behind the facade of conformity – created 
contexts of individual agency that were often diametrically in contradiction to the will of the 
state without openly challenging its authority.40  This tactic enhanced one’s chances of exploiting 
their given circumstances.  In the words of historian Jeannette Madarász, “the strong focus on 
personal interests affected East German society most severely.  It undermined the desired sense 
of collectivism by concentrating concern on the individual and no longer on the group.”41  She 
continues: “individualisation, however, does not entail autonomy, emancipation, and limitless 
self-realisation, but rather a combination of self-determination and dependency on existing 
conditions.”42  Indeed, there was a relatively wide range of choices available to citizens for 
coping with the demands of the state, including various degrees of participation in official party 
organization and structures.43  Similarly, the Konsum also offered its members and consumers a 
broad set of choices ranging from employment, to cultural, political, and educational 
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opportunities.44  As the years passed, selective participation – delineated in the repetitiveness of 
everyday life – allowed the individual to navigate and apply a wide spectrum of behaviours to, in 
the words of prominent historian Eric Hobsbawm, “work the system to their advantage – or 
rather to their minimum disadvantage.”45   
The DDR was a participatory state.  Historians like Fulbrook and Andrew Port have 
complicated the notion that the DDR’s stability was based on its repressive apparatus.  They 
paint the picture of compulsion from above by uncovering numerous cases of large-scale and 
voluntary compliance from below.  In other words, they point out that millions of East Germans 
supported the régime on account of their ideological conviction and through sheer 
opportunism.46  My dissertation tries to further complement this perspective.  In my view, East 
Germans had to (ironically) participate in order to attain individual agency; or to put it another 
way, participation was a prerequisite for building a life in the DDR.  Similarly, Fulbrook coined 
the term ‘honeycomb’ system.  For her, there was not a clear-cut distinction between state and 
society – that is, the DDR was a ‘honeycomb’ system in which ordinary people were connected 
to the political structures of the state, although they were still free to pursue their individual self-
interests, so long as these interests did not conflict with those of the régime.  While the populace 
had curtailed freedoms, it was still able to maintain a give-and-take dialogue and relationship 
with the régime, which was akin to a nascent civil society.  She argues:  
The exercise of power was in many areas both far more multifaceted and complex, and 
also less sinister and repressive... The ‘state’ or the ‘régime’ was not a unitary actor, 
which simply did (mostly nasty) things to the ill defined, undifferentiated mass of ‘the 
people.’  There were clearly hugely repressive and utterly reprehensible aspects of the 
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SED régime; but there were also areas in which thousands of citizens cooperated and felt 
they were able to pursue common goals and ideals.47    
 
Rather than painting a picture of society that was fearful of the SED and its lurking Stasi, Port 
similarly describes a situation in which workers and farmers regularly made known their needs 
and concerns to authorities.  Like Fulbrook, Port argues that East Germans were not complacent, 
and they were, in fact, not simply subjects of the régime, but actors with agency.48   
 As will be seen in the sections discussing the Stasi, selective participation also had 
sinister elements.  In this regard, some of Robert Gellately’s conclusions, though discussing Nazi 
Germany, are applicable to the DDR.  He suggests that the key element of Gestapo control was 
the “active participation of ‘ordinary’ citizens.”49  This active and opportunistic participation was 
also a necessary element of Stasi control in the DDR.  To further quote Gellately and apply one 
of his key conclusions to the DDR, “the important ingredient in the terror system – denunciation 
– was usually determined by private interests and employed for instrumental reasons never 
intended by the regime.”50  This notion of negative participation is discussed more fully in 
sections 8.4.1 and 9.4.1. 
1.3.5. Modernity and gender categorization  
The SED believed that dictatorial rule was necessary to ensure that modern society 
avoided political anarchy, economic disintegration, and a return of fascism.  During the latter 
half of the twentieth century, it, like other modern states, underwent drastic changes in cultural, 
social, and gender roles.51  In particular, the DDR’s bureaucratic administration, its high level of 
industrialization, its high degree of secularization, its monopolization of the channels of 
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communication and surveillance, its state security system, its single mass party rule – with its 
binding, all-encompassing ideology, and its inclusion of women in education and wage labour – 
made the DDR a modern dictatorship, and thus, in many ways, a modern state.52  On the basis of 
these modernistic features, political ideologues in the DDR tried to realize Marx’s vision of a 
“Dictatorship of the Proletariat” and establish utopia by socially engineering breaks with many 
older German traditions to create new “socialist personalities.”53   
To carry out the SED’s vision of a modern state with modern people, the participation of 
women in wage-labour and politics was encouraged (though never at the upper levels of the 
political hierarchy), industrialization and urbanization were promoted, an inclusive education 
system was established, and opportunities for social mobility were created.  Viewing East 
Germany as modern, according to historian Konrad Jarausch, allows for a more balanced 
consideration of the achievements of SED rule alongside its failures.  However, these 
modernizing elements were often achieved through state intrusion into the lives of citizens and 
the repression of certain societal groups, namely those individuals whom the party perceived as 
capitalistic, fascist, and aristocratic (the Junker).54   
A number of studies address the connection between women, gender, and modernity in 
East Germany.  In Sex after Fascism, Dagmar Herzog urges historians to analyze published 
writings about “sexual practices”55 in relation to memory and morality over the forty years of the 
DDR’s history in order to gain crucial insight into the state’s “alternate modernity.”56  Such an 
examination provides new insights into how the DDR dealt with the Nazi past by constructing 
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modernity based upon the newly established gender role of the emancipated and empowered 
workingwoman.  The image of the emancipated women, especially the representation of working 
mothers, was used by the state to represent the wider success of socialism.  The SED 
purposefully constructed these new roles to garner women’s loyalty.57  
The SED attempted to create a modern state by equating female emancipation and new 
societal roles for women with modernity.  Therefore, as a society, the DDR established symbolic 
systems by which to represent gender, and, by extension, new symbols, metaphors, and concepts 
for women to define their identity.58  Historian Joan Scott states:  
Within these processes and structures, there is room for a concept of human agency as 
the attempt (at least partially rational) to construct an identity, a life, a set of 
relationships, a society with certain limits and with language – conceptual language that 
at once sets boundaries and contains the possibility for negation, resistance, 
reinterpretation, the play of metaphoric invention and imagination.59   
 
Furthermore, as seen in archival correspondence between the SED and the Konsum, the political 
ideology of both organizations was laden with gendered concepts that were translated into 
policy, such as the welfare and protection of women.  For this reason, the SED experienced a 
relatively high level of success in integrating women into education, the workforce, and low to 
mid-level administrative positions.  In fact, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, women may 
have preferred the DDR’s prescription of the female gender categorizations: employed, educated 
and politically active mothers.  This categorization became a primary site of Ostalgie (a German 
term referring to a longing for certain aspects of life in the DDR).  Of course, it should be 
pointed out here that this “emancipation” was, in some ways, an ideological and propagandistic 
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means of compelling women to participate and invest themselves in the system.  This form of 
emancipation had its successes and is now looked back upon with nostalgia.60           
Women in West Germany were expected to return to the traditional gender roles of the 
nurturing mother and caregiver, whereas in the DDR women were required to join the workforce.  
This is the primary focus of Hildegard Maria Nickel and Eva Kolinsky’s study Reinventing 
Gender, where they argue that East German women enjoyed educational and employment 
advantages in comparison to their contemporaries in the West.  As a result, Nickel and Kolinsky 
characterize East German women as more flexible, mobile, and educated.  To use their words, 
they were “trend-setters with a more modern agenda than that familiar in the West.”61  As they 
put it, East German women enjoyed a “modernity bonus.”62  Indeed, if one were to measure 
modernity through gender equality, women in the DDR enjoyed distinct advantages over their 
West German counterparts in that they held more vocational and professional qualifications and 
achieved employment integration.  Collectively, Herzog, Nickel, Kolinsky, and Hildegard have 
argued that the DDR’s policy on women was – in many ways – successful.63  
The inclusion of women in “societal life” was particularly important for the Konsum.  
However, women were generally underrepresented in industry and production.  By the late 
1950s, large numbers of women were given some level of on-the-job training, but few had 
become certified as skilled workers.  While there were improvements to their wages, they lagged 
men behind because of deliberate wage discrimination.64  Nevertheless, in order to increase 
economic productivity and channel women into the industrial workforce, the party dangled 
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consumption carrots, raised unskilled wages, and added childcare.  But in spite of educational 
opportunities, women remained in low-wage positions and were virtually absent from the East 
German priority industries of the 1960s: chemicals, optics, and electronics.65  Even by 1989, 
women in the GDR workforce continued to earn twenty-five to thirty percent less than men.  The 
majority of women provided the state with unskilled labour, and many women worked at jobs 
that were below their qualification.  Women were also underrepresented at the highest wage 
levels and they tended to avoid supervisory functions.66  Still, the GDR was a ‘working society.’  
Indeed, with 91 percent of all women active in the labour force in 1988-89, this was as true for 
women as it was for men.67 
The image of the emancipated women, especially mothers, was used by the state to 
represent the wider success of socialism and its modernity.  Women were not only ideologically 
important for the régime, but their economic importance needs to be stressed, for they formed a 
crucial section of the DDR’s workforce.68  Women were targeted by the state to work full-time 
through propaganda, which described full-time employment as a socially and politically 
necessary.  This propaganda, therefore, implies that women who continued to work only part-
time were a burden on the state. Furthermore, by providing women with social security and 
treatment as equals, Erich Honecker, the leader of East Germany from 1971 to 1989, hoped to 
gain their support.69 
The state’s effort to increase social benefits and the provisions of legal protection for 
women greatly improved their position in the DDR.  These social benefits and the introduction of 
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new legal rights, such as the abortion law in 1972, afforded women more freedom to develop 
greater self-reliance and self-esteem.  Moreover, the state’s effort to treat women independently 
removed societal stigmas for single mothers, and they were the chief beneficiaries of the social 
security policies implemented in the 1970s and 1980s.70  But, it needs to be noted, that the state’s 
aim in providing these social benefits was the full-time employment of women.71  However, 
these state privileges, although designed to help women, actually reinforced traditional gender 
roles by reinforcing the role of women as mothers.  And by trying to comply with this image, 
women were increasingly responsible for the policies of the family, thereby upholding and 
conforming to more traditional expectations.  A year’s maternity leave also made it difficult for 
women to achieve equality in the workplace.  Unsurprisingly, this was a partial reason for male 
dominance in high-powered management positions.72    
When considered alongside West Germany and other Western societies, the DDR 
appeared relatively non-modern, especially with its low degree of mass consumption, low quality 
consumer goods, lack of civil society or public sphere, and the dominance of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology within economic, political and social institutions.73  On the other hand, what made the 
DDR particularly modern was its high level of gender equality, sizeable industrialization, 
extensive focus on technology and science, first-rate educational system, revolutionary social 
engineering, and its deliberate break from many older traditions.  This dissertation, therefore, 
associates female participation in education and employment with modernity.  My 
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conceptualization of modernity aligns with the idea of the individual having a measure of agency 
in the economy and the state.  
Finally, the Konsum had to portray modern consumption in a modern state.  In 1951, for 
instance, the Konsum outlets developed their first self-service checkout installations in order to 
improve the consumption experience.  The policy of self-service became an integral component 
of the SED’s modernisation of consumption.  In fact, the new self-service stores were considered 
proof of the DDR’s modernity.74  In 1959, the cooperatives planned the opening of 250 self-
service stores in an effort to overtake the amount of similar shops in West Berlin.75  In October 
1959, in celebration of the DDR’s tenth anniversary, the SED opened the store Chemie im Heim 
on the prestigious Stalinallee in East Berlin.  Chemie im Heim was one of the DDR’s largest 
stores, and it was intended to be a showcase of the régime.  Moreover, it was to become the 
model of the modern Konsum stores in which customers could touch and select their own 
items.76  Personal consumption will be discussed further in Chapter 8.     
1.4. Methodology 
The purpose of the archival research and interviews conducted for this dissertation is to 
demonstrate that there was conformity and there was resistance, often in the same actions and at 
the same time in ways that were intentionally difficult to disentangle.  Since authority and 
emancipation co-existed, these actions can be interpreted in various ways.  Ultimately, it is not 
the intention of this dissertation to disentangle these things, but rather to show how they were 
systemically entangled in a society where there were few neutral, autonomous, or completely 
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private spaces.  The effect of my interpretation and methodology is, therefore, purposefully 
kaleidoscopic.  Of course, I am trying to weigh every piece of evidence with an awareness of the 
difficulty in knowing the minds of the people who lived in the past from the sources left behind.  
This notwithstanding, my methodology explains to the reader some possible reasons that certain 
actors either avoided or engaged in actions that were somehow participatory and system-
sustaining, while individualistically opposed to the power structures of the East German 
dictatorship. 
1.4.1. Interviews 
Although archival documents and secondary sources paint a vivid picture of the régime’s 
use of the Konsum as a political tool for the purposes of garnering support for the emerging 
socialist political and economic institutions (i.e., indoctrination) from the SBZ/DDR, I can only 
speculate as to how the population reacted to this indoctrination.  For this reason, I have 
conducted interviews with East Germans to illustrate their experiences of interacting with the 
Konsum.  Though extremely useful, the interview as a research source has its own unique 
shortcomings.  Over the years, memories of a certain period of time in one’s life tend to fade or 
become idealized.  In addition, interviewees may have their own motivations for portraying a 
certain image of their lived experience.  As historian Dagmar Herzog suggests, “Each memory 
was always an interpretation, mixing kernels of truth about the past with powerful emotional 
investments that had much to do with an evolving present.”77   This was definitely the case 
during an interview with a Konsum administrator from the Konsumgenossenschaft-Bezirk-Suhl in 
which he was particularly nostalgic for the DDR.  In another interview with a low ranking 
Konsum employee, she only reluctantly spoke of these times and her experiences with working 
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in the Konsum.  Her employment was described as “a means to earn money – nothing more.”78  
Yet, in other official and unofficial conversations, people working within the Konsum indicated 
that there was a special culture or Bewusstsein (consciousness) associated with the co-operative 
organization.79  Furthermore, they stressed that the Konsum was somehow different than the 
state-run retail organization (Handelsorganisation).80  
In his recent study on the Stasi titled The Firm, historian Gary Bruce draws his evidence 
primarily from interviews. When describing some of the pitfalls of oral history, he notes “human 
memory is not a still photograph of a bygone era but a never-ending collage of images, 
constantly tweaked by the circumstances of the present.”81  He continues: 
It is deeply rooted in humans to remember personal aspects of their life rather than 
broader historical developments.  Naturally, East Germans today remember their 
vacations on the Baltic, their first love, hikes in Thuringia, the view from the TV Tower 
in East Berlin, meeting under the World Clock at Alexanderplatz, rather than the order to 
shoot at the Berlin Wall.  There is a self-defence mechanism at play against what appears 
to East Germans to be a suggestion that because the country in which they lived was the 
country of the Stasi and the Wall, their triumphs, achievements, personal relationships, 
even their lives were all for naught...  Because East Germans recall living a “normal life” 
does not mean that the régime must therefore have been benign, ordinary, and normal, 
but rather suggests that the passage of time alters our memories of what once was, 
especially in Germany where many unfulfilled post-unification aspirations have certainly 
affected views of the DDR.82   
 
In a similar vein, Roland Jahn, the current director of the Stasi Archive, stated in a 2011 
interview with Der Spiegel (a popular German weekly): 
                                                
78 Author's interview with anonymous (former Konsum Saleswoman), Essingen, Germany, 2011. 
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Konsum; however, the HO did not survive the Wende. 
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The sun also shines in a dictatorship.  Everyone has his or her personal memories.  Many 
think that because they experienced the DDR in this way, that’s how it actually was.  
But, this is not correct.  There were actually both: prison in Hohenschönhausen and 
nudism on the Baltic Sea.  I understand the different vantage points.  Even within my 
own family there were differing perspectives of the DDR.  My mother always thought 
that when someone was arrested there was a reason for it – that is, until her son was 
arbitrarily arrested.83   
 
After conducting a number of interviews, I recognize that the range of opinion and tone is as 
complex and diverse as those experienced by Ronald Jahn and those described by historian Gary 
Bruce.   
I will refer to interviews conducted with Ulrich Fitzkow (a former civil engineer in the 
DDR); Dr. Burchard Bösche (an executive within the Hamburg based Zentralverband deutscher 
Konsumgenossenschaften); Martin Bergner (a former Konsum employee and economist in the 
DDR and the current spokesperson for the Berlin based Zentralkonsum – the successor of the 
VDK); as well as a former Konsum saleswomen and a former DDR school teacher who have 
both chosen to remain anonymous.  The information gleaned from these interviews underscores 
the tensions that existed from experiencing both the positive and negative aspects of life in the 
DDR.  Mention should be made that East Germans tend to tell stories between the lines and 
through intonation, pauses, and tone.  This is essentially an unofficial commentary in which 
meaning has to be drawn from not necessarily what is said, but rather what is not being said.  For 
this reason, it can be difficult for a foreigner to capture a complete understanding of the nuances 
employed by the interviewee.  Caution is, therefore, the foundation for my critical evaluation of 
interviews and archival evidence.   
Three of the interviews were conducted face-to-face in Stendal, Hamburg, and Berlin.  I 
recorded and transcribed each of these interviews.  The interviewee then had the chance to either 
make additions, revisions, or withdraw from participation in this project.  Due to distance and 
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time constraints, the interviews with Herr Bergner and the anonymous Konsum worker were 
conducted through mail correspondence (interview questions can be seen in Appendix 11.3).  
The process for selecting interviews was admittedly unscientific; rather, figuratively speaking, a 
“snowball effect” was used that started with Herr Fitzkow.  He then recommended that I contact 
the anonymous schoolteacher and the process continued from there.  These interviews were 
carried out in accordance with the guidelines and approval of the Research Ethics Office at the 
University of Saskatchewan.  All of the interviewees were given a choice to use their actual 
names, a pseudonym, or to remain anonymous.  They all gave their written permission to 
participate in this project.  Thanks to their participation, the interviewees have added a human 
element to this work.  And, since they were caught up in the dramas of these events, I have tried 
to quote them as much as possible to draw attention to the complexities of the choices they had 
to make in their daily lives, and the often difficult and opaque nature of the situations with which 
they were confronted.  In so doing, I hope that I have avoided the arrogance of moral 
judgements, especially since I am an outsider and non-German who never experienced having to 
live under the SED dictatorship.             
1.4.2. Archival research 
  I was drawn to study the Konsum because of its ubiquity, voluntary mass-membership, 
predominantly female workforce, propaganda role, and the masses of “paper” this organization 
left behind in various archives throughout the former East Germany.  Specifically, this 
dissertation rests almost exclusively on research and evidence gathered from various state, city, 
and regional archives throughout the former East German state.  From the archive of the Stiftung 
Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganizationen der DDR (SAPMO-DDR) I have utilized the 
files of the Abteilung Handel und Versorgung, Büro Werner Jarowinsky 1963-1989, Sekretariat 
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Paul Merker, and the Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik.  The Archiv Konsumverband in Berlin 
(AKB) holds the co-operative newspaper Der Konsumgenossenschafter and Eingaben der 
Bevölkerung (formal complaints made in written or verbal form directed at any party official or 
governing body, including the Konsum).  The Sächsisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (SWA) is a regional 
archive in Leipzig.  It houses the files of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig from 1884 to 1990 
and the files of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Zwickau from 1873 to 1990.  In Berlin, the East 
German secret police archive, Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitdienstes 
(BStU or Stasi Archive), contains files regarding the infiltration of the Stasi into the Konsum 
workforce and Stasi observations of consumption and consumers within Konsum stores in order 
to gauge the mood of the population.  The Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Leipzig (SSL), Sächsisches 
Staatsarchiv Chemnitz (SSC), Thüringisches Staatsarchiv Meiningen (TSM), and Landesarchiv 
Berlin (LAB) have been utilized to analyze urban, rural and regional circumstances.  More 
importantly, the aim of using archives throughout the former East German state has been to 
demonstrate the wide reach of the Konsum to nearly every community within the state.  For more 
information on the archives and their collections, see section 12.1 in the bibliography.      
1.4.3. Interpretation of archival materials  
East German archival documents are comprised of what can either be described as East 
German language or DDR Deutsch.  They include mundane reports about the supply situations in 
individual retail outlets; correspondence between the various administrative branches; photos of 
the work place and shop window displays; Eingaben or protest letters; and various Konsum 
publications.  These documents not only reflect the Konsum’s various political and economic 
roles, but also demonstrate the ways in which the SED was making concerted efforts to control 
this organization.  While archival sources describe the larger political and economic processes of 
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the Cold War, the historian has to wade through a great deal of politicized treacle or jargon to 
find the valuable discourse.  More specifically, the esoteric language in these documents was 
couched in what George Orwell might have described as “Newspeak” or “a medium of 
expressions for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of [East German 
socialism].”84  In short, these documents demonstrate that the population developed and learned 
patterns of accepted behaviour for the specific purpose of either avoiding confrontation with the 
authorities, or manipulating governmental and party institutions to their advantage.  The 
population would generally assess the political implication of a given situation and then employ 
the appropriate behaviours as well as respond in ideologically couched vernacular.  As archival 
sources indicate, communication between the SED and the Konsum included specific language 
that was unique to the ideological discourse of the DDR.  With the continuous presence of 
propaganda, slogans, and acceptable terms, the language of socialism became at least partially 
internalized.  This internalisation of ideology was a requisite for maintaining membership and 
attaining promotion within the Konsum and, more broadly, for functioning in the ideologically 
charged daily interactions in the SBZ/DDR.  Historian Stephen Kotkin has described this process 
as “learning to speak socialism.”85   
The communications between the party and the Konsum may (merely) be construed as 
evidence of functionaries paying lip-service to the party in order to advance their own position, 
and thus these documents may not necessarily reflect the dominance of the party; instead, they 
may be what the political scientist James C. Scott defines as the “public transcript” (i.e., the open 
and public interaction between subordinates and the ruling elite).  If the armed wing of the state 
is particularly threatening (as was the case in the DDR), then the subordinate will seek to 
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incorporate the rituals of the ruling caste; or as Scott states “the more menacing the power, the 
thicker the mask.”86  In these public situations (parades, party rallies, internal party 
communication, etc.), there may be convincing evidence for the hegemony of the dominant 
discourse, and the subordinate group is actually an enthusiastic partner in its subordination.87  
More likely, however, these Konsum functionaries learned the “rules of the game” by 
internalizing the language of the SED discourse, all the while maintaining hegemonic 
appearances through performances of the “public transcript” that were often for the purpose of 
self-preservation and self-advancement, while avoiding the SBZ/DDR’s Orwellian security 
services.  Scott puts it this way:  
The slaves who artfully reinforced their master’s stereotyped view of them as shiftless 
and unproductive may well have thereby lowered the work norms expected of them.  By 
their artful praise at celebrations and holidays, they may have won better food rations 
and clothing allowances.  The performance is often collective, as subordinates collude to 
create a piece of theatre that serves their superior’s view of the situation but that is 
maintained in their own interests.88   
 
By applying Scott’s methodology to the reading of archival sources, one can draw the general 
conclusion that the functionaries of the Konsum were simply acknowledging the party’s truth 
(Partei-Wahrheit or simply what they assumed state officials wanted to hear) as an evasive tactic 
without necessarily being invested in the performance.   
The works of Foucault have heavily influenced my analysis of archival sources.  His 
famous dictum “where there is power, there is resistance… These points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network” is applicable to a study of the DDR for signifying and 
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expressing that totalitarianism was often resisted and negotiated.89  For this reason, I try to 
consider archival sources with something of a Foucauldian and perhaps even poststructuralist 
approach to discourse.  Foucault dismisses the possibility of “an attempt at totalitarian 
periodization, whereby from a certain moment and for a certain time, everyone would think in 
the same, in spite of surface differences, say the same thing through a polymorphous vocabulary, 
and produce a sort of great discourse that one could travel over in any direction.”90  Yet, to a 
certain degree, this actually seemed to have occurred in the DDR, since an entirely new set of 
meanings, knowledge, and discourse (much of which was borrowed from the Soviet Union) was 
imposed on a less than receptive German population.  In my view, the state and the citizenry 
were able to reproduce the existing meanings of knowledge and discourse to advance their 
position in relation to the other, while not necessarily being invested in the performance.  To 
make sense of this, I base my archival analysis on the following questions Foucault raises in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge: 
Who is speaking?  Who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right 
to use this sort of language?  Who is qualified to do so?  Who derives from it his own 
special quality, his prestige, and from whom, in return, does he receive if not the 
assurance, at least the presumption that what he says is true?  What is the status of the 
individuals who – alone – have the right, sanctioned by law or tradition, juridically 
defined or spontaneously accepted, to proffer such discourse?91   
 
By asking these questions, it becomes apparent that in the DDR there was a corpus of statements 
that were in continual circulation within its hermetically sealed borders.  Both the “top” and 
“bottom” of DDR society understood the rules as to when particular statements could and should 
be uttered.92  From the bottom, communication and discourse with the régime had to be 
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generated individually and in isolation from others, since a collective approach would have been 
interpreted by the régime as a challenge to its authority.  Moreover, the sites from which the state 
produced its discourse and verbal performances were ubiquitous.  In the context of this 
dissertation, they included advertising, consumption, employment, the police, schools, and the 
physical spaces of the Konsum stores and restaurants.93  Hence, as an institution involved in 
these said sites, the Konsum was helping the state produce new forms of knowledge and 
discourse and became an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA).   
 Louis Althusser, a French Marxist philosopher, formulated the notion of ISAs as 
institutions that produce and reproduce meanings of the dominant ideology.  To directly quote 
him, “ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man 
or a social group.”94  Ideology, in other words, is not only the ideas that legitimize the rule of the 
dominant class, but also the systems by which the ruling class promulgates these ideas to justify 
its rule.  According to him, the most apparent ISAs were religion, the family, the unions, the 
media, sport, literature, and, most importantly, education.  These institutions aim to secure 
consent for a given social order or mode of production on both a conscious and unconscious 
level.  On the basis of this definition, and since the Konsum functioned on the level of the 
educational, economic, political, communicative, and ideological, there is a relatively clear 
parallel between it and an ISA.95   
To give a general definition, ideology entails the dissemination of values, knowledge, 
ideas, norms, and rules (i.e., culture) from the dominant party-class to the subordinate class of 
subjects.  It is for these reasons that the Konsum is a worthwhile subject of historical analysis, 
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especially since the documents it produced reflect the meanings and values that were in 
circulation under SED rule.  And, since co-operatives in this area of Germany were one of the 
organizations that were in existence prior to the DDR and continue to exist to this day, these 
shifts in meanings and values become readily apparent.  To make a further point, as subjects and 
destinations of SED ideology, the Konsum archival documents further demonstrate that East 
Germans were able to produce and reproduce the appropriate and accepted signifiers and 
discourse during their communications with the régime.96   
The subjects, in turn, process and transform the given ideology into a range of 
meaningful behaviour, including incorporating it into the process of forming an identity in line 
with the terms, meanings, and categories of SED ideology (I am worker; I am a member of the 
proletariat, a working mother, and so on).97  As in all social contexts, it can be concluded that the 
subject is the embodiment of the meanings of the given ideology.  However, in the DDR, there 
were avenues of resistance by which behaviours could have been carried out to give the 
appearance of conventional conformity in order to allow the subject to resist in ways that were 
paradoxically and simultaneously conformist and oppositional.   
Archival sources also reveal tensions between attempted totalitarianism and selective 
participation.  On one level, for example, they demonstrate that Stasi involvement in the Konsum 
and wider East German society was a common, albeit negative, form of participation that had 
totalitarian undertones.  On the other hand, Stasi involvement was also used for personal gain 
and was a form of, albeit negative, selective participation.  Take, for instance, the case of a Stasi 
informant codenamed Max.  In 1956, by gaining the trust of the Stasi, Max was able to travel to 
West Berlin, as well as to acquire monetary bonuses.  However, Max used his experiences in 
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West Berlin to organize an escape to the West not only for himself, but also for nine others from 
his hometown.  In other words, he used his connection with the Stasi to achieve personal ends.98  
As in the case of Max and other informants cited in this dissertation, the very systems that the 
state, the Stasi, and the Konsum established, while having characteristics of totalitarianism, could 
be manipulated for advancing one’s interests.  Hence, historian Gary Bruce posits, “The 
informant network had a built-in element of denunciation for personal gain.”99  Ultimately, 
Eingaben or Stasi reports demonstrate that East Germans actively participated in, resisted, and 
manipulated the structures that dominated them.  As in the case of Max, resistance and 
conformity were often part of the same action, although in ways that were intentionally difficult 
to disentangle.     
It is in light of the works of Foucault, Scott, and Althusser that I have interpreted archival 
material.  These works remind one that the Konsum and SED policies were never seamlessly 
implemented.  Indeed, people interpreted, negotiated, and mediated SED policies and discourse 
on a daily basis, and different actors put them into practice to their own advantage, or simply 
resisted and avoided them whenever they did not meet their economic interests.  While a picture 
emerges in which co-operatives were a subservient political and propaganda tool of the party, the 
actual political and propaganda functions of the Konsum in practice are often difficult to 
determine.  Documents and publications produced by the Konsum and the SED were often 
tainted with the personal views and preferences of the writer, which unsurprisingly led to highly 
subjective analyses that could have put individuals in great danger of being characterized as 
politically unreliable.  Indeed, Fulbrook is correct which she states, “archives lie.”  She 
continues, “All historical documents, from whatever historical context, are artefacts of particular 
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motives and situations, written with certain intentions and audiences in mind; they must therefore 
be the subject of appropriate evaluation and interpretation.”100  With this in mind, I have 
conducted my archival research.  In my view, the documents are still extremely useful and 
demonstrate the politicized nature of SED rule and the infusion of ideology into the most 
mundane aspects of everyday life. 
1.5. East German historiography (secondary sources) 
 
In his article loosely translated as Consumer Co-operatives in the Soviet Zone and the 
DDR: Hypotheses of a little explored research field, historian Ulrich Kurzer suggests that 
historians need to continue to examine and somehow measure the societal influence and 
importance of the Konsum.  He further proposes future avenues of research, such as the 
connection between consumer satisfaction with the stability of the régime; the possibilities for 
women in respect to political and economic participation; and the extent to which Konsum 
personnel interacted with the Stasi.101  This dissertation attempts to answer these questions and 
fill in these gaps within East German historiography.   
1.5.1. Consumption  
Mark Landsman’s Dictatorship and Demand explores the ways in which central state 
ministries and planning authorities interpreted and attempted to fulfill the party’s and the general 
population’s call for greater access to higher-quality consumer goods.102  To that end, Landsman 
primarily argues that the SED was unable to reconcile its ideologically driven imperative to 
boost Soviet-style “productivism” through heavy industry (i.e., big construction projects, steel 
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and machine building) with light industry (i.e., consumer goods and services) was disregarded 
and viewed with the scorn of being “non-productive.”  It was only with antithetical pressure from 
below and competition with West Germany that light industry became such a concern for the 
SED.  With that said, the SED could not win in this Cold War contest with West Germany’s 
prosperity, nor could it meet the increasing demand of its citizens.  Similarly, as Judd Stitziel 
demonstrates in his book Fashioning Socialism,103 the DDR failed to create an alternative 
consumer culture based on socialist ideals.  He also traces power relationships that were inherent 
in the exchange and circulation of goods and reinforces the importance of women in the realm of 
consumption in DDR society.  He describes “the category of gender in a broader narrative of 
political, economic, social, and cultural history.”104  As Jonathan Zatlin in The Currency of 
Socialism aptly argues, East Germans judged the performance of the régime through its ability – 
or perhaps more fitting, inability – to provide the populace with consumer goods.105  Combined, 
these three studies draw wider connections between political, economic, and social 
considerations.  They stress that the failure of the East German régime was based on the 
command economy’s failure to satisfy the ever-increasing consumption demands of its citizens.   
Finally, these works demonstrate that consumption represented an exceedingly important 
interaction between ordinary people and the DDR’s command economy.  Therefore, due in part 
to the SED failing to make a viable socialist consumer culture, the citizenry ultimately turned 
against the party in 1989.  Of course, restriction on information and the general dictatorial 
structures also played a role in the collapse of the state, but all of this falls outside the scope of 
this dissertation.  
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1.5.2. Varying interpretations of the Konsum 
 
There are various interpretations of the roles that the Konsum played in the DDR.  For 
many citizens, the Konsum was nothing more than a chain of retail shops.  My interpretation 
departs from this conception, however, because I argue that this organization was highly 
political.   
The picture of the Konsum that Wilhelm Kaltenborn produces in his work, Zwischen 
Resistenz und Einvernahme, was based largely on the literal interpretation of co-operative 
statutes.  Within these statutes, there was clearly a mix of SED political and economic rhetoric, 
as well as traditional co-operative ideology, thereby engendering misinterpretation of the exact 
role of the Konsum in DDR society.  In actual practice, as Kaltenborn suggests, these statutes did 
not translate into political obligations for the co-operative members.  Although there were 
political and ideological elements within the organization, there was no political expulsion of any 
members.  For Kaltenborn, this is an especially important point, since he argues that as a mass-
organization the Konsum was not especially effective, and this organization was by no means a 
“transmission-belt” of party ideology.  Furthermore, he also reaches the conclusion that the DDR 
co-operatives were not part of the state repression apparatus, nor were they instruments of state 
paternalism and party indoctrination.106  Moreover, Kaltenborn is under the impression that the 
Konsum was primarily an independent and private enterprise during the DDR.  Here, I disagree 
and attempt to argue that the Konsum was largely under state control.  Of course, Kaltenborn’s 
interpretation may be influenced by and reflective of his current position within the executive of 
the Zentralkonsum (the successor of the DDR consumer co-operative organization).             
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Historian Brett Fairbairn’s interpretation of the Konsum is markedly different from that of 
Kaltenborn.  For Fairbairn, the 1950s was a period in which East German co-operatives were 
subjected to the increasing authority of state controls, as they became more and more centralized.  
This increased centralization meant that influential positions, especially in management, were 
given to SED party members.  Consequently, the co-operative governing apparatus was almost 
completely subordinate to the SED, with its members in control of eighty to ninety percent of the 
senior management positions.  These SED party members within the co-operatives kept files on 
the political activities of their subordinates, and active party support became a primary credential 
for hiring or promotion.  Co-operatives, like other “democratic” mass-organizations, were 
expected to demonstrate loyalty to the SED by acknowledging the primary position of the party 
within the DDR.  In effect, as Fairbairn maintains, co-operatives became “transmission-belts” 
that conveyed the party’s influence to wider circles of the population that otherwise may not 
have been within the direct reach of the SED.107  In his work, he alludes to themes and ideas, 
such as the autonomy of the consumer co-operatives under the SED dictatorship and the role of 
women in the Konsum.  Fairbairn also touches upon the nature of SED rule in respect to gender, 
state-citizen relations, and participation.   
Fairbairn’s work focuses on the period of 1945 to 1955 and compares and contrasts 
postwar co-operative development in both East and West Germany, whereas my work focuses 
solely on the Konsum during the entire lifespan of the SBZ/DDR.  Similarly, this dissertation 
builds and expands upon the ideas Fairbairn outlines with a few key differences.  In my view, the 
Konsum was more inclusive of women in the realms of education and upper-management than 
Fairbairn argues (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 9).  In this respect, I go so far as to use terms such 
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as progressive or even emancipatory to describe the Konsum.  I also paint a picture of the 
Konsum as a broad and participatory mass-organization that successfully reached its targeted 
segments of the population (Zielgruppen): women, youth, and rural inhabitants.  In these 
respects, this dissertation contributes and adds to Fairbairn’s work, while still functioning as a 
piece of independent scholarship.  
This dissertation is also influenced by the work of historian Katherine Pence.  Similar to 
Fairbairn, she focuses almost exclusively on the postwar period (at least in her publications to 
date) and compares and contrasts capitalist versus socialist consumption in West and East 
Germany in order to tease out wider conclusions about the constructions of gender roles in the 
newly emerging German states.  Pence only nominally explores the Konsum; instead, she 
examines the HO in considerable detail.  With that said, Pence makes a few key points about 
East German consumer culture that I continually refer to and substantiate in my examination of 
the Konsum.  First, she argues, “the trumpeting of DDR success set a standard of achievement 
that put the régime in a difficult position since the juxtaposition of abundant displays and bold 
promises with concomitant economic failings made the discrepancy between promise and reality 
increasingly glaring, especially with the West next door.”108  I build upon and substantiate this 
argument in Chapters 7 and 8.  Second, I draw on the idea that the state attempted to establish a 
satisfactory consumer culture as a way to of legitimize its rule.  As Pence suggests, “the SED 
recognized that alleviating consumer crises and building a viable consumer culture would be one 
                                                
108 Katherine Pence, "The Myth of a Suspended Present: Prosperity’s Painful Shadow in 1950s East 
Germany," in Pain and Prosperity: Reconsidering Twentieth-Century German History, ed. Paul Betts and Greg 
Eghigian (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 157. 
45 
 
 
 
key to gaining and maintaining power.”109  Again, this connection between consumerism and 
state-legitimacy is a theme throughout this dissertation.   
Besides Fairbairn, Pence, and Kaltenborn, other recent scholarship demonstrates the 
growing vibrancy of the field of socialist consumer culture.  Andreas Ludwig at the 
Dokumentationszentrum Alltagskultur der DDR in Eisenhüttenstadt and Ina Merkel at the 
Philipps-Universität in Marburg have published many works pertaining to East German 
consumption that directly and indirectly deal with consumer co-operatives.110  Yet, Thomas 
Adam and Stefan Jaunich argue that “in spite of their size and scale, an overview of the East 
German co-operative movement is not readily available, and the development of the co-operative 
system in the DDR remains largely terra incognita.”111  Jan Bösche echoes this contention by 
suggesting “there are many potential research possibilities through an examination of the role of 
the consumer co-operatives in the former DDR.  On the one hand, they were tightly bound to the 
system; on the other hand, there were diverse forms of open and veiled resistance within these 
consumer co-operatives.”112  Additionally, Witho Holland’s recent publication about East 
German consumer co-operatives entitled Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: Rechtliche 
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und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung is a useful study.113  He effectively examines the legal and 
structural relationship between the state and the Konsum.  My contribution to the field is to take 
his work one step further by discussing the relationship between the state, the Konsum, and the 
people and analyze how and why people participated in the Konsum.   
The consumer co-operatives – founded at the onset of the Soviet occupation – constituted 
a significant part of the economic, social, cultural, political, and gendered history of the DDR.  It 
is my intent that this dissertation will make an original contribution to these areas of East 
German historiography.  While the literature mentioned in this section is helpful and connects to 
important historical debates about the nature of East German society, and the degree of 
“totalitarian” control, it is surprising – given the Konsum’s size and political importance – that 
relatively little academic study of the consumer co-operatives has yet been done in English and 
German.114  To speculate, there may be a few reasons for this.  First, historians, as well as the 
general East German public, have tended to perceive the Konsum as simply a retail and 
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distribution chain.115  Second, an historian interviewed for this project indicated that historians 
have to use language that supports and subscribes to the current German narrative to secure state 
funding for research, namely that the East German state was a brutal and oppressive dictatorship 
that needed to be colonized by the West.  Moreover, in 1994, the recently enlarged Federal 
Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland, BRD) passed a resolution officially 
recognizing the totalitarian characteristics of SED rule.  In other words, historical works on the 
DDR serve as binaries to the narrative of the Western democratic functions of the BRD.116   
Before moving onto Part I, it is worth a little last-minute reflection to re-state and clarify 
my thesis, conceptualization, and objectives more succinctly.  Above all, this study attempts to 
provide new understandings of the ways in which the party’s actions affected its citizens, and the 
ways in which citizens responded to, averted, and manipulated the SED’s attempted total 
politicization of their daily lives.  The concept of attempted totalitarianism is appropriate, for the 
SED undertook the unrealizable goal of attaining the complete ideological subordination of the 
population.  The SED attempted to achieve this subordination through the total control of all 
aspects of individual life and social processes.  However, selective participation undermined the 
state’s attempts at totalitarian control as people came to terms with the constrained parameters of 
life in the DDR, and they came to understand that the proper forms of participation would enable 
them to further their own interests and aspirations, while avoiding the more repressive aspects of 
the régime.  Specifically, I will explore the range of potential participation the Konsum gave to 
its employees and consumers.  This dissertation further rests on the argument that the SED 
hijacked (i.e., “democratically centralized”) and used the Konsum as a tool to bring the 
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consuming public into a space of surveillance and observation while eliminating the black 
market and private retail.  To this end, the study has drawn attention to the Stasi’s incursion into 
the mundane aspects of everyday life in the realms of education, work, and consumption. This 
dissertation will, moreover, examine the various political, economic, propagandistic, 
communicative, and educational roles of the Konsum, while alluding to the nature of power 
relations, Soviet-style socialism, and the tensions between totalitarian elements of the socialist 
construction in East Germany.  By employing this unique approach and as the first full-length 
study on the Konsum, it is my hope that this piece of work will be an original and valuable 
contribution to the historiography of the SBZ (1945 to 1949) and the DDR (1949 to 1990).   
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PART I: CONTEXT AND STRUCTURE  
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2. The historical foundations of the Konsum, 1945 to 1990  
 
 
The cooperatives in the SBZ/GDR became a mass-organization in which people were subjected 
to a communication and educational process that was to teach the socialist way of working and 
living. 
- Historian Gerhard Rönnebeck117 
 
The purpose of co-operatives in a social market economy is to further the interests of their 
members; the purpose of socialist co-operatives is to fulfill state objectives; the self-
administration typical for co-operatives is replaced by state-decreed targets...  They [East 
German Consumer Co-operatives] were fully integrated in the central command economy; 
the wholesale and intermediate sale prices were state-fixed. 
 
- Historians Gunther Aschhoff and Eckart Henningsen118 
 
 
 
Map 2: The division of Germany and Berlin at the end of World War II in 1945 (the Soviet Occupation Zone 
and the borders of the future East Germans state are in red)119  
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When the Soviets re-established consumer co-operatives in eastern Germany for food 
distribution and reconstruction, they were reaching back to pre-war structures and traditions to 
address present-day problems.  Consumer co-operatives had a significant history prior to the 
Second World War that made them highly relevant to both the economic and political challenges 
of the postwar era.  Co-operatives are "autonomous associations of persons united voluntarily to 
meet their economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and 
democratically controlled enterprise."120  In Germany such small-scale self-help enterprises 
began to emerge around the middle of the 19th century under the overall leadership of Hermann 
Schulze-Delitzsch (mainly for more urban, artisanal, and liberal co-operatives) and Friedrich 
Wilhelm Raiffeisen (for more rural, agrarian, and conservative ones).  While consumer co-
operatives existed in those early decades, they really took off beginning in the 1880s-1890s when 
they began to develop a following among urban Social Democratic workers.  Large stores in 
Dresden, Leipzig, and Berlin (in the east) and Hamburg (in the west) led the way.  These 
working-class associations thrived in the 1920s in loose affiliation with the Social Democrats 
and trade unions, but sometimes also were led by activists from Germany's then-new Communist 
Party.  The National Socialists took over the co-operatives and eventually amalgamated them 
into the Nazi labour organization called the German Labour Front. However, twelve years of 
Nazi rule did not wipe out generations of working-class traditions, so the co-operatives were re-
established in both eastern and western Germany under Allied rule after the war.  The re-
establishment in the Soviet zone was especially swift and decisive; indeed, the rebuilding of the 
Konsum network and central organization preceded the creation of the East German state in 
1949.  From the beginning in 1945, the co-operatives were places where Germans – socialists, 
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communists, and others – could work with the Soviet occupiers to ensure local needs were 
met.  The occupying authorities (and after them the DDR and its ruling party, the SED) in turn 
took an interest in the political affiliations and loyalty of the co-operative activists and leaders. 
This chapter includes a general history of East Germany from 1945 to 1990 in order to 
provide a historical point of reference for the reader.  And since this chapter moves from one 
historical development to the next, constant explanation will be given to the reader as to why a 
particular event is important and relevant to understanding the Konsum.  There are also continual 
references made to other chapters that give more explicit explanation of the topic at hand.  All of 
this is done to maintain a logical thread that connects the reader to changes in political 
developments and climate and their impact on the Konsum.  The aim of this chapter, therefore, is 
not to provide the reader with an historical survey of the DDR; rather, it is to highlight and 
introduce the key events that are relevant for an understanding of the Konsum.121   
2.1. Chronology of the DDR and its impact on the Konsum 
 
The aim of this section is to highlight key domestic and international events that 
influenced the Konsum and its members.  It will introduce the reader to historical periods that 
will be referred to in later chapters.  Since there was a gradual evolution in the development of 
society in the DDR, this section highlights historical shifts in East Germany.  As is evidenced in 
later chapters, it is apparent that the Konsum and its members were directly influenced by the 
SED’s ideological shifts and the wider political fortunes of the state.     
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2.1.1. The SMAD – May 1945 to October 1949 
 
The Soviets created an administration system on 6 June 1945 called the Soviet Military 
Administration in Germany (Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland, SMAD) to 
establish their political and economic objectives in their territory of occupied Germany.  The 
SMAD was the instrument through which the Soviets administered and controlled every facet of 
political, social, and economic life in the SBZ.122  In these initial postwar years, the SMAD 
formalized and instituted a number of economic reforms that were nothing short of 
revolutionary.  The Soviets and the German Communists believed that they were acting on 
behalf of the working-class by subordinating economic policy to the political objective of 
destroying the foundations of “bourgeois power.”123  For this reason, the SMAD permitted and 
supported the re-establishment of the “working class” co-operatives rather than “bourgeois 
private trade.”    
By controlling trade in the postwar years, the Soviets and the German communists were 
able to use consumption, and, by association, the Konsum as a form of social control.  Since 
these authorities controlled services and supplies, they were in an advantageous position to 
exercise leverage over what was then an exceedingly destitute and desperate population.  
Scarcity, in other words, was a key to the SMAD’s strength and a formidable means to subjugate 
the population.  In later years, scarcity, although remaining a key to social control as people 
conformed in order to get access to “luxury” items, hindered the SED’s attempts to inspire 
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popular support.124  But rather than legitimize its rule through consumption, the SED preferred 
and attempted to base its rule on antifascism. 
2.1.2. Antifascism 
 
Foucault argues that every society has its “major narratives” based on a multitude of 
religious, political, and scientific discourses; in the case of the DDR, the fundamental state 
narrative was antifascism.125  At its most basic, antifascism means opposition to fascism.  The 
term antifascism originated in Italy in the early 1920s as a response to Mussolini’s dictatorship, 
and shortly thereafter it became common currency and discourse within the Communist 
International.126  From its very beginnings, the DDR claimed to be an antifascist state, comprised 
of resistors, victims, and survivors of the Nazi régime who were opposed to neo-Nazism, racism, 
and xenophobia.  The DDR state-narrative was predicated on the notion that the communists 
were the most important group of victims of the Nazis, while simultaneously being the most 
important force of resistance.  The SED legitimized its claims to power on the basis of this state-
sponsored narrative, thereby making it a critical component of its discourse on class struggle.  
Accordingly, proof of antifascist activity was an important biographical credential for reaching 
the upper echelons of power in the SED-state.  Of course, antifascism was not only a state 
narrative, but it was also a rallying cry for a struggle against the numerous enemies of socialism.  
This element of DDR propaganda was particularly prominent in the late 1940s and into the 
1970s.  During this period, West Germany was described as “fascist” and the 17 June Uprising in 
1953 was caused by “fascist provocation.”   The Wall was explained as a necessary measure to 
protect the DDR state from fascists and officially hailed as the “antifascist-protection-wall.”  By 
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the 1970s, as relations between the two German states improved, the rhetoric of antifascism 
became less pronounced.  In later decades, the pantheon of antifascist resistors was expanded to 
include social democrats, Christians, officers who attempted to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 
1944, and victims of the Holocaust; this was clearly a manoeuvre to spread the legitimacy-base 
of the DDR to wider segments of the population.127  The Konsum, as a political mass-
organization, was expected to propagate and legitimize the SED system of rule by virtue of the 
antifascist myth along with its symbols and systems of belief to its students, employees, and 
members.  Of course, antifascism was not just a state narrative but also a storyline accepted by 
large parts of the German population.     
2.1.3. The SED and the founding of the bloc parties  
 
In June 1945, one month after the end of the War, Marshal Zhukov issued Order Number 
Two, which allowed for the establishment of antifascist political parties in the SBZ.  Thereafter, 
political life in the SBZ quickly began to re-emerge.  Not surprisingly, the first party to appear 
on the political scene was the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) on 11 June 1945.  In its 
manifesto, the KPD advocated an antifascist democratic republic, rather than a Soviet style 
political system. Initially, the KPD, in an effort to win popular support, toned down its Soviet 
rhetoric and presented itself as a broadly based workers’ party; this, however, did not last, and 
already by 1946, the party began to transform itself into a Soviet style party.  Four days after the 
KPD, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) was founded, promoting both democracy and socialism 
under the leadership of Otto Grotewohl.  Another party established at this time was the Christian 
Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) on 26 June.  On 5 July 1945, the founding of the CDU 
was closely followed by the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany 
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(LDPD).128   The CDU and the LDPD advocated private property and a market economy.  In 
many ways, these parties were the antithesis of communism.129  There will be recurrent 
references to these parties in later sections. 
In July 1945, the four parties (KPD, SPD, CDU, and LDPD) agreed to form a bloc of 
antifascist democratic parties under Soviet control.  The goals of the bloc were to further de-
Nazify Germany, establish a functional economy as quickly as possible, create a democratic 
Rechtsstaat (state founded on the rule of law), and, most importantly, implement measures 
decreed by the occupying power.130  The Bloc System was an instrument of control for SMAD 
and the KPD, which enabled these organizations to transform the political and social systems in 
the zone along Soviet guidelines.131  However, the subsequent election in Austria and the SBZ 
proved that the non-Socialist parties and the SPD were becoming troublesome rivals to the KPD.      
On 4 November 1945, the election in Austria was a massive defeat for the Communists. 
The Social Democrats won 76 out of 165 seats in the Austrian national assembly versus four 
seats for the Communists.  This election in Austria implied to the Communists in the SBZ that 
they could not win an open and free election against the SPD; thus, a fusion between the two 
parties was forced and a new party was formed: the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED).132  On 21 April 1946, in the Admiralpalast Theatre in Berlin, 
former KPD leader Wilhelm Pieck and former SPD leader Otto Grotewohl crossed the stage, met 
in the middle, and shook hands to seal the fusion of the two parties.  This famous handshake, 
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shown in the image below, remained the symbol of the SED for roughly the next forty-three 
years.133   
 
Illustration 2: The famous handshake between Wilhelm Pieck (left) and Otto Grotewohl (right) under the 
portrait of Engels and Bebel at the Unity Party Congress, where the KPD and SPD were joined as the SED, 
21-22 April 1946134 
 
 
Illustration 3: The Konsum did its part to promote this symbolic Handshake at a department store in Erfurt 
in 1953 (on the left is Lenin, on the right is unidentified)135 
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After 1948, the SED was transformed into a “Party of a New Type.”  This meant that the 
SED was evolving into a Marxist Party committed to a highly centralized organization based 
upon Leninist and Stalinist ideology.  In other words, the SED was to be refashioned after the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).136  This reorganization involved increased party 
discipline and the elimination of any opinions that did not adhere to the new official party line.137  
Thereafter, social democracy was vilified and the former co-operation between social democrats 
and communists, on which the SED was founded, was abandoned.138  With the support of 
SMAD, the communists within the SED were able to “democratically centralize” power under 
their control and eventually consolidate their influence throughout the emerging bureaucracy, 
including the security and judicial systems.139  In this respect, the Konsum mirrored the SED’s 
wider political shifts in policy and increasingly hard-line stance against its perceived political 
threats.  For instance, social democratic influence within the Konsum was also targeted, and the 
SED’s control of the Konsum was further strengthened at that time.     
Similar to Lenin’s CPSU, the SED was governed through a system of democratic 
centralism.  This meant that lower levels in the party hierarchy were bound to implement the 
resolutions taken from above.  More specifically, power was highly centralized in the hands of 
the Politburo and the party leader (General Secretary or First Secretary).  Below the Politburo 
was the Central Committee, which functioned more as an advisory committee than a decision 
making body; it was elected during the party congresses held approximately every five years.  
While membership in these organizations was partially based on expertise in specific sectors 
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such as the economy and military, one’s commitment to the party was almost always the decisive 
factor in such appointments.140  In the next chapter, it will be evident that the Konsum eventually 
began to reflect this highly centralized style of governance, as power became concentrated in the 
VDK (something similar to the Politburo in this context) and the Konsum president.  
2.1.4. The planned economy 
Distribution in East Germany was not only economic, but it was also political because the 
SED directed and controlled all aspects of economic life.  Konsum and SED functionaries were, 
therefore, responsible for the most trivial aspects of consumption, ranging from distribution 
practices to the design of the state-produced chocolate Christmas Santa Claus.  This was the 
primary problem of the centrally planned economy, as production and distribution decisions 
were by a small group of elites within the Konsum and the party.  According to communist 
economic theory, the relationship between consumption and production had to be determined by 
the economic plan, rather than the market.  In communist societies, consumption was to enable 
existence and satisfy basic need.  However, the SED leadership quickly realized that this 
ideology was not compatible with the reality of having a successful market-driven West German 
state as a neighbour.  Ultimately, consumption and distribution in East Germany became the 
gauge for the legitimacy of the socialist system.141   
When the SMAD introduced the Soviet model of the planned economy to the SBZ/DDR, 
the Soviets and German Communists prioritized economic investment in heavy industry, while 
ignoring demand for consumer products.142  In the words of historian Peter Caldwell, “the plan 
had three purposes: it was a technical means of organizing an entire industrial economy, a 
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political ideal of the total governance of society, and a road map toward a qualitatively different 
world.”143  Caldwell continues, “the plan was intended to move the object, society, from its 
present state to a future one.  The subject of the plan was the party as the avant-garde of society; 
the object of the plan was the totality of social and economic relations; the goal of the plan was a 
transition from capitalism and fascism to socialism and democracy (as defined by the party).”144  
Yet, historian Niall Ferguson concludes:  
The problem for the Soviet Union was simple: the United States offered a far more 
attractive version of civilian life than the Soviets could.  And this was not just because of 
an inherent advantage in terms of resource endowment.  It was because centralized 
economic planning, though indispensable to success in the development of nuclear arms, 
was wholly unsuited to the satisfaction of consumer wants.  The planner is best able to 
devise and deliver the ultimate weapon to a single client, the state.  But the planner can 
never hope to meet the desires of millions of individual consumers, whose tastes are in 
any case in a state of constant flux.145   
 
As will be discussed in later chapters, the SED invested ever more resources in meeting the 
consumption demands of its citizens.   However, the SED’s style of command economy was ill 
suited to meet the constantly changing demands of so many people.  Hence, the command 
economy was never able to deliver the promises of opulence signified in Konsum propaganda, 
which had a strong eroding effect on the DDR’s popular support. 
2.1.5. The National Front and the mass-organizations  
 
The East German Parliament (Volkskammer or People's Chamber) was the single 
legislative chamber of the DDR. Its members (from its founding in 1949 until the first free 
elections on 18 March 1990) were elected on a slate called the National Front.  While this system 
had the semblance of democracy, all the opposition parties answered to and were controlled by 
the SED.  From 1981 to 1987, the SED was allocated 127 seats, whereas the Christian 
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Democratic Union, the Liberal Democratic Party, the National Democratic Party, and the 
Democratic Farmers’ Party were allocated 52 seats each for a combined total of 208 seats.  In 
addition, seats were allocated to various mass-organizations.   Among them were the Free 
German Trade Union with 68 seats, the Free German Youth with 40 seats, the Democratic 
Women’s League with 35 seats, and the Cultural Association with 22 seats.  The co-operatives 
were not allocated seats in the East German parliament, but two Konsum presidents were 
members (the role of Konsum presidents will be discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter).   
On 10 June 1945, the SMAD issued its Second Decree or Order Number Two, permitting 
the establishment of mass-organizations in the SBZ.146  According to Lenin, mass-organizations 
were intended to act as “transmission-belts” through which the SED could survey, indoctrinate, 
influence, organize, infiltrate, and control the population.  Officially, the Konsum was the second 
largest such organization in East Germany, with 4.1 million members in 1971 and 4.6 million in 
1987.  The Confederation of Free German Trade Union (FDGB) had a membership of 7.2 
million in 1971, which increased to 9.5 million in 1987.  The Women’s Democratic League 
(DFD) had a membership of 1.5 million in 1987.147     
These mass-organizations had to convey SED ideas, policies, and intentions to target 
sectors of society; for the Konsum, this included workers, youth, farmers, women, and families.  
To quote historian Corry Ross, “the mass-organization at the local level functioned like 
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intermediary pulleys connecting the central party authorities (the engine) and the masses (the 
wheels).”148  Historian Mary Fulbrook further explains this targeting:  
Beyond the age of about six, the coverage of the East German population by one or 
another mass-organization was more or less total.  One would have to be an 
exceedingly rare individual never to have belonged to a single one of these 
organizations (arguably only an unusually religiously committed, unemployed person 
of extraordinary willpower, lack of leisure interests or ambitions, and remarkable 
capacity for survival as a loner in this most collectivized society).  The importance of 
the system of mass-organizations in the shaping and experience of East Germans’ lives 
cannot be overestimated.149  
 
Although mass-organizations were supposed to ideologically influence the population, they were 
not able to completely dominate the lives of their members.  Instead, the population used mass-
organizations as a means to provide non-political entertainment, such as holidays, pursuing 
hobbies, and other interests.150  Accordingly, the SED devoted a great deal of its meagre 
resources for the purposes of strengthening the mass-organizations, the purpose of which was to 
drench and saturate social life and leisure time with party ideology.151  As shown in Chapter 4, 
the Konsum invested a significant amount of resources into such activities in which participants, 
as interviews indicate, enjoyed their participation.     
2.1.6. The Stasi  
 
One of the Soviets’ top priorities following the defeat of Hitler was to ensure that local 
police forces were in place, which the SED and the SMAD sought to control from the onset of 
the Soviet occupation.  By 1948, the Soviets and the SED had, indeed, managed to form an 
impressive police system in their zone, with nearly 81,000 men and women working in the 
security apparatus.  The SED leadership clearly understood the importance of having these forces 
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under their strict control.  During the First Party Congress in 1949, the future leader of the Stasi, 
Erich Mielke, “let his comrades know, in no uncertain terms, that these forces were critical to the 
party’s calculus of building its influence in East German society.”152  While the crime rate 
drastically diminished in the late 1940s, the security agencies continued to expand in the ensuing 
years to target those accused of “political offences.”153   
On 8 February 1950, the SED leadership founded the East German Ministry for State 
Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS or Stasi).  Its creation was presented to East 
Germans as a necessary and defensive measure to manage the worsening Cold War with the 
West.154  The German leaders of the newly created security ministry – Wilhelm Zaisser, Ernst 
Wollweber, and Erich Mielke155 – had previously been agents of Soviet intelligence, with which 
they maintained close contact.156  The MfS initially focused its efforts on groups and individuals 
who opposed the East German régime, particularly members of the “rebellious” youth, as well as 
external enemies such as the American “imperialists.”157   
The Stasi employed informants as a means of resolving conflicts and controlling the 
workforce in the factories.  It also employed official representatives who openly observed and 
monitored state-owned factories.  Stasi officers and informants produced regular reports on the 
functioning of the Konsum factory and the Konsum retail outlet.  Generally, the presence of Stasi 
officers was part of the daily routine of the workplace, and they were treated as colleagues; 
however, they used their status to recruit informants from among the people already working in 
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the factory.158  Stasi involvement in the Konsum is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 9. 
While Stasi officers were usually open about their profession and status within this 
organization, unofficial members or informants (Inoffizielle Mitarbieter, IMs) worked secretly 
and only the Stasi recruiters knew their identities.  The informants had a few primary roles in the 
Konsum: spying on colleagues, reporting on the morale of the workforce, and monitoring the 
general mood of the public in relation to consumption.  From the information gathered by these 
informants, the Stasi made weekly reports written from their vantage points within Konsum 
stores.  Their reports were often tainted with their personal views and preferences, which 
unsurprisingly led to highly subjective reports that put others in great danger of being seen as 
politically unreliable.159   
The Stasi was a formidable surveillance apparatus.  It continued to expand, reaching 
90,000 full-time employees and nearly 200,000 informants by the 1980s.  These employees and 
informants had the singular goal of detecting resistance by being informed about all aspects of 
people’s lives.  The most appalling aspect of this type of security system was the endemic 
distrust that its omnipresence engendered and spread throughout DDR society.  Many began to 
resent the lack of trust between doctors and patients, lawyers and clients, and even wives and 
husbands.160  People also detested Stasi tactics, such as sending compromising photographs and 
letters with false allegations to friends and neighbours.  Worse still, Stasi agents spread rumours 
that the alleged “class enemy” had actually worked for the MfS and had a “loose tongue,” 
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making the person appear untrustworthy.161  Nevertheless, Fulbrook suggests, “many developed 
coping strategies of one sort or another, such that – almost like swatting unwanted insects at a 
summer picnic – the Stasi became for them a predictable and manageable evil in an otherwise 
tolerable or enjoyable life.”162  Whether the Stasi was perceived as a nuisance or something 
worse, Stasi officers and informants certainly made deep inroads into the Konsum and monitored 
its employees and customers for any signs of potential resistance.   
The Stasi was initially used to guard industrial areas and protect the economy.  This basic 
role as the protector of the economy remained intact until 1989.163  Yet, Bruce notes that the 
central focus of Stasi operations varied from district to district (kreisspezifisch).  Specifically, he 
gives the example of district Gransee where protection of military installations was the primary 
concern for the Stasi.  On the other hand, in district Perleberg the Stasi’s central focus was the 
protection of the economy.164  And so, to give a relatively slippery answer, at certain periods and 
in certain locations the Stasi held a dominant position in the economy.  As will be seen at later 
points of this dissertation, the Stasi was willing to spend time and resources to micromanage the 
economy in order to infiltrate into the most humdrum and anodyne aspects of the economy in 
attempt to have it work better for its citizens.  It will also become clear that the Stasi was 
reporting on and reacting to individual demands for improved consumption (see section 8.4.1).  
In this sense, the Stasi was acting as a liaison between state and consumers.  In order to increase 
the population’s commitment to the East German state, the Stasi, acting on behalf of consumers, 
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ordered the Konsum to produce goods that would please its customers.165  However, as the 
guardian of the entire East German economy, the Stasi was overburdened with safeguarding 
literally all facets of political and economical life:  
Such as microelectronics, the ailing energy sector, the chemical industry and foreign 
trade; the protection of key personnel and groups; the uncovering of enemy plans and 
activities in enterprises and institutions at home as well as those of enemy secret services 
in the Operation Area, especially the FRG [West Germany]; ensuring a stable balance of 
payments; comprehensive surveillance of would be émigrés and East German citizens 
who had contacts with Westerners; monitoring the general political operational and 
economic situation; and the prevention of unrest, strikes, fires, and damage to plant and 
equipment.166   
 
The Stasi – the shield and sword of the East German economy – could never adequately 
complete all of these duties and was only able to intervene and put out the fire when a given 
situation became particularly dire.    
2.1.7. Stalinism and land reform  
 
Stalinism can be defined as forced social transformations, namely collectivization, 
industrialization, expropriation of private property, and the establishment of a centrally planned 
economy.  With these policies, to quote historian Norman Naimark, “a new kind of civilization 
was created in [eastern Germany] – a unique meshing of Soviet culture and German leftist 
traditions inherited from a half century of struggle against imperial, Weimar, and Nazi 
domination.  But it was a civilization frayed at the edges and full of contradictions.”167  In fact, in 
the DDR, the process of Stalinization was so brutal that its impact endures to the present day.  In 
this regard, the SBZ/DDR clearly underwent, as Naimark shows, a brutal, repressive, and 
revolutionary Stalinization process that created a new society:  
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The German Democratic Republic – as a state, as a “nation,” and as a society – was 
created primarily out of the interaction of Russians and Germans in the Soviet zone.  Its 
success, its failures, and its ultimate collapse derived from the initial institutions and 
habits of interaction established during the immediate postwar period.  The effects of the 
Soviet occupation still reverberate throughout eastern Germany.  Far from being an 
isolated episode in the flow of German history that can be dispensed with and forgotten 
now that unification has been accomplished, the history of the Soviet occupation is a key 
component in understanding the present and future of German society.168  
 
Similarly, Stalinism and its ideological projects such as land reform and the later collectivization 
of agriculture shaped co-operatives in the DDR.  
The first revolutionary and Stalinist driven policy to impact the SBZ came in the autumn 
of 1945 in the form of land redistribution.  The Soviets and German Communists agreed that the 
countryside had to be reformed in order to gain support for the new régime and to punish what 
the Soviets perceived as the most ardent supporters of the Third Reich (the Junker landlords – 
the dominant power in East Germany for centuries).  The policy of land reform or land 
redistribution was the first major Soviet and communist intervention into the social structures of 
eastern Germany.  The confiscated land was distributed in plots of five to ten acres to “new 
farmers,” namely land-poor peasants, landless farm labourers, and refugees from the eastern 
territories.169  This enormous undertaking redistributed 2,743,306 hectares of land formerly 
belonging to 7,000 Junker.170  Land reform was, therefore, nothing short of revolutionary.  
Throughout the SBZ and particularly in Brandenburg and Mecklenburg, it led to the fundamental 
restructuring of land ownership and social relations, with some 82,810 families having received 
part of the confiscated agricultural land.171   
 Nevertheless, large farmers still held considerable power and control over machinery and 
food supply.  For this reason, in 1948, the SED bombarded them with a number of new restraints 
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including higher taxes.  Also, a new political party, the SED controlled Democratic Peasants 
Party of Germany (Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands, DBD), advocated the platform of 
land reform, the collectivization of agriculture, and the strengthening of bonds between the 
farmer and the worker.  Given this repression, around 5,000 large farmers simply abandoned 
their farms and fled to the West while the inner-German border was still relatively open between 
1950 and 1952.  To deal with this crisis in the countryside, the party introduced its first wave of 
collectivization in July 1952 under the banner of the “building of socialism.”172   
On a practical level, the Konsum supported the SED in these revolutionary 
transformations by using consumption as leverage over the population.  To explain, the Konsum 
provided farmers who were supporting these policies with better provisions, while denying 
supplies to others considered reluctant to acquiesce.   Furthermore, the Konsum had to politically 
propagandize and garner the support of rural inhabitants during these drastic changes in the 
social structure of rural Germany.173 
2.1.8. The 1950s: the June 1953 Uprising and the New Course 
 During the 1950s, the East German régime called upon its citizens to make sacrifices in 
the form of acquiescing to material deprivations and providing communal labour for the 
“building of socialism.”  In contrast to this harsh reality, the SED’s and the Konsum’s 
Propaganda departments popularized images of prosperity under socialism (see images in 
Chapter 7).  However, as historian Katherine Pence suggests, “basing the régime’s early years on 
a promise of things to come gave the DDR a more tenuous hold on legitimacy that would be 
difficult to maintain.”174  Already in the 1950s, consumption became stratified between two 
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classes of shoppers.  Lower priced, subsidized, and rationed goods were often sold in the 
Konsum, whereas the HO stores sold more luxurious and more expensive goods.175  The 
discrepancies between the two stores and two forms of distribution engendered a highly stratified 
consumer culture in what was ideologically supposed to be an egalitarian, class free, and socialist 
society, all the while highlighting that the SED’s promises of equality and prosperity were not 
being delivered.  As will be seen in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, the Konsum was charged with 
combating this negative perception of the state by demonstrating that prosperity had indeed 
arrived.   
At the Second Party Congress in the summer of 1952, the SED declared, “The political 
and economic conditions, as well as the consciousness of the working-class and the majority of 
workers, have sufficiently developed, so that the building of socialism has become the main task 
of the German Democratic Republic.”176  The “building of socialism” affected all sections of 
DDR society and led to further revolutionary changes through the following: collectivization of 
farms and the formation of agricultural co-operatives (Landwirtschaftliche 
Produktionsgenossenschaften, LPGs – 1952 to 1990), a campaign against churches and their 
followers, increased restrictions on independent economic activity, the near abolition of the 
private sector in industrial production, the systematic elimination of private retail, and mass-
investment in large construction projects at the expense of consumer goods production.  To 
remove a potential threat to the SED’s planned construction of socialism, the party eliminated 
provincial governments by replacing them with fourteen regional districts called Bezirke.177  That 
year (1952), co-ops received a new mandate from the SED, which demanded the support of the 
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Konsum propaganda departments during the establishment of these societal transformations.178  
This propaganda was directed at farmers in the countryside.  In fact, in the countryside the SED 
ordered the Konsum to become the primary means of promulgating party propaganda by using its 
retail network.  This propaganda initiative was intended to encourage and pressure farmers to 
join the LPGs.179   
During the first big collectivization push of 1952-53, few East German farmers became 
convinced of the virtues of collective farming, so many resisted joining the LPGs and fled to 
West Germany.  Some of the farmers who remained employed tactics of deliberate dithering in 
an effort to avoid collectivization, causing the SED to postpone its forced reorganization of the 
countryside until later in the decade.180  The growing crisis in agricultural production contributed 
to the June Uprising of 1953.  Shortages and general frustration with the command economy 
nearly led to East Germans toppling the régime in June 1953.  Indeed, the market based economy 
and consumer society emerging in West Germany were a real and constant threat to the DDR 
régime, which was unable to respond to the demands of consumers, even though it devoted an 
ever increasing amount of resources in its attempt to do so.181  Following the June Uprising, 
concessions were made to consumers in the form of the so-called New Course as a tool to 
stabilize the régime.182   
The New Course was a move away from the Stalinist focus on heavy industry.  
Furthermore, the New Course was a measure to direct more of the state’s meagre resources to 
consumer goods and the lowering of prices.  At the Fourth Party Congress in 1954, Walter 
Ulbricht outlined the basic fundamentals of this shift: 
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The essence of the New Course exists in the slowing at this time of the tempo of 
development of certain parts of heavy industry and heavy machine construction, which 
was forced upon us by the division of Germany.  Through this, more means will be freed 
for production of goods for mass consumption.  Extraordinary measures will be met to 
promote more strongly the food and stimulants industry, the textile industry and other 
branches of light industry, housing and construction and above all agriculture, and to 
support the initiative or private crafts and entrepreneurs.  More funds will be made 
available for this.183  
 
The Konsum played a critical role in the New Course.  It showcased socialism through the 
delivery of modern commodities, such as televisions and fashionable clothing, and it 
demonstrated and promoted the achievements of the New Course in shop windows as is evident 
in Illustration 4.  In Chapter 7, there will be a greater discussion of the Konsum as a showcase of 
socialism and the impact of the shop window displays.      
 
Illustration 4: A shop window promoting the first five-year-plan (1950-1955) 
The unstoppable progress of the five-year-plans was a common theme in Konsum  
shop window displays during the New Course.184 
 
 The New Course effectively came to an end in July 1958 at the Fifth Party Congress, 
which heralded a renewed impetus on the building of socialism.  As a result, the state again 
pressured private enterprises and private farms to become at least partially state-owned 
enterprises.  There was also a renewed campaign to urge farmers to join agricultural co-
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operatives.  While these new measures led to reductions in the provision of food (as farmers fled 
to the West in increasing numbers), the Fifth Party Congress promoted the development of a new 
socialist consumer culture in which the DDR would not only catch up with but also surpass West 
German per capita consumption (einholen und überholen).  This policy was initiated in a new 
Seven-Year-Plan to be fulfilled by the mid-1960s.185   
2.1.9. The 1960s: closing the border and the continued collectivization of agriculture  
 
In spite of the opposition to collectivization during the previous decade, a new drive of 
collectivization began in earnest in the early 1960s.186  These unpopular policies and problems 
often associated with consumption resulted in reportedly 2.6 million East Germans fleeing to the 
West between 1949 and 1961.187  To stop the exodus, East German security forces rolled barbed 
wire across the open border between East and West Berlin on 13 August 1961.  They explained 
to the citizens that this border was to protect them from fascism and imperialism.  Although 
brutal, the erection of the Wall represented the economic survival of the régime by impounding 
its best workers and farmers.188   
The SED used collectivization to further integrate agricultural production into the 
planned economy, while simultaneously extending the party’s authority throughout diverse rural 
communities.  In April 1960, the SED had – at least on paper – officially completed its campaign 
of collectivization.  In the countryside, however, the rural communities of the DDR discordantly 
rejected the agricultural collectives.  Many farmers refused to work on the collective farms and 
simply abandoned them by leaving the DDR.  But, with the construction of the Wall in August 
1961, flight to the West was no longer an option.  Thus, the rural population had no choice but to 
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accept the end of private farming along with new systems of rural organization.189  Fulbrook 
states:  
It took some years before the new organization of farming became in any way routinized, 
with the breaking of traditional, fiercely independent attitudes among small farmers and 
the emergence of new forms of co-operation and conflict resolution in agricultural 
collectives.  Yet agriculture, in a modest sort of way, was arguably one of the few 
success stories of the DDR, at least from mid-1960 to the mid-1970s.190   
 
The Konsum was critically involved in the transformation of consumption practices in rural 
towns.   They caused lasting changes in the agricultural areas of the DDR and aided the Party 
during the processes of forced collectivization.191  From the vantage point of the SED, it was 
possible to use consumption as means through which to implement political work, to use 
consumption as leverage over farmers in the countryside, and to use consumption to spread the 
party’s influence into rural areas via the network of Konsum retail outlets.192  However, constant 
scarcity of desired goods coupled with an overabundance of unwanted goods in the Konsum 
created a perpetual source of discontentment and social resentment in the DDR.  As a result, 
many rural residents regularly complained about and were continually disappointed by the 
fluctuating availability, uneven distribution, limited choice, and poor quality of not only luxury 
goods, but also essential items such as coal, fuel, and daily foodstuffs.193  
During the 1960s, the régime increased its commitment to consumption by promising the 
elimination of rationing and making broad improvements to the culture of shopping through the 
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implementation of the New Economic System (Neues Ökonomisches System, NES) in 1963.194  
That year, the SED, under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht, changed the fundamentals of the 
DDR’s political economy through the adoption and implementation of the NES.  The various 
economic industries were given greater flexibility and responsibility in order to increase the 
state’s economic productivity.  For the consumer co-operatives, the NES led to an increase in the 
productivity of their industries and enlargement in the assortment of consumer goods.195  To 
meet the demands of the NES, the consumer co-operatives, at the suggestion of the Ministry for 
Trade and Provision, attempted to make various improvements, including the modernization of 
their stores, services, and consumer goods.196 
 In the late 1960s, domestic and international events had an impact on the Konsum.  It is 
almost certain that co-ops and their members and employees would have noticed shifts in the 
political and economic landscape.  For instance, the early to mid-1960s was – in consequence of 
the construction of the Berlin Wall – actually a period of reduced internal and external tensions.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that these events reverberated throughout the entire Konsum 
organization.  From that point on, the Konsum had to explain to its members and workers why 
there was suddenly an “Antifascist Wall” dividing the city of Berlin.  In fact, the Konsum was 
often charged with explaining the current political situation to members, as was the case with the 
Prague Spring in 1968 and the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia by Eastern Bloc forces 
(this event brought an end of relative de-Stalinization, with some economic experimentation, or 
reformist style socialism in the Eastern Bloc).  What is important to note here is that the Konsum, 
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to some degree, participated in and was influenced by these wider historical developments.  All 
of this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.         
2.1.10. The 1970s and the establishment of new forms of luxury retail  
The 1970s saw growing debt and monetary pressures, the rise of the Intershops, which 
sold high-quality goods for Western currency, and unfavourable comparisons with Western 
consumerism.  These problems resulted from, as historian Charles Maier pinpoints, the Eighth 
Party Congress in 1971.  During this key moment in the history of the DDR, the party promised a 
greater abundance and assortment of consumer goods and a generous state-supported welfare-
system in return for support and acceptance of SED rule.  This new guiding state principle was 
christened “the unity of social and economic policy.”  In practice, this policy meant that scarce 
funds previously allocated for investment in industry and innovation now had to subsidize 
consumer prices, vacations, and social services to prevent the gap between West and East 
Germany from completely undermining the legitimacy of the SED régime.197  Hence, it fell upon 
the Konsum to demonstrate the success of the so-called “unity of social and economic policy.”  
Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the SED from 1971 to 1989, believed that once 
the basic needs of DDR citizens were met (a warm, dry apartment, cheap basic food, and steady 
work), socialism would flourish.  While this paternalism originally helped stabilize the socialist 
state, it later created inflexible structures that hindered the state’s ability to meet popular 
consumer needs in the 1970s.  That is, this system had little room for innovation; scarcity and 
shortages were constant features of daily life.  As consumers, East Germans experienced 
constant frustrations, as they were forced to endure long lines, a continual search for goods, and 
incessant postponement in the purchase of highly desired goods such as cars, washing machines 
and so on.  In the DDR, consumption needs were always secondary and only received attention 
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when it became necessary to deal with supply shortages, or in crisis situations that were no 
longer ‘manageable.’  With consumerism, West Germany was constantly present through the 
media and TV commercials, which in turn created new consumer needs and increased pressures 
on the East German state.  In short, West German mass consumer culture became the measure of 
success in the socialist DDR.198  Rather than gaining popular favour, placating the population, 
and consolidating the rule of the SED, this shift to consumerism laid bare the shortfalls of the 
planned economy and the general inadequacies of East German industry.199  Ironically, 
Honecker’s promises about socialist consumer abundance raised popular expectations, which 
could only be partially fulfilled by borrowing massive amounts of “capitalist” money from West 
Germany to pay for the import of desirable commodities produced in the West.200   
 The western currency shops (initially confined to port cities and airports) had maintained 
only a modest public presence during the Ulbricht era in the 1950s and 1960s.  Access to foreign 
currency was the essential element for consumption in the Intershops, and thus stratified and 
separated the population.  This separation was not based on privileges provided by the state, but 
upon both access to West German relatives and their willingness to financially support their 
relatives in the East.  More troublingly, in-demand professionals wanted their pay to be in 
western currency.  In spite of this, Honecker drastically increased the role of hard-currency retail 
in 1972, as the Intershops became a major supplier of luxury goods for East Germans.201  In so 
doing, the SED fundamentally undermined the value of its own currency.  In an attempt to 
further raise its foreign currency reserves while eliminating the black market, the party expanded 
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the network of Intershops.202  Zatlin concludes, “The SED’s decision to institutionalize the use of 
West German marks in the Intershops did not merely represent a symbolic surrender of the value 
of capitalist money or a tacit concession to the superiority of the West German consumer model.  
By the late 1970s, capitalist money had displaced socialist money as a store of value and a 
medium of exchange.”203   
 Women who were likely predominantly Konsum shoppers were the largest social group 
against the Intershops because they tended to do the household shopping and were, therefore, 
most affected by the funnelling of higher quality and western goods into the Intershops.  These 
shops were causing such resentment and envy that people began to smash store windows and 
protest in front of these shops.204  To dispel women’s anger, Honecker permitted an increase in 
the number of Exquisit and Delikat stores in 1977.205    
 The Exquisit stores sold leather goods and clothing; they, like the Intershops, were 
created in 1972 but were quickly overshadowed by the Intershops.  The Delikat shops, on the 
other hand, sold a variety of foodstuffs, ranging from popular West German products like Jacobs 
coffee and Nutella chocolate spread, to high quality East German products.  Although the 
Exquisit and Delikat shops did not earn hard currency for the state, they did manage to make a 
hefty profit.  Eventually, East Germans became disgruntled with and began to question the need 
for upscale East German shops.  What is more, these shops undermined the egalitarian politics of 
the SED, with its foundation in Marxism-Leninism.206  By 1977, the number of Exquisit shops 
reached 109, with a six percent share of East German retail.  However, by 1985, this number 
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ballooned to 442 and the network began to expand into small towns.207  With a peak of 442 
Exquisit, 300 Intershops, and 250 Delikat shops, the nearly 30,000 Konsum outlets clearly 
dwarfed the more exclusive shops.208  What is more, these shops, as well as the HO were simply 
too expensive for most people.  We can, therefore, conclude that the Konsum was the primary 
means of retail for the vast majority of East Germans right through from the late 1940s and into 
the late 1980s.   
2.1.11. The 1980s and the collapse of the East German state  
 By the 1980s, East German society was very different from that of West Germany.  
Living conditions, social institutions, widespread expectations and experiences had all been 
dramatically transformed by the then thirty-year experiment in attempting to construct a socialist 
society as understood by the SED.  Far from classless, East German society had its own unique 
system of inequalities and social stratification.  By this decade, the East German state was 
bordering on bankruptcy literally and figuratively.209   
 To help anaesthetize the population during this period of stagnation, Honecker permitted 
the near-universal access to Western television.210  Western television meant that there was 
alternative source of information, including advertising, which was a counterbalance to the 
SED’s attempts at total ideological influence.211  This access made apparent the attractions of the 
West: culturally, politically, and especially economically.  What is more, it further forced the 
DDR into a competition of systems, which was an unremitting problem for, as Fulbrook 
describes it, “this drabber part of a divided nation.”212  
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   By the 1980s, it can be argued that East German women experienced greater 
“emancipation” than those in West Germany.  In 1984, fifty percent of the East German 
workforce was female, whereas in West Germany this number was only thirty-nine percent.  In 
both Germanies, women worked in lower paid jobs that garnered lower social status than those 
occupied by men.  This was certainly the case with female employment in the Konsum, which is 
the primary discussion in Chapter 9.213   
By late 1989 a substantial number of East Germans had turned their backs on the socialist 
experiment.  On 9 November 1989 the East German press corps announced that the decision had 
been made to open the border, which was “to take effect at once.”  This news release led to 
masses of people flooding into the West.  Historian Niall Ferguson writes that “by midnight all 
the checkpoints had been forced to open and one of the greatest parties of the century was under 
way, closely followed by one of its biggest shopping sprees.”214  As a result of the collapse of the 
state, the very survival of the Konsum was brought into question, which will be discussed in the 
conclusion of this dissertation.  
2.2. Conclusions 
 
The SED attempted nothing less than total penetration and control of social processes, 
with the demands of total conformity and adulation for every political initiative.  Of course, this 
was an unrealizable project.  And by the 1970s and 1980s, it appeared that the state recognized 
that outright ideological commitment was unattainable and was willing to accept passive and 
outward conformity.  During this period, it seemed as though a sort of East German normality 
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had set it, with both ruled and rulers understanding the limits of their respective power.  Still, the 
party was able to build up a repression apparatus that was able to penetrate and observe.215   
Fairbairn argues that the first two decades of the DDR was a particularly politicized 
period for the Konsum.  During this time, the Konsum helped the régime propagate modes of 
thinking that encouraged individuals to support the state.216  He continues to argue that, while the 
Konsum may have been more fully under the control of the party during the 1950s and 1960s, it 
was given a relative amount of autonomy in which to carry out its economic functions during the 
1970s and 1980s.217  Indeed, this may have been the case, and, as this chapter has shown there 
were changes in the political fortunes of the SED during the turbulent Cold War.  Yet, in my 
view, archival evidence paints an image of the Konsum as a relatively static organization in 
which the integration of women was always a top priority: this will be a continual theme in the 
subsequent chapters.  What is more, the politicized DDR language remained a constant in the 
Konsum.  The most recognizable shift in discourse came only during the latter half of the 1980s 
when Eingaben became collectively written (a significant shift away from atomized venting) and 
as individual complaint came to be more vocal in the requests, complaints, and demands.   
The other primary and constant of the Konsum was placating the demands of the 
population through consumption.  And throughout the nearly five years of Soviet rule and the 
four decades of the DDR, the Konsum had to supply its consumers with more and more 
consumer goods, such as real coffee, to demonstrate the improved standard of living for East 
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Germans.  In other words, the Konsum and the consumption opportunities and goods it provided 
for consumers helped to stabilize the régime while subduing unrest.218   
The SED viewed co-ops as a trustworthy partner and tool to be used during the transition 
to socialism; however, they were not intended to last beyond this period.  Moreover, their 
socialist legitimacy was based on obedience to the party and state, rather than traditional co-
operative values.219  While the consumer co-operatives had a century of experience and traditions 
by 1945 – particularly in the areas of supply, education, and female membership – the Konsum, 
as the following chapter demonstrates, mirrored the hierarchies, suspicions, prejudices, and 
ambiguities of the East German style of governance.220  This especially became the case with the 
establishment of the Konsum’s highly centralized top administrative structure: the Verband 
Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften, VDK.   
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3. The “democratic centralization” of the Konsum 
Table 2: The centralized governing structures of the Konsum with the VDK at the top (circa 1959)221  
                                                
221 AKB: 1114/A10, The Co-operatives of the German Democratic Republic, (Berlin: Verband Deutscher 
Konsumgenossenschaften, 1959), 23. 
83 
 
 
 
This chapter, as alluded to in the table on the previous page, discusses the centralization 
of the operating structures of the Konsum and the ways in which the SED hijacked the top 
administrative branch of the co-ops – the Verband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften, VDK.  
This process of centralization is relevant to understanding why the Konsum became subordinate 
to the SED.  Therefore, the larger and more complex theme of this chapter is an examination of 
the hegemony of the SED within the Konsum.  Due to SED domination, one should be cautious 
about even associating the word co-operative with the Konsum for the simple reason that the 
term “co-operative” should be associated with voluntary and autonomous governing structures.  
As will become clear, the compulsory state-decreed creation of “co-operatives” in the DDR 
created a highly centralized distribution system of rationed goods, with the purpose of 
eliminating private and non-state controlled retail, especially the black market in the immediate 
postwar years.222  What is unique about this chapter is the examination of the democratic 
centralization of the Konsum, along with the beginning of an initial assessment of the Konsum’s 
role in eliminating both private retail and the black market.  Additionally, this chapter argues that 
the VDK initially defended the consumer co-operatives against the SED, but then became an 
instrument by which the SED could control the Konsum and its vast network of factories, outlets, 
and schools.   
3.1. The development of the Konsum under the hegemony of the SED  
 
In 1945, the Konsum was one of the first institutions to be (re)established by the Soviet 
Military Administration in Germany (Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland – 
SMAD).  The SMAD gave the Konsum the difficult economic task of dealing with the 
immediate emergency of the postwar distribution of rationed goods.  During this process, 
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however, the SED stripped co-operatives of their autonomy.  Though the consumer co-operative 
movement in Germany was traditionally representative of the working-class, it became an 
economic tool of the communist dictatorship during the Soviet Occupation.  This subjugation 
continued until 1989.   
3.1.1. The re-establishment of the Konsum and the SMAD’s Order 176 
The SMAD permitted the re-establishment of consumer co-operatives in the closing days 
of the Second World War.  Given their working-class credentials, their plight at the hands of the 
Nazis, and their large numbers of communist members, co-operatives were perceived by the 
SMAD as a trustworthy working-class and antifascist organization.223  The party committed 
itself to supporting the co-operatives and making amends for their forced liquidation by the 
Nazis.224  Perhaps justifiably, the Konsum received the remaining property previously belonging 
to the German Worker’s Front (a Nazi organization that had seized co-operative property after 
1933).225  To ensure that the work of the administration of the new consumer co-operatives was 
in the interests of the workers, only reliable antifascists were permitted to become co-operative 
administrators (Vorstand).  As Walter Ulbricht (future leader of East Germany) reported on 24 
August 1946, “employees who were involved in the suppression and liquidation of the pre-Nazi 
co-operatives cannot be involved in the leadership of the new co-operatives.  In addition, these 
individuals are not permitted to work in this newly founded organization.”226     
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Soviets attempted to abolish private trade when 
they established the initial foundations of the Soviet state during the period of War Communism 
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from 1918 to 1921.  Following a similar course in their occupied territories of Germany, it is 
likely that the SMAD perceived consumer co-operatives as the only reliable distribution and 
retail partner in Germany.  Moreover, the Soviets tended to believe that private and small shop 
owners were Nazi supporters.  (There is some justification to this, since the Nazis’ primary base 
of support came from Protestant, rural-agricultural areas of Germany, as well as small farmers, 
shopkeepers, and independent artisans).227  Given these Soviet perceptions of Germany, the first 
“ideologically acceptable” consumer co-operative was founded in Calau (a small city in 
Brandenburg directly south of Berlin) on 5 May 1945, three days before the end of the Second 
World War.228   
Table 3: Members, retail outlets and regional distribution: 
 31.12.1946 Retail-  31.12.1948 Retail-      Population        Population  
 Members outlets   Members  Outlets               per outlet 
Berlin (Ostsektor) 
 109.000 210  185.000 509    1.14M (1956)  2240 
Brandenburg 
  210.000 925  285.000 1883     2.6M (1950)  1380 
Mecklenburg 
 64.000  359  106.000 713     2.0M (1950)  2805 
Saxony 
 405.000 1919  534.000 2584     5.7M (1950)  2205 
Saxony-Anhalt 
 228.000 1253  497.000 1987     4.1M (1950)  2063 
Thuringia   
 209.000 918  324.000 1627     2.8M (1950)  1722229   
 
By the end of 1945, there were already sixty-two reconstructed co-operatives with over 
500,000 members in the SBZ.  These first consumer co-operatives, under the tutelage of the 
Soviet authorities, were obligated to assist and support the emerging economic system in 
accordance with Marshal Zhukov’s Order 176 on 18 December 1945.230  With rapidly expanding 
membership, retail chains, and turn-over rates, the emerging strength of the organization was 
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becoming strikingly apparent to the SED.231 The preceding table below shows how the rapid 
expansion continued, especially in the two-year-period from the end of 1946 to the end of 1948.    
The mandate or master-statute from the SMAD-Order 176 was based on the old co-
operative laws from 1889.  Like the original German co-operatives, these newly established co-
ops were expected to sell high-quality goods at fair prices, as well as to manufacture some of 
these products.232  More importantly, however, Zhukov’s Order 176 stipulated that the consumer 
co-operatives develop into a retail trade network capable of providing the population with basic 
services, selling food to farmers, and supplying the cities with goods essential to daily living, and 
other consumer products, namely household wares and clothing.233   
Through this Order, the status of the Konsum in the SBZ was elevated to an official 
organization for trade and production, as well as serving as a practical political partner to the 
ruling power of the Soviets.234  The primary function of these newly founded co-operatives was 
to support the Soviet Military Administration.  The consumer co-operatives, according to the 
SMAD, were to become “democratic” (i.e., antifascist) organizations that had to support the 
struggle of the antifascist parties against Nazism, militarism and imperialism.  As well, the new 
co-operatives were expected to contribute to overcoming Nazi ideology and spreading socialist 
ideas, especially to its primarily female clientele, workforce, and members.235   
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3.1.2. The Konsum as a rations distributor and state-run retailer  
The shoppers’ dependence upon consumer co-operatives was, at first, particularly 
apparent, since specialty and department stores had not yet reopened following the end of the 
War.236  These consumer co-operatives had to deal with a precarious supply situation, which was 
exacerbated by the huge influx of refugees from the former German territories that the Soviets 
and Poles had annexed.  In fact, the territory of Germany occupied by the Soviets contained 
nearly two million more people in 1945 than it did in 1939.237  Amid this swelling population, 
the Konsum’s distribution of food to German refugees and the general German population 
proved to be far from fair.  That is, the Konsum sought to better provide for specific groups of 
the population who would make a direct contribution to the establishment of socialism, for 
example construction workers, whom the Konsum provided with warm meals during their day 
and night shifts.238   
 
Illustration 5: A Konsum soup kitchen in Leipzig, 1945239 
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The Konsum’s ever increasing economic role as a goods distributor is clearly evident in 
various archival documents in which top SED officials regularly recognize the growing 
importance of this organization.  For instance, the SMAD/SED’s use of the Konsum as a supply 
and rations depot is apparent in a report from 24 August 1946 entitled Guidelines for the re-
founding of the consumer co-operatives:  
The new consumer co-operatives should improve the population’s supply of food and 
consumer goods at low prices; obtain unadulterated food for processing; avoid price 
increases through the regulation of purchases of products at the wholesale prices; strive 
for the establishment of a network of profitable distribution centres in which meat and 
textile products can be made available.240 
   
On 9 November 1946, Paul Merker reported to Max Fechner, member of the Central Committee 
and city counsellor of Berlin, that consumer co-operatives had become an essential factor in the 
economy of the Soviet Occupation Zone.241  Another report, dated 13 November 1946 by 
Politburo member Helmut Lehmann, indicates the growing economic prominence of co-
operatives in the postwar period:  
Given the significant meaning that co-operatives maintained for the working population, 
it was self-evident that the party would associate itself with this movement.  Consumer 
co-operatives had been significantly revived throughout the SBZ and in Berlin.  In 1932, 
the co-operative membership amounted to 938,000, whereas in 31 August 1946 it had 
reached 1,139,000.  In 1932, the monthly turnover rate was 19 million Reich Marks.  
Throughout the course of the year 1946, the monthly turnover rate had increased to 77 
million Reichsmark.  As of 30 September 1946, the number of sales outlets amounted to 
5,272.  In 1932, there were only 3,556.  These numbers proved the growing significance 
of the consumer co-operatives and their importance in the provision and distribution of 
basic goods.242   
 
Furthermore, a report entitled The Consumer Co-operative Movement in Germany dated 4 
February 1948 indicates:  
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Consumer co-operatives had developed into a critical component of the economy by 
supporting the new democratic economic system of the SBZ.  Their development as a 
party-controlled mass-organization of the working people guaranteed state control and 
the just distribution of rationed goods.  They were obligated to distribute scarce goods, 
namely textiles and shoes to workers in vital industries.243   
  
While these quotations give the impression of the increasing importance of co-operatives 
as a goods distributor, this may not necessarily have been true.  In fact, the preceding documents 
and quotations may be evidence of the manner in which SED officials communicated with 
Konsum officials and the perceptions that both parties wanted to portray concerning this 
organization.  More broadly, SED and Konsum officials were developing socialist discourse or 
DDR Deutsch in the nascent milieu of the socialist dictatorship during the late 1940s.  In 
particular in the preceding quotation, we see politicized terms like “democratic,”  
“party-controlled mass-organization,” and “state control.”  Konsum documents from later 
decades become even more tied to the linguistic style of the Soviet Bloc as Americans are 
continually referred to as imperialists, the West Germans as fascists, and the Soviet Union as the 
benevolent mentor, guarantor of world peace, and the communist big brother.  In describing 
DDR Deutsch, historian Konrad H. Jarausch notes, “it was [the] language – full of Soviet 
imports, Marxist-Leninist phrases, SED-slogans, and East German regionalisms – that seemed 
odd.”244   
3.1.3. Elimination of the black market and private trade  
To serve the SED, the Konsum had to oppose what the party perceived as “overcharging 
by private capitalists” and to eliminate the black market.245  As indicated by an internal party 
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document from the Department of Political Economy from 1946, the rural consumer co-
operatives, although not a means of bringing about the socialist economy, were fully capable of 
opposing private capitalists in the area of goods distribution.246  In Saxony in May 1946, for 
instance, the consumer co-operatives were ordered to conduct a propaganda campaign against 
black marketeers by providing information to functionaries and active members through a 
regularly published Mitteilungsblatt (newspaper); the following year, this department instructed 
the Konsum to oppose private industry directly by providing its members with quality, 
unadulterated goods at the cheapest price possible, as well as to produce food and consumer 
articles.247  In 1948, the Konsum continued to lower prices for textiles and shoes to force private 
retailers to follow suit.248  In spite of this, the Konsum was incapable of fulfilling the needs of 
consumers during the postwar years, forcing the party to continue permitting private stores to 
supply the majority of consumers.  However, with each successive wave of socialist construction 
in the following decades, the government applied more pressure on private retailers to join the 
state-run Konsum and incorporate private enterprise into the state-controlled retail system.249  
The following graph illustrates the continual decline of private enterprise and the increase of 
state/socialist retail during the 1950s to the end of the 1970s:  
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Table 4: The number and type of retail outlets 
 
250 
 
Another aim of eliminating the black market was to bring customers into a readily 
observable space in which they could be controlled and surveyed.  In this sense, Konsum 
architecture became similar to philosopher and social theorist Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon 
prison.  The essential feature of Bentham’s prison was that the guards would be able to view the 
prisoners at all times, but that the prisoners would be unable to see the guards and so would not 
know if and when they were under surveillance.  In a similar sense, the Konsum created sites and 
spaces in which saleswomen, other customers, and the state’s security services easily observed 
customers.251  Labelling the Konsum as a Foucauldian disciplinary institution would be an 
overstatement, but the Konsum was a site in which there was a continual presence of what 
Michel Foucault described as a “normalizing gaze” of surveillance that made it possible to 
qualify, to classify and to punish.”252  Stasi files support this contention and indicate that there 
was a great deal of observing and classifying taking place in these stores in order to monitor 
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deviance or dissatisfaction amongst the population.  For instance, an unofficial collaborator – 
code named “Barbara Wagner” – gave weekly reports on the mood and behaviour of the 
customers in the town of Bad Elster on the German-Czechoslovak border.253  In this way, the 
Konsum brought the consuming population away from the black market and into the view of the 
state, thereby creating a sort of dialogue between the customer and the régime via the 
communication channel of the embedded Stasi informants (an examination of the Stasi in the 
Konsum is further discussed in sections 8.4.1. and 9.4.1).  
3.2. The democratic centralization of consumer co-operatives 
 
The SED was able to strengthen its hold on power and infiltrate once relatively 
independent organizations through a process of democratic centralization.  Like most 
associations, the Konsum was organized on the basis of hierarchy with power concentrated at the 
top.  However, “democratic centralism” (a term adopted by Lenin and common currency 
throughout the Communist bloc) meant that open discussion was possible only until a higher 
rank of the organization reached a decision.  At this point, the decision was binding and all lower 
party agencies and members were forced to implement it without question.254  Although 
considered “democratic” by the ruling elite since it expressed the will of the workers and 
peasants, this system of rule was generally authoritarian, and it ensured that the party dominated 
the state and society.  Following the war, the concept of “democratic centralism,” which was also 
considered antifascist, formed the basis of political reorganization in the SBZ along communist 
lines.  Democratic centralism was the basic organising principle of the SBZ/DDR; it was 
designed to maximize SED domination of political, societal, and economic institutions.  During 
the Soviet occupation, all political parties and mass-organizations were structured hierarchically 
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and in accordance with the guidelines of democratic centralism – the Konsum was no 
exception.255   
3.2.1. The removal of opponents and the increase of SED influence within the Konsum 
In order to “democratically centralize” or, perhaps more accurately, stalinize the Konsum, 
the SED gave long-standing party members leadership roles in the reformed co-operatives.  By 
directly controlling administrative selection from above, the Soviets ensured that the East 
German co-operative organization supported the emerging communist régime in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone.256  Historian Mustafa Haikal notes that by 1946 the most important personnel 
decisions already fell outside of the administration of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig and 
had to be confirmed by the party.257  Helmut Lehmann, the Central Secretariat of the SED in 
Berlin, demanded that the consumer co-operatives be filled with SED functionaries in order for 
the SMAD to officially recognize the organization.  As he put it in a speech dated 6 June 1947:   
The party acted as a mediator between the workers’ movement and the Soviet occupying 
power.  The party was prepared to help the co-operatives in their attempt to receive 
recognition by the occupying power and to defend co-operative claims in reference to 
property that the Soviets sequestered.  In return, the co-operatives had to fulfill their 
duties within the workers’ movement.  We, therefore, demand that our members of the 
SED also become socialist functionaries within the co-operatives, which was the only 
guarantee that the co-operatives properly fulfill their duties and obligations.258 
 
These leading co-operators had to prove that they were politically loyal while under the 
direct scrutiny of the SED security apparatus (secret police, prisons, and extensive networks of 
informers).259  The secretary of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Sirow, Comrade Donner, was a case 
in point.  For not “being up to the challenge of his obligations” (seiner Aufgabe in keiner Weise 
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gewachsen), he subsequently drew the attention of the regional administration of the party and 
was placed under the direct control of a Comrade Grohn.  To ensure the loyalty of this co-
operative, the SED embedded eleven party members into its administration.260  Historian Gareth 
Pritchard argued that the SED displayed skill and patience in the removal of opponents.  In his 
judgement,  “the Soviets and the KPD/SED leadership took great care to avoid provoking all 
their real or potential opponents at the same time, but instead, using what the Hungarian 
Communist leader Matyas Rakosi called ‘salami tactics,’ non- or anti-Stalinist political 
tendencies were sliced off the body politic one by one.”261  The SED applied these “salami 
tactics” to the consumer co-operatives throughout the postwar years by removing “disloyal” 
employees, demanding the loyalty of co-op managers, and inserting party members into the 
upper echelons of the Konsum.262  An official party document dated December 1948 states:  
The functionaries of our party had to attain administrative positions in the consumer co-
operatives.  Only when the tight coordination of the work of functionaries was successful 
could the leading role of the party have been further developed in the consumer co-
operatives in order to assure that the interests of the workers were met.263    
 
To aid in the party’s internal encroachment on the Konsum, the SED and the Department of 
Trade and Provision also gave party members within the organization specific instructions:  
All members of the Socialist Unity Party who were active in the consumer co-operatives 
had to clearly understand that they were obligated to uphold the leading role of the party 
within the co-operative organization.  That is to say, these functionaries were 
responsible for the implementation of the party’s and the government’s will in the co-
operative workplace.  That meant that co-ops were messengers of the party’s politics 
and ideology, and that employees and members must be exemplary socialists.  It was 
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also compulsory for co-operatives to be actively involved in the development of 
socialism, and to help thwart the class enemy’s attacks on our régime.264   
 
Undoubtedly, it can be inferred that most Konsum managers likely became SED members in 
order to retain their jobs or for career advancement.  Nevertheless, the number of party members 
within the Konsum increased, thereby increasing the SED’s control to, as historian Brett 
Fairbairn estimates, around eighty to ninety percent of the administrative positions, all the while 
eliminating Social Democratic influence.265   
In the summer of 1948, SED party bosses removed co-operators they deemed to be too 
Social Democratic or too closely connected with the West German co-operative organization.  In 
1949, during a show-trial in Leipzig, many co-operative leaders with Social-Democratic ties 
were removed or imprisoned.266  An illustration of this is the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig, 
where a complete expulsion of an entire generation of co-operative leaders took place on account 
of their affiliation with the SPD.  In total, five top administrators, eight members of the 
supervisory committee, five departmental leaders, two sales-outlet inspectors and several 
employees were forcibly removed from their work.  In the two years between 1948 and 1950, the 
SED had by and large removed social democratic influences from within the Leipzig consumer 
co-operative.267  As Wolfgang Richter, the head-administrator of the Eilenburg consumer co-
operative from 1974 to 2003, stated in an interview in 2004:  
The influence of the party within this organization was incredibly strong.  The number of 
the SED in the upper echelons of the co-operative administration was always above fifty 
percent; therefore, the SED maintained a majority within the organization.  
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Consequently, when there were crucial votes regarding personnel elections, SED 
members always toed the party line.268   
 
To ensure SED loyalty in the lower- and midlevels of the Konsum, the party undertook a 
number of effective measures.  First, it established and inserted sub-party organizations or small 
party cells (Grundorganisation).  Members of the sub-party organizations had to take special 
courses in Marxism-Leninism.  In turn, members of these sub-party organizations were charged 
with spreading these teachings amongst their fellow colleagues.269  Second, the SED increased 
its influence in the Konsum by demanding the political loyalty of those seeking higher 
promotion.  Third, the open presence and constant “gaze” of the SED and Stasi were weapons 
used to ensure loyalty.  For instance, the Konsum inserted within every co-operative qualified 
party members and Stasi functionaries to solidify the leading role of the party.270  In fact, the 
SED actually measured its influence within the Konsum based on the level of Stasi infiltration.  
In August 1960, for instance, the Stasi reported that the influence of the party was particularly 
strong within the administration of Konsum-Mitte-Berlin.  However, the party’s influence within 
Konsum-Mitte-Berlin’s sales outlets was weak.  To help spread the influence of the party, it used 
Socialist work brigades (this will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9).  As of November 
1960, for instance, there were eighty-six brigades embedded in various retail outlets within this 
co-operative.271    
 The ultimate key to SED control of the Konsum was ultimately the establishment of a 
centralized umbrella organization under the direct control of the party – Verband Deutscher 
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Konsumgenossenschaften (VDK).  In fact, the party clearly indicated in archival documents, “the 
leading posts of this organization were to be filled with ‘reliable’ party members.”272     
3.2.2. Democratic centralism and the establishment of the VDK      
 The VDK, the Konsum’s centralized administrative organ, was ultimately responsible for 
determining the political role of the Konsum.  It alone determined and controlled the ideological 
and propaganda functions of the Konsum, including the political and antifascist education of its 
members.  The VDK forced the consumer co-operatives into supporting the SED’s ideology.273  
As will be discussed and Chapters 5 and 6, the VDK also created and was responsible for an 
extensive network of schools to educate members and functionaries in practical and ideological 
matters.274  This education of members and workers was intended to strengthen the Konsum as a 
mass-organization and to garner membership and employee support for the party.275  This 
organization ultimately set the agenda of the entire network of consumer co-operatives and 
transformed them into a politically and economically subservient tool. 
The VDK was founded in August 1949 on the principles of democratic centralism in 
order to further centralize control of the consumer co-operatives under the auspices of the 
SED.276  The VDK functioned as a parent organization of the entire Union of the Consumer Co-
operatives (see the chart at beginning of this chapter), and it administered the fifteen regional co-
operative associations, determined the long-term objectives of the Konsum, and realized and 
implemented the resolutions of the SED.  It also ran the Konsum’s Department for Agitation and 
Advertising (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7), which had the explicit goal of educating members, 
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consumers, and workers in Marxism-Leninism and persuading members to actively participate in 
various activities.277   
 
Table 5: Leadership structure of the Konsumgenossenschaften 
The SED gave direction at each level to both the government and Konsum organs.278  
 
Through the establishment of the VDK, the conditions were set for the complete 
inclusion of the consumer co-operatives into the system for centralized state planning, including 
the two-year-plan of 1949/50.279  Because the consumer co-operatives were directly involved in 
the régime’s economic plans, the VDK also had the task of drawing up economic goals that it 
had to implement and fulfill.280  While there may have been some flexibility in developing these 
plans, the state and its planning authorities always had the power to either reject or have them 
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implemented.281  And by the end of the 1940s, the party introduced the law “On the 
Improvement of the Supplying of the Population,” which brought consumer co-operatives under 
the complete control of the SED.  Although the Konsum could make proposals and requests to 
the planning system, these were subject to the approval of the Department of Trade and Supply 
(see Table 4).  At the local, regional, and national levels, co-operatives had to submit their plans 
to their respective planning authority.  And so, as previously mentioned, by the early 1950s, the 
Konsum was becoming a centralized, hierarchical system.282   
Table 4 further illustrates that the VDK was economically subordinate to the state and its 
planning authorities in the Department for Trade and Supply.  In 1952, the subordination became 
more pronounced as the SED transformed the Konsum into a five-tiered hierarchy with the VDK 
at the top, followed by regional federations, district federations, primary co-operatives and local 
sales points.  With each level subordinate to the level above, consumer co-operatives in East 
Germany – rather than being representative of the values put forward in the Rochdale co-
operative principles – were more comparable to Stalinism or, to use Soviet terminology, 
democratic centralism.  In addition, co-operatives were forced to reorganize their administrative 
boundaries so as to align with those of the state.  This helped facilitate close collaboration 
between the régime and the Konsum at each administrative level.  Because of the increasingly 
close collaboration between co-operatives and the state, the Konsum became a tool for the social, 
political, and attitudinal transformations that were directed from above by the party elite, and 
which were the primary objectives of every mass-organization in the DDR.283  (See the following 
chapter for an in-depth discussion of the Konsum as a mass-organization). 
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The administration of the VDK was given the direct task of politically mobilizing its 
membership and forced the further integration of the Konsum into the command economy.284  
This coercion was based on the régime’s need for co-ops to help solve the urgent postwar supply 
problems.  As a result of its increasing importance in the economy, the state played a direct role 
in the development of the Konsum and its absorption into the centrally planned economy.285  The 
Konsum, according to Ulrich Kurzer’s publication, quickly and resolutely contributed to the 
DDR’s rising standard of living in the years and decades following the Second World War.286   
He states, “of course the Konsum was part of the economic and social history of East Germany, 
particularly before the founding of the state.   Nevertheless, after the Wende, the Konsum was not 
impacted by discussions or implications about its political past.”287  Furthermore, in his concise 
study of the former East German co-operatives, Gerhard Rönnebeck points out, that the VDK’s 
system of governance (democratic centralism) “not only ignored traditional co-operative 
philosophy, trade and retail practices, but it also integrated and incorporated this once 
independent German mass movement into the East German political and economic apparatus.”288  
This system remained in place until the fall of communism in 1989.   
3.2.3. Opposition to the VDK and SED within the Konsum 
Historian Brett Fairbairn argues that the VDK initially defended the interests of co-ops 
against the SED and the state’s increasing infringement.  For example, senior officials of the 
VDK complained that they were being ill-treated by the state, and in 1950 they angrily claimed 
“‘that officials of the DDR are not acting as democrats and are not making decisions as 
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democrats.  Consumer co-operatives have the duty to inform the public of this fact.’”289  
Fairbairn states, “the reason for this evolution was simple: consumer co-operatives were too 
large for an increasingly totalitarian state to leave them alone.”290  During this time, the VDK 
was free to determine and develop the Co-operative Master-Statutes and was responsible for 
every decision that fell to co-operative trade. 291   
There is also evidence of opposition to the dominance of the SED within the Konsum.  
The consumer co-operative movement in Germany was one of the oldest in the world, so it may 
have proved somewhat resistant to complete subordination to the Soviet and Stalinist traditions.  
In fact, there is proof of resistance during an incident in 1950.  At the Konsumgenossenschaft-
Arnstadt, there were stormy scenes at a meeting of the SED factory cell when an elderly comrade 
began to threaten and abuse a younger SED member who had been passing information related 
to deviant opinions in the group to the district leadership (Kreisleitung).292  Archival sources 
further suggest that there was opposition to the party’s invasion of the Konsum.  For instance, 
reports from the VDK entitled How will the leading roles of the SED be realized in the consumer 
co-operatives of Neubrandenburg state:     
In the working/party organization of the co-operatives in the region of Neubrandenburg, 
the political and ideological work of the party had been weakly developed.  Although 
62.5 percent of the leading functionaries in the district organization and co-operatives 
were party members, and although the district leadership was comprised of party 
comrades, these functionaries were suffering from a blatant disregard of the party’s 
authority.293   
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The report continues: “the party’s work in the consumer co-operatives was, in most cases, fully 
inadequate.  Moreover, there were only three party members in the administration.  The chief 
executive and current party secretary, comrade Helburg, went against the will of the party by 
fleeing to West Germany.”294   
There were multiple instances of party members lamenting the disinterest of co-operative 
workers and members.  In one such example, the party noted, “The scheduled party work in the 
majority of the consumer co-operatives was inadequate.  The leading party members in the co-
operative district associations had little interest in the completion of ideological work.”295  
Another report written by N. Stiehler, a member of the administration, bemoaned the lack of 
political and ideological interest amongst leading Genossen (comrades and members) in the 
Konsum.  In fact, Stiehler demanded that they develop an improved “socialist attitude” towards 
their work.296  Generally speaking, this opposition led to a low turnout at factory assemblies and 
party and union meetings.297  Specifically, an internal document dated December 1947 reveals 
the party was frustrated by a lack of participation in women’s groups.  “The collaboration of 
women in the consumer co-operatives was below expectations,” according to the document, and 
“the creation of women’s groups is still suffering from apparent shortcomings and disinterest.”298  
A report from the Department of Economics also identifies a dearth of interest in the party’s 
ideological work that could be perceived as unenthusiastic support or perhaps even foot-
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dragging.  It states, “The fundamental weaknesses of the consumer co-operatives continue to be a 
lack of ideological clarity amongst the workers and members.  Therefore, ideological work needs 
to be brought to the foreground to garner their support.”299   
It should, however, be underlined that these sources may indicate not that dissent was 
real, but rather that some functionaries (the authors of these documents) could advance 
themselves by accusing others of feigned support.  Be that as it may, historian Andreas Ludwig 
maintains, “In the early 1950s, during the high-phase of Stalinism, some co-operators openly 
opposed and criticized the state.”300  In an interview, Dr. Burchard Bösche, an executive in the 
Hamburg-based Zentralverband deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften, also describes the Konsum 
as something akin to a shelter or hideout (Unterschlupf) for people with negative political 
credentials and personal biographies.  He states:  
There were many people who were critical of the SED system, and they found refuge and 
work in the Konsum.  For a long time, I was in contact with the chairman of the 
Konsumgenossenschaft-Bezirk-Leipzig.  Since he was in an American POW camp and 
suspected to have participated in the 17 June 1953 Uprising, he was not allowed to work 
in other state-owned-industry.  Nevertheless, he had a very successful career in the 
Konsum.301  
 
Unsurprisingly, some members and workers felt a strong sense of loyalty to this organization due 
to its co-operative principles and goals.302   
3.3. The Konsum and its relationship to other forms of East German retail  
From 1945 to 1948, German consumers had little choice between Konsum stores and 
private stores.  In the words of historian Mark Landsman “consumer co-operatives offered the 
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only alternative to small-scale private shopkeepers.”303  In 1948, however, the SED established 
the State Trade Organization (Handelsorganisation, HO). These shops resembled Western stores 
and were often called “a piece of the West in the East.”304  The best locations in the cities were 
reserved for the HO, whereas the Konsum was responsible for the provision of the countryside. 
There was a continual struggle about the shop locations in the cities, and which organization 
could bring in more profit.  The Konsum perpetually made the argument that they had millions of 
members, and that these people not only lived in the rural towns, but also in the cities.305  In 
1956, a Klein Krieg (small war) broke out between the Konsum and the HO.  During this so-
called “small war,” the Konsum fought for greater independence from the Ministry for Trade and 
Provision, as well as the local state authorities.306  Gradually, the HO was able to overtake the 
Konsum in sales.  Both organisations maintained around thirty-five percent of the total retail sale 
in the DDR, and this number fluctuated minimally throughout the remaining lifespan of the state.  
By the 1960s, the conflict between the Konsum and the HO largely came to an end.  Following 
that, the Konsum worked seemingly well with the state authorities and the HO.307      
  The role the Konsum played and its history can be dived into two periods.  For example, 
the consumer cooperatives were given elevated status within the SBZ; however, because the state 
perceived cooperatives as a ‘lower form of socialist property,’ they were later put at a continual 
disadvantage with their primary competitor – the HO.  Already by 1951, the influence of the 
party and the cooperatives role in the ‘Building of Socialism’ was clearly established and 
defined.  That is to say, in the eyes of the SED, the primary task of the Konsum was not in the 
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provision of goods for the population, but in the struggle for peace, solidarity, and the unity of 
Germany.308  At first, the cooperatives were gradually incorporated into the political and 
economic system, during which the SED influence in them continually rose.  The cooperatives 
were also incorporated into the SED’s propaganda apparatus.  The second phase began with the 
dismissal of Walter Ulbricht by Erich Honecker in 1971.  With the change of leadership of the 
SED party-state, Honecker, at the Eighth Party Congress of the SED (1971), proclaimed his 
program for the establishment of ‘Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik’ (a program of 
‘consumer socialism’).  Thereafter, the Konsum was able to focus on economic tasks and their 
ideological and political demands became secondary.309   
  As discussed in section 2.1.10, the provision of commodities in the consumer co-
operatives grew even more difficult with the introduction of state owned Exquisit-Laden, 
Intershops, and Delikat shops.  To shop in these stores, one either needed access to Western 
currency, or privileged access and status often related to party connections.310  As a result of 
these new stores, consumer society in the DDR was further stratified and became a three-tier 
system, with the Konsum functioning as a third-rate or third-tier store next to the second-tier 
stores of the HO.  To make matters worse for the average consumer (i.e., those without access to 
West German currency), highly valued products were withdrawn from the assortment of goods 
produced by and available in the Konsum for the benefit of these newly established shops in 
which foreign money was used.  The Exquisit-Laden shops soaked up the population’s excess 
buying power in East German Marks, whereas, starting in the mid-1970s, the régime developed 
the Intershops with the intention of absorbing the growing quantity of West German Marks 
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coming into the country.  In order to increase foreign currency reserves, the régime enlarged the 
network of Intershops following the construction of the Berlin Wall.  Initially, the state restricted 
the access of East German citizens to these shops, but in 1973 the régime legalized the 
possession of Western currency and actually encouraged East Germans to spend in these 
shops.311  By conceding a large role in retail to the Intershops, the SED created and increased 
social stratification, which advantaged those with direct access to western currency.  In fact, this 
system stymied patrons of the Konsum who may have been loyal to the régime, while privileging 
consumers with Western contacts.312  By the 1980s, the availability of goods further diminished 
in the Konsum shops, because these products could be bought only at inflated prices in the luxury 
Exquisit-Laden and Intershops.313    
 Following the demise of the East German state, the Treuhand (the Trust agency that 
privatized East German enterprises) dissolved the HO.314  During the Wende, it was difficult for 
the Konsum administrators and the Treuhand to determine which property belonged to the 
Konsum and what was state owned.  In most cases, the co-operatives established new branches 
on property that was previously owned and controlled by the HO.315 
3.4. Conclusions   
 Consumers had very little choice between the Konsum and other forms of private and 
state retail; hence, they were largely dependent upon the Konsum outlets established at the onset 
of the Soviet occupation.  When there was a choice, it usually would have been between an HO 
shop and a Konsum shop and in many places it was only the Konsum shop.  Likely, the only 
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other remaining option for the consumer was to travel to the next big city for shopping.  But 
since the majority of people had full-time jobs, and shops closed at 6pm, this was not really a 
plausible possibility for the majority of the population.  Consumers’ dependence upon the 
Konsum remained largely intact for much of the history of the DDR.  For instance, consumers 
especially relied on the Konsum for the provision of bread.  In Bezirk Frankfurt, 
Neubrandenburg, and Magdeburg, the population received over half of their daily intake of meat 
products and over a quarter of their baked goods from the Dorfkonsumgenossenschaften (rural 
co-operatives).  These examples clearly indicate East Germans’ dependence upon the Konsum.  
Accordingly, the Konsum’s impact on daily life should not be underestimated.316   
By 1989, the Konsum had made a considerable contribution to the state economy by 
controlling 31.3 percent of all retail sales; 38.4 percent of food sales; 24.6 percent of industrial 
products; there were 198 co-operatives; 32,000 retail outlets; and 13 Konsum department stores 
(called konsument).317  These numbers represent state-driven from above rather than 
membership-driven growth from below, which was in direct violation of co-operative ideology 
and guidelines.  Economically, the Konsum could sell only what it could buy from the state (i.e., 
the state defined what the Konsum was expected to produce and what the Konsum had to sell).  
Moreover, the Konsum had to compete with private retail for its share of goods from state 
suppliers and wholesalers.  By favouring the Konsum with supplies and propaganda over 
privately owned retail, the SED used the co-operative outlets as a means to deliver goods to a 
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destitute population whilst eliminating what the party perceived as capitalist retail and the black 
market.318   
Even though the Konsum was beholden to the party in its upper administrative levels, 
later chapters will show that there was a relatively high level of customer participation, a 
voluntary-membership-base, and membership control of Konsum retail outlets by virtue of 
elected membership committees (i.e., these shops were local self-organizations at the lower 
levels in which the SED did not intervene).  While there were instances of opposition to 
Stalinism, the process of democratically centralising the Konsum proved to bring this 
organization effectively under the direct control of SED-state.  Moreover, consumer co-
operatives evidently served the SED by performing the following: allocating goods in an ever-
increasing amount to the workers, supporting the state’s economic endeavours, promoting class-
consciousness, and (as will be a continual theme in the ensuing chapters) politicizing and 
educating the working-class.319  Part II continues with these themes and shows how they became 
interwoven with aspects of persuasion and pacification.  
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4. DDR Deutsch: the Konsum as a mass-organization, cultural 
centre, and mobilizing force 
 
I enjoyed Konsum cultural activities.  I remember celebrating my children’s end-of-the-year 
school parties in a Konsum restaurant. These restaurants were especially popular in the 
countryside during the harvest season.  
- An anonymous interviewee320 
 
The building of socialism in the DDR requires the development of socialist personalities 
amongst our people.  However, the socialist consciousness does not develop spontaneously; 
rather it has to be patiently and persistently cultivated.  For this reason, a great deal of attention 
and resources need to be directed into the Konsum membership meetings.  
- A document form the Sachsen state archives in Chemnitz and the Konsumgenossenschaft-Gornsdorf, 21 June 
1958321 
 
 
 
Illustration 6: Konsum cultural activities in front of the slogan “The support of cultural activities is an 
important task of the Konsum”322  
                                                
320 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
Germany, 27 June 2011. 
321 SSC: 30878/1077/2, Ergänzung zur Arbeitsentschließung der Delegiertenversammlung der Konsum-
genossenschaft Gornsdorf am 21. Juni 1958, 1. 
322 SSC: 30878/1148/5, III/36 (Date not given - likely the 1950s). 
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This chapter examines the political and propagandistic role of the Konsum as a mass-
organization and cultural centre on a domestic level.  It also explores the manner in which the 
Konsum transmitted the SED’s ideological messages through membership meetings and cultural 
activities.  Hence, this chapter raises the following question: was the Konsum able to effectively 
carry out the role expected of all DDR mass-organizations, namely to function as what Lenin 
described as a “transmission-belt” of propaganda from the vanguard party to the Konsum’s mass 
membership?323  To answer this question, the research utilized for this chapter is drawn primarily 
from the perspective of the state, with some references to interviews and attendance numbers 
from Konsum political meetings and cultural activities.  In other words, this chapter primarily 
deals with the state and the Konsum’s intentions to persuade, though there are some references to 
reactions.   
In some ways, the Konsum and its role as a mass-organization reflected the tensions 
between attempted totalitarianism and selective participation.  On the one hand, the Konsum was 
attempting to control and politicize leisure time.  Still, as this chapter will show, people had the 
ability to participate on their own terms and in ways of their own choosing.  And for many, this 
participation was fun.  In some ways, therefore, I would argue that the Konsum did articulate 
some of the interests of its members in what might be described as a nascent civil society.     
4.1. Mass membership 
Owing to its widespread membership base, the Konsum became an important economic 
and political institution for its members in the SBZ and the DDR.324  Any East German over the 
age of sixteen – regardless of background, political ideology, and party membership – was 
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eligible for membership in the Konsum.325  There were concrete advantages to being a Konsum 
member such as rebates, reduced prices, and primarily the membership refund (members 
received a membership rebate of as much as two to three percent of the Konsum turnover).326   
The Konsum’s open membership policy resulted in the swelling of its ranks.327   As 
indicated in Tables 5 and 6, East German membership was reported to have quickly surpassed 
that of the German co-operatives in 1932 in all of the states (Länder, see also map in section 
11.1.) of the DDR: 
           Table 6: 1946 membership numbers:328 
 
   31.12.32   31.3.46   30.4.46 31.5.46      30.6.46      31.7.46        31.8.46__      
Saxony  356,026    274,785  293,920   351,028      355,000     369,197       376,197  
Saxony-Anhalt 122,832      48,829  133,121   164,421      191,475     217,658       235,761  
Thuringia  175,179      81,597  138,680   151,011      156,770     168,755       174,481 
Mecklenburg    36,351      27,567    36,568     42,604        45,130       49,737         54,594 
Brandenburg  187,698      74,860  151,740   148,679      179,754     192,554       200,934 
Berlin (Soviet Sector)   60,000      20,000    48,064   78,920        86,696       90,307         97,685   
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Soviet Zone  938,086   527,638   802,095   936,663  1,015,098   1,088,208  1,139,492  
 
As of May 1947, the Konsum’s membership comprised forty percent workers, fifteen percent 
white-collar employees, three percent independent professionals, four percent farmers, five 
percent independent self-employed tradesmen and industrial workers, six percent pensioners, and 
twenty-nine percent housewives.329  As Table 6 indicates, the membership rose rapidly into the 
1950s and 1960s, but eventually stabilized at around 4.5 million in the 1970s out of a population 
of around 17 million.  The size of membership by and large remained intact for the final two 
decades of the DDR. 
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Table 7: The increasing membership of the Konsum measured in millions 
330 
According to the socio-economist Johnston Birchall, the numbers in Table 6 demonstrate 
extremely rapid growth for a co-operative.  He maintains that, “under communist régimes, co-
operative sectors grew until, on paper at least, they were the biggest in Europe.”331   In his view,    
We would be wrong to be impressed by such figures.  In every country, communism 
meant the loss of the fundamental principles by which we define co-operatives: 
voluntary membership, independence, democracy, and return of economic results to 
members.  Democratic centralisms prevailed: primary co-ops were controlled by their 
federal bodies, the federations by party members and government appointees, and co-
operative business was conducted in a framework of imposed quotas and targets which 
left the members in charge of only the details of how to meet the state’s requirements.332  
 
In this context, Birchall is only partially correct.  In the DDR, East Germans were not forced to 
join the Konsum; rather, they became members for various reasons, which included gaining 
access to Konsum stores and the membership refund, maintaining the co-operative tradition, and 
                                                
330 AKB: 1114/A12, Dr. Heinz Fahrenkrog, President of the Union of Consumer Co-operative Societies of 
the GDR, The Consumer Co-operative Societies in the German Democratic Republic, (Berlin: Verband der 
Konsumgenossenschaften, 1976), 51.  See also Rönnebeck, Die Konsumgenossenschaften der ehemaligen DDR: 28. 
331 Birchall, The international co-operative movement: 118.  
332 Ibid.  
0	  
0.5	  
1	  
1.5	  
2	  
2.5	  
3	  
3.5	  
4	  
4.5	  
5	  
1946	   1951	   1961	   1970	   1975	   1989	  
114 
 
 
 
participating in Konsum cultural activities.  In this sense, the Konsum membership was based, 
contrary to Birchall’s claim, on voluntary support for various individual, financial, consumerist, 
cultural, and political motivations.  Of course, the Konsum was often the only retail or cultural 
option available in smaller centres, which brings into question the degree of voluntarism.  There 
were, in other words, degrees of voluntarism based on the options available and the potential 
benefits one received for such participation.  For instance, in a 2011 interview, an anonymous 
female interviewee indicated that she was not a member because Konsum membership did not 
translate into concrete political advantage, which was unlike membership in other DDR mass-
organizations.333  In fact, as she points out, it was very difficult to realize educational and career 
ambitions without membership in the SED, FDJ, and the FDGB.  In her words, “motivations for 
having membership in the Konsum were always a private matter.”334  In another interview, 
Martin Bergner, a former Konsum economist, concurs when he states that “there was no political 
pressure to join the Konsum – motivation was based upon getting the patronage refund.”335  It 
will be seen in the subsequent sections that the larger the population centre the lower the 
participation numbers in Konsum political and cultural meetings.   This likely indicates that East 
Germans weighed their various options to determine what level of participation in a given mass-
organization would reap the highest rewards.  On the basis of this reasoning, in Leipzig, the 
DDR’s second largest city, participation in the Konsum was low because it engendered less of 
the biographical credentials one needed for advancement in East German society in comparison 
with the other more prominent mass-organizations and the SED.   
                                                
333 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
Germany, 27 June 2011. 
334 Ibid. 
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4.2. A mass-organization 
The Konsum was a political organization that facilitated the state’s effort to produce and 
promote a specific kind of knowledge, a linguistic discourse (see subsection 4.2.6 on Konsum 
publications), an appropriate use of free time, and East German state-narrative.  The Konsum’s 
propaganda provided instruction in the virtues and the political discourse of socialism, as well as 
how to give and obey the orders of the ruling SED (see Chapter 6 on education).  The Konsum 
inculcated discipline and encouraged the Konsum’s members, consumers, workers and 
employees (mostly women), youth, and rural residents in the SBZ/DDR to establish, promote, 
and maintain communist rule.  Clearly – as internal party documents suggest – the SED 
(correctly) understood that the Konsum had ample opportunities to act as a political tool on 
account of its propinquity to millions of East Germans.  It is for these reasons that I suggest the 
Konsum was a relatively effective mass-organization.   
4.2.1. The subordination of the Konsum to the political objectives of the state 
Archival documents written in the early postwar years indicate that the Konsum was 
rapidly becoming a political organization.  A report, dated 13 August 1946, by Helmut Lehmann, 
a member of the Politburo, states:  
The party perceived the Konsum as an antifascist mass-organization, which was obliged 
to aid the party in the realisation of socialist goals.  For this reason, it was absolutely 
necessary for the consumer co-operatives to commit themselves to completing these 
political tasks and have a decisive influence in the socialist movement.  The central 
secretariat and the SED have approved party work in the co-operatives.  Our party 
members in the Konsum had to aid in the fulfillment of these tasks.336    
 
This quotation indicates that Lehmann recognized or was at a minimum paying lip service to the 
notion of the Konsum as an antifascist mass-organization.  In a speech from June 1947, Lehmann 
                                                
336 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/111, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker.  November 13, 
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stated the following in regards to the relationship between the SED and the consumer co-
operatives: “In the struggle against capitalism in the socialist state, the co-operative was to 
become a political functionary of the régime.”337   
SED and Konsum functionaries were attempting to place the Konsum at the political 
disposal of the state.  These functionaries requested the recognition of the Konsum as a mass-
organization, with representation in the Antifascist-Block.  In August 1947, Lehmann declined 
this request.  He wrote to the co-operative state party executives in Berlin, Potsdam, Schwerin, 
Weimar, Dresden, and Halle suggesting that “we believed that this would not have been 
appropriate.  [The specific reasons as to why Lehmann declined are not given in the document.] 
Nevertheless, we recommend that in special cases the Konsum may and will eventually be 
included in the Antifascist-Block.”338  This is important as it shows that the Konsum was not 
considered officially part of the governing structures of the DDR, although it seems as though its 
leadership was eager to subordinate the Konsum to the needs of the state.  The Konsum, however, 
differed from other mass-organization because the FDJ (socialist mass youth organization), DFD 
(mass women’s organization), and the FDGB (trade union federation) had seats in the People’s 
Chamber (Volkskammer).  But, as discussed in Appendix 11.2, the Konsum still had a strong 
voice within the Volkskammer, with at least three of its long-serving presidents as members.        
The Konsum coordinated its political work with other mass-organizations, especially the 
FDJ and DFD.  In his article Die Konsumgenossenchaften der ehemaligen DDR, historian 
Andreas Ludwig shows that by the spring of 1945, the first co-operatives began to engage with 
                                                
337 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/6.02/74, SED Zentralkomitee: Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik, Protokoll über 
die Konferenz der Konsum-Genossenschaftsverbände in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone in Schwerin/Meckl. Am 
Donnerstag, dem 5. Juni und Freitag, dem 6. Juni 1947, 32. 
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mass-organizations such as the FDGB.  In September 1945, the FDGB compelled its members to 
join the co-operatives; in turn, the FDGB was also represented in the co-operative executive 
branch.339  In fact, co-operatives were obligated to maintain a close working relationship with the 
FDGB; the FDGB reciprocated by encouraging its members to join the Konsum.340  During a 
conference held on 12 September 1947, Bernhard Göring, a representative of the FDGB, 
stressed, “although the consumer co-operatives were to remain politically neutral, they 
nevertheless had political duties to fulfill, namely leading in the struggle against fascism and for 
democracy.”341  This quotation demonstrates that the Konsum – at least outwardly – fulfilled and 
incorporated the roles of an antifascist mass-organization.342  Gerhard Lucht, the president of the 
VDK, further placed the Konsum at the disposal of various mass-organizations.  In August 1959, 
he wrote: 
Co-operative tasks can only be solved through the establishment of an extensive 
socialist relationship, and the development and support of diverse forms of socialist co-
operative work through a collaborative relationship between the leadership of the local 
organs of state power, with the trade organs of all property forms, the committees of the 
National Front, the Agricultural Co-operatives, the mass-organizations like the Free 
German Trade Union Federation, Democratic Women’s League of Germany, and the 
Free German Youth.343   
 
Documents from the Department of Trade and Provision indicate that the subordination 
of the Konsum to the ideological policies of the SED continued well into the late 1950s.344  One 
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such document from the department of Trade and Provision from 13 August 1958 states the 
following: 
Co-operatives have been given the task of providing the population with their education 
in socialist principles in order for co-operators to make a significant contribution to the 
establishment of the socialist state power, and the formation of the political unity of our 
people.   The co-operatives have placed themselves at the disposal of the workers’ and 
farmers’ state and the new means of production.  As a mass-organization, they were 
committed to the development and consolidation of socialist consciousness amongst our 
citizens.345     
 
Combined, these quotations indicate that at least outwardly the Konsum wanted the SED to 
recognize it as a mass-organization.  Beyond that, however, it would be illusory to attempt to 
measure the sincerity of these statements.  Nevertheless, the following sub-section gives some 
concrete examples of what the Konsum did as a mass-organization and presents some of the 
ways that members reacted to this.    
4.2.2. Activities as a mass-organization and membership participation  
One of the main roles of the Konsum was the organization of monthly membership 
meetings.346  Generally, Konsum members who wanted to become party candidates were 
required to attend such meetings and then demonstrate a basic understanding of the fundamentals 
of Marxism-Leninism.347  The specific intention of these gatherings was to engender trust in the 
party.  These meetings were designed to increase the qualifications of all members so that they 
would be better able to implement party resolutions in their daily lives.348  To this end, attendees 
(employees, members, and youth) had to discuss political and ideological questions with 
propagandists in order to deepen their understanding of the socialist and working-class 
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worldview, as well as celebrate and give importance to events such as the 40th Anniversary of the 
October Revolution in 1957.349  At political meetings, the Konsum functionaries explained to 
workers and members the fundamental political policies of the party.  For instance, with the 
construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961, the Konsum was forced to explain the 
necessity of this construction as an “antifascist-protective-wall” and a measure necessary to 
preserve peace and protect the socialist state against the hostility of West-German agents and 
saboteurs.  In order to clarify the threats from the West, the Konsum held a membership meeting 
entitled: Why do the two German states confront each other as Enemies (Warum stehen sich die 
beiden deutschen Staaten feindlich gegenüber?)350  
The propaganda departments of the Konsum, moreover, helped speakers and 
propagandists prepare their addresses during these meetings.  Propagandists offered seminars, 
speeches, lectures, and consultations to answer various questions about the socialist construction 
in East Germany.351  These speakers were instructed to mobilize members politically and 
convince them that their criticisms were being addressed – thus, they were helping to improve 
co-operative work.352  Generally, these propagandists ensured that various political discussions 
took place.  Within the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Köpenick, for instance, a number of 
functionaries were charged with ensuring that ideological work was carried out smoothly.  As the 
secretary of the administration of this co-operative, Frau B. had to certify that there was a high 
level of political and ideological work in the form of high membership participation during these 
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meetings.  Furthermore, Herr H. was directly responsible for agitation and propaganda; he 
ensured that written and oral propaganda reflected the current and important political events of 
the day.353  In May 1961 in Leipzig, for instance, some of these political events included 
contemporary discussions about Gagarin’s first space flight, the Franco-Algerian War (1954 to 
1962), and the 15th Anniversary of the SED.  There were also general discussions about 
contemporary global politics, which included members declaring their solidarity in support of 
Cuba in 1961.354  This evidence reflects how the Konsum propagandists were promulgating the 
SED’s message and explicating international events within the wider discourse of the 
Communist Bloc.  What is more, it testifies to the active involvement of the SED in the Konsum. 
During a number of meetings, members also had the opportunity to converse, grumble, 
air grievances, and raise significant issues about the DDR’s current economic and supply 
situations.  For instance, at meetings of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig-Mitte, members 
vented their complaints and frustrations about the Konsum’s distribution practices along with the 
poor quality and shortages of its consumer goods.  Specifically, they grumbled about the 
inadequate supply of milk and the general unavailability of food products.355  In fact, when 
members did attend meetings, the primary motivation was likely to “blow off steam” and – as 
permitted by the powers above – to openly grumble.  Renowned anthropologist and political 
scientist James C. Scott would likely describe these meetings as something of a win-win 
situation for both the party elite and subordinate classes in the DDR, since the dominant actors 
allowed subordinates to express their anger in an environment that was controlled by the 
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powerful.  By participating in these meetings, subordinates were accepting the status quo and 
working within the state-controlled, state-observed, and state-monitored channels of venting or 
grumbling without directly challenging the state.  Nevertheless, Scott states, “The purpose of 
grumbling is often not simply self-expression, but the attempt to bring the pressure of discontent 
to bear on elites.  If the message is too explicit, its bearers risk open retaliation; if it is too vague, 
it passes unnoticed altogether.”356  As will be shown in Chapter 8, East Germans became 
especially well versed in the art of grumbling and exerting pressure on the state, without directly 
and openly challenging the authority and legitimacy of SED-rule.     
 The Konsum measured the ideological impact of its agitation and propaganda by 
measuring attendance in membership meetings.  While every member was encouraged to attend 
co-operative ideological meetings, attendance at them was generally low.357  In Herzberg 
(Brandenburg) in 1952, there was a reported participation rate of 59.2 percent in the membership 
meetings, which was an increase of around 22.8 percent from the previous year.  Within other 
co-operatives, however, the membership participation rate was declining.  The participation rate 
in Stendal (Saxony-Anhalt) was 42.5 percent in 1950 and dropped to 18 percent in 1952.  In 
other centres at that time (1952), the participation rates were even worse with only 12.1 percent 
in Gardelegen (Saxony-Anhalt), 12.3 percent in Osterburg (Saxony-Anhalt), and a mere 6.1 
percent in Berlin.  To increase participation, the membership meetings were reduced in 
Gardelegen and Osterburg from two nights per week to one.  More generally, the overall average 
participation rate dropped from 36 percent in 1951 to 27 percent in 1952.  The author of the 
report titled The Analysis and Results of the Representative Elections, Rudi Blankenburger, was 
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worried about this participation since “the membership meetings were necessary for the Konsum 
to develop into an aggressive mass-organization.”358  There were a total of sixteen membership 
meetings at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig-Nord in 1962 in which only eight percent of the 
members participated.359  There were multiple meetings held throughout the Konsum’s network 
in Leipzig which portray the meagre participation:  
KG Mitte 7.4 percent 
KG Südost 6.3 percent 
KG Süd  7.0 percent 
KG West  7.3 percent 
KG West  7.3 percent 
KG Nordost  9.0 percent 
         KG Nord         9.7 percent360 
 
The Konsum believed that this derisory and declining participation was based on inadequate 
preparations for the meetings, as well as this organization’s inability to gain the support of 
youth.361  Nevertheless, these numbers demonstrate that the membership was largely uninterested 
in the Konsum’s portrayal of contemporary politics and ideology.  When members did 
participate, they generally wanted to discuss the development of a retail trade network, the 
supply situation, and the amount of the patronage refund, rather than political and ideological 
concerns.362  This was, I think, evidence of selective participation in a mass-organization on 
one’s own terms.   
As a response to the dwindling turnout, the Konsum made various attempts to increase 
membership participation.  For instance, in 1962, the Konsum tried to improve its collaboration 
with the party, DFD, and within the National Front to siphon members from these other mass-
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organizations.363  Believing that promotional improvements would translate into increased 
attendance, the Konsum “prettied-up” (verschönt) its advertisements for meetings and cultural 
activities in shop window displays (see Illustration 7).364  At the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig-
Mitte where the average attendance was around 7.5 percent, the co-operative’s agitators 
personally invited members to meetings; in addition, they tried to improve the cultural 
opportunities and the promotional advertisements.365   
 
Illustration 7: A “prettied up” poster promoting the Konsum sponsored Cultural Ensemble and Variety 
Program in Plauen (Circa 1960s)366 
 
Cultural activities also took place during these meetings.367  The official purpose of all 
this was to increase membership participation in antifascist culture.368  Furthermore, by making 
improvements to the content of these activities and creating an active cultural life, certain 
members of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig-Süd believed this would translate into increased 
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efficiency in the workplace.369  By 1962, at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig-Süd all 
membership meetings included cultural performances such as people’s art shows, slide shows, 
films, fashion shows, and performances by students from local theatre and music groups.370  Two 
interviewees stated that they enjoyed the cultural activities organized by the Konsum, especially 
the dances and musical performances.371  The following images portray some these activities. 
 
Illustration 8: Konsum variety show and cultural activity in front of the slogan “The support of cultural 
activities is an important task of the Konsum” (date and place not given – likely the 1950s in Saxony)372 
 
 
Illustration 9: Konsum members enjoying Konsum sponsored cultural activities (date and place not given – 
likely the 1950s in Saxony)373 
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Illustration 10: A Konsum musical performance (date and place not given – likely the 1950s in Saxony)374 
 
The Konsum ultimately dedicated a significant portion of its limited resources to funding 
meetings, assemblies, and cultural activities so as to fulfill its ideological and cultural obligations 
(for specific monetary figures see section 4.2.4).  In January 1963, for instance, the 
administration of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig financially sponsored various activities 
including youth discussions (forty participants), a conference for store administrators (eighty 
participants), a women’s conference (eighty participants), and various educational courses 
(nearly five-hundred participants).  In March 1963, further activities were planned, including 
membership meetings with hundreds of members and participants expected.375   
The Konsum’s sponsorship of political meetings and cultural performances demonstrates 
some of the primary problems inherent in the entire system of East German socialism, namely 
putting the importance of political objectives before economic imperatives.  In my view, this was 
evident whenever the Konsum “wasted” the working hours of its employees in political and 
ideological training and vast resources on the aforementioned politicized activities.   
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During these meetings and performances, the Konsum tried to convince and persuade the 
masses of the correctness (Richtigkeit) of the political course of the SED government and to 
mobilize them for the great challenges during the “building of socialism” and the struggle for a 
unified, independent, peace-loving, and democratic Germany.  In other words, the Konsum had 
to help its customers and members develop an “aggressive spirit and to love and defend their 
homeland.”376  Additionally, this agitation was expected to convince the workers of the necessity 
to fulfill and over-fulfill economic plans.  The SED and the Konsum believed that this agitation 
was an important instrument in the political and ideological education of its members and in 
explaining co-operative tasks and duties.377  In 1952, the Konsum’s propaganda department 
stated, “these systematic activities and the propaganda work in the consumer co-operatives will 
contribute to the development of the socialist consciousness of its 2.5 million members.  By 
contributing to their ‘democratic’ education and ideological understanding, the consumer co-
operatives had transformed themselves into an aggressive mass-organization.”378  Of course, this 
politicisation was likely, by and large, offset by low attendance.   
The Konsum’s sponsored meetings and activities need not be interpreted as solely 
coercive.  Many members may have used their membership in the Konsum to pursue their own 
career ambitions, interests, and hobbies during these events.  This selective participation was 
often not politically relevant to the goals and objects of the SED’s brand of socialism.  Historian 
Mary Fulbrook suggests:  
Mass-organizations were not simply or always experienced as (merely) coercive, but 
were for many people at one time or another enabling, and experienced as a provider of 
entertainment and facilitator of holidays, hobbies and interest groups... But within this 
state-controlled organizational framework, large numbers of people were genuinely able 
to pursue certain leisure activities and follow their own interests, from fishing, singing 
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and bee-keeping to cacti collection, pottery and cooking, particularly when these were 
not obviously of immediate political relevance.379    
 
A former Konsum saleswoman, for example, revealed in an anonymous interview how “these 
activities were simply fun and entertaining,” indicating that Fulbrook’s argument is accurate in 
her case.380 
When asked if he considered the activities of the Union of the Consumer Co-operatives 
effective, Wolfgang Richter, a long-standing director of the consumer co-operative in Kreis 
Eilenburg, replied: “with what I know today and with my current attitude, my answer is Jein 
[yes/no or sort of].  The role of the consumer co-operatives as a mass-organization was largely 
deprecated.  Co-operative politics were largely ignored, especially since the election of the 
Volksvertretung (Representative body of the people) had nothing to do with us.”381  Similarly, 
historian Brett Fairbairn asserts, “on the one hand, the functionaries of the co-operatives were 
successful in their economic duties.  Politically, however, they did little to help the party 
implement its political objectives.”382  He further argues that the co-operatives often fell short of 
these ambitious political and ideological goals and their propaganda was often criticized for 
being too primitive; in general, the membership was more interested in attaining the patronage 
refund than in politics and ideology.383  The low attendance numbers at these meetings supports 
Fairbairn’s argument.  A 2011 interview with Ulrich Fitzkow, a (East) German civil engineer, 
also echoes Fairbairn’s contention: Fitzkow was not even aware that the Konsum was a mass-
organization.  In his words, “I am not aware of any political role played by the Konsum.  This 
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organization did not have a political role; rather it was an economic institution.”384  In the case of 
Fitzkow, it is likely that as a male professional he would have gained little clout, aside from the 
patronage refund, through political participation in the Konsum.  Another possibility is that 
perhaps people grew so accustomed to the constant propaganda that they did not perceive the 
Konsum as political.  What is more likely, however, is that women, as the primary caretakers of 
the family, consumers, and participants in wage labour, recognized that there were some 
advantages to be gained through their participation in the Konsum.  Not surprisingly, therefore, 
Fitzkow was, for a time, a member of the SED, while his wife was a member of the Konsum.385  
Another possibility may be that Fitkow’s statement reflects the de-politicization of East German 
society.     
4.2.3. The Konsum as a women’s mass-organization  
 
The Konsum attempted to recruit women to accrue female support for the SED-state.  As 
a mass-organization, according to the guidelines of the SED for the re-establishment of the 
consumer co-operatives dated 24 August 1946, “the consumer co-operatives were a democratic 
organization and had to support the struggle of the antifascist parties against Nazism, militarism 
and imperialism, as well as contribute to the overcoming of Nazi ideology and to spread socialist 
ideas, especially to women.”386  The Konsum perceived and further expressed the image of 
woman as the “finance minister” of the family, responsible for daily consumption.  For this 
reason, the Konsum directed its propaganda at women in an effort to recruit them as members.  
In an attempt to tap into female labour reserves, the Konsum also tried to convey to women that 
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they had ample work opportunities within this organization.387  The party clearly recognized the 
potential of the Konsum for this task.388  With a mass membership, the Konsum was – as the 
party rightly perceived – in a position to educate and integrate groups of the population that were 
outside of the party’s reach, especially women.  Unlike the SED and the unions, the Konsum was 
primarily a women’s organization, almost something akin to the DFD but without the official 
status as such.  In 1947, of its 147,000 functionaries and employees, eighty-three percent or 
122,000 of whom were women.389  Co-operatives were to integrate women into the emerging 
socialist order in the Soviet Zone through various means of propaganda.390   
In 1945/46, when there were still open and free elections in the SBZ, the KPD/SED made 
extensive efforts to encourage women to participate actively in politics. The re-established 
consumer co-operatives were among the few mechanisms available to the emerging régime to 
encourage women into making the transition into public life.  On 13 November 1946, Lehmann 
gave the Konsum a new mandate.  To translate his words, “the newly formed co-operatives had 
to ensure that women and housewives participated in public life, so that they were not confined 
to the narrow realms of their families.  Rather, the Konsum was to encourage women to offer 
their services to the wider community.”391  
The Konsum urged women to use their free time in certain ways.392  As a mass-
organization, the Konsum sought to keep women active outside of the working day in the form of 
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political meetings and cultural activities.  During these meetings, the Konsum recruited women 
to the party and translated the SED’s message into easily accessible forms, although the 
messages being promulgated were not necessarily negative.  In fact, the intention of this 
propaganda was to encourage women to think beyond the home and family and to consider 
higher education and training, as well as the possibility of assuming positions of leadership in the 
Konsum and the party.393  The Konsum also created women’s committees through which women 
were to receive political and ideological education concerning the goals and primary objectives 
of the “workers’ and farmers’ state.”  In this way, the meetings and committees promoted the 
development of female propagandists and agitators.394   
Even though the party used the Konsum to carry out its political objectives, women also 
used their participation in this organization to their advantage.  It will become manifest in Part III 
that voluntarism in the Konsum was used as a tactic to foster good relations with Konsum 
employees and to acquire wanted consumer goods.  To speculate further, participation may have 
allowed women to demonstrate that they were actively involved in party institutions and 
spending their free time in appropriate ways.  This imperative to “take part” was almost certainly 
more pronounced in rural communities where choice and the limited options available were 
factors.       
4.2.4. Mass-organization and youth 
 The Konsum actively supported and invested in youth.  The aim of this investment was to 
mobilize and prepare young people to carry out party and government tasks, to meet the 
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challenges of fulfilling the five-year-plans, and to educate them in matters of socialism.395  
Furthermore, the Konsum aimed to develop their class-consciousness and their ability to work as 
cadres and functionaries.  Through daily work with youth, the Konsum sought to awaken in them 
a love of country and work.396    
The Konsum used its network of schools to build up a reserve of educated, young 
adults.397  In Altenburg, the Konsum offered young residents wide ranging educational 
opportunities; for instance, there was a youth-oriented course on the fundamentals of Marxism-
Leninism.  The Altenburg Konsum School also held practical courses on retail trade, restaurant 
management, and sales.398  Students were able to take language courses in Russian, French, 
English, Polish, and Czech.399  The regional administration of the Konsum was pleased that its 
network of schools continued to expand and that the general participation of young girls rose by 
27.3 percent in 1961.400 
The Konsum, furthermore, developed plans to invest in, interact with, and support 
youth.401  The Konsumgenossenschaft-Lichtenburg in Berlin, for example, made direct financial 
investment in youth: 2,500DM for youth work; 300DM for education; 500DM for summer and 
winter vacations; 600DM for cultural events; 350DM for theatre and film visits; and 150DM for 
the creation of cultural groups.402  At the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Köpenick, every party 
member was given a commission to work with two young employees in order to convince them 
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to become candidates of the party.403  The administration of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig-
Südwest considered the political and educational development of youth as one of its most 
important responsibilities.  This was accomplished by training young people for administrative 
positions and through Konsum-sponsored youth hiking trips and visits to the theatre and 
cinema.404  The Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Pankow utilized the monthly youth meetings to 
teach young members to trust the fundamentals of Marxist-Leninism; the party leadership 
supported this strategy within this co-operative.  The Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Pankow also 
held meetings to discuss contemporary political and economic questions in support of the youth 
club – Der Klub junger Neuerer.405    
 The Konsum opened retail outlets for youth and youth clubs for which its young workers 
were responsible – all of this was done with the assistance of the FDJ.406  With their combined 
financial support, the Konsum and the FDJ built 191 facilities with a capacity of 14,200 spaces.  
By controlling the election of suitable young candidates to run these facilities, these projects 
were designed to spread state influence to young people.  With the construction of the youth club 
installations in the countryside, the Konsum and the SED believed that the needs of the youth 
were being met by virtue of intellectually stimulating entertainment and cultural activities.407  
Furthermore, as cultural centres, the Konsum restaurants were required to hold various social 
events, which were meant to be popular with youth.  In short, these rural cultural centres had a 
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direct influence not only on young East Germans, but also on the general population, garnering 
their support for the wide societal changes that were to take place in the countryside.408  
4.2.5. The Konsum’s role as a mass-organization in the countryside (rural restaurants) 
Rural inhabitants of the SBZ/DDR had long-standing religious traditions and regional 
peculiarities that did not coincide with the SED’s modernist ideology and socialist 
transformations.  The SBZ was comprised of a large amount of rural territory, with almost a third 
of the population living in communities of 2,000 residents or less.  The SED soon recognized the 
difficulty of reaching and providing these communities with cultural entertainment in ways that 
corresponded to the modernist ideal of socialism.  Subsequently, the SED became particularly 
concerned about lingering nationalist and racist traditions in the countryside.409  To this end, the 
party used the Konsum to implement its designs for social and cultural transformations, namely 
creating new party-approved social and cultural infrastructure in the countryside.410  With 
millions engaged at some capacity in these events, the SED had a degree of success in 
establishing a new cultural language and new traditions of socialism in rural communities.   
Traditionally, the Gasthaus (inn with a restaurant) played a central role in rural life as a 
meeting point of the cultural life of the town or village.  However, according to the document the 
Consumer Co-operatives in the German Democratic Republic (published by the Konsum in the 
late 1960s), the role of the Gasthaus was not always positive in this regard, as it was typically 
more of a Dorf-Kneipe (village-pub).411  In the view of the SED, the establishment of Konsum-
Gaststätten and state sponsored cultural activities had to neutralize and negate the manifestations 
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of backwardness, such as the town pub, that lingered from the capitalist epoch in the 
countryside.412  For this reason, the Konsum began to bring a new Gaststättenkultur (restaurant 
and leisure culture) to the countryside.  In other words, the Konsum – as the party and VDK 
intended – became a focal point of political, ideological, leisure, and cultural activities in the 
countryside.  Through Konsum leisure activities, the party presented itself and its achievements 
to the rural population of the DDR.  More importantly for the SED, the Konsum served as a 
central reference point of social and cultural communication; that is, (like all mass-organizations) 
it acted as a “transmission-belt” of cultural codes, party ideology, and the symbolism of 
socialism to individuals in rural communities.  The SED and the Konsum believed that the 
socialist transformation of the countryside was one of the most difficult tasks faced by the party 
during the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.  During this process, the rural 
consumer co-operatives were like a base of operations for the working-classes in the countryside, 
where the Konsum created a wide network of restaurants intended to be centres for social, 
political, and cultural life.413   
In Bezirk Leipzig in 1957 (see map in section 11.1.), the Konsum took over thirty-six 
restaurants, thereby increasing the number to 104, with an increased turnover of approximately 
ten million Marks.  For many Konsum functionaries, the operation of a restaurant was an entirely 
new undertaking; nevertheless, they continued to expand and improve the network in order to 
transform these restaurants into cultural meeting points for each and every town and village in 
the DDR.414  In 1959, there were 4,000 Konsum restaurants, which served as cultural centres 
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where lectures were given, films shown, and parties celebrated.415  The SED wanted the Konsum 
retail outlet and restaurant to be the only possibility for cultural consumption in rural locales.  
That way, the party could control which products were consumed along with the message of 
consumption, while observing the behaviour of the restaurant patrons.  In other words, the rural 
restaurant was – as the SED wanted and intended – becoming the sole cultural meeting point of 
the new socialist town.416   
The party stressed that co-operative cultural work and activities were significantly 
important.  For that reason, the SED continually demanded that the co-operative network be 
strengthened both politically and economically in order to influence cultural life in the smaller 
centres of the DDR.417  These co-operative restaurants sponsored various cultural activities in 
which elements of the new socialist lifestyle were apparent.418  Thus, one could find a number of 
state-sponsored activities that were – as the interviews conducted for this dissertation suggest – 
genuinely popular with rural residents.  For instance, they offered a range of cultural activities, 
including fashion shows, film screenings, and town parties.419  Customers, according to historian 
Manfred Kirsch, praised co-operative cultural groups (choirs, amateur plays, dance groups), as 
well as child-oriented activities (kindergarten and fashion shows).420   
Fitzkow stated in an interview “the consumer co-operatives were a significant meeting 
place (Treffpunkt) in the countryside for rural inhabitants.”421  In fact, all of the interviewees 
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mentioned that they had, at one time or another, eaten in Konsum restaurants – an experience 
which they all genuinely seemed to enjoy.  According to Kirsch, the entire family ate there, 
especially farmers during the harvest.  He also posits that co-operative members enjoyed their 
time there as most of these Konsum restaurants were equipped with a hall in which various 
events took place, such as harvest festivals and other cultural and sporting experiences.422  In 
perhaps an over idealized tone Kirsch states, “the consumer co-operative restaurant became a 
neighbourly destination in which one could enjoy a Lübzer Pils following the working day.”423   
It is, however, difficult to estimate and measure the ideological and social impact of the 
cultural centres on East Germans.424  What is certain was the intention of the SED to use Konsum 
bars and restaurants as conduits for direct contact with citizens of the DDR.425  Simply put, East 
Germans could not avoid the Konsum’s ubiquitous 6,300 restaurants, the majority of which were 
located in the countryside.426  During the co-operative meetings in the countryside, the VDK, as 
previously mentioned, normally recorded the participation rate of thirty to forty percent of the 
membership and the workers; moreover, the sales committees particularly bound the membership 
to the Konsum.  In the cities, however, the participation of the membership was significantly 
worse (see membership numbers from Leipzig in section 4.2.2). 427    
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Illustration 11: Konsumgaststätte Sarmstorf near Güstrow, 1960428 
 
According to Dr. W. Köppert’s Konsum publication of 1958 titled The Profitability of 
Rural Consumer Co-operatives, “the consumer co-operatives in East Germany had diverse 
propaganda opportunities with which to help the working-class during the difficult 
transformation from capitalism by supporting the rule of the SED.  In this situation, the Konsum 
had a particular advantage because of their status as a political mass-organization.”429  In 
recognizing the political potential of the rural consumer co-operatives, Köppert stated:  
By the Third Co-operative Congress held in 1955, sixty percent of all rural and 
agricultural families were members of the consumer co-operatives.  One, therefore, can 
clearly recognize the enormous potential co-operatives held over this segment of the 
population.  The co-operatives functioned as an educational tool for the rural 
membership.  The co-operatives were authentic schools of democracy and of socialism, 
which will train cadres to become leading functionaries in co-operative industries.  These 
functionaries will, then, be leaders and at the forefront of the socialist transformation of 
agriculture.430   
 
The VDK helped the party transform the countryside by creating new cultural spaces in 
the form of a network of co-operative restaurants.431  The aim of this cultural work was to spread 
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collectivist and socialist thought, as well as to create new cultural symbols in an area of Germany 
that the Soviets perceived as a former hotbed of German militarism.432  Historian Eric 
Hobsbawm might describe what occurred in the DDR countryside as “inventing traditions” (i.e., 
the creation of state holidays, ceremonies, heroes, or symbols), which – unlike spontaneous 
generation – have specific political and social functions and would never come into existence if 
not through state pressure.433  To put it another way, this was an attempt at totalitarian social 
engineering with three overlapping characteristics: a) the establishment of symbols to create 
social cohesion among included membership groups and the exclusion of the unwanted so as to 
create real or imagined communities, b) the establishment and legitimatization of institutions and 
systems of hierarchy and authority, and c) the establishment of systems of beliefs, value systems, 
and codes of proper behaviour.434  
4.2.6. Konsum publications (the link between party and consumer) 
  On 20 August 1948, the Konsum requested a licence from the SMAD to publish its own 
newspapers for members and functionaries.  In its request to the SMAD, the Konsum indicated 
that this newspaper would be a connecting link between functionaries and members.  The format 
of the initial paper was about eight pages.  Every month 5,000 copies were to be published.  The 
intent of publishing so many copies was to ensure that every member and functionary would 
have a copy in hand.  The typical context of the newspaper read as follows:  
1. Articles about the responsibilities and goals of the Konsum, as well as the political 
importance of the consumer co-operative movement.  
2. Publications of the guidelines for the recruitment of Konsum functionaries and reports 
about the work in the co-operative schools.  
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3. Reports about individual co-operatives and their contributions to supply.   
4. Publications dealing with specialist education and training of the sales personnel, as 
well as information for trainees in advertisement, window display, decoration, and the 
graphic design of posters.   
5. The dissemination of co-operative news from all over the world.435   
    
In August 1948, the SMAD gave the Konsum a licence to publish the monthly 
Konsumgenossenschaftlichen Mitteilungen to educate, mobilize, inform, and politicize its 
members and functionaries.436  From that point on, the consumer co-operatives published a 
number of newspapers in which advice for the Marxist notion of the “use value of commodities” 
could be found.437  Ultimately, according to Holland, the SED-controlled VDK had final 
authority over co-operative publications and the dissemination of the Konsum’s monthly 
publications.438    
The consumer co-operatives developed a number of other publications: Konsum-
genossenschafter, Konsumgenossenschaftliche Mitteilungsblatt, die Konsumverkaufsstelle, and 
die Handelswoche.439  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Konsum began to increase the 
circulation of its co-operative publications; the objective behind this expansion was to increase 
the development of antifascist life in the membership organizations and enhance the political and 
economic work of the consumer co-operatives.440  The Konsum publications continued to deal 
with education and instructions for members and functionaries within the 
Verkaufsstellenausschüsse (consumer committees).  During this time, the press devoted a great 
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deal of its resources to the monthly Blick vorwärts (look forward), which dealt with the 
fundamental principles and challenges facing the Konsum.  The weekly newspaper, Konsum-
Genossenschafter, (consumer co-operator) appeared in over 130,000 copies, and described the 
tasks and objectives of the Konsum; it also gave practical advice and instructions for the daily 
operations of retail outlets.  Over half of the published contributions came from its readers, 
among them members, honorary functionaries, and employees from the retail outlets.  In another 
way, this newspaper acted as a forum to coordinate the efforts and energies of every branch of 
the Konsum to carry out successful co-operative work.441    
During the SBZ and the initial decades of the DDR, the Konsum produced these 
publications to shore up its political responsibilities as a mass-organization and to “re-educate” 
the German people by creating a new socialist mentality (Denkweise) among women, members, 
workers, and functionaries.442  Specifically, the content of the newspaper supported the 
Konsum’s role as a mass-organization by including the following themes and objectives: a) 
deepen co-operative thought amongst members and functionaries; b) demonstrate the connection 
between politics and economics; c) discuss SED orders given to the Konsum; d) explain 
statistical material about the development of the Konsum in the SBZ and the British, American, 
and French occupied zones of Germany; e) educate through articles about commercial business; 
and f) serve as an educational paper (Schulungsblatt) and as a contemporary news source 
(Mitteilungsblatt).443   
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Illustration 12: A selection of the various Konsum publications444 
 
Konsum newspapers not only produced articles about individual employees (especially 
women), but also featured the ways in which their work and contributions furthered the socialist 
project and state narrative.  For instance, a report about a female member from the co-operative 
newspaper Konsum-Verkaufsstelle dated 1 February 1958 is couched in political and ideological 
language.  It deals with the work of Gertrud Mundstock, a co-operative worker and member, who 
describes her efforts to convince other co-operative members about the correctness of the “party 
of the working-class” and the “government of the “workers’ and peasants’ state.”  Moreover, the 
report gives her credit for supporting and organising the combined ideological efforts of the co-
operatives with the DFD and the committees of the National Front.  The report concludes with 
the following: “her active work in the consumer co-operatives and the other societal 
organizations is highly valued, because she is a mother of five.”  This quote is revealing in that it 
is encouraging women to be both mothers and active members of society.  This ‘double burden’ 
was the expectation for women to be responsible for housework and participate in wage 
labour.445  Similarly, the Konsum newspaper Handelswoche wrote a report about Thea Bellstedt 
                                                
444 SWA: U2/618, Geschäftsbericht des Vorstands des Verbandes Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften für 
das Jahr 1956, Beschlossen auf der 8. Tagung des Genossenschaftsrates des Verbandes Deutscher 
Konsumgenossenschaften, 31. 
445 AKB: Konsum-Verkaufsstelle Nr. 3, 18 January 1958, 5. 
142 
 
 
 
in July 1959.  Bellstedt, as the newspaper article describes her, was a hard worker, who always 
had time for a friendly word with her customers.  Then the article becomes increasingly political 
by promoting her ideological contributions and notes that she founded the first workers’ brigade 
at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Mühlhausen the previous year and was an active member of the 
FDJ.446        
 The Konsum publications categorized women and explicated women’s roles in East 
German society.  These categories included housewives, consumers, working mothers and so on.  
However, beginning in the late 1950s, the state became less tolerant of housewifery as a 
legitimate occupation and there was increased pressure on women to achieve the ideal: the fully 
employed mother.  In 1965, there was an actual shift in the Family Law declaring housewifery as 
“backward consciousness.”447  Yet, because they were not integrated into the mainstream world 
of work and politics and by extension the ideal promoted by East German discourse, the issue of 
unemployed housewives was a problematic and persistent category.  Hence, the Konsum, along 
with the DFD, appealed particularly to these women in their capacity as consumers, but also tried 
to integrate unemployed women into the workforce by giving them auxiliary jobs.  By including 
women in the Konsum as factory workers, members, consumers, and sales personnel, the 
Konsum helped form the categories through which women were able to participate in East 
German socialism. These categorizations permeated all aspects of Konsum publications, and the 
political discourse it constructed became the blueprints for female identity and participation in 
East Germany.  In a sense, the East German woman was the product or subject of these 
ideological manifestations, yet also the manipulator of them in ways, which were separate from 
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the interests of their producer – the SED and the Konsum.448  This role of integrating women into 
the socialist project remained largely intact and signifies the more static nature and stolid role of 
the Konsum.   
In 1970, the Konsum started an advertising newspaper to educate the public about new 
commodities.  The paper was delivered four times throughout the course of the year to every 
membership household.  It was a delicate process for the publishers to direct the attention of 
consumers to goods that were scarcely available, while simultaneously drawing their attention to 
the political themes of the day.  For instance, Konsum advertising of the H 55 TK (a cupboard) 
depicted this item as essential for the modern household, but customers were angered by having 
to wait a year or more for the H 55 TK.  This advertising also had to attune readers to the current 
political situation.  For instance, in 1970 the newspaper commemorated the 100th anniversary of 
Lenin’s birth.  That year, Konsum advertisers and publishers were, for the most part, unable to 
print a piece of paper without it paying homage to Lenin.449   
Furthermore, DDR advertising was not designed to increase profit for certain goods; 
rather it was meant to inform and educate the population about new products on the market and 
political events, slogans, anniversaries, and, of course, the antifascist narrative.  More generally, 
the Konsum publications indicate that the line between advertising and political propaganda was 
blurred and murky.  Generally, this advertising/propaganda promoted the régime and the socialist 
way of life rather than the Konsum and the wares it produced.  More importantly, however, these 
publications were used to regulate demand through “rhetorical misdirection” or to draw the 
attention of consumers away from scarce goods to surplus products.450   
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Once the Konsum became a member of the International Co-operative Alliance in 1971, it 
began to export its publications overseas, which were printed in the language of the targeted 
country.  With access to these publications, the international co-operative public was informed of 
developments in the Konsum and the DDR vis-á-vis the “Magazine of the Consumers’ Co-
operatives of the DDR” and similar periodicals which were designed for foreign readers in all 
parts of the world.451   
Konsum publications promoted the plans, industries, functionaries, members, and 
achievements of the Konsum.  Of course, all of this was more broadly contextualized to fit within 
the broader antifascist state narrative by drawing attention to the ways in which the Konsum 
industries and employees were realizing the SED’s economic and political objectives.452  
Furthermore, Konsum publications demonstrate the difference between official representation 
(what James C. Scott would describe as part of the public transcript) and private communications 
(the hidden transcript).  As archival sources, there are clear reasons to trust and mistrust these 
publications.  The VDK published them as a means of instruction, indoctrination, and 
propaganda.  Hence, these publications need to be carefully interpreted as they were neither 
completely trustworthy nor objective; these documents, nevertheless, say a great deal about the 
political discourse and the language used in East Germany, as well as what the state expected 
from its citizenry.  Ultimately, Konsum publications are a useful tool to learn about what I 
pejoratively describe as East German language or DDR Deutsch.   
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4.3. Conclusions 
During the years of the Soviet occupation between 1945 and 1949, on top of their 
economic function of supplying the population, the SED assigned the cooperatives with the task 
of politically educating their members, thereby transforming the Konsum into a mass-
organization.453  And so to answer the question raised at the beginning of this chapter, the Union 
of the Consumer Co-operatives of the DDR was both an effective and ineffective mass-
organization.  As a communication system, the Konsum – with its extensive network of retail 
outlets and publications – established direct and unremitting contact with its primary target 
groups and was able to attempt to infuse ideology into their daily experiences and leisure 
activities.  It must be remembered that the Konsum was the second largest mass-organization in 
East Germany, with 4.1 million members in 1971 and 4.6 million in 1987.454  Unlike other SED 
controlled mass-organizations, such as the Free German Youth with an allocation of fifty 
representatives and the Democratic Women’s League of Germany with an allocation of thirty-
five representatives, co-operatives were neither officially represented in the People’s Chamber 
(Volkskammer), nor was there a fixed number of Konsum representatives in the Central 
Committee and the SED controlled Politburo.  But due to high Konsum membership numbers 
and unremitting contact with specific segments of the East German population targeted by the 
SED, this organization was a relatively effective instrument for spreading ideology, as well as a 
useful propaganda tool and mobilizing force for the state.  Evidently, its impact on individuals is 
exceedingly difficult to measure.  I therefore base my conclusions on the sheer size of the 
organization and its massive network of members, sales outlets, workers and functionaries, its 
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close proximity to women, youth, and rural residents and the statements made by those 
interviewed for this dissertation.  Furthermore, the SED and the Konsum controlled cultural 
activities in the countryside and encouraged East Germans to spend their leisure time doing 
certain “party-approved” activities in certain “party-approved” ways.  Therefore, these activities 
became a totalitarian incursion into their daily lives.  Accordingly, I believe that historian Jan 
Bösche is correct when he argues that the SED valued the political role that the consumer co-
operatives played with their mass membership because they were well-positioned to conduct 
ideological work, namely convincing the population that “the party is always right.”455   
Nevertheless, Fulbrook is also correct when she states, “only a minority of members 
swallowed the ‘political-ideological slogans’ of the respective organizations at face value.”456  In 
fact, participation in the Konsum’s political meetings and cultural activities may have been 
nothing more than individuals pursuing their own leisure interests and attempting to verify in 
their personal biographies that they were participating and volunteering in the appropriate 
recreational activities, though they may have had to regurgitate a few ideological slogans in 
order to do so.  Perhaps for this reason the SED valued the consumer co-operatives because they 
appeared to members to be semi-autonomous from the régime.  Of course, the role of a mass-
organization was to serve as messenger or “transmission-belt” and persuade the masses of the 
correctness of the ruling party and its ideology.  In the context of this chapter, it has been shown 
that a number of societal groups each with their own motivations converged in the Konsum 
(junction) in the form of people participating to pursue leisure activities as opposed to being 
subject to ideological persuasion.  The ensuing chapter will explore how the Konsum carried out 
a similar role of a propagandistic “transmission-belt” internationally.    
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5. International role of the Konsum 
 
The Konsum encourages friendly relations with the West German co-operatives and supports co-
operators from both German states in their struggle for peace, democracy, and social progress.   
- From the statutes of the Konsum (date not given)457 
 
 
Illustration 13: A.P. Klimov (rt.), President of Centrosoyus, the Russian state-owned co-operative 
organization, and Dr. Heinz Fahrenkrog, President of the Association of Consumers’ Co-operatives in 1975 
The original caption from this document reads: “an agreement signed between two fraternally allied co-op 
organizations on continued scientific and technological co-operation and intensification of socialist economic 
integration is sealed with a cordial handshake between.”458  
                                                
457 SSC: 3078/1077/1, Konsumgenossenschaft Statut (date not given), 5. 
458 AKB: 1114/A12, Dr. Heinz Fahrenkrog, President of the Union of Consumer Co-operative Societies of 
the GDR, The Consumer Co-operative Societies in the German Democratic Republic, 88. 
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The history of modern Germany has been strongly influenced and at times even 
determined by the course of international events.  The same is true for the history of German co-
operatives, which were caught up in the division of the two Germanies, the Cold War, and a 
complicated web of German-German relations that existed both in periods of tension and détente.  
It was against this backdrop that the Konsum waged its struggle against the alleged evils of 
imperialism, neo-colonialism, and racism.  Moreover, this chapter shows that the Konsum 
attempted to persuade its citizens, West Germans, and national co-operative organizations of the 
justness of the DDR and the Soviet Union’s foreign policy.459  In these respects, Konsum foreign 
policy clearly reflected the SED links with Soviet bloc countries.  VDK President Heinz 
Fahrenkrog further explicated Konsum support of SED foreign policy in a 1975 publication 
commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the East German consumer co-operatives: 
Results and experience underpin the lesson history has taught us, namely that friendship 
with the Soviet Union and other countries of the community of socialist states is the 
foundation of the all-round and continuous development of the DDR, of ensuring its 
independence and of creating the most favourable conditions for its peaceful 
construction.  The DDR is an integral part of the community of socialist states and it 
maintains fraternal links with its friends through bilateral and multilateral contracts in 
political, economic, technical, intellectual, cultural and other spheres.  And so do the 
consumers’ co-operatives.  Strong bonds of friendship and fraternal co-operation exist 
between the co-operative organizations of the socialist countries.  Close relations which 
are continually intensifying have existed with all co-operative organizations of the 
European socialist CMEA countries for many years now.460   
 
5.1. The Konsum and the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) 
 The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) was founded in London in August 1895.  
This first forum of the ICA was attended by co-operative organizations from Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Holland, Italy, Russia, Serbia, Great Britain, Australia, India, Argentina, and the United 
States.  The ICA – at least initially – saw itself as an organization that was determined to help the 
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working classes.461  At the 1896 Congress, the ICA took a strong stand on religious and political 
neutrality as indicated by the following statement: 
The Alliance does not concern itself with either politics or religion.  Co-operation is a 
neutral ground on which people holding the most varied opinion and professing the most 
diverse needs may meet and act in common.  In order to maintain this neutrality, on 
which the unity of co-operative movement depends, every person and association in 
membership of the Alliance recognizes that co-operation is self-sufficient and must not 
serve as the instrument of any party.462 
  
During the Cold War, these ideas influenced the ways in which the ICA perceived co-operation 
in Eastern Bloc/communist countries, especially the idea that co-operation was voluntary and 
free of state intervention.463   
The Konsum tried to join the ICA on several occasions.  A memorandum written by the 
Verband-Berliner-Konsumgenossenschaften to the ICA on 1 January 1947 indicates that the 
functionaries and members of the Berlin Konsum were very pleased that delegates from the ICA 
had come to Berlin to inspect the conditions for the reconstruction of the consumer co-operatives 
that were destroyed by the Nazi régime.  This memorandum also pointed out that the Konsum 
was prepared to implement the ICA’s instructions, provide all requested information and 
documents, and permit ICA inspection of already reconstructed co-operative installations.464  
The closing paragraph of the memorandum states:  
We hoped that all the co-operatives in all of Germany can be unified into a single 
association and that the German co-operatives can once again be accepted into the ICA.  
We have done everything within our power to exterminate Nazi ideology, overcome the 
spirit of militarism, and, with all of our democratic resources, help with the 
reconstruction of a new Germany, thereby ensuring that there is world peace.465   
 
                                                
461 Rita Rhodes, The International Co-operative Alliance During War and Peace (Geneva: International 
Co-operative Alliance, 1995), 21-24. 
462 Ibid., 25. 
463 Ibid., 5. 
464 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/113, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker , Verband Berliner 
Konsumgenossenschaften G.m.b.H., Berlin, den 27.1.47, Memorandum, An die in Berlin weilenden Herren der 
Studienkommission des Internationalen Genossenschaftsbundes, 36. 
465 Ibid., 41. 
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In spite of these efforts, the ICA became aware of the repression and violation of basic 
co-operative principles taking place in the East German Konsum.  The position taken by the ICA, 
nevertheless, did not deter the East Germans from attempting to join the ICA in 1948, only to be 
rejected.  Again, in mid-1949, six regional co-operative unions of the VDK applied for 
membership into the ICA.  In response, the ICA executive stalled and the applications were 
considered only in November 1949, as the ICA’s experts doubted that DDR co-operatives were 
democratic.  As a result, a debate within the ICA ensued over how Rochdale co-operative 
principles could be followed within a Communist system.466  This debate again resulted in the 
rejection of the DDR in 1949, as the ICA determined the following: 
Co-operative Organization must be completely free and independent and must be able to 
take up a position with regard to all the problems which affect their own interests, or the 
general interests, independent of the State and public authorities generally, as well as of 
private organizations (political parties).  In countries where a dictatorship exists, and 
where there is substantially only one party and a single political movement, where the 
right of free association is denied and where any divergent opinions are suppressed, free 
and independent Co-operative Organization cannot exist.467   
 
The central committee of the ICA met in Helsinki in 1950 and confirmed that East German 
membership should be rejected, along with several other Eastern European applications. 
Fairbairn writes that the ICA’s decision to reject East Germany’s application “appears 
understandable not only on the basis of who composed the ICA, but also – even more so – on the 
basis of the information available to it [SPD sources].  As we have seen, the information on what 
was occurring in East Germany was not 100 percent accurate, but it was accurate enough for all 
that.”468  Subsequently, the 1954 and 1960 East German applications were rejected.469  
                                                
466 Fairbairn, "Co-operative Values and the Cold War," 19. 
 467 Minutes of the meeting of the ICA Executive, 1949, as quoted in Rhodes, The International Co-
operative Alliance During War and Peace: 332. 
 468 Fairbairn, "Co-operative Values and the Cold War," 19-21;  Ibid. 
469 Ibid., 19. 
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During the 1950s and 1960s very few, if any, Western and capitalist countries, including 
West Germany and the United States, recognized the DDR as a state.  Wider recognition only 
came in the 1970s with the onset of improved relations between East and West Germany based 
on the policy of Ostpolitik.470  In accordance with Ostpolitik, the SED wanted to use the 
Konsum’s membership in the ICA as a platform to promote its principles, foreign policy 
initiatives, and struggle for peace.  According to an archival document from 1961, “the Konsum 
had to struggle for the diplomatic recognition of the DDR and for the improvement of its 
standing and authority on the world stage.”471  To accomplish these objectives, the Konsum 
produced propaganda brochures (Auslandspropaganda des VDK) entitled “The Democracy in the 
Consumer Co-operatives of the German Democratic Republic” and “Welcome to the Consumer 
Co-operatives in the DDR.”  All of these were printed in three foreign languages.472   
East German Konsum publications berated West Germany and its co-operative 
organizations for rejecting its membership application.  In an article published in 1957 from the 
cooperative publication Blick vorwärts, Werner Krüger argues that the ICA and the 
“Zentralverband deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften [ZdK or West German cooperatives] were, 
although under a so-called the ‘flag of neutrality’, actively supporting West German political 
initiatives.”473  Krüger also suggested, “monopoly capitalism, which was personified by the West 
German government, has suppressed the ZdK from becoming an antifascist mass-organization 
and rejected the Konsum’s application.”474  The Soviet representative in the ICA described the 
Konsum’s rejections from this organization in Paris in 1960 as “blatant political discrimination” 
                                                
470 Fulbrook, A History of Germany: 181. 
471 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/137, Author Unkown, Bericht über die Prüfung der Abteilung 
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directed towards co-operative organizations from socialist countries.  “This discrimination had 
resulted in,” according to his speech, “the divisions of the co-operative movement.”475   
At an international co-operative conference held in the DDR in 1966, President Weiss, 
the acting president of the VDK, encouraged the ICA to recognize the DDR and co-operative 
societies in emerging communist states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.  Only then, as Weiss 
believed, would the ICA develop into a truly international organization.  In the following 
quotation, it seems that Herr Weiss wanted the legitimacy of ICA membership, while 
downplaying its recurring rejection of communist states:   
The International Co-operative Alliance is called upon to unite the co-operative forces of 
the world.  But the ICA today has no more than 163 million co-operative members; it 
thus unites far less than half of all co-operative members in the world within its ranks.  
The extension of international co-operative relations and contacts calls for a contribution 
by the ICA to an exchange of delegations, literature and experiences in the sphere of co-
operative construction.  Co-operatives at present not yet members of the ICA should not 
be excluded from that co-operation.  The time has come to pursue a policy of friendly co-
operation on an equal footing, as aspired by the DDR and by many states of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America; the time has come for the ICA to develop into a genuinely 
international organization which unites co-operative members of the whole world.476     
 
The ICA, however, rejected the appeal of President Weiss.  After all, this was the time of the 
Cold War, which heavily impacted West German relations with the VDK.   
In 1969, there was a change of West German leadership from Kurt Georg Kiesinger, a 
CDU politician who perceived the DDR as an aberration, to Willy Brandt.  In 1970, Brandt 
championed the easing of Cold War tensions via his foreign policy initiative hailed as Ost-
Politik.  In return for improved relations with the Soviet Bloc, West Germany recognized the 
DDR as a state; this also meant an improvement in relations between East and West German co-
operatives.  The leading committee of the ICA voted unanimously in Bucharest in October 1971 
                                                
475 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/137, Rede des sowjetischen Vertreters auf der Tagung des Zentral-
komitees des IGB zur Frage der Mitgliedschaft, Paris, Januar 1960, 1. 
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to include the Konsum.  At this Congress of the ICA, it was suddenly determined that the 
Konsum had made enough progress to be granted membership.  The former reasons for denial 
included the lack of independent planning due to subjugation to the state’s planning authorities; 
forced or state driven co-operation (Zwangsgenossenschaften); the absence of political neutrality; 
and being under the authority of a third party – the SED.477   
As a member of the International Co-operative Alliance, the Konsum worked closely with 
co-operatives from the Soviet Bloc, as well as from western states.  According to an official 
DDR publication from 1985, the Konsum – through its connections within the ICA – resolutely 
strove for peace, social progress, and the elimination of the arms race.  The consumer co-
operatives were also committed to the national and social liberation of struggling peoples.  
Specifically, at the Konsum’s international co-operative school, cadres from “nationally 
liberated” states were educated.  Many of these countries were going through a process of 
decolonization and maintaining or establishing ties to the Soviet Union, including Cuba, Kenya, 
Uganda, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Basutoland, Iraq, Indonesia, India, and Burma.  The VDK 
also maintained active relations with special organizations of the United Nations, as well as 
UNESCO and ILO.478  At the Tenth Konsum Congress in May 1988, the then President of the 
ICA, Lars Marcus, was in attendance and actively participated.  During his welcoming address, 
he declared “I bring you greetings from the ICA, in which the Konsum is a highly-valued 
member.  Your membership is a representation of the co-operative tradition functioning in your 
                                                
477 Holland, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: 104. 
478 Karl Becher, Richard Mand, and Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR., Handbuch 
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civilized society...  With great certainty, I have been witness to the Konsum’s many 
achievements.”479   
5.2. Konsum relations with co-operatives in foreign countries 
 The Konsum represented the DDR internationally by sending its delegates and 
functionaries to co-operative organizations in Western countries.  For instance, a delegation of 
the VDK met in Rome for the seventieth anniversary of Italy’s Lega Nazionale delle Co-
operative e Mutue.  The VDK also sent a delegation to Sweden to study the operation of self-
service stores.  Members of the VDK, in addition, visited and were apparently warmly received 
at a consumer co-operative in Nottingham, England.  Furthermore, the Konsum engaged in 
literature exchanges and sent its publications to fifty-nine co-operative organizations in thirty-six 
countries.480  Within these international settings, the Konsum maintained the party line and 
supported the international actions of the Soviet Union.  For instance, the Konsum and its then 
3.3 million members, at least on paper, officially supported the suppression of the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956 (or in the view of the DDR, the counter-revolution).  In fact, the Konsum 
supported Soviet troops by donating trucks,481 shoes, and clothing as a sign of support for the 
internationalism of the proletariat and of opposition to the counter-revolutionary threat emerging 
from within Hungary.482  
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Illustration 14: In a sign of support of communist rule, the Konsum sent trucks to co-operatives in Hungary in 
1956 
 
 The Konsum hosted international co-operative conferences, symposiums, exchanges, and 
congresses.  For propaganda purposes, the Konsum deliberately wanted to host, educate, and 
support co-operators from emerging post-colonial nations and emerging communist countries.  
Specifically, during the early 1960s, the Konsum maintained close relations with co-operators 
from Cuba, Kenya, Uganda, Togo, Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Basutoland, Iraq, Indonesia, India, 
and Burma.483  These symposiums were designed for international students to develop specific 
perceptions of the DDR, namely to persuade them that East Germany was a supporter of a 
peaceful and nuclear-free Europe.  Moreover, the Konsum had to convince its fellow co-
operators of the dangers of West German militarism and the necessity of a German peace accord 
and the resolution to the Berlin problem – that is, the reasons for the construction of the Berlin 
Wall in 1961.  The Konsum also attempted to promote normalized relations with any country that 
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would give the DDR official state recognition (Iraq was one of the first non-communist states to 
recognize the DDR in May 1969).484   
In 1966, the Konsum hosted the Third International Symposium of the Union of German 
Consumer Co-operatives Societies, under the slogan: “The Role and Tasks of Co-operatives in 
the Transition to a Socialist System of Society.”  The symposium ran for one week in Halle 
during which the Konsum hosted representatives from Algeria, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, 
Czechoslovakia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Poland, Uruguay, the UAR, and Zambia.485  Guests at 
the conference were able to attend lectures such as the “The Development of Socialist Relations 
of Production in DDR Agriculture and the Role of Co-operatives in this Process,” which was 
given by Dr. Friedrich, Director of the Institute of Agrarian Economy at the University for 
Agricultural Production Co-operatives.  Attendees were also taken on tours of the various types 
of collective farms.486  The VDK President, Weiss, delivered a lecture on the development of co-
operatives and their current situation in the DDR.  In his estimation, “the consumer co-operative 
societies will constantly continue to extend their international relations and to consolidate them.  
At present regular contacts exist with co-operative organizations in fifty-eight countries.”487  The 
general impression the Konsum tried to extend to international delegates was that of success in 
both centralized administrative policies and collective farming policies.488    
On a micro-level, individual East German co-operatives, for their part, sought to engage 
in contemporary political activities with developing states; for illustration, the 
Konsumgenossenschaft-Stadt-Leipzig protested on 5 May 1970 what it perceived as the crimes of 
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the Nixon administration in Cambodia.  In the name of its 3,600 members, it demanded the 
withdrawal of all American soldiers from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.   To demonstrate their 
solidarity with Cambodia and in protest of the bombing of North Vietnam, a number of workers 
from this consumer co-operative personally signed a protest resolution.489  Here, it should be 
noted that war and peace were – given German history – real and legitimate worries of the East 
German people.490  On a larger scale, during the 1970s, the Konsum along with the United 
Nations supported the development of young states.  The Konsum defined this decade as the 
“Decade of Cooperative Development” and hosted the 43rd ICA Seminar in Dresden in 1975 (see 
Illustration 15), which was attended by representatives from socialist, capitalist, and developing 
countries, as well as the United Nations and the International Labour Organization.491   As seen 
in Illustrations 15 and 16, representatives of the Konsum took an active part in conferences both 
domestically and internationally.    
 
Illustration 15: The 43rd ICA Seminar held in Dresden in 1975 
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Illustration 16: Representatives of the Konsum at the ICA Regional Seminar for East and Central Africa in 
Tanzania492 
 
Exchanges of Konsum workers to other socialist countries, especially young skilled 
workers (waiters, cooks, confectioners, butchers and shop assistants from department stores) 
were not uncommon.  In 1975, one thousand of these young specialists were able to broaden 
their knowledge of foreign languages as well as co-operative institutions from neighbouring 
socialist states.  These interactions promoted cordial relations between delegates.  For this 
reason, the exchange of skilled workers was, according to then president of the Konsum, Dr. 
Heinz Fahrenkrog, to “remain a critical component of international co-operation throughout the 
period of 1976 to 1980.”493 
 Another important aspect of international co-operation was the exchange of consumer 
goods in order to enrich the quantity and variety of available goods on the domestic markets.  
This was achieved through the so-called “goods from fraternal countries weeks” (see illustration 
below) in which goods from foreign countries were made available.  In 1976, there were 
seventeen such weeks in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, during 
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which goods from the DDR were sold.  In turn, an equal amount of imported goods were sold in 
Konsum department stores in Cottbus, Leipzig, Plauen, Stralsund, and other cities in the DDR.494 
 
Illustration 17: “Goods from fraternal countries”  
The description of the image says, “Business was booming in Leipzig’s “konsument” department store from 
the first hour on during a sale organized jointly with ‘SPOLEM’ (Poland’s nationwide cooperative network) 
at which merchandise from our two countries was featured” 
 
5.3. Relations with West Germany 
 
From the vantage point of East German co-operators, the West German consumer co-
operatives remained a capitalist enterprise in which democratic participation did not exist.495  
Furthermore, there were primary differences in the development of the consumer co-operatives 
in the Western Zones in contrast to consumer co-operatives in the SBZ.  For example, in the 
SBZ, land reform – at least according to the East German co-operators – resulted in the removal 
of the “monopolists” and this established the conditions for the free development of legitimate 
working-class co-operatives.  By contrast, in the Western Zones, the continued rule of the 
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capitalists – as the East German co-operators claimed – “had hindered the workers’ efforts to 
transform the consumer co-operatives into a workers’ mass-organization.”496   
In spite of these ideological differences between East and West Germany, the then 
president of the ICA, Lord Rusholme, sought to create a unified German co-operative 
association.  Looking back, the attempts to create a unified German association began in March 
1947 at a meeting of co-operators in Hamburg.  While there, delegates from the SBZ and 
Western Zones discussed the creation of a unified co-operative institution.  However, as they 
developed basic principles for this organization, conflicts arose between the delegates over the 
questionable political neutrality of the consumer co-operatives in the SBZ.  Thus, these 
negotiations were delayed for a considerable time until it was finally determined that the 
objective of a unified co-operative system was illusory.497  During this long delay, co-operators 
in the American and British zones formed the Hamburg based Central Federation of German 
Consumer Co-operatives (Zentralverbandes deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften für das 
vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet, ZdK) in September 1948.  As a result, the division of the German 
co-operative movement was solidified.498   
Relations between the VDK and West German co-operatives were often 
confrontational.499  In fact, the administration of the Konsum – the VDK – was created as a 
bulwark against the influence from the Wholesale Society of German Consumer Co-operatives 
(Großeinkaufs-Gesellschaft, GEG) and the ZdK.500  According to a report of the consumer co-
operative in Berlin from 14 September 1948:  
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Through the newly constituted GEG in Hamburg, through the foundation of an 
Association of the Consumer Co-operatives for the Tri-Zone (Verband der 
Konsumgenossenschaften für die Tri-zone) and through the proposed admission of the 
consumer co-operatives of the Western Zones into the International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA) without the co-operation of the consumer co-operatives of the East Zone, 
the representatives of the consumer co-operatives in Hamburg had created the division of 
the German consumer co-operative movement...  The GEG in Hamburg could never be 
described as a legitimate representation of the German consumer co-operative 
movement, because the co-operative members living in the eastern zone did not stand 
behind it.501   
 
 
Illustration 18: Konsum poster calling for the unity of the German co-operative movement502 
 
Following the creation of separate East and West German states in 1949, as seen in 
Illustration 18, the co-operators from their respective Germany became more vocal in their 
struggle for a unified Germany under the auspices of their respective ideological orientation.  
There was a great deal of suspicion and mistrust between the two co-operative organizations.  
According to Konsum propagandists and agitators, West German consumer co-operatives 
supported the Adenauer-government’s preparation for war and the remilitarisation of West 
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Germany and were actively working to deepen the division of Germany.503  Germany’s division 
was always provisional; reunification was always in play and a possibility at least in the minds of 
German leaders from east and west.  Therefore, each Germany (and within each Germany, each 
co-op organization) could claim national leadership and legitimacy over the whole of Germany.  
East German propagandists attempted to use this alleged legitimacy to conduct propaganda 
campaigns in the West.   
The zonal division of Berlin did not stop Konsum propagandists from conducting 
campaigns in West Berlin.  In 1954, for instance, the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Köpenick 
conducted political and propaganda work in West Berlin.  This co-operative had a department of 
politics and ideology that developed propaganda leaflets for distribution in the West Berlin 
borough of Schöneberg.  It reported that the majority of West Berliners took the leaflets and 
specified certain responses from a number of West Berliners.  For instance, Luise W., who lived 
on Monumentenstraße, accepted propaganda material and declared that she was fully in 
agreement with the Konsum’s ideological arguments.  An actress living on Emerstraße reported 
that she did not have time for a discussion and little interest in political events, but she was still 
willing to take the Konsum’s propaganda material.  Frau R., living on Prinz-Georg-Straße, was 
apparently open-minded about this propaganda initiative.  On the other hand, Herr S. was 
reported as refusing the ideological leaflets and expressing that the SED was a totalitarian party 
which should be forbidden.504   
At the shop level, employees at a Konsum store also did their part to improve German-
German relations.  In 1958, President Lucht instructed the Leipzig consumer co-operative to 
begin work with the West German consumer co-operatives.  At this time, Konsum 
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Genossenschaft-Leipzig set a goal to double its delegation work with West Germany.  At the 
foreground of this effort was the improvement in the quality of the delegations to enable them to 
explain the fundamental problems of capitalism to their West German friends.  In so doing, this 
consumer co-operative attempted to give their West German counterparts the opportunity to 
resist the Adenauer administration and government.  This was to be accomplished by helping 
these co-ops become true workers’ organizations that would resist price and tax increases.505  In 
a further example, employees at a Konsum retail outlet in Leipzig attempted to initiate mail 
correspondence with West German co-operators; however, they received no reply.  In July 1962, 
another attempt was made to establish contact, but again received no response.  In spite of this, 
the workers at this Konsum store continued in their attempts to contact the West Germans and 
support the Konsum’s international work and improve German-German relations.506     
Inter-German co-operative relations became ever more influenced by the Cold War.  
During the late 1950s, the primary objective of Konsum German-German relations was to gain 
the support of the West German consumer co-operatives in the Warsaw Pact’s struggle against 
NATO, and for an atomic weapons-free-zone in the middle of Europe.507  In an interview with a 
former Konsum employee, Martin Bergner states, “As an international organization, the role of 
the Konsum was to introduce foreigners – particularly West Germans – to socialist ideas.”508  He 
also states that Konsum international relations were a way by which to attain “foreign currency,” 
though he does not elaborate on how this was achieved.  Perhaps the Konsum was able to raise 
some foreign currency through its relations with West Germany; however, Bergner ultimately 
                                                
505 SSL: 20237 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Leipzig Nr. 1896, Die nächsten Aufgaben der Konsum-
Genossenschaften des Bezirkes Leipzig im 2. Fünfjahrplan, 36-39. 
506 SWA: U2/I66, Verwirklichung der Aufgaben der nationalen Genossenschaftsarbeit (Date not given). 
507 SSL: 20237 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Leipzig Nr. 1896, Entschließung der 6. Genossenschafts-
ratstagung des KGV Bezirk Leipzig, Leipzig, am 28. Februar 1958, 1. 
508 Author's interview with Martin Bergner (former economist for the Konsum and current Spokesperson 
for the Zentralkonsum), Berlin, Germany, 18 August 2011.
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describes the relationship between East and West German co-operatives as “distant” and “aloof” 
(distanziert).509  More broadly, the representatives often gained valuable insight into each other’s 
co-operative movements and the economic and political ideologies of their respective German 
state.510  Historian Annette Kaminsky argues that, especially during the 1950s the primary role 
(Hauptaufgabe) of the Konsum was not to supply the population with consumer goods; rather, it 
was to support the will of the SED in its apparent struggle for international peace and the unity of 
Germany.511   
In the 1960s, the Konsum adopted the role of educator and mentor to its West German 
counterparts in an attempt to “help the West German co-operators in their struggle for the unity 
of action of the working class and to have a political influence on them.”512  In fact, the Konsum 
even began regular and systematic weekend schools designed for short study/vacation stays 
intended for West Germans.513  In 1961, for instance, 204 West German consumer co-operators 
spent a fourteen-day vacation in the DDR, during which they participated in systematic political 
schooling.  As stated in a document titled Evaluation of the Vacation-Schools in 1961, “this 
method of educational work with the West Germans has proven to be especially important in 
explaining the significance of the current political situation [the Berlin Wall was erected in 
August 1961].  Through this education, the basic tenets of Marxism will be systematically 
carried to West German working classes.”514  Underpinning the Konsum’s international and 
educational work with the West German consumer co-operatives was the notion that the DDR 
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embodied the societal lessons of the struggles of the working classes and the best German 
patriots, and was based on great scientific and humanist traditions.  The Konsum had to help 
convince East Germans that the primary objective of the DDR was to ensure peace and security 
between the two Germanies, so that the objectives of the socialist construction could be 
completed.  However, according to the Konsum there were clear strains in the relationships 
between the two co-operative organizations.  Conflicts arose from the Konsum’s belief that West 
Germany placed profits above human rights, the dangers of Neo-Nazism, and the treacherous 
politics of the SPD.  Therefore, the Konsum – whenever there was contact with West German co-
operative representatives – attempted to introduce Marxist-Leninist literature to West Germans 
in an attempt to augment their class-consciousness.515   
 In 1969, the education of the West German co-operators (especially women and youth) 
was the focus of the twentieth anniversary celebrations of the founding of the DDR.  
Specifically, the East Germans wanted to instil in West Germans the notion that their 
government was a tool and restorer of capitalism in Europe and that only when the working 
population was in control would it be possible to ensure that West Germany had a future of 
peace, democracy, and progress.516  In this effort, the Konsum primarily targeted West German 
women and sought to explain to them the magnitude of the East German constitution in its 
defence of women’s rights.  The Konsum even gave itself the goal of establishing student groups 
and educational opportunities for women in the West German city of Dortmund.  Conversely, 
West German women were invited to attend the Konsum’s vocational schools in the DDR.  In a 
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similar vein, the Konsum also set a target to “gain the support of fifteen young West Germans by 
the end of the year 1969.”517 
 More generally, the objective of Konsum propaganda work with West Germany was to 
demonstrate that the DDR embodied the best traditions of the German working class movement 
and to improve relations between East and West.  This effort was also an attempt to have West 
Germans learn to trust the political nature of the DDR and to educate them about the 
fundamentals of life in a workers’ and peasants’ state.  Some of this was attempted through 
individual contact via letter correspondence and through educational trips and stays in the 
DDR.518  Of course, the objective of German-German co-operative relations reflected the ebb 
and flow of the Cold War.  For instance, during the 1950s and 1960s, relations between the two 
co-operative organizations, at least from the vantage point of East German archival documents, 
were strained with the Konsum portraying West German co-operative leaders and Social 
Democrats as right-wing and supporters of war policies and imperialism.519  During the 1970s 
and 1980s, it seems as though relations improved and the Konsum’s rhetoric and discourse 
towards the West German co-operators became subdued.  At least this is the impression given in 
an archival document produced in the late 1980s, which states, “Normal and constructive 
relations had developed between the Konsum and the Bund deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.”520  The document continues by pointedly declaring, “Both 
sides were taking measures and working together to strengthen the ICA, the co-operative 
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movement, the interests of co-operatives, the peace initiatives, and societal progress in 
developing nations.”521   
5.4. International education 
The party members in the executive of the VDK recognized the importance of the 
Konsum’s educational network as a way to politically educate and develop the class-
consciousness of leading functionaries in the local organizations, as well as co-operators from 
around the world.522  The VDK especially supported educational measures in developing 
countries and was responsible for the co-operative schools and the publication of instructional 
material for international use.523   
The Konsum began to train international students in the early 1960s at its technical school 
in Blankenburg (Harz Mountains), with the aim of spreading co-operative ideas and promoting 
the governmental system of the Soviet Union and East Germany.  The primary objective of the 
school was to train co-operative officials from developing (socialist) countries, pass on the 
lessons learned in the co-operative systems of the DDR and the Soviet Union, and establish close 
relations with similar co-operative institutions in other countries.  Building on the experience 
gained at Blankenburg, the Konsum opened the International Co-operative School of the Union 
of the Consumer Co-operative Societies of the DDR in Dresden in 1967.524  
The Konsum’s International School in Dresden served a propaganda role.  It was charged 
with promoting and disseminating some of the fundamentals of the DDR’s antifascist state-
narrative to foreign students.  This national narrative was succinctly put in a 1974 booklet 
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entitled Welcome to the International Co-operative College, which was given to students 
attending the Konsum’s International School.  It stated, “The German Democratic Republic is a 
highly developed socialist industrialized country with a modern agriculture and food industry 
and counts among the world’s ten most efficient industrial countries.”525   
 
Illustration 19: International Students at the International Cooperative School in Dresden, 1975 
According to figures and captions associated with this image from the original archival document, 
“over 700 co-op officials have attended courses lasting mainly five or ten months.  The members and staff of 
the DDR’s co-ops regard cooperative solidarity as a fundamental principle of their international work, of 
which the International Cooperative School opened in 1961 is but one example.”526  
 
The courses offered at the International Co-operative School were generally designed to 
further train managers, while exchanging experiences among the international student body.  
Accordingly, only students who had gained considerable experience as managers of co-
operatives were eligible to attend.  Students were also required to have previous training and 
general education in the field of co-operative trade in their respective home country.  During the 
period from 1961 to 1974, the Konsum trained approximately 300 students from more than forty 
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countries in nine ten-month-courses and 260 students in nine five-month-courses.  The courses 
were conducted in English, French, or Arabic.527  Nine teachers (four of whom had doctoral 
degrees) were responsible for conducting these courses, and all of them had completed college 
courses in the field of economics or agriculture, as well as pedagogy.  In addition to these 
teachers, guest lecturers dealt with specific subjects regarding co-operative practices.  Students 
were required to take part in lectures, private study, seminars, colloquia, and attend individual 
and group consultations; generally, this teaching program amounted to about forty hours a week.  
There was also a particular focus on theory in practice, which meant that there were a number of 
excursions to co-operative establishments in Berlin, Leipzig, Karl Marx Stadt (Chemnitz) and so 
on.  Students underwent evaluations in various subjects through both oral and written 
performance tests.  Finally, the students received a monthly stipend of 300 East German Marks 
(Marken der deutsche Notenbank, MdN), with a 70 MdN deduction for board and lodging.528  
By 1975, 750 members of co-operatives from forty countries had been trained at the Konsum’s 
international school in Dresden.  Another 500 managers were slated to attend courses by the end 
of the 1970s.529   
There were exchanges of students between co-operative educational institutions, 
especially between the DDR and the Soviet Union.  The results of these were, according to 
Konsum President Fahrenkrog in 1975, “very positive.”  Besides this, there were exchanges with 
the co-operative associations of Poland, Czechoslovakia, twelve Asian countries, African and 
Middle East countries, and other developing countries, whose students were studying at Konsum 
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facilities.  As of 1976, further preparations were being made to carry out co-operative 
educational projects, including the “scientific elaboration of the subject matter.”530   
 
Illustration 20: International Conference, circa 1975 
According to the figures and captions associated with this image from the original archival document, 
“Regular conferences of experts from co-operative organizations of socialist countries are an important part 
of international activities.  The International Co-operative School hosted a conference dealing with the 
principles of further development of co-operation in the field of co-operative educational work531 
 
5.5. Conclusions 
 
In the immediate postwar years, there was limited collaboration between the consumer 
co-operatives in the SBZ and the Western Zones.  In fact, the Konsumgenossenschaft-Wedding (a 
West Berlin district) was, for a short time, a member of the Konsumverband-Berlin-Ost.  This 
co-operative received a portion of its goods from the Soviet Sector and was able to serve 
customers from East and West Berlin until September 1952.532  However, Konsum relations with 
its western counterparts reflected the ebb and flow of the Cold War; during the particularly 
intense periods, the Konsum turned inwards and towards the communist world to strengthen its 
ties with emerging Soviet allies in Africa, as well as countries in Central American and Asia.  
The Konsum attempted to support these countries in what it perceived as their struggle for 
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freedom.  Finally, these international initiatives from the vantage point of the DDR were key 
components of Konsum propaganda.533   
During the late 1980s, relations between the VDK and the West German co-operatives 
improved.  Within the Central Committee of the SED, a commission under the Leadership of 
Economics Minister Günter Mittag coordinated the activities between both German states.  The 
president of the VDK and the FDJ suggested co-operating with the West German consumer co-
operatives.  The President of the ZdK, Herr Busman, positively responded to the offer of co-
operation with the VDK.  The collaboration between the two co-operative federations involved 
activities to ensure peace, tourism, delegation exchanges, economic and technical collaboration, 
an archival exchange, and an intern exchange (10 interns for two to three weeks).534  Yet, Dr. 
Burchard Bösche (an executive with the Hamburg based Zentralverband deutscher 
Konsumgenossenschaften) states:  
This tension between the two co-operative organizations dates back to when the 
Hamburg based wholesaler, Großeinkaufs-Gesellschaft, lost substantial amounts of its 
property in East Germany, which was requisitioned by the Soviets and given to the 
Konsum.  As a result, the relations between the ZdK, a West German co-operative 
organization, and the Zentralkonsum (the successor to the Konsum) remain “cool” to this 
day.”535      
 
As presaged in Part I, this chapter has shown what the SED wanted to do with the 
Konsum in relation to the SED’s foreign policy.  It is difficult to accurately measure the impact 
of the Konsum’s international work, but what is certain is that the Konsum advocated SED 
foreign policy and was a microcosm of the ways in which the Cold War impacted East German 
institutions.  That is to say, when relations improved between East and West, there were also 
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improved relations amongst East and West German co-operative societies. The most evident 
example of this was when the Konsum was accepted into the ICA in 1971 during a detente in the 
Cold War.  More importantly, Konsum foreign policy illustrates the subservience of this 
organization to the SED by promulgating the antifascist state narrative to international students 
and foreign co-operators.  For instance, throughout the mountains of archival documents adduced 
from the Konsum, Americans are almost always referred to as imperialists, West Germans as 
fascists, the Hungarians in 1956 as dangerous counter-revolutionaries, and the Soviets as the 
helpful big brother.  The following chapter will continue with the theme of persuasion by taking 
a closer look at Konsum education.   
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6. Becoming transmission-belts: education and the conveyance of 
ideology  
 
The consumer co-operatives placed a great value on the education of their employees and 
functionaries and the active collaboration of its membership, especially with women so that they 
can serve in the exorcism of the demon of Nazism and the development of a democratic and 
peaceful Germany. 
- An archival document from 1948 in Berlin536 
 
The Konsum’s teaching of socialist consciousness had to abolish foreign, capitalist influence and 
struggle against antiquated “habits” lingering from the capitalism epoch.  A conciliatory 
tolerance of the capitalist influence would only hinder the construction of socialism.  Socialist 
education in the Konsum schools was directly connected with the struggle between progressive 
forces and outmoded tendencies. 
- As stated by Walter Ulbricht in 1958537 
 
 
 
Illustration 21: Konsum education with a predominantly female student body (circa 1950s)538 
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The Konsum’s inclusion of women in the education process at the onset of the Soviet 
occupation and during the lifespan of the DDR was modern and progressive.  This “inclusion” 
had a parallel function of generating female loyalty for the state.  Nevertheless, the initial 
inclusion of women in these co-operative schools was, in my measured opinion, a first step 
towards multiple educational opportunities in technological fields at various polytechnic high 
schools.539  In fact, during the 1950s and 1960s, women were, according to historian Jeannette 
Madarász, able to fulfill their search for self-realization through social advancement and further 
education.540  In acts of subtle resistance, however, workers expressed their disinclination to pay 
attention to the régime’s “education” by switching off political broadcasts at the workplace and 
coughing during political presentations.  With that said, the attitudinal and behavioural effects of 
the régime’s ideological politics on the various segments of the East German population should 
not be underestimated.  In fact, women may have reacted differently to politicized education 
(i.e., welcomed the opportunity) as compared to youth and men.541  According to historian 
Jeannette Madarász, women were more loyal to the régime than other segments of the population 
given their educational opportunities.542   
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The Konsum and the SED believed that the consumer co-operatives had to develop into a 
progressive, democratic, and antifascist mass-organization of consumers, with an ideologically 
trained body of functionaries.  However, as the party believed in 1949, the correct type of 
ideological thinking was underdeveloped; to alleviate this, the Konsum developed co-operative 
schools and colleges to overcome these apparent weaknesses.543  This chapter considers how the 
Konsum functioned as an educational network in the SBZ.  Within the co-operative 
organization’s educational classes, there was an evident transmission of co-operative ideology, 
Cold War politics, and the gendered propaganda of the SED.  In his article Zwischen Resistenz 
und Einvernahme, Wilhelm Kaltenborn asks rhetorically, “what can we discern from the 
programme of study to which women were subjected in the co-operative schools?”544  This 
chapter addresses this question and argues that Konsum employees were trained to become 
ideological conduits or transmission-belts of SED ideology.   
6.1. The founding and organization of Konsum schools – types of courses   
In 1946, the state and provincial co-operatives were responsible for providing the co-
operative workers with opportunities for further education and training.545  The SED believed 
that education was a robust method of strengthening the Konsum; in practice, this meant that 
workers had to undertake courses in “progressive democracy.”  In June 1947, Helmut Lehmann, 
the Central Secretariat of the SED in Berlin, commented on co-operative schools:  
The co-operatives needed to be an important school for the economic insight and 
socialist economic thought, but they had to also spread co-operative ideology in the 
service of the family.  In addition to that, they can and should be schools for the 
development of administrative skills.  One cannot administer a state with political and 
economic illiterates.  Only when we have socialist educated functionaries will we have 
achieved our goal.  I suggest, therefore, that we establish co-operative schools for the 
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administration of people, goods, and so on.  Finally, participation in the co-operative is 
one way in which people can be included in and come to understand the newly 
established administrative machinery.546    
  
These educational programs had to convince farmers, youth, and women of the advantages of co-
operative practices.547  In Saxony, in May 1946, the Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik (Department of 
Economic Policy) ordered the consumer co-operatives to establish a single, large, antifascist 
school.  In this school, thirty functionaries were required to take a comprehensive, multi-week 
course dealing with the problems of the co-operative movement.  During this course, the 
functionaries covered a number of specialized fields.548 
In late 1949, the SED and the administration of the Konsum believed that co-operative 
functionaries had lost their practical experience and the co-operative movement had become 
foreign to the younger generation during the Nazi dictatorship.  As a result, there were scarcely 
any educated and trained co-operative functionaries and staff.  To remedy this situation, the SED 
and the Konsum established a three-tiered educational structure, as well as guidelines and a 
curriculum for each level in the system.549   
In the lowest tier, the Grundschulen (co-operative basic schools) were responsible for the 
training of the personnel in the co-operative stores, consisting primarily of women.  The SED 
wanted the Grundschulen to be the connecting link between the administration and the members; 
hence, they had to pay particular attention to the education and training of the Konsum personnel 
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along party-approved lines.  The instructors, as ministerial documents show, needed to have an 
influence on the students and trainees which ensured their support for the “democratic 
centralization” of the co-operative system.550  Additionally, the trainees were required to attain a 
professional education, which would enable them to successfully complete their duties in the co-
operative trade.551  These Grundschulen were also used to politically educate co-operative 
employees and create reserves of educated functionaries.552   
The propaganda and ideological component of Konsum education becomes evident when 
the curriculum of the Grundschulen is examined in detail.  The Grundschulen implemented 
course work on the development of a menschlich (civilized/humane) society, including the 
various societal formations and the concepts of class struggle as the driving force of societal 
development.  Since the emerging society in the SBZ was becoming effectively sovietized (i.e., 
adopting the political and economic institutions of the Soviet Union), this study of menschlich 
society was almost certainly based on the model of the Soviet Union.  Other political 
components included sections on fascism and the overcoming of Nazi ideology.  The creation 
and development of the consumer co-operatives was the fifth module of the course; as such, it 
may be construed as less important than the political facets of the training.  This module was 
followed by a section entitled: The Status of Women in the Past, Present, and Future and their 
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Significance and Importance in fulfilling the Duties of the Consumer Co-operatives.553  The 
development of ideologically oriented and trained employees was the goal of all Konsum 
elementary schools; hence, the party believed that special courses for party functionaries of the 
consumer co-operatives were of significant importance.554 
The primary task of the Mittelschulen (co-operative middle schools) was the training and 
education of qualified functionaries and workers, as well as the administration of the co-
operative stores, propaganda leaders, and inspectors.  According to the document Guidelines for 
the Co-operative Schools, the Mittelschulen trained the majority of the leading co-operative 
functionaries.  In addition to their co-operative and specialist education, these functionaries 
undertook a thorough political component during their training.  For example, the students were 
required to understand the most important aspects of contemporary politics and the issues of the 
day, as well as grasp the materialist (i.e., Marxist) worldview so as to apply political judgments 
in any given situation.555  Specifically, the curriculum in the Mittelschulen comprised five 
political components based on Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy; it was also permeated with elements 
of de-Nazification.  Although the remaining three components dealt directly with co-operatives, 
they, too, placed co-operatives into this worldview.556 
The co-operative Hochschulen (university or college of higher education) was 
responsible for training the instructors in the Mittelschulen and the highly qualified co-operative 
functionaries, especially young professionals.  In these schools, the objective was to help these 
functionaries develop a communist worldview.  The training of the middle school instructors 
                                                
553 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/112, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker, Richtlinien für die 
genossenschaftliche Schulungsarbeit in den Konsumgenossenschaften, beschlossen auf der Beiratssitzung am 11.-
12.9.1947., 23. 
554 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/6.02/74, SED Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik, Bericht: Über die Zonen-
konferenz der Konsumgenossenschaften in Berlin am 14.9.1948, 129. 
555 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/112, 11.-12.9.1947., 23. 
556 Ibid., 25. 
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took place over a period of six months.  The course structure itself was similar to that of the 
middle schools, but it contained additional advanced components in the history of the German 
workers’ movement, and German history in general, particularly the Reformation, the Thirty 
Years’ War, and the period from the Revolution of 1848 to the First World War.  For the co-
operative Hochschulen, only highly qualified candidates were selected.557  The structure of this 
curriculum conveyed a Marxist-Leninist paradigm.  Even within the various historical 
subcomponents, the main themes repeatedly referred to the notion of class struggle, as well as to 
the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin.      
A document from the Central Committee of the SED indicates that in the regional, 
district, and party schools, seminars about the consumer co-operatives were incorporated into the 
course work.  This document states, “Because the Konsum had become an important mass-
organization, it is, therefore, necessary that all party functionaries come to understand the 
importance of this mass-organization through these courses.”558  This quotation signifies the 
subordination of the once independent and thriving German co-operative movement to the 
educational role of a Soviet-style mass-organization.559   
The network of co-operative schools continued to expand during the Soviet occupation.  
As of 13 August 1947, there were functioning co-operative schools in Gelenau/Erzgebirge, 
Allstadt in Saxony-Anhalt, Saackrow, Wilhelmshorst, Schwerin, and Oberhof.  In Gelenau, 
courses were offered in accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping.  In Allstadt, six courses dealt 
                                                
557 Ibid. 
558 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/114, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker, Abteilung: 
Genossenschaftswesen, Bericht von Karl Draeger, 15.Juni.1948, 27. 
559 Co-op education in Western countries often embodies a modest counter cultural character.  This was not 
so in the DDR; rather, Konsum education was populist in nature.  Konsum education, in other words, was 
mainstream in the DDR.   
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respectively with propaganda, auditing, transport, accounting, women, and secretaries.560  There 
was a district party school (Kreispartieschule) in Neustrelitz for consumer co-operative 
functionaries and SED members.561  By 1949, there were additional Konsum schools in 
Kühlungsborn, Spremberg, Wilhelmshorst, and Letzlingen.562  In Blankenburg, there was the 
Konsum Technical College for Domestic Trade (Fachschule für Binnenhandel).  At any given 
time, there were approximately 200 young Konsum workers (consisting mostly of women) taking 
a three-year administrative course.  These women were trained to take responsibility for 
administrative duties within the Konsum (see image on page following).  Members of the 
executive were trained at an educational centre in Cotta bei Pirna where they took courses that 
lasted several weeks.  As discussed in the previous chapter, at the international school in 
Dresden, co-operators from all over the world were trained, particularly those from African 
countries.563   
In Weimar, the Dorotheenhof served as an educational centre for the Konsum for over 
forty years.  There, the first course opened on 8 August 1949 and was attended by young 
saleswomen.  On top of the practical education, political-ideological training was emphasized.  
Weimar also served as a centre for training special cadres in the field of socialist economics, as 
well as quality control inspectors, price inspectors, ledgers and members of the administration 
(Vorstandsmitglieder).564  None of these schools survived the demise of the East German state.565  
Nevertheless, an anonymous interviewee indicated that Konsum education was generally useful 
for employees, particularly the three-year economics course undertaken at the College for 
                                                
560 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/111, SED Zentralkomitee, Sekretariat Paul Merker, Bericht über die 
zurzeit vorhandenen Genossenschaftsschulen, Berlin, 13 August 1947, 141. 
561 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/116, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker, Referat in 
Neustrelitz (Kreisparteischule), Berlin, 6. April 1948, 24. 
562 Kirsch, Die Marken Bitte!: 138. 
563 Holland, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: 49. 
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Domestic Trade in Blankenburg (Harz).  In fact, this degree program continues to be recognized 
to this day.566  Dr. Burchard Bösche (a West German executive employed in the Hamburg based 
Zentralverband deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften) indicated that practical Konsum training 
was beneficial for employees.  According to him, “Konsum personnel were often better-qualified 
than their counterparts in capitalist, West German retail.”567 
 
Illustration 22: The Dorotheenhof in Weimar568 
 
 The co-operative schools may also have played a wider role in communities and the 
socialist transformation of village culture.  Since they underwent ideological training, the 
teachers in the schools were, at least outwardly, uniformly socialist and they made every effort to 
transform local cultural life.569  Though not directly referring to Konsum teachers, historian Jan 
Palmowski states, “all teachers participated in ideological training events, while at election times 
or at harvest time, the school and its pupils campaigned publicly on behalf of state and party.”570  
It is difficult to determine the actual amount of resources that the Konsum was willing to 
allocate to its educational network, yet archival sources indicate that the party devoted some of 
                                                
566 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
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567 Author's interview with Dr. Burchard Bösche, 26 July 2011. 
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of the Konsumverband.  Ibid., 144. 
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its limited resources to the provision of education.  The following quotation demonstrates that 
the Konsum was prepared to heavily invest in these schools:  
At the last council meeting on the 18th and 19th of June 1948, Comrade Lucht [future 
president of the VDK], as an executive of Berlin’s Konsum-Haupt-Sekretariat gave the 
Advisory Council the suggestion to establish a co-operative college in Gütersfelde palace 
in Teltow.  After careful estimates, the renovation of the palace will cost approximately 
one million Reichsmark.  The construction of the college was meant to help alleviate 
personnel problems within the Konsum-Haupt-Sekretariat and the Verbandsleitung.571  
  
The report underscores that all party schools had to include co-operative themes in order to 
emphasize the importance of the Konsum as a mass-organization and its role in training co-
operative functionaries.572  
 The party members in the executive of the VDK recognized the value of education for 
leading functionaries in their development of class-consciousness.573  The politicized education 
of students continued until the 1950s.  During this decade, Konsum employees received a highly 
politicized reading list, which included Stalin’s Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR; 
History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; and Marxism and the Question of 
Nationalism.  As well, students also read the Collected Works of Lenin: Volumes 1 and 2, 
Friedrich Engels’s The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State, and Marx’s and 
Engels’s The Communist Manifesto.574   
 Between 1950 and 1965, the number of sales positions in the Konsum rose from 
approximately 14,000 to over 38,000.  During this fifteen-year timeframe, seven new workers 
joined the Konsum’s workforce per day.  This exponential growth caused problems, however, as 
many unqualified personnel were hired.  While seventy-five percent of the Konsum employees 
                                                
571 SAPMO: DY30 IV 2/2.022/111, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker. Bericht: Betr. Hoch-
schule der Konsumgenossenschaften.  Berlin, 22. Juni 1948, geschrieben von Kurt Draeger, 142. 
572 Ibid. 
573 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/133, Handel, Versorgung und Außenhandel. Berlin (Date not given), 12. 
574 SWA: V8/2043, Literaturverzeichnis, Leipzig, den 13. April 1954, 2. 
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had received some sales training by 1959, the quality of the personnel remained a systemic 
obstruction.575  For this reason, in his article from the 1958 Konsum publication Blick vorwärts, 
Dr. Willi Köppert stressed that “a way needed to be found that would provide functionaries of 
the Dorf-Konsumgenossenschaften (rural consumer co-operatives) with the opportunity to visit 
co-operative schools.”576   
 On account of this exponential growth, there was a rapid rise in student enrolment in the 
Konsum schools in the late 1950s.  In 1959, 15,000 trainees were taking part in some sort of 
instruction within the network of schools.  The majority were being trained to work as sales staff 
in the retail outlets.  Among these 15,000, many were prepared for work in the production 
factories.  Some were also taught at the Zentralen Schule des Verbandes Deutscher Konsum-
genossenschaften (Central School of the Union of Consumer Co-operatives), where they took a 
six-month course for leading functionaries of the Konsum.577  However, the majority of the 
15,000 Konsum employees received only practical training.  For instance, Konsum sales 
personnel had to take weekly informational seminars regarding supply situations and delivery 
schedules.  Every single salesperson was trained and expected to be able to answer flawlessly 
supply questions for the clientele.578   
6.1.1. Becoming propagandists 
 The Konsum employee was trained to be the connecting link between the customer and 
the party.579  For this reason, every worker and functionary of the Konsum was required to 
deepen his or her political knowledge and ideological understanding of the latest political 
                                                
575 Ludwig, "Nicht mehr verteilen -- sondern verkaufen," 36. 
576 Köppert, "Ein Kampfprogramm zur weiteren Festigung des Bündnisses der Arbeiterklasse mit der 
werktätigen Bauernschaft," 53. 
577 SWA: U64/336, Die Konsum-Genossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Date not 
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developments.580  The Konsum believed that the increased political astuteness of its employees 
would lead to improvements in retail trade.  By becoming informational and ideological conduits 
and transmission-belts to consumers and members, Konsum employees became an important 
junction between party and consumer.  Hypothetically, employees became political 
functionaries, propagandists, and educators.581   
The Konsum further politicized education by establishing a propaganda department in 
every co-operative.  The primary undertaking of the propaganda department was to bring about 
the development of antifascist, co-operative, and political life.582  The directors of the 
propaganda departments in the consumer co-operatives were responsible for numerous political 
initiatives, which included the construction of members’ departments according to their sex and 
professional grouping (i.e., female workers, female farmers, and housewives).  This also meant 
the employment of a full-time female position for planning the establishment of educational and 
women’s groups.583  Given that the same person or group of people were often responsible for 
agitation, training, and advertising, we can conclude that lines between the three were blurred 
and in many ways were one and the same.   
 There were special courses for training new functionaries and SED members working 
within the Konsum.  One such course lasted for eight days, dealing with a different theme each 
day.  Day 1 focused on the role of the party in the co-operatives; Day 2 discussed the 
development of co-operatives in England, Germany, and the USSR; Day 3 examined the 
importance of co-operatives in the workers’ movement; Day 4 reviewed the current tasks of the 
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co-operatives; Day 5 examined co-operatives and the middle classes with a focus on monopoly 
capitalism; Day 6 instilled economic planning and co-operative distribution practices; Day 7 
considered the party’s political objectives in the co-operatives; and Day 8 concluded with 
questions related to co-operative practice.584  Not only were Konsum employees expected to be 
well versed in these subject areas, but they were also expected to relay this party-approved-
knowledge to customers through a socialist consumer culture, which infused consumption with 
socialist ideology.  Trade guides, for instance, attempted to raise socialist consciousness amongst 
store personnel, who then had to act as conduits of this information to their customers.  Because 
the act of consumption involved direct contact between the East German population and the 
state-directed economy, the SED clearly recognized the potential for co-operatives to promulgate 
specific types of ideological discourse to consumers through various means: advertising, shop 
window displays (see Chapter 7), and consumers’ contact with consultants and sales assistants to 
educate them about the links between socialism, modernity, and the abundance of commodities.  
Historian Katherine Pence argues that “unlike profit-driven capitalist advertising, this consumer 
propaganda aimed to educate the shopper about the availability of commodities, questions of 
taste and also the connection between material culture and the politics of socialism.”585   
Salespeople, for their part, had to be well informed about the correct use of available 
consumer products and were trained to carry on conversations about contemporary politics with 
customers.  Pence further states that “it was not only important for store clerks to be able to 
answer questions about the correct use of products, but also to get involved in conversations 
about the meaning of the [Konsum] stores, about the new refugee population, or the new Oder-
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Neiße border between East Germany and Poland.”586  Generally, Konsum salespeople were 
required to take twelve days of political instruction which dealt with subjects ranging from “the 
history of human society, the condition of exploitation, the state and democracy, the National 
Front, the history of consumer co-operatives, the Marshall Plan, the Two-Year Plan, the stores 
and functionary work, the trade unions, and others.”587  As this course load indicates, education 
was used to teach saleswomen to teach customers to equate consumer abundance with the SED’s 
political and economic policies.588  
There were Konsum schools, as was the case in Saaleck, which dealt primarily with 
political education, where students took courses on cadre and functionary training.589  Frau S. 
took a course on ideological work (massenpolitische Arbeit) from 14 September 1954 to 14 
December 1954 at Saaleck.  According to her evaluation, when she came to the school she had 
only trivial theoretical knowledge.  However, as the course progressed, she was able to draw a 
number of conclusions regarding the application of theory to daily work (in der Praxis).  Still, 
Frau S. had difficulty relating to her classmates who had lesser ability and knowledge.  She was 
simply unable to educate her classmates and gain their trust, which was one of the most essential 
aspects of being a functionary.  In spite of these faults, the Saaleck instructors believed she 
would still make a fine functionary, propagandist, and educator.590     
 During the 1950s and 1960s, the VDK and the Stasi took the ideological training of the 
Konsum workforce very seriously.  According to an internal Stasi document, “the Konsum retail 
outlets were to be portrayed as a focal point in the struggle for peace.  At these outlets, our 
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customers’ current discussions about political questions had to be properly dealt with in order to 
enable them to struggle for peace.”591  Moreover, there is evidence that the Stasi was measuring 
the ideological influence of Konsum workers on consumers.  It was estimated that ideological 
work was weakly developed and inadequate at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Mitte in 1960.  
The Stasi was alarmed that ideological work was considered less important than the concerns of 
daily work within this outlet.  More worrisome from the Stasi perspective, as the report also 
indicated, a very weak female comrade (Genossin) was elected to the administration of this 
Berlin co-operative.  She was reprimanded for not improving the ideological work of the party.  
Consequently, the Stasi believed this retail outlet was failing to influence its workers and 
customers ideologically, and so the Stasi recommend increased ideological training for the 
Konsum workforce.592  For instance, in order to have a current view on contemporary political 
events, sales personnel had to arrive at work fifteen minutes early to discuss newspaper articles 
and questions about collective living under socialism.  The primary reason for these meetings 
was to enable the sales-personnel to act as a junction between the party and the consumers.593    
The Konsum’s propaganda and agitation departments believed that the Verkaufsgespräch 
(sales talk or sales pitch) was a critical component of propaganda work in the retail outlets.  The 
SED and the Konsum clearly understood that millions of people frequented these stores every 
day.  As stated in Monatsschrift Grundsätliche Fragen, a Konsum publication from 1952, “the 
workers in the retail outlets have ample opportunity to explain the politics of our government 
during the sale of goods.  They have close contact with members and customers and could 
transform our retail outlets into centres of enlightenment and information hotspots 
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(Aufklärungszentren).”594  Therefore, sales personnel were trained to design political displays 
and to point out to customers the successes of the socialist economic system, as well as the great 
advantages of their peaceful relations with the Soviet Union.  They also had to explain the 
consequences of the division of Germany and convince customers that they had to assist in 
overcoming the tribulations of the Cold War.  Rather than making long speeches, sales personnel 
were taught to deliver these messages in a few “punchy” and direct sentences to maximize their 
impact on consumers and members.  Here is what the Konsum’s propaganda department had to 
say about the Verkaufsgespräch in a 1960s document entitled Guidelines for Agitation Work in 
the Consumer Co-operative:  
The Verkaufsgespräch will help us to help the population develop the necessary and 
proper modes of argumentation and draw the proper conclusions, which will enable them 
to improve their own work.  Moreover, a well-conducted Verkaufsgespräch enhances our 
ability to recruit new members for our consumer co-operatives.595    
 
As depicted in Illustration 23, during national political events and anniversaries, employees of 
the Konsum were trained and expected to enhance the political quality of displays and the 
ideological impact of their conversations with customers.596   
 
Illustration 23: The Konsum portraying the chronology of the DDR (Date not given) 
The Konsum often acted as an informational and educational junction between party and customer597  
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6.2. Women and education  
 
Following the founding of the SED in April 1946, the party came to the conclusion that 
women were lacking political knowledge, especially in the area of ideological theory.  For that 
reason, the SED became especially interested in the intensive education of women, particularly 
in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.598  According to the precepts of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, the SED was compelled to include women in its socialist experiment.  Of course, the 
other and more pressing reason for the SED appeals to women was because of male wartime 
deaths and the resulting distortion of the postwar demographic.  This meant female inclusion in 
political and ideological indoctrination in the Konsum’s network of educational facilities was 
also based on pressure of circumstance.  What is more, not to include women in education, the 
SED ideologues believed, would imply that the victory of socialism was not possible.599  The 
Konsum, therefore, took considerable measures to actively encourage women to participate in 
education.  As is continually stated in archival sources, the Konsum also firmly believed that 
having women participate in its educational courses would lead to female equality.600  
Additionally, the party sought to mobilize women for political tasks; first, however, women 
needed to achieve an adequate level of ideological awareness in order to participate in politics.601     
The co-operatives were to become elementary schools for the political education of 
women.  In the words of Politburo Member Helmut Lehmann:  
We had to manage the motherly instinct of women, because women’s motivation arose 
from their instinctual interest in their families.  The socialist transformation and plan for 
our community was, therefore, still alien to women.  Women today were called to fight 
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for the interests of the entire population; therefore, they had to first be educated in 
political collaboration.  The co-operative was capable of reaching women as a consumer, 
as a purchaser of goods, and as the caregiver of the family.  Moreover, the consumer co-
operative had to make clear to women that all the consumer goods they purchased were 
above all political products [produced by the state for private consumption and for use in 
the private sphere].  The co-operatives had to educate women to think not solely of the 
family, but also the general public.  In these respects, the consumer co-operatives were 
given a great responsibility.602   
 
This quotation encapsulates the SED’s contradictory definition of female emancipation and the 
role the Konsum was to play in the reorganization of postwar gender roles in East Germany.  
Lehman’s words indicate that the Konsum had to educate women politically and draw them into 
wage labour, as well as suggest that the Konsum’s focus on women was for quite traditional 
reasons, especially the notion that women were the family shoppers and were naturally inclined 
to be interested in consumption.    
The SED’s educational policies were especially directed at women – that is, they created 
a situation where women were able to take the necessary training courses in order to ensure that 
they were qualified for participation in the Konsum’s internal governance and party politics.  
Throughout the 1940s, the steady rise in the number of women enrolled in these courses was 
perhaps indicative of increased gender equality and modernity within the totalitarian structures of 
the SED régime.603  As an illustration of this point, Anne Wolter was appointed to the position of 
lecturer (Referentin) in the co-operative school in Gelenau (located in the Erzgebirge in Saxony) 
on 14 July 1947.  The courses that she taught lasted three weeks.  To translate her words, “of the 
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twenty-four registered participants, nine were women.  In addition to their work in the co-
operatives, these women were also first-rate functionaries of the party.”604   
The Konsum developed educational plans and courses for women (Frauenförderungs-
pläne), which were to prepare them for their new administrative and ideological roles.605  For 
instance, the Konsum offered an eight-day-course, with each individual day dealing with a 
different theme.  Day 1 dealt with the history of the German workers’ movement (from its 
beginnings in 1836 to the present); Day 2 focused on the development of the women’s 
movement and its role in the history of the workers’ movement (from 1891 to the present); Day 3 
investigated the struggle against Nazi-ideology, with a focus on the question of race and 
Lebensraum (a Nazified term referring to the conquest of living space); Day 4 dealt with the 
history of the co-operative movement in England, Germany, and the USSR; Day 5 reviewed the 
role of women in the co-operative and its connection with communal women’s committees; Day 
6 studied general economic questions; Day 7 examined economic planning and co-operative 
distribution; and Day 8 considered ways in which practical women’s work (organization, 
agitation, recruitment, and propaganda) could be implemented in the workplace.606  These 
courses were intended to provide women with the necessary skill sets for their ideologically 
driven gender roles in societal, state, and economic life.  Interestingly, family life was not 
included.607  Still, as the state developed, women maintained their traditional role as the caretaker 
of the family. 
                                                
604 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/111, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker. Bericht von Anne 
Wolter, 24.7.47, 139-40. 
605 SWA: U2/(SWA 538) 757, Frauenförderungsplan der Konsum-Genossenschaft Stadt Leipzig, Exact 
date not given though reference is made to 1954, 2-5. 
606 SWA: U2/SWA 1245, SCHULUNGSPLAN für den Frauen-Kursus, date not given. 
607 SWA: U2/(SWA 538) 757, 2-5. 
192 
 
 
 
Education became an avenue for female promotion.  VDK President Margarete 
Wittowski (1951 to 1954) stands as proof that women were able to reach the upper echelons of 
power within the Konsum.  Although their numbers in these top-managerial or decision-making 
positions were fewer than those of men, women were, metaphorically speaking, able to break 
through the glass ceiling; thus, of the approximately 30,000 elected Konsum representatives in 
1949, fifty percent were women, although their number in the top administrative positions was 
only around twenty-five percent.608  Nevertheless, female participation was high.  One can, 
therefore, conclude that women and East German gender roles were fundamentally changed by 
the experience of education in the SED dictatorship.  Indeed, women’s lives, previously limited 
to the family, were broadened by their opportunity to work and to receive various educational 
opportunities.  However, as an educator, the Konsum gave contradictory messages to women, 
since they had to reconcile the ideological imperative to become educated workers while 
maintaining their traditional role as caretaker of the family.  This contradictory message is not 
limited to Konsum education but it is an inescapable aspect of changing gender roles in capitalist 
cultures and societies as well.  However, in the DDR the differences lie in the level of state 
encouragement both financially and educationally for women to participate in wage labour and 
politics.  In point of fact, Konsum schools supported women in their role as educated and 
employed mothers by allowing them to bring their children to school with them.609   
Female education coincided with the state and the Konsum’s attempt to establish gender 
equality and modernity.  The SED’s vision of equality and modernity was the inclusion of 
women in waged labour and education.  According to Madarász, different segments of society 
reacted differently to these policies.  Women, for instance, may have felt more loyal to the 
                                                
608 Schwenger, "Konsumgenossenschaften," 774. 
609 SWA: V8/2017, Beschlüsse-Anweisungen-Informationen des Verbandes Deutscher Konsum-
genossenschaften, Berlin den 2. Oktober 1964, 194. 
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régime than youth.  In light of these sorts of reactions, the attitudinal and behavioural impact of 
the régime’s educational politics on the East German population should not be underestimated, 
especially with women.610  By looking at women with regard to their place in education, certain 
conclusions can be teased out in respect to their indoctrination into the SED’s ideology.  In the 
words of historian Angela Brock, “despite the high demands made of them by societal life, 
women generally responded more positively to political demands and the realities of life than 
men: a more pronounced pride in the DDR, acceptance of the leading role of the SED, a better 
relation to the Soviet Union, and a better attitude to the FDJ and societal involvement.”  She 
continues, “In this respect, the state’s endeavours to improve women’s societal standing by 
means of legislation and material help, most notably in the form of free education, bore fruit in 
ensuring women’s loyalty.  The first generation of women who had been socialized solely under 
socialist conditions had internalized new mindsets and attitudes by the late 1960s.”611  
6.3. Disciplinary institutions – evaluations and character assessments  
Students in the Konsum schools had to undergo character, behavioural, heritage 
(parentage or class background, for example), and technical assessments as a prerequisite for 
advancement – that is, demonstrating the right “personal traits” was equally as important as 
actual performance in courses for consideration for promotion.  Herr W., for instance, 
demonstrated an open and honest character throughout a course taken in 1956.  His behaviour in 
the collective was deemed satisfactory.  Also, his seminar work was very positive and he made 
solid contributions to discussions.  He received a 2.0 (the equivalent of a B+) for his work in the 
                                                
610 Madarász, Conflict and Compromise in East Germany: 92. 
611 Angela Brock, "Producing the ‘Socialist Personality’?  Socialisation, Education, and the Emergence of 
New Patterns of Behaviour," in Power and Society in the GDR, 1961-1979: The "Normalisation of Rule"?, ed. Mary 
Fulbrook (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 246. 
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social sciences.612  Frau U. was criticized for not taking course material seriously.  Nevertheless, 
she was still praised for her impeccable behaviour throughout the course.  The social heritage or 
class background of the student was also provided on their evaluations.  In the case of Frau U., 
she came from a working-class background.613  The Konsum School for Finance and Accounting 
suggested that Sonja W. receive further training as an accountant on the basis of her positive 
character evaluation (bright, helpful, honest) and an overall positive evaluation, along with a 
grade of 2.0 which enabled her to receive further training in accounting.614  Frau M., on the other 
hand, received a negative overall evaluation.  Consequently, she had to leave her position and 
take further courses on political economy.615  These evaluations showed that performance in the 
schools was critical to both maintaining a job and being considered for further training and 
promotion.  In speaking about similar methods of control in the Soviet Union, historian Stephen 
Kotkin suggests, “a far more subtle and in the end no less effective method of coercion was at 
hand: the ability to define who people were.”616  Furthermore, these evaluations demonstrate a 
key totalitarian characteristic of the régime, namely defining the identity of an individual in 
language that was reflective and drawn from the lexicon of the ruling ideology.  By extension, 
the Konsum was playing such a role by determining the working class heritage of its students and 
evaluating how they functioned within the collective.  Consequently, the Konsum had immense 
power and leverage over students’ life opportunities and was helping turn students into subjects.   
Those wanting to participate in a Konsum course had to present the school with a short 
biography of themselves (a very typical practice in the DDR) and a certificate of health four 
                                                
612 SWA: V8/2043, Beurteilung, der Koll. W., Leipzig, am 6.1.1956. 
613 SWA: V8/2043, Beurteilung der Kollegin U., geb. 25.2.1935, für die Zeit des Lehrgages für massenpol. 
Arbeit, Schulungsstuffe II, in Saaleck vom 4.5. bis 4.8.1954. 
614 SWA: V8/2043, 2. Lehrgang 1955, Beurteilung, KGV-Bezirk-Leipzig-Schule Finanzen Rechnungs-
wesen, Leipzig C1, Käthe-Kollwitz-Str. 54. 
615 SWA: V8/2043, Beurteilung, die Koll. M., Leipzig, am 6.1.1956. 
616 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: 224. 
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weeks before the beginning of the course.  The Konsum school administrator took these 
biographies, along with the school’s capacity, into consideration before permitting admittance.617  
Needless to say, having the proper education and character assessment was a necessary 
component for men as well as women to advance into the upper levels of management in the 
Konsum.  In a 2004 interview, Manfred Reimann, the chairman of the Konsumgenossenschaft-
Kries-Wurzen, explained that:  
Following a completed business course in 1949, I took a job at the consumer co-
operative in Kreis Döbeln.  At the time, I was nineteen, and the course of my life was 
always impacted by my attendance at the co-operative schools and the qualifications that 
I received there.  In 1953, I attended the Konsum Middle School for Accounting in Plau 
am See.  Thereafter, I began work as an internal accountant for the Kreisverband (co-
operative regional association) in Döbeln; I also began to take over responsibility for 
financial auditing in the Konsumgenossenschaftsverbandes-Bezirk-Leipzig.  During this 
time, I took a correspondence course at the Financial Technical College so that I could 
become an auditor.  My successful work as a financial accountant since 1956 gave the 
Vorstand of the regional administration a reason to offer me a job as the chief auditor in 
the Konsum-Kreisverband Wurzen from 1960-61.618   
 
In addition to the ideological components of this training, women in the Konsum-
genossenschaft-Leipzig were given practical training so as to take top managerial positions, 
including executive positions (Vorstandsmitglieder) and managers (Leiter).  In 1954, there were 
348 women taking specialist courses in co-operative schools.  Following these courses, women 
were placed into the positions for which they trained.  For instance, Frau W. was qualified for a 
position on the executive after a training course in trade and functionary work.  Frau M. had to 
take a course on social politics due to her important position in the Konsumgenossenschaft-
Leipzig.619  In fact, Konsum education has been described as effective by those interviewed for 
this dissertation.  Specifically, in an interview with Martin Bergner, the current spokesman for 
                                                
617 SWA: V8/2209 Beschlüsse-Anweisungen-Informationen des Verbandes Deutscher Konsum-
genossenschaften, - Lehrgänge an den konsumgenossenschaftlichen Schulen im Jahre 1963, Berlin, den 7. 
September 1962, 128. 
618 Bösche, "7.2. Interview with Manfred Reimann and Martin Tänzer," 76. 
619 SWA: U2/(SWA 538) 757, 1954, 2-5. 
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the Zentralkonsum, he described his educational experiences and his years spent in Konsum 
education during which he was trained in production, computer literacy, and languages as 
“positive.”  He states “the Konsum offered an excellent form of co-operative education and 
continuing education (Weiterbildung) for employees.  Konsum education was also helpful in 
securing a promotion.”620  
6.4. Conclusions 
   Educational processes required that students be subjected to socialist ideology and 
relations of power.  It is for this reason that the Konsum functioned as an Ideological State 
Apparatus by exposing students to the ideas, the language, worldview, organizational structure, 
and symbols of the SED.  And, similar to those at most educational institutions, co-operative 
students had to undergo a form of socialisation during their educational course work.621  
Ultimately, in the process of teaching, the Konsum provided instruction in obedience, deference, 
the virtues of socialism, the language and state-narrative of East German socialism, and ways to 
pass all of this on to Konsum customers and members.  In short, as the character evaluations 
demonstrated, this educational network inculcated discipline and self-discipline and encouraged 
the Konsum’s workers and employees – particularly women – to establish, promote, and 
maintain the socialist system in order to attain career advancement.  Still, women were a 
relatively invested and loyal segment of the population.622  To speculate, women may have 
entered into a sort of hidden agreement with the régime (i.e., the opportunity for education and 
perhaps career advancement in return for the outward appearance of loyalty).  The theme of 
female participation will continue to be discussed in Chapter 9.  In the meantime, the following 
                                                
620 Author's interview with Martin Bergner, Berlin, Germany, 18 August 2011. 
621 Foucault, History of Sexuality, I: 95. 
622 Madarász, Conflict and Compromise in East Germany: 92.   
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chapter continues with the subject of education and the ways in which it was juxtaposed with 
socialist consumer culture.   
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7. Konsum advertising: a junction of propaganda, education, and 
consumer culture  
 
The Konsum absolutely did not play a role in propaganda.  It was by no means a propaganda 
apparatus. 
- Martin Bergner (a former Konsum employee and economist in the DDR and the current spokesperson for the 
Berlin based Zentralkonsum – the successor of the VDK)623 
 
Daily – hundreds of thousands of members and customers come into the Konsum retail outlets.  
These stores connect and explain to members and customers the politics of our government and 
demonstrate the success of our planned economy.  
- Charlotte Aderhold624 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 24: Karl Marx display window in a Konsum a store, 1953625 
  
                                                
623 Author's interview with Martin Bergner, Berlin, Germany, 18 August 2011. 
624 Charlotte Aderhold, "AKB: Die große Bedeutung der Verkaufsstellenausschüsse für die Entwicklung 
der Konsumgenossenschaften zu einer kämpferisch-demokratischen Massenorganisation," in Monatsschrift 
Grundsätzliche Fragen der Konsumgenossenschaften (Berlin: Verband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften, 1952), 
55. 
625 AKB: FA 10 - Schaufenster und Fassadengestaltung zu gesellschaftlichen Höhepunkten und politischen 
Themen - 1953 - Werbe Abteilung Konsumgenossenschaften - Kreis - Oelsnitz. 
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 This chapter examines the ways in which the Konsum promulgated the ideology of the 
SED through politicized consumption.  Like the previous, this chapter also explores education 
and persuasion, albeit in the form of socialist advertising and shop window displays.  In the 
twentieth century, advertising became an important medium for the construction of dream worlds 
and creation of identities.  This was also true in Konsum advertising, though in ways unique to 
the context of a totalitarian state.  The DDR condemned freedom to consume as an illusory 
freedom promoted by capitalism.  Thus, the SED attempted to create a socialist consumer culture 
by eliminating illusion and replacing it with authentic desires and wishes based on the “use 
value” of objects “over their fantastic, quasi-magical ‘exchange value.’”626  A reference work for 
DDR advertising highlights the official differences between socialist and capitalist advertising:  
Socialist advertising truthfully informs consumers about the real benefits of goods and 
services without the exaggeration typical of capitalist advertising.  It does not manipulate 
consumers by trying to convince them that a given product offers additional benefits, 
such as an increase in prestige.  Customers are given information intended to facilitate a 
fact-based purchasing decision.  They should not allow themselves to get carried away 
by emotionally driven impulse purchases that they may later regret.627    
 
Unofficially, the primary aim of DDR advertising was to advertise the system of socialism and 
its advantages over capitalism through the tangible proof of displays of large assortments of 
consumer goods.  As a result, Konsum advertisers were no longer merely selling goods based on 
their usefulness, but through their association with political and ideological slogans.  As will be 
seen throughout this chapter, the Konsum praised the SED through association of the party’s 
political slogans with in-demand consumer goods.  All of this was done to persuade the 
consumer not only of the increasing prowess of the command economy, but also that life was 
                                                
626 Rosalind H. Williams, Dream worlds: mass consumption in late nineteenth-century France (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1982), 314. 
627 Annette Kaminsky, "True Advertising means promoting a good thing through a good form," in Selling 
Modernity: Advertising in Twentieth-Century Germany, ed. Pamela E. Swett, S. Jonathan Wiesen, and Jonathan R. 
Zatlin (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 264-65. 
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improving because of it.  This method of using shop windows with stacks of consumer goods to 
legitimize the state continued right up until 1989, even though by this time the majority believed 
that western consumerism was the far better alternative.628      
7.1. Propaganda, education, or advertising?  
Consumption propaganda, under the guise of advertising, played an explanatory, 
pedagogical, and persuasive role similar to that of the Konsum schools.629  As an educational 
medium, propaganda in the DDR classified systems of association and contrast.  All of this was 
done for the purpose of reinforcing and explicating the symbolizing systems of the SED-state.  
This chapter explicates how propaganda was used to inculcate and educate East Germans about 
the differences between capitalist and socialist consumption and, more broadly, between the two 
German societies.  While this chapter does not directly examine propaganda in the West, it 
should be noted that DDR propaganda was designed to help its citizens learn to understand the 
“socialist construction” by contrasting and relating it to an invented version of West Germany 
and capitalism.  Furthermore, propaganda in East Germany was an attempt to signify a break 
with the past, thanks to SED policies and its command economy.  Konsum propagandists, in 
other words, were exploiting many different signifiers by combining SED slogans with desired 
consumer products.630  At the heart of this definition of propaganda is the idea of mass-
persuasion and mass-pacification.    
The Konsum was given the propaganda role of showcasing socialism by demonstrating 
the superiority of the new socialist societal system to consumers.631  That is clearly indicated in 
                                                
628 Ibid., 266. 
629 Eli Rubin, Synthetic Socialism: Plastics & Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 135. 
630 Belsey, Poststructuralism: 7-22. 
631 Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: 164-66. 
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the 1952 document produced by the Konsum’s agitation632 and advertising department entitled 
Guidelines for Agitation Work in the Consumer Co-operatives:  
The SED recognized that the Konsum – with its 15,000 retail outlets [in 1952] – had the 
opportunity to conduct propaganda and agitation work for the party on a relentless and 
daily basis.  Given its close proximity with the population, the Konsum was in a position 
to persistently explain the governmental politics to its mass-membership.  In so doing, 
the Konsum was directly trying to increase the political consciousness of its members 
and consumers.633  
  
The purpose of the above referenced document deserves to be examined in more detail, since it 
explicates some of the broader ideological and advertising imperatives of the Konsum.  First and 
foremost, it demonstrates that the Konsum attempted, as is evident in the images throughout this 
chapter, to combine advertising with agitation for the purposes of educating (erziehen) the 
population.  More specifically, the document states that this “education” was to encourage East 
Germans to “fulfill the Resolutions of the Second Party Congress of the SED, develop and raise 
the socialist awareness (Staatsbewusstsein) of the Konsum’s then 2.5 million members, and 
recognize the importance of friendship with the great Soviet people.”634  Again, the important 
conclusion to be drawn from this document is that the SED was trying to combine consumerism 
and advertising with propaganda and ideology in an attempt to persuade East Germans of the 
superiority of socialism, to legitimize the rule of the SED, to mobilize the population, and to 
garner their support for further totalitarian experiments in social engineering such as the 
“building of socialism” in 1952-1953 (Stalinization of East Germany).635  All of this is clearly 
and succinctly stated in the 1952 document entitled Guidelines for Agitational Work and in 
                                                
632 Agitation can be directly translated into English as agitation.  While the English use of the word more 
directly relates to some sort of mental anxiety, the German term is limited to a political context in the sense of 
political rabble-rousing.     
633 SWA: U2/I/58, Richtlinien für die Agitationsarbeit in den Konsumgenossenschaften,1952, 3. 
634 Ibid., 2. 
635 Stalinism, at its most basic, means the centralized, totalitarian pursuit of Communism. 
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Illustrations 25 to 33, which brings into question the so-called political neutrality that the 
Konsum claimed following the fall of the Berlin Wall (see section 10.2).636           
East Germans’ dependence on the Konsum stores meant that its propaganda was 
frequently present whenever consumers (mostly women and rural inhabitants) shopped in co-
operative sales outlets.  Female consumers and rural inhabitants often did not have a choice 
among the Konsum, the other state-owned and operated retail organization (the Handels-
organisation, HO), or private retailers.  For the majority of Germans living in the SBZ, the 
Konsum was the only retail option available to them, particularly in smaller centres and in the 
countryside.637  Although people’s choices were significantly constrained by time, distance, and 
the policies of the régime regarding which stores were in which places, people did have options 
and could – except perhaps in the smallest and most remote rural communities – avoid their local 
Konsum if they really wanted to.  With that said, however, the only other option available to the 
vast majority of East Germans was to either, if they had access to Western currency, purchase 
goods in the hard currency stores (Intershops), or to shop in the few remaining private stores.  
The other more probable option was for the consumer to visit the HO, which had very similar 
“advertising” campaigns.638  It would have been extremely difficult for the average consumer to 
avoid completely the propaganda reach of the 50,000 combined Konsum and HO stores (my 
                                                
636 SWA: U2/I/58, Richtlinien für die Agitationsarbeit in den Konsumgenossenschaften, 1952, 1-3. 
637 The state trade organization Handelsorganisation (HO) was network of retail stores established in 
November 1948.  In these stores, East Germans had the opportunity to buy (un)rationed goods, albeit at very high 
prices.  These stores served two purposes: they soaked up additional cash that was circulating in the DDR through 
piecework and higher wages; and they served as a key advertisement for the régime by displaying concrete proof of 
the improvements in everyday life and showing off the promise of consumer plenty.  The HO chain rapidly 
expanded and its numbers were largely equal to those of the Konsum, with the 25,000 retail outlets and 37 percent of 
the DDR’s retail trade.  Swett, Wiesen, and Zatlin, Selling Modernity: 285. 
638 A broad discussion of the HO falls outside the scope of this dissertation.  For more on the HO’s 
advertising and shop windows, See Chapter 9 of Pence, "From Rations to Fashions." 
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interview with an anonymous school teacher attests to this).639  What is more, and as discussed in 
section 2.1.10, East Germans could neither legally hold hard currency nor shop in the western 
currency stores until 1974 (Intershops).640  Therefore, the consumer had very little choice during 
the 1950s and 1960s between the Konsum and the HO.  However, the only retail option that was 
always open to consumers was the Konsum on account of its ubiquity, especially in the 
countryside, and the affordability of its products.  By extension, we can therefore safely conclude 
that the Konsum had extensive reach into East German society.  In other words, the Konsum was 
at the heart of the consumption experience in East Germany and was the predominant form of 
retailing.  This meant that its propaganda/advertising, whether effective or not, was always 
present.    
The established co-operatives in rural communities generally did not generate profit; 
rather, they were subordinate to the party’s political objective of the “Building of Socialism.”  
The slogan of the VDK leadership reads as follows: “everywhere and at anytime, the consumer 
co-operatives guarantee the reliable provision of basic goods for the population.”641  Since there 
was a Konsum store in nearly every town and village, there certainly was some truth behind this 
slogan.  Dr. W. Köppert, a Konsum propagandist, argued in a Konsum sponsored publication that 
political duties were of greater importance to the Konsum than its respective profitability.  In 
1955, he declared:  
The commercial duties of the consumer co-operatives had an apparent political content 
that needed to be deepened.  This ideological work was intended to have a positive effect 
on the economic development of the consumer co-operatives.  As is generally known, 
Lenin taught us that the economic result can only be judged by the ideological impact of 
the enterprise.  Accordingly, the primary content of the political work of the consumer 
                                                
639 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
Germany, 27 June 2011. 
640 The Intershops were a chain of government-run retail stores in which only hard currencies, such as the 
U.S. dollar, West German Mark, or British Pound could be used to purchase high-quality goods. 
641 Bösche, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der Wende von 1989/90: 28. 
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co-operatives had to always include clarification of the political fundamentals involved 
with the “Building of Socialism” in the DDR, as well as West German imperialism.642  
 
With its high membership numbers, the Konsum and its propaganda-organs became an 
especially suitable medium for propaganda purposes.643  Indeed, the SED’s attempt to control the 
propagandized message of consumption was clearly articulated in a report written to the VDK on 
December 20, 1957:   
The Konsum implemented continually stronger measures in order to become a working-
class (i.e., political) organization, which would then contribute to the political tasks of 
the régime during the transformation from capitalism to socialism.  The consumer co-
operatives were for the party of the working-class – the SED – and they were one of the 
state’s most important propaganda tools.  The aim of co-operative work was to provide 
political and propaganda support for the SED in order to gain the population’s 
allegiance to our state.644      
 
Notwithstanding the Konsum’s attempts to integrate women into public and working life, 
its propaganda, at times, contradictorily maintained the traditional division of gender and pressed 
the idea that women were the primary shoppers and caretakers of their households.645  The party 
demanded that the Konsum support the state in its promulgation of propaganda and ideology by 
means of consumer consumption.  According to an internal party document from the Department 
of Political Economy of 1946, the consumer co-operatives were charged with disseminating co-
operative thought to women via a housewife-committee for every retail outlet.  These 
committees were expected to deepen co-operative thought amongst women.646  This combination 
of consumerism and political ideology became a common method for the SED to garner female 
participation in politics.647  Such methods included the establishment of administrative posts to 
                                                
642 Köppert, "Dorf-Konsumgenossenschaften und Rentabilität," 21. 
643 Hödt, "Konsummarken kleben," 123. 
644 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/133, Handel, Versorgung und Außenhandel. Berlin (Date not given), 1. 
645 Pence, "'You as a Woman Will Understand'," 226.  
646 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/6.02/74, SED Zentralkomitee: Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik, Vorlage an das 
Zentralsekretariat, Betr.: Konsumgenossenschaftliche Richtlinien der SED, 5.9.1946, 1-2. 
 647 Pence, "'You as a Woman Will Understand'," 219. 
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be filled by women at every level of the Konsum.  These efforts were intended to help women 
“overcome ‘the passive role as just a shopper’… and influence them ideologically.”648 
7.2. Shop Windows 
 
Since the beginning of the DDR, shop window displays expressed the political message 
of SED socialism that demonstrated the victory of socialism and the socialist state.649  These 
shop windows portrayed images of class struggle in the midst of daily articles of consumption 
such as shoes, clothes, and knee-high socks.  These images celebrated various themes: the 
working masses and their president, Wilhelm Pieck, “German-Soviet Friendship,” the struggle 
for peace and unity of Germany, and the planned economy.650  Additionally, every consumer co-
operative was to have a shop window display with Wandzeitungen (wall news-sheets) with 
political symbols and slogans to signify and publicize the significance of current political and 
economic events.  These shop window displays were intended to be an interesting attraction and 
educational point for customers, consumers, and employees.  Through this political propaganda 
work (Aufklärungsarbeit), the Konsum and its employees attempted to influence and garner the 
support of its clientele for the new political order in East Germany (antifaschistisch-
demokratischen Ordnung).651  Historian Brett Fairbairn maintains that:  
Co-operators had to work in their co-operatives while simultaneously using them as tools 
for the social, political, and attitudinal transformations directed by the party...  and so co-
operative shops hung banners with political slogans, set up political displays in their 
windows, and organized political meetings for their volunteers, members, and 
employees.652   
 
                                                
 648 Fairbairn, "Co-operative Values and the Cold War," 14. 
649 Schütterle, Klassenkampf im Kaufhaus: 57. 
650 Wagner, Bino, Fit und Arthur der Engel: 35. 
651 SWA: U2/SWA 1594, Verkaufsstelle der ausgezeichneten Verkaufskultur (Date not given - probably the 
1950s or early 1960s), 6-7. 
652 Fairbairn, "Co-operative Values and the Cold War," 13-14. 
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In so doing, the SED, along with the Konsum, was circulating, moralising, and politicizing every 
aspect of consumption.  Historian Donna Harsch states, “the act of shopping became 
ideologically charged.”653   
The shop window dominated the design of Konsum retail outlets.  The arrangements were 
intended to broadcast and promote the Konsum as an expression and reflection of the economic 
and technical accomplishment of the East German economy – in effect, to demonstrate that the 
consumer co-operative retail outlets were a modern trade industry in a modern country.  The 
following images were (modern) designs for the co-operative outlets in Bautzen and Delsnitz and 
demonstrate the prominence of the shop windows in these stores.654  Of course, the designs of the 
Konsum shop windows are entirely familiar.  Hence, Illustrations 25 and 26 demonstrate the 
parallels between capitalist and socialist modernity.   
 
Illustration 25: the prominence of display windows in the design of retail outlets in Bautzen and Delsnitz 
 
                                                
653 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic: 179.   
654 "SWA: U64/128 (date not given)." 
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Illustration 26: Department store on Leipzig’s Zschocherschen Straße, 1901655 
 
The SED and the Konsum recognized the potential of shop windows as a means of 
communication and trained employees accordingly.  In fact, many Konsum employees took 
courses in the development of shop windows and the design of posters for the window 
displays.656  During these courses, Konsum workers were instructed constantly to adjust the 
decorations and shop window displays so as to create new and interesting images for 
customers.657  The Konsum even held competitions for and gave bonuses to employees who 
produced the best window displays.  Herr M. was recognized and given a special bonus for his 
work at retail outlet 164 in Leipzig.  He was, as the archival document indicates, “responsible for 
the design of a display on a very busy street in which his window displays became the main 
attraction.”658  Shop window competitions were held between the Konsum, the HO, and private 
retailers.  For instance, one such competition between them was entitled the “The best shop 
                                                
655 Haikal, Gute Geschäfte: 72. 
656 SWA: U2/I/39, Protokoll über die Arbeitsbesprechung der Abteilung Agitation und Werbung am 
23.7.52. 
657 SWA: U2/SWA 1245, 2. Lehrgang der Genossenschaftsschule des Verbandes Sächsischer Konsum-
Genossenschaften in Gelenau/Erzgebirge vom 10. bis 26. Oktober 1946. 
658 SWA: U2/SWA 1080, Vorschlag zur Auszeichnung, Konsumgenossenschaft Stadt Leipzig, den 4. April 
1959. 
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window for the month of German-Soviet-Friendship.”659  During the early 1950s, the 
competitors had to portray specific themes, namely German-Soviet-Friendship as the 
fundamental foundation of the German nation, the Stalinist constitution as a constitution for the 
entire world, and the celebration of Stalin’s birthday under the slogan: “Generalissimo Stalin, the 
best friend of the German people.”660   
 
Illustration 27: “Every Co-operator is a friend of the Soviet Union” – Konsum shop windows promoting 
German-Soviet-Friendship (circa late 1940s to 1950s)661 
 
In the 1950s, the Konsum shop windows reflected SED policies on women’s issues.  
These displays portrayed women in both the workforce and in the professional world.  Moreover, 
these displays promoted the use of modern appliances in the household, the use of which was to 
translate into more free time for women to devote to work or party activities.  It should be noted, 
however, that the progressive policy of freeing women from the drudgery of household labour 
                                                
659 SWA: U2/SWA 1245, Abschrift aus dem Rundschreiben vom Verband Sächsischer Konsum-
genossenschaften Dresden (date not given probably the late 1940s or early 1950s). 
660 Ibid. 
661 SSC: 30878/440, (circa late 1940s to 1950s). 
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was partially triggered by the party’s desperate need to have women replace and replenish a 
workforce decimated by the deaths of many men during the War and the postwar mass migration 
of trained professionals to the West.662     
Following the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the 17 June Uprising, the SED, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2, embarked on the so-called New Course and attempted to use 
consumption as a tool to quell the population’s general frustration with the socialist project.  The 
Konsum aided this political initiative by increasing and improving its assortment of goods, 
particularly of food.  To better serve customers, the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Köpenick 
expanded its network from 104 retail outlets to 180 retail outlets during a one-month period from 
30 September to 31 October 1953.  During this time, there was also to be a general improvement 
in consumer culture by expanding the training of sales-personnel and augmenting decorative 
arrangements (including shop windows) in the retail outlets.663   
The Konsum had to link the increasing abundance portrayed in its shop windows directly 
to SED policies and initiatives.  In November 1953, Konsum propagandists attempted to use shop 
windows to convince consumers that there was growing prosperity as a result of the political and 
economic policies of the New Course (see section 2.4.8).664  By way of explanation, the SED 
was using the Konsum and its shop windows to suppress the opposition so adamantly expressed 
during the 17 June Uprising by drawing attention to the allegedly improving standard of living in 
the DDR.  Additionally, these windows and decorations had to communicate and function as a 
reassurance to East German consumers of the steady rise in the quality and availability of 
                                                
662 Fuchshuber, Zwischen Propagandainstrument und Werbemittel: 14. 
663 LAB: C Rep. 904-035 Nr. 3, Betriebs – Partei – Organisation – Konsumgenossenschaft Berlin-
Köpenick, Friedrichshagen, 29.10.1953, 1. 
664 SWA: U2/I/58, Entwurf der Arbeitsentschließung der Generalversammlung der Konsumgenossenschaft 
Stadt Leipzig 11.1953. 
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goods.665  This abundance was portrayed through so-called stack windows (Stapelfenster) in 
which mountainous stacks of goods were arranged alongside political slogans verifying the 
realization of socialist, SED, and utopian goals.666   
 
Illustration 28: So-called “stack windows” portraying socialist abundance.    
 
 
Illustration 29: A further image portraying socialist abundance 
 
The above left image has a soldier “protecting the people’s wealth” (year not given though likely sometime in 
the 1950s).  The lower right image is a shop window in Zwickau promoting abundance of socialist 
agricultural practices and the 11th anniversary of the DDR in 1960.667 
                                                
665 SWA: U2/I/58, Entwurf der Arbeitsentschließung der Generalversammlung der Konsumgenossenschaft 
Stadt Leipzig vom 11. Oktober 1953," 4. 
666 Pence, "From Rations to Fashions, 602. 
667 Above left image: "AKB: FA 10 - Schaufenster und Fassadengestaltung zu Gesellschaftlichen 
Höhepunkten und Politischen Themen, 25 June (year not given)."  Lower right image: "AKB: FA 10 - Schaufenster 
und Fassadengestaltung zu gesellschaftlichen Höhepunkten und politischen Themen, Zwickau 1960." 
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Shop windows also endorsed individual members of the SED.  The visual propaganda in 
shop windows was designed to improve awareness for coming elections, as well as to promote 
and portray the character of individual candidates.  The shop windows were also festooned with 
displays of candidates from the National Front.668    
 
Illustration 30: Konsum raising the profile of members of the National Front669 
 
The advertising/propaganda images in shop windows praised the socialist postwar 
recovery under the auspices of Soviet communism; furthermore, the images in the shop windows 
had to legitimize the socialist system of rule and endorse the success of the planned economy.  In 
fact, it was often difficult to determine whether the shop windows were advertising consumer 
products or the East German state (see Illustrations 31 and 32).  In these respects, the creators of 
the shop windows were no longer (merely) advertisers; instead, they became what German 
philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas might describe as “dealers in public opinion.”670  
The shop windows, in other words, transcended advertising to the point of becoming instruments 
                                                
668 LAB: C Rep. 904-138 Nr. 4, Protokoll über die am 5.6.57 durchgeführte Parteileitungssitzung.  
669 SSC: 30878/425, Gesellschaftspolitische Werbung – Volkwahlen 1954. 
670 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
Bourgeois Society (Cambridge UK: Polity Press, 1989), 193-94. 
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of opinion management, which “invades the process of ‘public opinions’ by systematically 
creating news events that attract attention... By means of a dramatic presentation of facts and 
calculated stereotypes it aims for a reorientation of public opinion by the formation of new 
authorities of symbols which will have acceptance.”671  The “it” from the previous quotation 
refers to what Habermas describes as the “engineering of consent” and the urged acceptance of a 
“person, product, organization, or idea.”672  More simply, the managers of shop window displays 
were literally attempting to sell the DDR and state-socialism to consumers, as well as mobilize 
them and garner their support for what was then an entirely new political system and status quo.  
In so doing, the state was communicating with East Germans not as citizens, but as consumers.  
Habermas states “enterprises evoke in their customers the idea that in their consumption 
decisions they act in their capacity as citizens, the state has to ‘address’ its citizens like 
consumers.  As a result, [as seen particularly in the shop windows] public authority too competes 
for publicity.”673             
 
Illustration 31: A Konsum shop window promoting consumer goods and the postwar recovery under 
socialism674 
                                                
671 Ibid. 
672 Ibid., 195. 
673 Ibid. 
674 SSC: 30878/440, (circa late 1940s to 1950s). 
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Illustration 32: A Konsum shop window promoting the East German state under the slogan “Look at what 
our hands have built - new people building a new state.” (Date not given)675 
 
Sometimes political messages were in the foreground of the shop windows, while in 
others the products themselves were paramount in delivering the message of the effectiveness of 
the socialist economic and political system.  In the latter half of the 1960s, for instance, there 
were blatant political messages celebrating the 17th anniversary of the DDR, along with non-
political displays that trumpeted the modern and high-quality products manufactured in the 
socialist economy.  According to historian Romana Fuchshuber, there were ninety-eight political 
shop windows (sixty-eight of which referred to the Seventh Party Congress) and forty-five non-
political shop windows in 1967.  Some of the political displays included slogans such as “Unsere 
Erfolge sind Beweis für die kluge und wissenschaftliche Politik unserer Partei (our successes are 
proof of the intelligent and scientific governance of our party) and VII. Parteitag – Für dich- für 
uns- für die Republik (the Seventh Party Congress is for you, for us, and for the republic).676   
The shop windows often mixed state-wide political slogans with local and regional 
flavour by portraying the strength and unity of both.  Thus, the level of political or non-political 
                                                
675 SSC: 30878/440, early 1950s. 
676 Fuchshuber, Zwischen Propagandainstrument und Werbemittel: 78-79. 
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content varied from community to community.  In Berlin, the shop windows reflected the city’s 
status as the showcase of socialism.677  In Karl-Marx-Stadt (today’s Chemnitz), for example, 
there were sixteen political displays versus twenty-two non-political.  On the other hand, the 
Leipzig shop windows had a great deal of political content dealing with various SED 
anniversaries, Soviet-German Friendship, and 8 March (International Women’s Day).678  In 
1970, the shop window designs in the Leipzig Konsum also promoted the significance of Leipzig 
as a centre of trade, specifically its trade fair, political stability, and the logic of the societal 
development of the DDR.679    
The shop windows also had a cultural-educational function for women and youth.  This 
was particularly apparent in the second half of the 1960s when the shop windows served to 
educate the population concerning the advantages of new household devices and to familiarize 
East Germans with the SED’s policy on women’s issues.680  The integration of youth into the 
socialist system was a critical component of SED and Konsum policy.  In the second half of the 
1970s, the shop windows reflected the SED’s youth policies by instructing youth on the proper 
use of free time.681  In an effort to appeal to youth, the Konsum combined the space flight of the 
East German Sigmund Jähn with youth fashion.  This is evident in the following image and 
slogan: “Willkommen Kosmoshelden” (welcome space heroes).  In so doing, the Konsum was 
attempting to fashion a politicized and idealized image of the socialist space hero, which East 
German youth were encouraged to emulate.682   
                                                
677 Ibid., 115. 
678 Ibid., 78-79. 
679 SWA: U2/(SWA 3320/2)I/190, Konzeption zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der Versorgungs-
aufgaben zur Leipziger Frühjahrsmesse 1970 (1.3.bis 10.3.1970), Konsumgenossenschaft Stadt Leipzig, Leipzig, 
14.1.1970. 
680 Fuchshuber, Zwischen Propagandainstrument und Werbemittel: 115. 
681 Ibid. 
682 Ibid., 94-96. 
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Illustration 33: Willkommen Kosmoshelden – Welcome Space Heroes – Youth Fashion, Berlin, 1978683 
 
At times, socialist decorators complained about having to work with the inconsistencies 
of combining political slogans with consumer goods in window displays.  In particular, they 
were frustrated by shortages in decorating supplies and having little or no access to the 
appropriate seasonal fashions.  Making matters worse, the procurement of decorating materials 
and financial support from the state proved troublesome, since the SED generally favoured the 
HO.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the HO was given official status as a state-owned enterprise; 
hence, it was considered a higher form of socialist property and allocated more resources for 
advertising in comparison to the Konsum and private stores.684  As Pence correctly points out, 
“without concrete goods present to verify the claims to offer a better way of life offered by the 
political slogans, the ideology was rendered transparent and fostered mistrust in the socialist 
project.”685  Ironically, once goods became more readily available, designers were unsure about 
how to integrate products with political slogans and images.  As the years progressed, the 
political theatre in the shop windows eased, and the actual consumer goods began to dominate 
                                                
683 Ibid., 95. 
684 Pence, "From Rations to Fashions," 584-86. 
685 Ibid., 596. 
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the displays.  Still, the stringent demands on the administrators of the retail outlets persisted and 
important political events had to remain visible.  While these images clearly reached consumers, 
the messages they conveyed seemed to be confused or perhaps even unintentionally satirical.  
Unsurprisingly, the viewing public often perceived displays as senseless and arbitrary.  For 
instance, it is difficult to determine the meaning and association of the image of Honecker behind 
bottles of alcohol (see image below), or the image of Marx in the window of a rubbish collection 
point for the recycling of glass bottles, or the DDR-Emblem in front of brassieres.686   
 
Illustration 34: Honecker in a shop window behind bottles of schnapps to commemorate the fortieth 
anniversary of the DDR687 
 
When shopping in co-operative stores, consumers were exposed to window-displays and 
posters promoting co-operative-political perspectives, as well as SED political slogans that 
illustrated the party’s intended totalitarian societal transformations and represented the objectives 
of the socialist planned economy.688  In fact, these displays often included a mix of political 
slogans in association with desirable consumer products.  The initial consumption experience in 
                                                
686 Wagner, Bino, Fit und Arthur der Engel: 35. 
687 Ibid., 34. 
688 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/112, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker, Diskussions-
grundlage zu Punkt 2) der Tagesordnung für die Beiratssitzung des Konsum – Hauptssekretariats am 11. Und 12. 
September 1947 in Kühlungsborn: Berlin, den 15, September 1947, 28-29. 
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the co-operatives was further politicized through the Cold War and the DDR’s political and 
economic competition with West Germany.689  As a result, the intended message of East German 
consumption was clear: the Soviet system emerging in the DDR was the more viable alternative.  
These displays and shop windows also reflected the widening fissure between East and West 
Germany in the political, economic, and cultural realms.  According to Katherine Pence, “the 
display windows in the consumer co-operatives became the places in which the newly emerging 
East and West German societies competed.”690  For this reason, state and Konsum functionaries 
were actively committed to the improvement of shop windows, for they believed that the 
political message of the DDR was closely tied to them.  Public officials from the government’s 
economic departments, such as the Ministry for Trade and Provision, and the party’s economic 
departments supervised the development of these displays.691  
In the DDR, the shop window became a focal point of meaning, symbolism, and 
signification in which modern consumption and economic recovery were to be expressed.  An 
archival document from the Saxon State Archive in Chemnitz states, “the signified message had 
to display and express [i.e., objectify or reify] the success of the socialist state.”692  For the social 
philosopher and political economist Adam Smith, commodities were nothing more than objects 
that were circulated.  On the other hand, DDR advertisers used shop window displays to bring 
commodities to life through spectacle.  As historian Thomas Richards argues:  
For Smith, commodities neither attract nor repel representation.  They are simply there, 
stockpiled, ready and waiting to enter the long process of circulation to which he devotes 
the bulk of The Wealth of Nations.  Commodities are dead letters, supplies animated and 
                                                
689 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic: 156. 
690 Pence, "Schaufenster des sozialistischen Konsums," 92. 
691 Ibid., 97-98. 
692 SSC: 30878/1077/2, Ergänzung zur Arbeitsentschließung vom 14.6.1958 auf der Delegierten-
versammlung am 25. Oktober 1958. 
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actuated by the spirit of demand.  In the mid-nineteenth century the commodity became 
the living letter of the law of supply and demand.  It literally came alive.”693     
 
Similarly, the “success” of the DDR was to be portrayed in the reification of SED ideology 
through the display of modern consumer goods.  In other words, the Konsum and its shop 
window displays were selling the culture and ideology of the DDR, as well as promoting and 
propagating its semiotics, social standards, and codes of conduct.  The ways in which East 
Germans ultimately understood and experienced their meaning remains mostly hypothetical.  
Yet, as will be seen in Chapters 8 and 9, the Eingaben and the interviews conducted for this 
dissertation demonstrate that East Germans were often distracted by the shortages in the stores, 
which significantly lessened and undermined the impact of propaganda and ideology associated 
with specific products and the DDR’s vision of modernity and abundance.   
7.3. Conclusions 
 In their work Propaganda and Persuasion, Victoria O’Donnell and Garth Jowett write 
that “propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate, 
cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist.”694  While these shop windows were not always ornamented with political slogans, 
they deliberately and systematically attempted to shape the perceptions of consumers and 
communicate to them that the SED’s political economy was the better alternative to the West 
German model.  Moreover, Konsum propagandists and advertisers were attempting to legitimize 
the Marxist-Leninist worldview through the perception of a plentiful consumer culture.  
Although the shop windows may have been an attempt to reflect the achievements of socialist 
productive capacity, the drab reality of shopping in the consumer co-operative frequently offset 
                                                
693 Thomas Richards, The Commodity Culture of Victorian Enlgand: Advertsing and Spectacle, 1851-1914 
(Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 2. 
694 Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donell, Propaganda and Persuasion, Second ed. (Newbury Park: Sage 
1992), 6. 
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and contradicted these displays of political unity and economic prosperity.  During periods of 
economic shortages (often the case in the DDR), the goods displayed in the shop windows were 
often unavailable for purchase in the store, consequently angering customers and forcing them to 
take individual action by acquiring goods through personal relationships or the black market.695   
 In many ways, the Konsum was simultaneously an effective and ineffective propaganda 
apparatus.  Its potential effectiveness could have been realized through its ability to disseminate 
propaganda to targeted segments of the population (Zielgruppe), namely female and rural 
consumers.  This tactic, however, was ineffective and counterproductive, since this propaganda 
produced an image of plenty that the Konsum stores were rarely capable of fulfilling. In fact, 
consumers were often unable to purchase the goods showcased in the shop windows.  As a result, 
the state inadvertently engendered a highly visible contrast between the idealized consumer 
culture portrayed in the shop windows and the reality of bleak consumption in the Konsum.  An 
anonymous interviewee indicated that Konsum propaganda had no direct influence on her, 
though she did find the political themes in the shop windows amusing.696  Hence, the SED failed 
to improve its image through the positive reification of itself in desirable consumer products. 
Indeed, the association and embodiment of the party with consumer products ultimately 
backfired, as East Germans blamed the SED and the Konsum for “shoddy” goods and perpetual 
shortages.  To make matters still worse for the SED, consumers negatively juxtaposed the party’s 
political slogans with these products, thereby discrediting the party and socialism.697  The 
people’s fundamental, though not complete, rejection of the Konsum will be a main theme of the 
upcoming chapters.    
                                                
695 Fuchshuber, Zwischen Propagandainstrument und Werbemittel: 116. 
696 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
Germany, 27 June 2011. 
697 Kaminsky, "True Advertising," 284. 
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PART III: REJECTION 
People’s reactions to the Konsum  
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8. “Manipulating the System to their minimum Disadvantage:” 
Propaganda, shopping, and venting in the Konsum 
 
Wider patterns such as the growth of consumer culture and the ‘privatisation’ of aspects of life 
and leisure, as well as the individualized channels of complaints and grumbling – all fostered and 
sustained by official policies – ironically led to or reinforced the growth of individualism in this 
would-be collectivized society. 
- Historian Mary Fulbrook698 
 
Over time, they [East Germans] learnt what could or could not be usefully discussed in any given 
context, and they learnt to deploy – or even, among younger generations, actually internalize – 
the ‘language’ of ‘actually existing socialism,’ even if they did not always fully agree with the 
substance. 
- Historian Mary Fulbrook699 
 
 
 
Illustration 35: The handwritten Eingaben written by Angelika Grenz, 7 December 1987700 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
698 Fulbrook, The People's State: 8. 
699 Ibid., 258. 
700 Angelilka Grenz, "Eingaben: Angelika Grenz, Senftenberg, den 7. Dezember 1987," in "Wir sind doch 
nicht die Meckerecke der Nation": Briefe an das Fernsehen der DDR, ed. Ina Merkel (Berlin: Schwarzkopf & 
Schwarzkopf, 2000), 196-97. 
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Shopping in the Konsum was an experience that involved a kaleidoscope of day-to-day 
activities, consumption, propaganda, ideological indoctrination, and the complex interaction 
between the party and the populace.  However, as we have seen, the SED’s attempt to control all 
facets of consumption ultimately backfired whenever expectations were not met (a common 
occurrence).  As a result, East Germans vented their frustrations with consumption at the party 
and its version of a socialist consumer culture (Verkaufskultur).701  As Judd Stitziel aptly 
demonstrates in his book Fashioning Socialism, the SED’s attempt to establish official theories 
and ideology failed because East Germans ultimately judged the achievements of socialism by 
what they could actually purchase in stores.702  What is more, the party was in the powerful 
position of controlling the command economy, the allocation of commodities, and the politicized 
message of consumption.  For this reason, consumers’ everyday experiences when shopping in 
the Konsum retail outlets became a critical propagandistic and ideological junction in the 
relationship between state and society in the DDR.  However, the stark contrasts between the 
propaganda images of consumer abundance and the actual shopping experience in the Konsum 
retail outlets contributed to East Germans’ disillusionment with the entire system of state 
socialism.703  Therefore, when speaking about the public motivation for the revolution of 1989, 
historian Gary Bruce suggests “it was often not solely a poor standard of living, but the 
combination of this with the overblown SED propaganda that eroded the legitimacy of the 
régime, and drove angry East German citizens to the streets [in 1953 and 1989].”704   
                                                
701 André Steiner, "Dissolution of the "Dictatorship over Needs"?: Consumer Behaviour and Economic 
reform in East Germany in the 1960s," in Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies in the 
Twentieth Century, ed. Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judt (Cambridge, England Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 167. 
702 Stitziel, Fashioning Socialism. 
703 The politicization and feminization of consumption are partially examined in Mark McCulloch, "The 
Union of Consumer Cooperatives and the SED’s Embryonic Educational and Ideological Systems in the Soviet 
Occupied Zone of Germany, 1945-1949," Eras 12(2011). 
704 Bruce, The Firm: 174. 
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This chapter expands on Stiziel and Bruce’s arguments by applying them to the 
experience of shopping in the Konsum stores.  It highlights the difficulties and disappointments 
that East Germans experienced when unable to acquire a desired commodity and raises the 
following questions: what was the shopping experience like in the Konsum retail outlets and how 
did this impact people’s perceptions of the state?  This chapter also challenges the notion of 
totalitarianism and endorses the idea of a nascent civil society in the DDR by examining how 
Eingaben forced the state to react to and try to fulfil the consumer demands of its citizens.       
8.1. Propaganda versus reality  
Consumers in the Soviet Occupation Zone/German Democratic Republic experienced a 
wide spectrum of consumer experiences ranging from the satisfaction of finding needed wares to 
endlessly rummaging through state-owned Konsum-stores in search of a particular item.  While 
the cost of products such as bread, milk, and meat were subsidized by the state and readily 
available, East Germans generally could not rely on the steady and predictable flow of desirable 
goods such as TVs, cars, and washing machines.  At the same time, however, the planned 
economy produced an overabundance of poorly produced wares that could only be off-loaded at 
bargain prices.  To make matters still worse for the Konsum and its retail network, the East 
German consumers compared their living experience to the perceived quality of life in West 
Germany.705  Ultimately, the products available and the experience of shopping in the Konsum 
stores were examples of the ways in which the state shaped everyday life in the DDR.  While 
shopping had become a major focus of the régime, the SED’s propagandized promises of 
                                                
705 David F. Crew, "Consuming Germany and the Cold War: Consumption and National Identity in East 
and West Germany, 1949-1989, An Introduction," in Consuming Germany and the Cold War, ed. David F. Crew 
(New York: Berg, 2003), 1. 
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material abundance ultimately raised consumers’ expectations to a point that the party and the 
Konsum simply could not deliver.706   
Consumers had to negotiate between the realities of consumption in the DDR and the 
propaganda of Verkaufskultur (socialist consumer culture) by spending endless and often 
fruitless hours in search of needed wares.  To quote historian Katherine Pence:  
Unmotivated shopkeepers failed to uphold proposed standards of cleanliness, service and 
décor.  All these factors created a wide disparity between the reality of daily shopping 
and the conception of ideal consumer culture, which often remained an unattained goal.  
Consumption in the young DDR usually was time-consuming, laborious, unpleasant and 
far from the promised “joyful” experience.707  
 
Similarly, one newspaper reader stated, “as soon as you opened the newspaper, you were 
placated and deceived.  The slogan may have read that ‘400,000 electric razors are available to 
the population.’  This, however, only increased my anger, since I didn’t need an electric razor.  I 
needed something else.”708  In the Eastern bloc, women were usually responsible for 
distinguishing between these forms of propaganda and the bleak realities of consumption and 
everyday life in the Soviet Bloc – that is, they had to wade through the politicized consumer 
culture to feed and clothe their families.  This required the ability to judge the quality of 
merchandise and the knowledge of how to manipulate the system to acquire goods through both 
legal and illegal means, namely by what Russians dubbed blat, or in the East German case, 
Beziehungen/Vitamin B (relations/connections).709   
The following sub-sections examine the experience of consumption in the co-operative 
retail outlets and the behaviours, strategies, and disappointments of consumer-tacticians in East 
                                                
706 Pence, "'You as a Woman Will Understand'," 224-25. 
707 Ibid., 226. 
708 Annette Kaminsky, "Einkaufsbeutel und Bückware," in Erinnerungsorte der DDR, ed. Martin Sabrow 
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Germany.  The overarching point is to demonstrate that this was a society with endemic 
shortages resulting in hardships, general discomfort, frustration, and inordinate amounts of 
wasted time.  And as Fulbrook suggests, “Much of the SED’s efforts were wasted: the realities of 
everyday life tended to belie the propaganda put out by the régime.”710   
8.1.1. Actual consumption in the Konsum  
The inability of the Konsum to create consumer satisfaction was a constant source of 
frustration for party officials.  Internal party documents from 1946 demonstrate that the party 
recognized the growing instability and resentment of the population in the realm of 
Verkaufskultur.  An archival document from 23 September 1946 states “within the population 
there was evident frustration and unrest for some time because of the irregular distribution of 
food and Genussmittel (luxury foods, alcohol, and tobacco), as well as industrial products.”711  In 
order to remedy this situation and quell the population’s demands, representatives from the 
departments of Domestic Trade and Commerce put forward the suggestion that the consumer co-
operatives improve the availability of these products and open new stores in cities and rural 
areas, as well as establish mobile sales units.712  
 
Illustration 36: Konsum Mobile Sales, late 1940s/early 1950s713    
Illustration 37: A new textiles store in Dommitzsch in the 1950s714 
                                                
 710 Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: 132. 
711 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/113, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker: Abschrift: Berlin, 
den 23. September 1946, für die Abteilung für Ernährung.   
712 Ibid.  See also Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: 199. 
713 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic: 156. 
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Customers continued to criticize the Konsum retail outlets for being unappealing, small, 
and under-stocked.715  Furthermore, a typical shopping trip to the Konsum store was often an 
unpleasant experience in which the consumer encountered surly salespeople.716  In late January 
1949, the authorities reported that the unfriendly and poor service in the consumer co-operatives 
was a constant source of complaint.  Mark Landsman, a historian of East Germany, writes:  
Whether in the weighing of bread, or including packaging material in the weighing of 
bread, or the unfriendliness of the sales people, the overall impression was one of great 
indifference on the part of Konsum employees towards customers.  In addition to the 
unpleasant salespeople, the actual co-ops themselves were often poorly maintained.  
They not only failed to meet hygienic requirements, but, as an investigation of one co-op 
reported, “The varied array of goods on sale works to the disadvantage of the food 
department… It is under no circumstance to be tolerated further that foodstuffs of all 
kinds like bread, butter, fat, cereals, and sugar are mixed in with vegetables, potatoes and 
other goods which develop dust.”  The investigation took particular exception to a 
separate glass-enclosed room where meat, sausages, and other goods were sold: “It defies 
description that in this wet room sacks with sugar and other important foodstuffs lay on 
the floor so that their contents become completely wet and the customers rightly 
complain.”717 
 
SMAD officials reprimanded Konsum employees for failing to establish adequate consumer 
provisioning and distribution.  In fact, the Konsum officials were taken to task by the SMAD for 
the poor state of many of the co-operative stores.  The lack of proper décor in them especially 
infuriated the Soviet officers in attendance.  One such Soviet officer put it this way: “the German 
has shown himself to have grown unaccustomed to saying thank you.  One has the feeling that 
the salesperson finds his work to be a heavy burden – indeed, this is not the case everywhere, but 
it has become characteristic.”718   
The state’s artificially controlled price policies in combination with poor planning, 
production, and distribution, created a system in which there were not only relentless shortages 
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of consumer goods, but also surpluses of good that would not sell.  Consequently, the consumer 
co-operative stores were often full of wares, though it was often difficult for a customer to find 
the exact product for which one searched.719  Historian Judd Stitziel argues:  
The palpable presence of an overwhelming number of goods that remained unsold in 
stores for months and years exacerbated consumers’ already significant anger over the 
lack of desired items.  These unsold wares formed a highly visible indication of the 
dysfunctional elements of the planned economy and its failure to fulfill consumers’ needs 
and desires.  Given the highly politicized nature of consumption and the practical 
meaninglessness of citizen’s votes at the ballot box, the purchase or refusal to purchase 
East German products could be considered part of an indirect plebiscite on the DDR’s 
political and economic system.720   
 
Fitzkow states in an interview, “there were many goods for sale, which nobody wanted.  For 
example, there were vast amounts of spoiled fruit and vegetables (mostly cucumbers), especially 
when they were in season.”721  This problem of over-supply of unwanted goods continued to 
plague the DDR.  As low quality goods piled up, retail staff complained about the difficulty of 
trying to sell them.  Given the close proximity of the consumer abundance of West Germany’s 
market economy, party functionaries grew concerned that the visual and physical dominance of 
low-quality goods reflected poorly on the SED’s style of socialism and its command economy.  
Rather than making efforts to contribute to egalitarian consumer possibilities, however, the state 
exploited differences in income by increasing the prices for higher quality goods, or selling them 
for hard currency in the 1970s and 1980s.722 
There were continual bottlenecks in the distribution of goods at the Konsum outlets, 
especially for highly desired wares (TVs, washing machines, cars, and so on).   This uneven and 
unpredictable distribution led to hoarding and impulse buying whenever these goods randomly 
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became available.  Consumers with income to spare often bought up certain articles specifically 
out of the fear that they might not be there again.  This practice of hoarding further destabilized 
the SED’s promised ideal of rational, planned consumption, which was worsened considerably 
during times of political uncertainty such as after the construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 
August 1961.  People also began to hoard goods out of fear of rising inflation or rumours of price 
increases.  Furthermore, a purchase did not necessarily mean complete satisfaction with the item, 
as many manufactured goods, particularly clothing, were altered in some way after purchase (i.e., 
adjusting length, width, dyeing, or bleaching).723   
In 1970 in Zittau (a small community on the German-Czech border), the Konsum closed 
its retail outlets 1120 and 1122 without notifying the population.  According to a Stasi report, 
customers were so disappointed with these closures and, more broadly, socialist consumer 
culture that they expressed their anger by protesting in the forms of meetings with the National 
Front and Eingaben.  In spite of their protests, these two Konsum shops remained closed.  In 
response, the Konsum received anonymous calls threatening to sabotage the stores if they were 
not reopened the following Monday.  In one call, the perpetrator stated, “I warn you that 
something is going to happen.”724  Indeed, something did happen.  At the Konsum retail outlets 
1120 and 1122, the shop windows became targets of anger and were destroyed.  The perpetrators 
then entered the shops through the broken windows and started fires.  The report concludes with 
the notation that the Stasi had not yet caught the perpetrators.725  
                                                
723 Judd Stitziel, "Shopping, Sewing, Networking, Complaining: Consumer Culture and the Relationship 
between State and Society in the GDR," in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics, ed. 
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725 Ibid., 1-4. 
229 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 38: A threatening letter sent to the Konsum and the Stasi warning against the closure of retail 
outlets, 1971726 
 
The Konsum propaganda, especially the Verkaufsgespräch, as discussed in previous 
chapters, was often counterproductive because of the stark contrast between propaganda and the 
actual shopping experience in these stores.  While ideological conversations with customers and 
members took place within retail outlets, attempts to engage in these conversations were not 
warmly received by customers at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Köpenick.  Instead, 
customers complained about the shortages of milk, butter, and vegetables.  Customers often 
replied to sales staff’s attempts at ideological conversation with the following answer: “first and 
foremost worry about providing us with a better selection of goods.  Only then will you be able 
to engage us in political and ideological conversations.”727  Frau H. described her negative 
experience at the Konsum butchery in Zwickau on 23 February 1989.  She complained that only 
one saleswoman serviced this outlet even though the store was often full of customers.  She said, 
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“I had to stress that this kind of service was not an isolated case.  It really should be considered if 
it is wise to anger the population right before the election.”728   
The Konsum, along with its retail outlets and the products sold within them, was a 
communications network.  Historian Rainer Gries suggests, “In its capacity as a consumer good, 
the product must meet some material need or desire, and it must also serve as a means of 
communication.  Not only is the product consumed; networks of communicative relationships 
also form around it.”729  A 2011 interview coincides with Gries’s argument.  During the 
interview, Fitzkow describes the Konsum’s propaganda as ineffective and his general interaction 
with this organization as negative.  For him, the primary message the Konsum portrayed to 
customers was actually counterproductive because, as he states, “the experience of shopping in 
the Konsum could best be described as shortages or continual bottlenecks in the delivery of 
goods [Mängel oder standigen Engpässe bei den Waren].  From the beginning to the end, the 
distribution in these stores was full of gaps [lückenhaft], which only became worse in the 
1980s.”730    
Of course, not every experience of shopping in the Konsum was negative.  An 
anonymous interviewee describes the shopping experience as “relatively positive, especially 
since the main objective of the Konsum was supplying the population with basic foodstuffs.  In 
this respect, it delivered a regular supply of goods to the population, namely bread, milk, meat, 
and sugar at very cheap, state-subsidized prices.”731  To speculate, this may be a point of 
intergenerational difference in the DDR.  That is to say, the generation that experienced the 
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deprivations of the War and postwar period was likely more conciliatory towards the Konsum, 
whereas their children and those exposed to West German advertising were less willing to 
accommodate socialist consumer culture.  It should also be noted that the evidence that remains 
is overwhelmingly negative since consumers would rarely write Eingaben when they were 
satisfied with an acquired good.  Perhaps we are, therefore, only seeing one side of the coin.  
Yet, the positive and the negative shopping experiences in the retail outlets impacted how 
citizens perceived their socialist state, as such experiences generally served to either legitimize or 
de-legitimize it in the eyes of the consumer.    
8.1.2. Consumption in the countryside 
The co-operative provision of goods in the countryside was fused with political 
considerations.732  There was a close collaboration of the party with the consumer co-operatives 
to increase the influence of the party through consumption in Thuringia, Mecklenburg, and 
Brandenburg.  However, from the party’s perspective, its political influence was weakly 
developed in these areas.  To offset these weaknesses, the Konsum was expected to use its 
influence and extensive network of retail outlets and educational facilities in the countryside to 
promulgate the ideology of the SED.  The SED also recognized the potential of the Konsum to 
garner support for the party by adequately supplying the rural populace during the harvest.733   
The SED ordered the Konsum to improve living conditions in the countryside by 
establishing a co-operative sales outlet in every town – regardless of size.  Consequently, these 
outlets became more plentiful in rural areas than in urban centres (see maps in Appendix 
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11.1).734  These retail outlets were inserted into old castles, manor houses, and apartment 
complexes.  In the following months and years, more permanent facilities were built to house the 
consumer co-operatives.  In larger centres, Konsum department stores were built.735  According 
to internal party documents from the Department of Trade and Provision, which were addressed 
to Gerhard Lucht (president of the VDK from 1954 to 1963), the primary task of the co-
operatives was to ensure the best possible provision of the population in the countryside.  This 
became the basis for the initial steps towards the creation of a socialist consumer culture in rural 
areas.736  
The SED expected to gain political capital by satisfactorily supplying the rural population 
through this development of a widespread network of Konsum retail outlets.  The rural consumer 
co-operatives were to assist the party in neutralising and integrating potential resistance in the 
countryside during the establishment of the agricultural co-operatives (landwirtschaftliche 
Produktionsgenossenschaften, LPG) and the “socialist transformation of agriculture” in July 
1952.737  During this transformational and revolutionary period, the Konsum played a critical role 
as the state’s primary retail trader to the inhabitants of the newly formed LPGs.738  To ensure the 
rapid and unhindered growth of the LPGs, the number of consumer co-operatives continued to 
increase.739  An official party document from the Department of Trade and Provision states, “co-
operatives were the primary means of trade in rural areas.  They were bolstered both politically 
and economically in order to influence the political and cultural life in the smaller centres 
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through consumption.”740   The SED, in other words, adopted the policy that an important 
prerequisite for the implementation of these revolutionary transformations could be met through 
satisfactory consumption in the new rural co-operative stores.741    
Within a year, thousands of rural co-operative outlets (Verkaufsstellen) were opened.  By 
the end of 1953, there were 996 regionally (Kreis) organized rural and urban consumer co-
operatives in the DDR.  In addition, twenty-four regional co-operatives were opened in the 
Stadtkreisen.  Even though the Konsum stores and retail centres were generally unprofitable, 
there was a small co-operative in every East German community.742   
Shopping was often an unpleasant, unrewarding, and disillusioning experience in spite of 
the relative ubiquity of the Konsum in the countryside (at least in the cities, especially Berlin, 
consumers had other retail options).  The Konsum outlet in Saalfeld was a case in point.  Because 
it could not satisfy demand, many consumers turned to private merchants to meet their daily 
needs.  As party personnel at the Konsum admitted, private dealers sold a greater variety of 
higher-quality goods at lower prices, while they, in contrast, had very little to offer local 
residents.  Many Saalfelders complained about people with personal connections to Konsum 
saleswomen, since some gained unfair access to goods at the expense of others.743  This was 
sarcastically referred to as Vitamin B, for Beziehungen, which will be discussed in greater detail 
in the following chapter.  Informal networks or Vitamin B were a common technique in 
acquiring desired goods, which resulted in frustration and resentment for those who lacked such 
connections or Beziehungen.  The following humorous poem is one such example: 
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In the Konsum store no aunt  Beim Konsum keine Tante  
In the H.O. store no relatives   Beim H.O. keine Verwandte  
From the West no package  Aus dem Westen kein Paket  
And you still ask me how  Und da fragen Sie mir noch  
 I’m doing.     wie es mir geht.744   
Customers were repeatedly frustrated by supply shortages and uneven distribution practices in 
Saalfeld, while the authorities and workers who managed the Konsum and other state-run stores 
also grew annoyed.  For example, the SED District Secretariat in Saalfeld berated the Konsum 
for neglecting the rural areas, where it was the main supplier.  Historian Andrew Port writes “this 
was especially disconcerting at a time when many farmers were complaining about the failure of 
the Konsum to offer its customers more indispensable items like blankets.”745   
At an SED trade conference in 1959, nearly all areas of rural East Germany reported 
dissatisfaction with consumption.  The Weekly Post (Wochenpost) often described the negative 
shopping situation in the countryside.  This is evident in the following passage: “the co-operative 
farmers, the rural workers, and many people living in the countryside had to perpetually travel to 
the nearest district principal town (Kreisstadt) in a search to buy this or that item.”746  This 
frustration was compounded because most consumers in the countryside had to shop in the 
Konsum, which supplied the rural population with over seventy percent of their consumer 
goods.747  This dependence on the Konsum and lack of other alternatives engendered a situation 
that complicated the ability of rural inhabitants to find a desired product, thereby making it 
necessary for them to travel to the nearest district capital or even Berlin to search for needed 
wares.  According to one frustrated Konsum shopper, “my wife and I spent two days searching in 
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vain for a fully automatic washing machine.  When four or five new units were delivered, they 
were immediately sold.”748   
By the late 1980s, consumption and the supply situation were rapidly deteriorating in the 
countryside as the DDR’s command economy began to flounder to the point that the Stasi was 
becoming alarmed.  For instance, consumers in Ebersbach (a town of around 8,000 inhabitants 
near the German-Czech border) had to deal with severe unpredictability in the availability of 
goods.  In Kreis Löbau, there was limited availability of fruits and vegetables.  As a result, the 
Stasi came to the conclusion that it had to collect more information about how the population 
was reacting to the supply problems.  This being so, the Ministry of State Security, a highly 
effective and repressive secret police agency subsequently intensified its surveillance in the 
sleepy town of Ebersbach and Kreis Löbau.749  The likely result of this increased observation 
was Stasi officers wasting vast amount of working time and resources.   
8.2. Selective participation, individual agency, and the consumer-tactician 
The section will examine selective participation, individual agency, and the consumer-
tactician.  As discussed in section 1.3.2, the consumer-tactician had to navigate the DDR’s urban 
and retail spaces.  In a sense, the consumer-tactician was the product or subject of these 
ideological manifestations, yet also the manipulator of them in ways that were separate from the 
interests of their producer – the SED.750  Historian Eli Rubin describes such tactics:  
East Germans learned, by necessity, to become far more self-sufficient in the repair, 
maintenance and general understanding of the things in their everyday life than were 
most people in the capitalist consumer societies of the West.  And when an East 
German could not repair a television, a heating panel, a carburetor or a leaky roof, they 
could almost always rely on a neighbour to do it for them, often in exchange for some 
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other service or good such as babysitting, vegetables from the community garden plot, 
or maybe even use of official connections to gain an advantageous spot on a state 
waiting-list.  Most East Germans developed a kind of self-reliance and independence 
from the state as well as the market.751   
 
Although incapable of directly overturning the state, selective participation was essential for 
surviving in the DDR and, by extension, inadvertently undermining the SED régime.  While not 
revolutionary, selective participation did contribute to revolutionary outcomes.  After all, for 
Konsum customers and members (mostly women and rural inhabitants), the goal was not to 
overthrow the system, but to survive and enhance their lives within the SED’s system of 
domination.  By nibbling away at the state, these people were, as E.J. Hobsbawm so aptly puts it, 
“‘working the system’ to [their] advantage – or rather to [their] minimum disadvantage.”752   
  Consumer-tacticians responded to the dearth of consumer goods in a variety of 
resourceful ways. Labouring women would frequently leave work for short periods to attempt to 
attain sought after goods often sold out by the late afternoon.  Queuing, however, was the most 
common practice, and it was not uncommon for consumers to line up for hours outside the 
store.753  In the words of historian Katherine Pence, “in search of scarce groceries, women 
regularly stood in long queues and dragged their shopping bags from store to store.  The extra 
burden of shopping under these conditions complicated the ostensible state goal to integrate 
women more fully into the workforce.”754  Consumers attempted to increase the likelihood of 
being at the store when new goods arrived by means of networking, complaining, and making 
regular visits to the local consumer co-operative.755  The desire for products perpetuated a 
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situation that resulted in the alteration of goods to a new purpose hence a general avoidance of 
waste.756   
When it came to day-to-day life, consumer-tacticians, especially women, expressed their 
concerns by resisting the SED’s plans through acts of individual self-interest and selective 
participation.  For example, employed mothers missed work and lamented the quantity and 
quality of housing, food, and consumer goods.  Women also used the SED’s rhetoric about 
female emancipation to gain concessions from the state.  These tactics were almost always 
individual, but they nevertheless demonstrated to the state that their needs had to be met in order 
for women to maintain jobs, participate in educational and training courses, and bear children.  
These tactics compelled the SED to make adjustments to production goals, primarily by 
pressuring the Konsum factories to produce and sell higher quality goods.  Through everyday 
actions (Eingaben, arguments, complaints, and occasional open protests), East German women 
were able to influence the economic priorities of the régime to include the consumption needs of 
the family.  In other words, a production-obsessed and male-dominated SED leadership was 
compelled to implement a welfare policy with consumerist features to placate women’s 
demands.757 
Female consumers used their alleged status as women, as housewives, and as members of 
the DFD to pressure the Konsum into delivering wanted goods.  The following example of an 
Eingabe from 1965 is, according to historian Felix Mühlberg, quite typical for it contains the 
following components: an expression of who one is and why their needs are important, 
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references to DDR norms and values, a threat, and a request.758  For instance, one letter from 
1965 states:  
In the name of the membership of DFD Group 43 and all women in our area, we 
protested the closing of Konsum butcher shop 102.  The closing of this store was in no 
way in accordance with the resolutions of the Women’s Congress and the Politburo of 
the SED, which were intended to ease the burden on the East German women.  As a 
result of the closing, we women now require more time to do our shopping and have to 
spend a lot of time waiting in line.  Although members of the Konsum, many now had to 
shop in the HO and lose their rebate stamps in the process.759   
 
The letter closes with a request for a change in this situation.760   This was a clever tactic; it 
pressured the party to fulfill the resolutions of the women’s congress and a very clever way that 
women drew attention to the state’s progressive rhetoric for the purposes of meeting their 
demands.  In a similar vein, James C. Scott writes:  
It is the young people, those who display a serious interest in the theoretical foundations 
of communism and begin immersing themselves in Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, who pose a 
much greater danger to the régime.  The Soviet authorities realize this.  A person who 
takes theory seriously will, sooner or later, begin comparing it with practice, and will end 
up rejecting one or the other, and, later on, the two of them together.  But a person who 
has not been seduced by the theory will view the practice as a common and immutable 
evil – one that can be lived with.761 
 
The women of DFD Group 43 were cleverly using theory as leverage to have the SED fulfill its 
progressive promises, specifically in this example the resolutions of the Women’s Congress.  In 
adopting this approach, they were manipulating the system to their advantage. 
The following is a further example of the consumer-tactician.  In a sales outlet in 
Güstrow, a co-operative member and gardener sold 10 KG of plums to the Konsum for a 
predetermined price of 1.50 MdN per KG.  That year, there was an overabundance of plums, but 
this did not impact the fixed sales price.  The plums were then immediately put on sale for the 
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price of thirty pfennigs (cents) per KG.  Recognizing this discrepancy between the sales price 
(1.50 MdN) and the Konsum’s selling price (thirty pfennigs), the gardener re-purchased his own 
plums for a total of three MdN.  In so doing, he got his produce back and made a profit of twelve 
MdN.  This is an example of a clever way in which Konsum members were able to take 
advantage of socialist price policies.762  This act was individualistic and showed self-interest and 
might even be described as oppositional, but it did not carry a political element.  In this case, the 
member was both looking after himself and depriving the state of income.  In East Germany, 
these acts – although uncoordinated – were, I suspect, ubiquitous.   
The examples of the gardener and the women of DFD Group 43 offer interesting cases of 
tactics under the East German dictatorship.  Through them, it becomes apparent that co-operative 
members were actually employing a variety of tactics.  In respect to these aforementioned cases, 
the words of historian Alf Lüdtke are particularly appropriate: “whichever way people acted and 
behaved, they did things ‘their way’ – they concomitantly entertained highly individualized sets 
of feelings.”763  Esther von Richtofen further points out that “official structures not only imposed 
control, but that they could also be exploited for their own purposes: [East Germans] could 
utilize SED rhetoric and force higher ranking cultural functionaries to do things for them.”764  
The command of socialized German discourse or what I have described as East German 
language or DDR Deutsch – delineated and endorsed by the state – defined full participation in 
East German society, but it was also the prerequisite for becoming a consumer-tactician.765   
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8.2.1. Voluntarism or individualism?   
Members often eagerly volunteered to participate at their local Konsum outlet and for 
various Konsum political endeavours.  For instance, beginning in 1975 members participated in 
the modernization of the Konsum retail outlets.  This policy under the slogan: “Do your part! 
Volunteer for the beautification of our cities and communities! (Schöner unsere Städte und 
Gemeinden – Mach mit!) cost the Konsum thirty-one million MdN.766  While this voluntarism 
had a collective connotation, the advantages were individualistic, because the volunteer was 
likely able to find out when more interesting items such as bananas had arrived.767  This suggests 
that a citizen’s motivation for volunteering was both in support of co-operative or SED ideology, 
and to a considerable extent for the attainment of desired products.  In other words, this 
voluntarism was likely a tactic to establish friendly contacts with store personnel, with the 
potential of gaining privileged access to goods.  This type of selective participation neither 
necessitated open violence against the régime, nor did it require political coordination and 
organization.768 
8.2.2. Rebate stamps and the advantages of Konsum membership  
Every Konsum member received a refund on all purchased goods.  The percentage of the 
patronage refund (usually between 1.5 to 3 percent) was determined during the Konsum’s 
General Assembly.769  The Konsum also offered its members services and rebates and reduced 
prices in other partner-establishments, such as local hotels, museums, theatres and travel 
agencies.770  Upon entrance into the co-operative organization, the new members (usually 
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women) were eligible to receive a patronage refund of as much as two to three percent of the 
Konsum turnover.  At the end of the year, the co-op earnings were counted and the refunds were 
distributed.  Many families used this extra income to help subsidize their Christmas 
celebrations.771  The yearly patronage refund was also a welcome supplement to the family 
income and was used for the purchase of coal and potatoes over the winter.772 
“The rebate stamps (Rabatt-Marken) please” was, unsurprisingly, the most commonly 
used phrase by the consumer at the checkout at the local co-operative; the members often 
exchanged these stamps at the end of the year in return for goods.773  The small green, blue, red 
and brown rebate stamps were given in denominations of one, five, ten or fifty MdN.  One 
received the stamps after the presentation of the Konsum membership identification to the 
cashier, but the sales person often knew the customer, so this representation of identification was 
usually not necessary.774  At home, these Marken were placed in a small booklet, and at the end 
of the year they were cashed in at the local co-operative.  Generally, the Konsum members were 
avid collectors of rebate stamps, which could be exchanged for products, such as coffee, 
refrigerators, washing machines, sewing machines, and crafts.  In later years, members could 
even exchange stamps for motor vehicles, jewellery made from precious metals, hand-cut lead 
crystals, musical instruments, postage stamps, hats, and so on.  Every September, 1.5 to 1.7 
percent of consumer co-operative profit was used to provide patronage refunds.  Per family this 
amounted to a yearly average of 150 MdN.775  Former co-operative member and employee 
Werner Müller stated in an interview, “in many families, it was a tradition to be a co-operative 
member.  However, many citizens of the former DDR only joined co-operative ranks because of 
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the refund.  When coal was needed for the winter or potatoes for storage, this extra money was 
always needed.”776 
  Sabine Hödt remembers her tenth birthday when she was able to start participating in the 
tradition of collecting refund stamps for her grandmother.  On the one hand, Hödt was excited 
about the refunded amount of money, even though she dreaded the preparatory work.  In her 
words, “prior to the submission of the membership book, every family frantically searched 
through all their bags, purses and articles of clothing in an effort to track down every last 
membership stamp.  I found it nauseating to have to sort and lick these stamps.  Why couldn’t 
the backside taste like fruit or liquorice?  And why did the aftertaste linger like soap?”777   
 Herr Fitzkow stated in an interview that the rebate stamps were particularly important for 
him and his family and East Germans in general.  Normally, they received about 100DM at the 
end of the year.  In fact, one year a mistake was made by the saleswomen, and she gave the 
Fitzkow family a 600DM patronage refund (Rückvergütung).  Accordingly, in Fitzkow’s words, 
“that was a good mistake.  We used the money to buy something nice.”778  Martin Bergner had 
and continues to have a strong sense of loyalty with the Konsum organization.  Bergner, a former 
member of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Altenburg and current employee within the Konsum, 
concurred, “The patronage refund was something very important.”779      
A great number of Eingaben written to the Konsum stress the value of the rebate and the 
frustrations about not receiving the expected amount.  For instance, in a letter written in 1964, a 
member complained, “I have been a member of the consumer co-operatives since 1946... but I 
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am unable to use Konsum-rebate-stamps for the credit payment.”780  Another frustrated consumer 
wrote, “I had been a member of the Konsum since 1950.  On February 1963, I, along with my 
husband, bought a radio worth 895 MdN at the Konsumkaufhaus-Leipzig.  Since I was in a hurry 
(we didn’t know when the stores closed on Saturdays), I forgot my membership book.  I kindly 
asked for the receipt so I could later claim the rebate stamps.  In a rude reply, I was told that I 
could not claim the stamps...  My husband and I were so upset about this incident that we nearly 
decided to give up our Konsum membership.”781  In a further example, a male customer 
complained via an Eingabe to the Konsum-Fahrzeughaus-Leipzig (vehicle dealer) that he did not 
receive any rebate stamps following the purchase of a scooter.  This customer was also frustrated 
that there was only one membership book for himself and his wife, and that this meant that the 
couple had to carry another piece of identification.782  Another customer complained in an 
Eingabe directed to the administration of the Konsum-Leipzig about constantly having to carry 
the membership-book in order to receive rebate stamps.783  The fact that these consumers were 
willing to take the time to write letters of complaint about having to carry around their 
membership books indicates that they did so, in spite of the inconvenience.  These are just a few 
examples depicting the importance of rebate stamps for consumers, particularly when it came to 
larger and more expensive items.  The upcoming section will examine the writing of Eingaben in 
more detail.       
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8.3. Eingaben: venting and totalitarianism	   
In February 1953, the régime enacted laws that governed how the various state authorities 
would respond to the treatment of both oral and written petitions (Eingaben).784  Customers and 
workers had the opportunity to direct Eingaben to the various administrative levels of the 
Konsum.  For instance, the Executive of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig ensured that every 
member could direct Eingaben to its various administrative levels, including individual members 
of the executive.  In fact, the executive guaranteed that letter-writers would receive a written 
response from them within ten days, and they guaranteed a two-day response for letters written 
to the lower branches of this organization.785   
The Konsum and the SED used Eingaben for the displacement of social tension, for 
allowing certain things to be said, and for certain forms of social power to be exercised.  At 
times, Eingaben consisted of state slogans and promises to force the régime to fulfill its 
egalitarian ideology, while others contained sarcastic and forceful language and should be 
interpreted as an avenue for venting.  Both, however, demonstrate that citizens were given an 
outlet, the ability to complain, so they used it.  Of course, the letters also demonstrate the 
totalitarian nature of the DDR.  To support this contention, we need to return to a quotation by 
Hanna Arendt from the introduction: “totalitarian movements are mass-organizations of 
atomized, isolated individuals.”786  Therefore, even the most hard-hitting letters were permitted, 
since the individuals writing them posed no direct threat to the régime due to the isolation of the 
letter writer.  However, as will be seen later in this section, once the complaints became 
coordinated, the Stasi would intervene.   
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As people learned the discourse of East German socialism, they began to redirect the 
party’s egalitarian values back at the SED in what Michel Foucault describes as a reverse 
discourse.  To explicate, once an ideological categorisation or norm comes into existence, it is 
possible to “identity with it, and then defend it, insist on your rights, and join forces with others 
who feel oppressed by the norm, invoking what Foucault calls a ‘reverse discourse’ as the basis 
of resistance to the norm itself.”787  Similarly, as Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci observed, the 
dominant must make good on at least some of its promises if it is to gain the support of the lower 
classes.  This requires actual sacrifice and restraint from the dominant groups, which in turn 
could be exploited and redirected at the ruling power by the subordinate classes.788  Eingaben 
reflect Foucault and Gramsci’s hypotheses.  As some indicate, a class struggle arose from the 
SED’s failure to live up to the implicit promises of its Marxist ideology – that is, by making 
these humanistic pledges to legitimize its rule, the SED was actually fashioning a weapon to be 
used by East Germans.  Historian Judd Stitziel argues, “by adopting the régime’s language in 
order to ask the state to fulfill official promises and to respect worker-consumers’ ‘rights,’ East 
Germans reproduced official discourses while practicing a form of self-regulation.”789  These 
conclusions are evidenced in the following example.  A frustrated Konsum customer knowingly 
used SED language by comparing socialist retail with capitalism.  The letter-writer stated:  
I bought a TV for 2170DM at the Konsum retail outlet 430 on 13 December 1962.  
However, my personal satisfaction did not last long.  A few days later, the original 
picture tube became defective.  This was then replaced on 18 January 1963.  In August of 
this year, this component again needed to be replaced...  This type of service has nothing 
to do with socialism and socialist retail trade.  On the contrary, such fraudulent methods 
remind me of capitalism.790   
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On the other hand, Eingaben also coincide with James C Scott’s arguments about 
grumbling and venting.  As will be clearly seen in some of the following letters, day-to-day 
communication between the party and the subordinates (i.e., consumers) was conducted in a 
dialogue of grumbling.  In the words of Scott, “over time a pattern of muttering may develop that 
has much of the communicative force of a quite refined language as the timing, tune, and 
nuances of the complaints become quite definitely understood.  This language exists alongside 
the language of deference without necessarily violating its prescriptions.”791  The SED, for its 
part, allowed for relative protest against some state authorities (i.e., venting or grumbling).  In 
fact, Eingaben may have acted as a kind of safety valve through which the population could vent 
their frustrations with the régime, without directly challenging the authority of SED rule.    
Hence, Eingaben were instruments of social control – albeit on a limited scale and individually.  
Scott argues:  
The point of grumbling is that it stops short of insubordination – to which it is a prudent 
alternative.  Because the intention of making an explicit statement is denied, the need for 
a direct reply is also denied: officially, nothing has happened.  Looked at from above, the 
dominant actors have permitted subordinates to grumble providing that they never 
infringe on the public etiquette of deference.  Looked at from below, those with little 
power have skilfully manipulated the terms of their subordination so as to express their 
dissent publicly, if cryptically, without ever providing their antagonists with an excuse 
for a counterblow.”792   
 
Similarly, the following Eingaben demonstrates that the writers were mostly interested in 
material incentives and venting:  
I don’t know how you came up with the name ‘Navigation’.  Certainly, it was because 
the name ‘Atlantic’ was already patented.  But, this soap resembles neither.  I, therefore, 
recommend that you patent the name ‘Abwasser’ (sewage), because it has more in 
common with your product.  For these aforementioned reasons, could you please send 
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me three pieces of higher quality soap or the amount of 2.85 MdN plus one MdN for the 
postage?793   
 
In another example, the writer expressed his frustration over not being able to get any beer for 
his vacation.  In his words,  
We had just come back from our local co-operative store and again the Radeberger beer 
was only available on ration.  After twice waiting in line, there was no more beer.  And, 
after consulting with Frau Reppe, she indicated that no more beer would be available.  
In your opinion, was a good vacation dependent on beer?  Well, I am of the opinion that 
a good beer was part of a good vacation.  Up until a year ago, one could pre-order a case 
of beer for a holiday, but not anymore.  And so, I would like to know if there is still a 
law for beer allocation.  I cannot understand why – forty-four years after the war – I 
can’t get a case of beer.  Perhaps this was because of the high-handedness of the co-
operative administration.  I eagerly anticipate your response.794     
 
These examples illustrate that the Konsum was an avenue by which the concerns and frustrations 
of individual members – to some extent – could be vented up the SED’s economic hierarchy.   
The customers bombarded the state departments and the Konsum with protest letters.  The 
Konsum soap factory in Riesa (Konsum-Seifenwerk-Riesa) was a particularly popular target.795   
In one such example the writer declared, “dear comrade director!  For a Christmas present, I 
bought my wife a gift package with the soap – Mon bijou – from your factory in order to make 
her happy.  But, when my wife opened and used the soap, it released a smell.  At first it was 
pleasant; an hour later, however, the soap smelled, cleaned, and lathered like spoiled cheese.”796  
Another letter from Rolf Krüger written to the Konsum-Seifenwerk-Riesa from 10 November 
1989 says: 
For years, we’ve been using this soap and we were completely satisfied with it.  It is 
cheaper than the other products currently available.  I wanted to know if the production 
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of the product has been ceased.  If this was the case, this is complete nonsense and the 
Minister of Trade and Provision should have put an end to this.797   
 
In an Eingaben from Angelika Grenz, she laments to the Konsum-Seifenwerk-Riesa that the soap 
sold was not practical for children.  She also describes how relatives in West Germany were able 
to send her two children (at the time three and seven years old) superior soap in the shape of 
small animals.  Accordingly, she suggested that the Konsum-Seifenwerk-Riesa should undertake 
soap production in the form of toys.798    
The Konsum received numerous Eingaben from members criticizing the shopping 
experience in consumer co-operative stores and the unavailability of goods.  Hanna Kraft, who 
actually worked in a Konsum store in Brodau, wrote an Eingaben to an East German television 
program.   In her words, “it was often difficult and based on luck if one was to receive bread on 
Fridays...  The situation was often so bad that a majority of the population had to travel 2.5 km to 
Zschortau or Delitzsch to do their shopping.  We wanted a range of goods that would have 
allowed all the citizens in Brodau to do their shopping here.”799  Another anonymous Eingaben 
vented frustration at the régime and the Konsum regarding its provision of ice cream.  It states:  
Among the problems that irritated us the most, the ice cream situation was the worst.  
The state’s offered explanations for these problems were often contradictory and 
inconsistent and we cannot accept them.  Because of this problem, consumer co-
operative members were growing angry and beginning to insult the republic.800   
 
Customers and employees also complained about the irregular business hours at the co-
operative outlets.  Grete Schmidt wrote an Eingaben in Markleeberg on 28 March 1989.  The 
letter stated, “The co-operative store in which new goods were received was closed for either the 
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entire morning or afternoon.  Because of the enormous line-ups, it was very difficult to discover 
new shoe models.”801  An Eingaben written by Hanna Kraft from 4 January 1987 describes her 
experience with working at the local co-operative store and its constantly changing working 
hours in Brodau (part of the city Delitzsch with approximately 500 inhabitants):    
I was employed at the co-operative store until August.  The hours of operation at this co-
operative store were a complete catastrophe.  The opening times were the following: 
Monday and Friday 9am to 2pm, Tuesday 9am to 3pm, Wednesday 9am to 1pm and 2pm 
to 3pm, Thursday 9am to 4pm.  When I stopped working there as a saleswoman, the 
hours of operation again changed: daily from 9am to 2:30pm.  After fourteen days, we 
determined that this was too long, so on Wednesday the hours of operation changed to 
10am to 2:30pm.  When something came up, the store was often closed at 12pm.  The 
majority of workingwomen could not leave their jobs until 4pm, so they could not shop 
in Brodau.  We want a co-operative that will have consistent hours of operation for 
employees and consumers from 9am to 1pm and 3pm to 6pm, so that all the citizens in 
Brodau can do their shopping here.802   
 
These letters expressed to the party that their loyalty was contingent upon the SED 
fulfilling its promise of an abundant provision of commodities.  Through these letters, consumers 
were attempting to forge a contract with the state in which material prosperity would be a 
significant prerequisite for state legitimacy and the loyalty of the citizenry.803  In other words, 
consumer-tacticians were able to demand that the party provide higher quality consumer goods 
and make economic adjustments to satisfy their needs and demands.  By writing these letters in 
either socialist discourse or direct and often sarcastic language, they were making the most of 
their situation by exploiting the rules of the game and manipulating the system to their 
“minimum disadvantage.”804  To put it another way, consumers or petitioners were attempting to 
pressure the party to bestow the commodity the individual desired.  This was, at times, 
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accomplished by echoing the party’s own language, thereby “encoding” their individual pursuit 
of goods in the politicized language of Soviet-style socialism.  Life in the DDR and personal 
satisfaction, therefore, required one to develop creative strategies to manipulate the system.  
Those individuals who were able to adjust their stance to the necessity of the given context of the 
DDR’s socialist dictatorship maximized opportunities in the overtly politicized sphere of 
consumption in the DDR.  Since the sphere of consumption was a junction in which the state and 
the citizenry met, these Eingaben demonstrate how individuals learned to employ multiple 
tactics to maximize their exploitation of the system, while, on account of the atomization of the 
letter writer, not directly challenging the rule and hegemony of the SED.   
While the SED created the scenarios for the performance of conformity and support, it 
was clear that most East Germans were only going through the motions and were in fact not 
invested in the performance.  Scott illustrates an example of such behaviour when speaking of 
motorists and pedestrians:  
The traffic light changes when a pedestrian is halfway across the intersection.  As long as 
the pedestrian is not in imminent danger from the oncoming traffic, a small dramatization 
is likely to ensue.  He lifts his knees a bit higher for a step or two, simulating haste, 
thereby implicitly recognizing the motorist’s right-of-way.  In fact, in nearly all cases, if 
my impression is correct, the actual progress of the pedestrian across the intersection is 
no faster than it would have been if he had simply proceeded at his original pace.  What 
is conveyed is the impression of compliance without its substance.805   
 
If the opposite occurs and the pedestrian openly refuses to make the appearance of haste or, even 
worse, slows down, then a direct defiance of the motorist’s right to the road has occurred (i.e., 
the symbolic order has been breached and challenged).  By directly defying the motorist, the 
pedestrian is announcing his right to the road and a game of “chicken” would most likely ensue 
in which the pedestrian is at a serious disadvantage.806  If the East German was in the presence of 
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party officials or the secret police, it was necessary that the performance maintain the minimal 
standards of conformity and state loyalty; otherwise the SED’s authority would have been 
challenged.  Like the driver from Scott’s analogy, the party and state held a clear advantage in 
resources over the average East German citizen.  For that reason, the performance would at least 
appear to be more genuine in the presence of the Stasi than perhaps in the company of trusted 
acquaintances.  These Eingaben were a similar performance; they illustrated an impression of 
compliance while venting anger at the state and demanding that it fulfill its promises of socialist 
consumer abundance.   
 Nevertheless, the following is an example in which these demands and complaints 
exceeded the accepted limits – that is, when they became coordinated and group-orientated the 
state perceived them as a challenge to its authority and subsequently intervened.  On 17 June 
1988, for instance, the administration of Konsum retail outlet 306 Ebersbach (a small city in 
Saxony just north of the Czech border) submitted a complaint letter entitled “Eingabe to the 
council to the district of Löbau and the department of Trade and Provision.”  This protest letter 
drew the direct attention of the Stasi functionaries in Dresden.  Given the urgency of the supply 
situation, Hans Modrow, the high-ranking First Secretary of the SED of the Bezirk 
Administration in Dresden, was also notified.  The letter stated, “For months the supply of fruit 
and vegetables in the co-operative retail outlet in Ebersbach was miserable.  There were never 
any cauliflower, tomatoes, and cucumbers for sale, and the selection of fruit was also meagre.  
Since this co-operative retail outlet was the only available option for shopping in the area, we 
requested a quick change to these conditions.”807  Since forty-eight citizens signed this Eingabe, 
the Stasi was alarmed, resulting in the identification of the signatures and the examination of the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the writing of this letter.  In the end, the examination did not 
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produce what the Stasi might have perceived as evidence of “enemy activity,” but the secret 
police force was distressed by the general and growing frustration with the supply problems in 
Ebersbach.808  
 Historian Paul Betts suggests that by the early 1980s collectively written Eingaben, such 
as the preceding example, reflected an emerging public sphere and the growing confidence of the 
citizenry to demand justice.  To use his words, “a revealing marker of change was that 
signatories were less apprehensive about preserving their anonymity in more politically oriented, 
collectively written Eingaben.”809  Indeed, the rules of DDR language had changed by the late 
1980s when the end of the régime was in sight.  This Stasi document further demonstrates a few 
other important particularities.  The Stasi paid close attention to Eingaben and the mood of the 
population in relation to consumption.  Furthermore, there were, as Foucault would remind us, 
concrete boundaries to what could be said in Eingaben.810  It seems as though the letter writer of 
this Eingabe and those who signed it overstepped the limits of acceptable protest by coordinating 
a group protest letter.  This suggests that atomized complaint was allowed, but coordinated group 
protests were not.   
As the years progressed, the number, the harshness, and the directness of the Eingaben 
increased.  By the time the régime collapsed, there were millions of Eingaben in the party and 
state archives.  There were so many that each and every East German could have written at least 
one Eingabe in the course his or her life.  During Honecker’s rule, the majority of these letters 
were sent to higher levels of government in order to express their anger directly at officials.  It 
should be noted, however, that Eingaben sometimes led to effective results and improvements.  
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Then again, inefficiencies of the planned economy could not ultimately meet the increasing 
demands of East Germans.811  Nevertheless, the state did try.      
8.4. The state and Konsum monitor and try to improve consumption 
The state’s persistent efforts to satisfy and respond to these Eingaben and consumer 
demands resulted in dedicating ever more resources to consumption.812  The inadequate supply 
of the rural population with consumer goods was a recurrent topic of discussion at Politburo 
meetings, trade conferences, and discussions of the Department of Trade and Provision.813  In 
fact, the Handbuch gesellschaftlicher Organizationen in der DDR (an official East German 
publication) let East Germans know that “the party charged co-operatives with continually 
improving the material conditions in the co-operative stores through socialist rationalisation.”814  
The Ministry of Trade and Provision assigned Konsum sales clerks the tasks of polling 
customers.  In plain language, women responded to this polling by demanding vacuum cleaners, 
ovens, washing machines, blenders, toasters, and so on.  Clerks then relayed this information 
upward through the planning hierarchy until it ended up at the Planning Commission.815  The fact 
that the state and the Stasi were reacting to consumer complaints is indication that the régime 
responded to pressures from below and that there was some degree of government 
accountability.  
The Konsum knew that shortages undermined its propaganda and agitation campaigns.  
Here is what the Konsum propagandists said about this: “shortages can be criticized and they had 
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to be overcome as quickly as possible.  What we promised had to be real and fulfilled.”816  
Furthermore, the SED also knew that its power to shape compliance rested just as much on the 
small things of everyday consumption in the Konsum retail outlets as on the major political 
initiatives of social engineering.  It was through the provision of commodities that the SED tried 
to convince East Germans that their state was worth having and keeping.817  Accordingly, the 
SED recognized the frustration of consumers and attempted to improve consumption.  This 
suggests that the story of SED rule and its attempted totalitarianism is more complicated than 
one of pure repression: it demonstrates that the state worked to provide for its citizens’ wishes to 
some extent.     
In the 1950s, there was also a shift from the distribution of rationed goods (verteilen) to 
the creation of a new culture of selling (verkaufen), which was heralded as a sign of the growing 
normality of the economic and political status quo in the DDR.  In the Konsum, this shift was 
marked by improving the shopping experience of customers through a broader selection of 
goods, a more pleasant atmosphere, modern advertising techniques (for example fashion shows) 
and displays of goods next to the cash register for impulse-purchases.  There was also a name 
change in the Konsum members’ magazine from Die Konsumverteilungsstelle (the Konsum 
Distribution Outlet) to Die Konsumverkaufsstelle (the Konsum Retail Outlet).  The VDK justified 
this name change to signify a shift from distribution and rationing to retail and consumerism.  
This shift also marked a change in the relationship between the customer and salesperson in 
which the Konsum worker was no longer merely a distributor of goods, but a “friend and 
advisor” who was helping construct a more enjoyable and functional consumer culture.818  
Historian Katherine Pence states that “the transition from “distributing” to “selling” was largely 
                                                
816 SWA: U2/I/58, Richtlinien für die Agitationsarbeit in den Konsumgenossenschaften, 1952, 4.  
817 Kaminsky, "Einkaufsbeutel und Bückware," 248. 
818 Pence, "'You as a Woman Will Understand'," 223. 
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associated with a shift from the crisis years of rationing to a return to postwar normality.  In 
order to make amends for the actual continuation of rationing and to renew an image of a return 
to normality and prosperity, the trade organizations and ministries began to promote this new 
focus on selling.”819  This served dual purposes: it was a shift in consumption but also a political 
campaign that attempted to express to consumers how the command economy was capable of 
assuaging needs and desires.   
In 1957, the secretary of the Consumer Co-operative Leipzig (Konsumgenossenschaft- 
Stadt-Leipzig) received over 441 written complaints, which was a substantial increase from 347 
in the previous year; there were numerous verbal complaints as well.  According to the written 
complaints, customers were particularly frustrated whenever there were shortages of specific 
goods, namely coffee, tropical fruits, chocolate, radios, and televisions.  Eighty-one of the 441 
complaints were directed at the sales personnel and customers, venting about what they 
perceived as unfriendly service and “snotty,” impolite treatment.  The lack of sales personnel 
was also criticized, since this created significant delays and queuing.  Forty-nine complaints 
were concerned with spoiled potatoes and by extension the quality of their storage.  Another 
twenty-seven complaints dealt with the provision of milk and cheese, and there were twenty-two 
Eingaben about the hygiene in the retail outlets.  The secretary of the co-operatives took these 
complaints seriously and demanded that the sales staff take educational courses on consumer 
culture, sales service, and hygiene.820  For these reasons, the Konsum invested considerable 
resources in improving shopping conditions in its retail outlets.  In 1957, it invested 40,000 DM 
in the modernization (primarily the development of self-service stores) of its current stores and 
78,000 for the establishment of new retail outlets.  An additional sum of 200,000 DM was 
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820 SWA: U2/(SWA 530)I/108, Bericht über die Bearbeitung von Beschwerden und Kritiken 1. Jahre 1957, 
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invested in renovating another 100 retail outlets.  A further 67,000 was invested in refrigeration 
systems.  Knowing that consumption reflected the general state of socialism and the command 
economy, the goal was – as always – to demonstrate to members and customers the growing 
strength of the socialist economy and the abundant consumer culture it provided.821   
While rationing had been replaced by subsidizing by 1958, shortages and price-controls 
continued to frustrate consumers.  The prices for basic foodstuffs, such as butter, meat, rye bread, 
baked goods, and fish in the Konsum stores, as well as the cost for rents, electricity, and public 
transportation, were heavily subsidized by the government.  These goods, moreover, were sold 
well below their actual costs.  In contrast, retail and industrial goods (i.e., cars, televisions, 
refrigerators, and textiles) were sold at prices that far exceeded their production costs.  
Furthermore, East Germans paid significantly more for Genussmittel (coffee, tea, alcohol, and 
tobacco) than West Germans due in part to the limited purchasing power of the East German 
currency (Marken der deutsche Notenbank, MdN).  The state imposed high taxes on these goods 
to offset the cost of subsidized foodstuffs, rents, and public transportation.  During the economic 
crisis of 1960-61, the deteriorating supply situation – particularly the lack of meat, sausages, 
butter, cheese, shoes, underwear, and washing powder – affected the entire population and in 
many cases convinced a not insignificant number of people that it was time to leave the DDR.822  
Again, the state was fully aware of this and was persistently monitoring the population’s 
consumption.   
In 1961, the Konsum tried to improve consumption by providing its workforce with a 
number of publications defining ways in which sales staffs were to deal with a wide range of 
customers.  According to one such publication, the majority of the shoppers in the Konsum stores 
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18.12.1957, 8. 
822 Steiner, "Dissolution of the "Dictatorship over Needs"?," 170. 
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were women and they were apparently more critical than men, especially non-working women 
who had more time to select and contemplate the purchase of goods.  Also, women were 
responsible for the household budget and were careful when spending money, whereas men were 
supposedly less concerned with price and more easily persuaded than women.  Additionally, the 
document described methods for dealing with a wide variety of customers, such as the talkative 
customer, the quiet customer, the nervous customer, the slow customer, the undecided customer, 
the decided customer, the grumbler, the mistrustful customer, the trusting customer, and the 
experienced customer.  Generally, the most experienced – and perhaps challenging – customer 
was the housewife due to her supposedly superior knowledge of consumer culture.  When 
dealing with the experienced and housewifely customer, Konsum sales-staff were instructed to 
speak only in language appropriate for the personality and sex of the given customer.823   
 
Illustration 39: Konsum education material from the early 1960s portraying saleswomen serving the taciturn 
(schweigsam) and “nit-picky” Nörgler) customer824 
 
8.4.1. The Stasi conflates consumption with national security   
 
 The Stasi understood that consumption shortages undermined support for the East 
German state.  Remember, Konsum propagandists said, “What we promised had to be real and 
                                                
823 AKB: Werben und Verkaufen, von Redseligen, Schweigsamen, und Anderen Kunden, Verband 
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fulfilled.”825  The Stasi, therefore, linked consumption with national security, and it was 
compelled to intervene whenever the population grew too dismayed over shortages because it 
understood (correctly) that its power to shape compliance rested just as much on the small things 
of everyday consumption in the Konsum retail outlets as on the major political initiatives.  On a 
macro level, this sub-section will examine the correlation between consumerism and national 
security.  On a micro level, it illustrates that the Stasi had considerable influence on the Konsum 
and almost unfettered access to spy on its employees and members.  
The Stasi operated a division for the “protection of the economy” known as Department 
XVIII.826  The Stasi’s Department XVIII was perhaps the singular body that was most able to 
intervene in the East German economy.  It provided the muscle to ensure that the party’s 
economic decrees were enforced.  During the initial years of the fledgling East German state, this 
included the removal of small, private businesses, forcing the farmers onto collective farms, and 
staging show trials in rural villages.827 According to historian John C. Schmeidel, economic 
industries “viewed the Stasi as the godfather, the well connected fixer that could overcome by its 
clout the shortages, the ‘plan mentality’ that punished good results by imposing higher norms 
after a good year, the favouritism, and the misallocation of resources that have distinguished 
command economies since the Russian Revolution.”828  The Konsum, therefore, may have 
welcomed the infiltration of Department XVIII due to its ability to provide leverage over 
competing industries and allocate resources in the shortage economy of the DDR.   
It was common for Department XVIII to imbed informants (Inoffizielle Mitarbieter, IMs) 
into sensitive industrial and economic areas.  While Stasi officers were usually open about their 
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826 Kristie Macrakis, Seduced by Secrets: Inside the Stasi's Spy-Tech World (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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827 John C. Schmeidel, Stasi: Shield and Sword of the Party (New York: Routledge, 2008), 18-19. 
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profession and status, IMs worked secretly within the Konsum and only the Stasi recruiters knew 
their identities.  The informants often held a few primary roles in the Konsum: spying on 
colleagues and reporting on the morale of the workforce.  From the information gathered by 
these informants, the Stasi and its informants made weekly reports written from their vantage 
points within Konsum stores.  These reports were then used as an instrument to monitor how 
consumption was having an impact on the mood of the population.829   
The cases explored in this sub-section demonstrate the considerable efforts the IMs 
undertook to gather information about the everyday consuming practices of East German 
citizens.  For example, the supply report from Potsdam’s Konsum outlet for the week of 7 March 
to 13 March 1986 indicated that the quality of goods failed to satisfy consumers.  In turn, the 
Konsum’s management reported that they were only able to make a limited amount of meat and 
poultry products available to consumers.830  Officials were alarmed by the provisional report 
from the week of 6 June 1986 to 12 June 1986.  The report indicated that there were considerable 
quality control problems.  More troublingly, the delivery of bread to the Konsum retail outlets 
309, 315, and 316 did not take place on schedule.  Consequently, the customers were burdened 
with having to make two or three trips to their respective retail outlet in order to pick up the most 
basic of foodstuffs; not surprisingly, they blamed the sales staff for the unavailable products 
which led to unpleasant exchanges and arguments.831   
Historian Eli Rubin notes that the Stasi was alarmed by the growing confidence of 
consumers and identified those who were not shopping in mainstream shops (i.e., Konsum type 
stores).  The Stasi considered these people to be “outsiders” and thus worth putting under 
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surveillance.  To make this argument, Rubin uses the case of Angela, who, after 1989, 
discovered that the Stasi kept a file on her.  The informer (one of her neighbours) noted her 
selection of wood and antique furniture instead of the ubiquitous East German plastics.  For the 
Stasi, this was unequivocal evidence that Angela was not the “average” consumer; therefore, she 
was described as “different, suspicious, and worth watching carefully.”832  The example that 
Rubin presents can be more broadly contextualized within the framework of this dissertation.  
For instance, the Stasi defended the consumers who used products that were in accordance with 
the socialist aesthetic, but was suspicious of those who did not conform, thereby elevating 
consumption to a matter of national security.833  
The Stasi took the president of the VDK to task over the provision problems.  It was 
monitoring citizens’ frustration with and criticisms of the range of goods in the Konsum stores, 
and the Stasi became acutely aware of the inadequate quality of meat and sausages.  Customers 
particularly complained about the high salt content, freshness, the insufficient shelf life, and the 
rapid discoloration of meat products.834  As a result, the president had to inform the Council of 
Ministers of the DDR about the shortages, as well as the plans and designs for the modernization 
and reconstruction of the consumer co-operative meat processing industries to quell consumer 
demand and frustration.835  Above all, what the Stasi wanted from the Konsum was a “yardstick” 
by which to measure how the supply situation was impacting the mood of the population.836  In 
this context, the Stasi – the world-renowned infamous secret police and intelligence service – 
                                                
832 Rubin, Synthetic Socialism: 281. 
833 East German authorities were also suspicious of youth in jeans.  While youth saw jeans as a symbol of 
rebellion and freedom, the Stasi perceived this consumer product as derisory Western influence.  According to 
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834 BStU - Archiv der Zentralstelle: MfS-ZAIG 21122, Bericht über Kontrollergebnisse zur Sicherung der 
Qualität Struktur von Fleisch- und Wurstwaren im Grundsortiment (date not given - probably late 1980s), 138. 
835 Ibid., 145. 
836 Kurzer, "Konsumgenossenschaften in der Sowjetischen Zone und in der DDR," 815.
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became something of consumer advocate and played the role of liaison between consumers and 
the Konsum.  
The Stasi was able to wield a big stick to make an organization as large as the Konsum 
work better for consumers.  The Stasi was monitoring citizens’ frustration with and criticisms of 
the range of goods in Konsum stores and became acutely aware of the inadequate quality of meat 
and sausages.  Customers particularly complained about the high salt content, freshness, the 
insufficient shelf life, and the rapid discoloration of these meat products.837  As a result, the 
president of the Konsum had to inform the Council of Ministers of the DDR about the shortages, 
as well as the plans and designs for the modernization and reconstruction of the consumer co-
operative meat processing industries to quell consumer demand and frustration.838  Above all, 
what the Stasi wanted from the Konsum was a “yardstick” by which to measure how the supply 
situation was impacting the mood of the population and the stability of the East German state.839  
In this context, the Stasi – the world-renowned infamous secret police and intelligence service – 
became something of a consumer advocate and played the role of liaison between consumers and 
the Konsum.  
8.5. Conclusions 
While some of the previous chapters described the ways in which the SED manipulated 
the Konsum to its political advantage, this chapter describes the ways in which East Germans 
communicated with the state.  This chapter has shown that Eingaben were an avenue for some 
level of negotiation with the régime.  Yet, there was a tension between the aspirations of the 
state’s totalitarian ambitions and individuals choosing from a range of available options between 
                                                
837 BStU - Archiv der Zentralstelle: MfS-ZAIG 21122, Bericht über Kontrollergebnisse zur Sicherung der 
Qualität Struktur von Fleisch- und Wurstwaren im Grundsortiment (date not given - probably late 1980s), 138. 
838 Ibid., 145. 
839 Kurzer, "Konsumgenossenschaften in der Sowjetischen Zone und in der DDR," 815. 
262 
 
 
 
conformity and resistance so as to express and, at times, assert their own interests.  As members 
learned the rules of the game, they began to exploit the co-operative retail system.  This was not 
so much resisting or complying – rather it was individuals participating in the co-operative and 
socialist systems, while not necessarily sharing the state’s goals.  In other words, these members 
could not help but participate in the system; however, their participation was often based on 
gaining an advantage at the expense of the state.   
The Konsum largely, though not completely, failed to contribute to a satisfactory 
consumption experience.  The East German consumer, who judged consumption in the DDR in 
comparison to the West, was recurrently disappointed with the state controlled consumer culture 
of the DDR.  The East German consumer also seemed to ignore and devalue the benefits of 
subsidized and price-controlled consumption in the Konsum retail stores.  The continual 
economic shortages and the minimal purchasing power of the MdN led to an undermining of 
confidence in the DDR’s and the Konsum’s retail system. Zatlin thus argues, “it was these 
shortages of economic and ethical goods – the absence of key commodities and social equality – 
that fuelled the political unrest that breached the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989.”840  Stitziel 
echoes this argument: “East German citizens ultimately judged the achievements of socialism not 
by officials’ theories or images of consumer goods but rather by what they could actually 
purchase in stores.”841   
The examples of Eingaben presented in this chapter reveal that consumption was the 
critical junction and an avenue of communication in the relationship between the Stasi and 
society in East Germany.  Because the Konsum failed to deliver an abundant supply of quality 
consumer products, the Stasi understood that it was perpetually delivering the wrong message to 
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consumers, namely that the command economy could never function as well as West Germany’s 
market economy. Economic shortages ultimately contributed to East Germans opting for the 
West German consumer model in 1989.  Ironically, it was only after the fall of the Berlin Wall – 
when prices of once subsidized basic commodities drastically increased – that East Germans 
began to appreciate the elements and subsidies of their command economy and now extinct 
socialist consumer culture.842    
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9. Working in the Konsum: identity, memory, and “democracy”  
 
Preparations are being made to introduce women to co-operative administrative work and for 
women to be elected to the Aufsichtsrat.  
- Comrade Eckstein, 1946843 
 
The new elections of the Konsum had to be used to overcome ideological weaknesses and to 
create clarity about the leading role of the party within the co-operatives. 
- Archival Document from 1957844   
 
 
Illustration 40: The predominantly female Konsum staff (date unknown – likely the 1950s) 
 
 
Illustration 41: The predominantly female Konsum staff (date unknown – likely the 1950s)845 
                                                
843 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/114, 6.6.1947, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker  An Gen. 
Eckstein, Landesvorstand Thüringen, Weimar, geschrieben von H. Lehmann, 46. 
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Female labour was urgently needed because of the postwar population demographic in 
the Soviet Occupied Zone of Germany.  In 1946, of a total population of nineteen million in the 
SBZ, women of working age (fifteen to sixty) outnumbered their male counterparts by nearly 
three million.846  Therefore, female participation in the workforce was not only politically and 
ideologically motivated (see introduction), but it was also driven by (demographic) economic 
necessity.847  Women’s strength in numbers forced the German communists to garner their 
support as potential workers.848  Therefore, to fulfill economic plans, increase productivity, and 
raise the standard of living, women were required to participate in the production process.849  For 
this reason, the July 1948 edition of the co-operative newspaper Konsum: Genossenschaftliches 
Mitteilungsblatt promoted the notion that “Frauenarbeit [women meeting the obligations of their 
professional work and societal duties in combination with motherhood] was especially demanded 
and supported.”850   
This chapter considers participation (mostly female) in the Konsum workforce and the 
ways in which work was politicized in Konsum factories and retail outlets.  In spite of state 
incursion into this realm, there was rudimentary democracy at the lower level of the East German 
co-operatives.  That is to say, the remarkable and significant factor about state involvement in 
the Konsum was the manner in which totalitarian indoctrination (presumably negative) became 
intertwined with what could be interpreted as nascent gender equality in East Germany 
(presumably positive).   
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9.1. Women in the Konsum workforce 
Women primarily occupied East German consumer co-operatives: female staff and 
female shoppers.  Indeed, one party functionary referred to co-operatives as “women-dominated 
spaces.”851  Seeing that the employees in the local stores and the majority of the consumers were 
women, the SED recognized the potential of the Konsum to serve as ideal places to garner female 
support for the party.852  On 9 November 1946, Paul Merker, a KPD and later SED functionary, 
reported to Max Fechner, minister of justice of the DDR, “that women were a primary concern 
for the Konsum and were being actively recruited into the organization.  Women should 
exclusively occupy the sales positions in the outlet stores and spread the ideology of the co-
operative movement to the general public.”853    Of course, mention should be made that men 
also worked as salespeople in the Konsum, although this was usually in the technological sales 
departments in the larger department stores.854 
As we have seen, the administration of the Konsum was given the direct task of 
politically mobilising its workforce in support of the SED and its policies.  Similar to the 
Konsum schools and co-operative education, the party and the VDK attempted to use 
employment in the Konsum to increase “socialist consciousness” amongst its predominantly 
female workforce.855  According to a commonly used slogan in the co-operative newspaper 
KONSUM, “Women had to be bearers of the co-operative movement.”856  At a meeting of the 
Central Committee of the SED in mid-1947, a party member pronounced, “consumer co-
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operatives were a tool for the political mobilization of its female employees.”857  To accomplish 
this, every worker had to attend co-operative meetings, make political and ideological 
contributions to the movement, and act in accordance with SED-influenced co-operative 
statutes.858  As a result, the party heavily influenced the Konsum, but state-intervention also 
forced it to increase the role of female workers in its administrative branches, since the Konsum 
had to conduct itself in accordance with the progressive and modern aspects of SED ideology.  
Acting on behalf of the SED and its efforts to indoctrinate women, Helmut Lehmann, a member 
of the SED-Politburo, gave the following instructions to the Konsum on 13 November 1946:  
The co-operative movement had been given a decisive role to fill with women, 
particularly housewives.  In order to achieve this, it was necessary to implement the 
formation of housewife-committees in every sales-outlet.  From these committees, 
propagandists for the co-operative movement had to emerge from the female ranks.  
With the aim of spreading party and co-operative ideology, the posts of the sub-party-
organizations as well as the committees of the co-operative system had to be primarily 
filled with women.  In order for the party and the co-operatives to become successful, 
they had to ensure that women participated in public life.  We had to ensure that our 
ideology spread to women, so that they were not confined to the narrow realms of their 
families, but that they also offered their services to the wider community.859   
 
There were instances in which women were able to attain high managerial positions 
within the Konsum.  In a letter addressed on behalf of the Konsum to the International Co-
operative Women's Guild in London dated 23 July 1946, Emmy Freundlich, a famous social 
democrat and co-operator from the prewar years, stresses that “with great pleasure, we elected a 
woman to the position of president of the supervisory committee of the consumer co-operatives.  
Frau Lodahl was the first woman to be elected to this position.”860  The letter continues with 
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Freundlich stating “women within the co-operatives played a decisive role in the reconstruction 
of German political and economic life.  The more women were able to receive working positions 
within the co-operatives, the easier it was to include them in the political structures of the 
embryonic socialist state.”861  According to an interview with Martin Bergner, a former Konsum 
economist, “throughout the history of the Konsum there were no differences in the roles between 
men and women in the Konsum.  In fact, women were actively involved in leadership roles and 
the administration.”862      
Further evidence suggests that the Konsum made an official effort to include women in 
upper level positions and to combat traditional gender stereotypes about women in the 
workforce.  A report from 25 June 1948 suggests that Herr Lehmann wanted the regional 
executive of the Konsum in Thuringia to implement a resolution compelling women to join the 
co-operative administration.863  During a co-operative conference held in Erfurt on 31 May 1947, 
it was determined that a number of comrades held a negative view about the inclusion of women 
in the Konsum hierarchy.  As a consequence, the state, or more specifically the SED Central 
Committee, intervened on behalf of women and supported the possibility of only women being 
allowed to fill the supervisory committee of the Thuringian co-operatives.  The archival 
document states:  
To combat the negative attitude towards women, a large portion of progressively minded 
co-operative members supported the option to fill Thuringia’s co-operative Aufsichtsrat 
[supervisory committee] only with women.  In the Konsumgenossenschaftsverband-
Sachsen-Anhalt, two women were already elected to the Aufsichtsrat.  It was also 
suggested that in the future female co-operative leaders would have a voice in the 
Vorstand [executive].864   
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While Konsum documents illustrate the goal to include women in administrative posts, 
women were still underrepresented in positions garnering high social status, such as factory and 
other government-run industry directors and high-ranking posts within the party.  Generally, the 
SED discriminated against women, regardless of their qualifications or training.  Still, one third 
of all managerial positions in East Germany were occupied by women, though these were lower- 
and mid-level managerial positions.  For example, women in the plants were seldom top 
administrators, and there were only four female directors or in this context Direktorinnen in the 
entire DDR.  The women who attained management positions were often in charge of smaller 
factories with fewer than 500 employees.865  Fairbairn maintains that women were prominent in 
the lower administrative levels of the Konsum, but were often unable to attain high-level 
managerial or decision-making roles.866  However, the Konsum may not have reflected the wider 
pattern of female employment in the DDR.  From archival sources, a diverging picture emerges 
in which the VDK was actively recruiting and funnelling women into its administrative branches.  
This point is illustrated by VDK president Gerhard Lucht’s August 1959 letter to the Department 
of Trade and Provision demanding, “The re-election of the organs of the VDK ensure an 
increased number of women in the leading organs of the VDK.”867 
I could not find archival statistics comparing female East German employment with 
employment from other co-operative institutions in the West.  Nevertheless, there were 
numerous individual cases of women gaining high administrative posts in the Konsum and 
actually maintaining these positions after the Wende and into the present-day.  In 1984, Sigrid 
                                                
865  Dagmar Langenhan and Sabine Roß, "The Socialist Glass Ceiling: Limits to Female Careers," in 
Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. Konrad Hugo Jarausch (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 1999), 182. 
866 Fairbairn, "Co-operative Values and the Cold War," 14.   
867 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/133, Handel, Versorgung und Außenhandel.  August 8, 1959 
recommendations written by Gehard Lucht, president of the VdK, entitled Empfehlungen zur Vorbereitung, 
Durchführung und Auswertung des IV. Genossenschaftstages, 11. 
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Hebestreit, at twenty-years-old, became the youngest ever-elected chairwoman of a DDR 
consumer co-operative at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Weimar.  At that time, this co-operative 
had 1,200 employees, 368 stores, and 100 restaurants.868  Under the leadership of Hebestreit, this 
co-operative continues to be important for the city of Weimar by employing 710 people and 
providing for 6,293 members.869  According to Christa Paetow and Gesa Schwertfeger, “men – 
under orders from the party – were prevalent in the executives of the Konsum, yet we were able 
to become members of the administration of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Hagenow in 1988.”870  
Three years later, in 1991, these women emerged as top executives of this co-operative; it is now 
an important employer in the region with 9,374 members and a yearly turnover rate of twenty-
four million Euros.871  At the Konsumgenossenschaft-Haldensleben, Petra Woege was elected to 
the administrative branch shortly before the Wende.  In 1995, she became the chairwomen of this 
co-operative, with 177 employees (156 of whom are women) and a yearly financial turnover rate 
of fifty million Euros.872   
 The consumer co-operatives were to be a working environment in which women had the 
opportunity to develop practical work experience.  The best among the female employees were 
to be incorporated into management and administration.873  However, by guaranteeing 
employment and education for its citizens, the SED may have needed and used the Konsum as 
something of a dumping-ground for training women, young girls, and disabled young workers.  
This was the perspective of Dr. Burchard Bösche (an executive within the Hamburg based 
Zentralverband deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften).  While this may have been the case, there 
                                                
868 Barbara Bollwahn, Frauengenossenschaften-Genossenschaftsfrauen (MGV, taz, ZdK [Hrsg.]), 25-26. 
869 Ibid., 26. 
870 Ibid., 8. 
871 Ibid., 8-10. 
872 Ibid., 13-15. 
873 SWA: U2/SWA 1370, Entwurf der Entschließung zum Genossenschaftstag am 26./27. Aug. 49. 
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is no secondary or primary evidence to elaborate on Bösche’s statement.  In his opinion, “the HO 
and the other state-owned-industries received what they perceived as the more apt workers (male 
with working-class heritage).  For this reason, the Konsum workforce became predominantly 
female and young.”874  Of course, another reason for the Konsum’s support of female 
employment, especially of young women, was to tap into a pool of labour and recruit them as 
potential candidates for and supporters of the party.875   
9.2. Working conditions    
 The Konsum employed over 238,000 workers and salaried employees by the late 1950s 
and into the 1960s.876  The situation of the workers was determined by two factors.  As 
mentioned, there was a law ensuring that every citizen had the right to work and to be paid 
according to his or her contribution to the socialist economy.  Furthermore, the state was (at least 
on paper) directing its resources into improved pay, working conditions, professional support, 
and health coverage, as well as providing advice on the proper use of free time.  The Konsum 
was to act in accordance with these state aims and implement them in all its retail outlets and 
factories.877  While archival documents refer to these workers’ rights and the improvement of 
working conditions, it is unlikely that much investment actually reached the very lowest levels of 
the organization and improved the conditions of its predominantly female workforce.  As section 
9.3 will show, Konsum workers used their position as middlemen, or more accurately middle-
women, to their advantage to compensate for low pay.   
                                                
874 Author's interview with Dr. Burchard Bösche, Hamburg, Germany, 26 July 2011. 
875 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/2.029/86, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker, Büro Dr. Erich Apel 
und Wirtschaftskommission beim Politbüro - Beschluss über die Aufgaben der Parteiorganisationen in den 
Konsumgenossenschaften bei der Lösung der vom V. Parteitag der SED gestellten Aufgaben, date not given, 21. 
876 SWA: U64/336, Die Konsum-Genossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Date not 
given - probably 1959 or the early 1960s), 34. 
877 Ibid. 
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 9.2.1. Factory working conditions   
 
Illustration 42: Female workers in the Konsum chocolate factory >>Tangetta<< in Tangermünde in the 
1950s878 
 
The VDK and the Bezirksverbände were responsible for a considerable network of co-
operative factories, which not only produced goods for consumption in the consumer co-
operatives while simultaneously helping to fulfill state plans and economic targets.879  These 
factories focused on producing freshly baked goods and freshly cut meat products, with an 
overall target of helping the Konsum supply the daily food requirement for a third of the East 
German population.880  The July 1948 edition of the co-operative newspaper Konsum: 
Genossenschaftliches Mitteilungsblatt indicated that the Konsum had fifty-eight factories, 
including four mills, one large bakery, three meat factories, four marmalade factories, three fruit 
processors, one dough factory, two cereal products factories, one malt coffee factory, one 
mustard factory, three sweets factories, one mineral water factory, three breweries, three spirits 
factories, one chewing tobacco factory, three vinegar factories, one stationery factory, four 
clothing factories, one shoe factory, a brush factory, and two soap factories.881  By 1957, the 
Konsum had four factories that produced mustard.  The co-operative factory (Konsum-
Seifenfabrik) at Riesa produced washing soap, washing powder, shampoo, and stain-remover.  
                                                
878 Ludwig, "Kaffee, Kekse und Bonbons," 168. 
879 Bösche, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der Wende von 1989/90: 27.  
880 Herzog, Genossenschaftliche Organisationsformen in der DDR, Band 12: 168. 
881 SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/111, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker. KONSUM: 
Genossenschaftliches Mitteilungsblatt Juli 1948, Juli 1948/Nr.1, 118. 
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There were various other Konsum factories in Cottbus, Güstrow, Erfurt, Riesa, and Magdeburg.  
This network of factories continued to expand until the demise of the East German state.882   
Working life in these factories involved difficult conditions and relatively long working 
hours.  By 1959, workers in factories had to put in a forty-five hour work week, while sales 
women in the retail outlets had to work forty-eight hours a week.  Workers in the factories 
received a low base salary, but they were eligible for productivity bonuses.883  Moreover, on 
account of the DDR’s shortage economy, there was never enough money or resources to pay for 
properly ventilated and well-lit factory halls with modern machines that would have lessened the 
physical demands on workers.  More often than not, workplaces were very cold in the winter and 
extremely hot in the summer.  Cleanliness and the monotony of the work were also problematic.  
The situation was made worse by the continual breakdown of old machines and inconsistent 
deliveries of much needed raw materials and prefabricated parts.  These incessant problems 
meant production was interrupted and the goals of the centralized plans could not be achieved.  
Thus, the workforce had to endure overtime to compensate for broken-down machines and an 
inefficient division of labour in order to meet the objectives of the centralized plan.884  
9.2.2. Retail working conditions  
DDR society tended to devalue retail co-operative work because of the disproportionate 
number of women in this organization.  Consequently, retail work in the Konsum was considered 
simple, housewifely, and feminine.885  Thus, the high number of women in retail work actually 
devalued the profession.  Even though more than eighty-five percent of the workers in retail 
trade were women, only a few of them were in the top leadership positions.  Furthermore, most 
                                                
882 Kirsch, Die Marken Bitte!: 94. 
883 SWA: U64/336, Die Konsum-Genossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Date not 
given - probably 1959 or the early 1960s), 35. 
884 Madarász, Working in East Germany: 26. 
885 Merkel, "Die Konsumgenossenschaften der ehemaligen DDR," 88.   
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Konsum employees were forced to endure longer hours than the average industrial worker.886  
These conditions contributed to a high turnover rate, which in turn worsened an already stressful 
working environment.887  
 The average monthly income of the workers in trade and the Konsum was nearly a 
quarter below the average salary of an industrial worker, because the SED deemed retail work to 
be unqualified labour.  The workers in retail received a base-salary, which the party and the SED 
believed was in accordance with the demands of the work and its contribution to the socialist 
economy.888  It should be noted, however, that workers also received a productivity bonus, which 
usually constituted twenty percent of their income.  Though saleswomen in the retail outlets were 
paid a bonus in the form of a percentage of the retail turnover, these bonuses were also 
dependent upon the manner in which one was employed.889  The profit bonuses and the general 
lack of goods offered to workers generated little incentive for extra work.890  The specialist 
saleswomen earned somewhere between 365 to 415 DM, whereas a head administrator of a retail 
outlet had a salary of as much as 500 to 545 DM per month.  Pay increased after five years of 
employment and also increased with professional training.891   
To provide a better understanding of the purchasing power of the average Konsum 
income, the following is a list of living expenses in the DDR for the year 1959:  
    1 square meter of living space ...................0.65 to 0.90 DM 
  1 kilowatt of household electricity ............0.08 DM 
  1 cubic meter of gas  ..................................0.16 DM      
                                                
886 Ibid. 
887 Ibid. 
888 AKB: 1114/A12, Dr. Heinz Fahrenkrog, President of the Union of Consumer Co-operative Societies of 
the GDR, The Consumer Co-operative Societies in the German Democratic Republic, 77. 
889 Ibid. 
890 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/6.02/74, SED Zentralkomitee: Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik, Vortrag für 
Vorstandsitzung der Kammer am 27. Oktober 1947: Einzelhandel und Konsumgenossenschaften im Dienste der 
Verbraucher, 58. 
891 SWA: U64/336, Die Konsum-Genossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Date not 
given - probably 1959 or the early 1960s), 35. 
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  2 hundredweights of lignite briquettes.......3.84 DM 
  1 km public train transport .........................0.08 DM 
  1 suit ...........................................................approximately 160 to 210 DM 
  1 pair of shoes ............................................approximately 15 to 55 DM 
  1 kg of rye bread ........................................0.48 DM 
  2 hundredweights of potatoes ....................9.60 DM 
  1 kg of meat ...............................................4.60 to 7.80 DM 
  1 kg of lard  ................................................3.10 DM 
  1 kg of butter ..............................................9.80 DM 
  1 litre of whole milk ...................................0.68 DM892  
 
Most of these goods were subsidized by the state and within the means of the average Konsum 
worker.  In an anonymous 2011 interview, a former teacher in the DDR described Grund-
nahrungsmittel (basic foodstuffs such as bread, milk, sugar, meat) produced and sold in the 
Konsum as “quite cheap.”893   What is unlikely, however, is that Konsum workers could easily 
have afforded heavily taxed industrial goods, such as televisions, radios, washing machines, and 
refrigerators – the taxes for which were used to subsidize basic foodstuffs and general living 
expenses.  In the words of the interviewee, “such goods were super teuer (super expensive).  
Nevertheless, there were credit programs to help consumers pay for these goods.”894  Another 
possibility is that this salary was sufficient and even allowed people to purchase high-price 
items, such as TVs, washing machines, and cars.  The issue was not the price, since there was 
surplus of MdN in circulation on account of increasing salaries for workers; the issue was 
availability and waiting lines.895    
 Since two thirds of Konsum workers and the majority of Konsum retail workers were 
women, there were a number of measures in place to assure the protection of their health.  For 
instance, women were given one free day a month to do household work.  This monthly day off 
                                                
892 Ibid. 
893 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
Germany, 27 June 2011. 
894 Ibid. 
 895 Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism: 268. 
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was introduced in 1952 and was a paid day off for married and workingwomen, which became 
known as the household day or Haushaltstag.  Before and after the birth of a child they could 
claim extensive social and economic benefits, including access to a nursery and kindergarten 
system.896  As of 1975, women were eligible to receive children’s allowances of twenty MdN per 
month per child, in addition to childbirth allowances of 1,000 MdN.897  In cases of illness, 
workers received six weeks’ pay at ninety percent of regular salary; thereafter, they received fifty 
percent.  Workers were covered for medical treatments, medications, hospital stays, and sojourns 
in health resorts.  The yearly vacation ranged from eighteen to twenty-one days.  Workers were 
required to pay a thirty MdN union fee as a contribution to their vacations and holidays.  
Children of Konsum employees also received a free three-week stay at various vacation spots.  
Workers and members could participate in the various sports societies and cultural groups 
sponsored by the Konsum.898  The actual investment the Konsum put into these benefits is 
difficult to ascertain.  At a minimum, Konsum workers could use progressive rhetoric to wrestle 
some benefits from the state.  Officially, the objectives of these benefits were to enhance the 
general living experience of the Konsum employee during work and play.899  Unofficially, the 
benefits were designed to garner loyalty to the Konsum organization and the socialist system, and 
were yet another attempted totalitarian incursion into the private lives of citizens, since they 
enabled the state to control the leisure and vacation time of Konsum employees.   
                                                
896 SWA: U64/336, Die Konsum-Genossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Date not 
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 Retail work in the Konsum was often stressful, unappreciated, and with limited career 
opportunities.900  Historian Donna Harsch raises the point that “in most towns, saleswomen 
worked in tiny, gloomy Konsum shops that offered neither a hot meal nor warm camaraderie.  
The local SED or trade union showed little interest in them.  The turnover rate of retail personnel 
was very high, as was the rate of retreating into part-time work.”901  The workers often had 
inconvenient working hours, which often included weekend shifts.  In the smaller shops, there 
was a two-hour midday break, which lengthened the working day.  Because lifting vehicles were 
not readily available, saleswomen had to move crates and boxes by hand, and some employees 
had to move up to twenty-five tons on a weekly basis.902  As a result, saleswomen continually 
demanded smaller packaging, but industry and wholesale continued to produce only unwieldy 
and heavy packaging.903  According to historian Ina Merkel, “in the summer months, female 
Konsum employees had to move up to 200 boxes of drinks, with the average weight being 
approximately twenty-eight kg each, and were moving up to five tones on a daily basis or 
twenty-five tones weekly without any technological help.”904  In 1964, thirty percent of the 
workers in the Konsum left their jobs because of the difficult working conditions and low pay in 
the retail outlets.905  
The Konsum attempted to lighten the workload of its female employees.  For instance, in 
1965, there were ten express checkouts installed at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Nordost-Leipzig.  
Apparently, both customers and cashiers felt that this simplified their consumption and work.  
                                                
900 Men also worked for the Konsum as salesmen.  The division of labour in these outlets was gendered, 
with men generally working in the larger Konsum stores and in the technology departments, as well as in the 
Konsum butcher shops.  Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), 
Berlin, Germany, 27 June 2011. 
901 Harsch, Revenge of the Domestic: 255-56. 
902 Merkel, "Die Konsumgenossenschaften der ehemaligen DDR," 88. 
903 Kirsch, Die Marken Bitte!: 92. 
904 Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: 190-91. 
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Furthermore, coffee and cigarettes were made available in a self-service format, and Konsum 
employees reported that this method of payment eliminated extra work.906  The 
Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Pankow also tried to lighten the workload of women (eighty-six 
percent of this co-operative’s workforce).  Of course, as will become apparent in later sections of 
this chapter, this “lightening of the workload” was intended to enable women to use their newly 
won leisure-time to participate in political meetings and become functionaries within the co-
operatives.907   
In spite of these efforts, employees continued to write petitions to the SED and Konsum 
authorities about their deplorable working conditions.  In one such example written to the 
Minister of Trade and Provision from 13 December 1987, Frau Leue complains that the 
saleswomen at the Konsum Hühndorf were forced to deal with a malfunctioning heating system 
causing them to work in temperatures of around six degrees Celsius.908   
The anger and aggressiveness of the customers was also a constant problem about which 
saleswomen complained to their superiors.909  Numerous Eingaben demonstrate that Konsum 
workers had to deal with frustrated customers.  For instance, in a letter written to a retail outlet 
on Leipzig’s Hainstraße, the writer wrote, “it is no longer about money.  I am ashamed of our 
consumer culture.  West Germans have it so much easier!”910  In another letter, the Konsum 
customer wrote that “in the interest of socialist trade and the contentment of your clientele, 
please explain and extend my grievances to your colleague, Frau R., and pass on this letter to 
                                                
906 SWA: U2/(SWA 2532) I/336, Ergebnisse bei der Schaffung weiterer Einkaufserleichterungen für die 
werktätigen Frauen, KG Nordost, Leipzig, den 3.7.65.  
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genossenschaft Berlin-Pankow für die Wahlberichtsversammlung am 22.3.1965. 
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her.”911  Herr G. demanded that Frau W. (saleswomen at retail outlet 277 in Leipzig) be 
reprimanded for her inhumane and bureaucratic conduct.912  Finally, in another Eingabe, a man 
and his wife complained about the disagreeable tone of a saleswoman at a Konsum retail outlet in 
Leipzig and the negative impression she was having on the young employees.  Accordingly, 
these two customers began to use the store on Blümnerstraße, where they could apparently rely 
on better and more polite service.913          
Similarly, Konsum employees used Eingaben as a means to complain about customers 
and to defend themselves.  For instance, saleswomen in Zwickau wrote about their treatment at 
the hands of customers:  
Such Eingaben displeased us saleswomen.  We always tried hard to be polite and 
accommodating in the service of our clientele even though we were often not treated 
with the same respect.  Unfortunately, we are not in the position to fulfill every wish of 
our (so-called) customers because in the previous weeks the delivery of meat had been 
intermittent.  In spite of this, we always made every effort to make our meat products 
available to customers as fast and as fresh as possible.  In fact, our selection and quality 
of meat was becoming comparable to that of West Germany.  I only wish that customers 
who wrote such Eingaben had to experience working behind the sales counter and were 
personally confronted by the many problems we saleswomen had to deal with on a daily 
basis.914         
 
Section 9.3 explores the often-tense relations between customers and employees in more detail.    
The evidence presented in this sub-section reveals how the party recognized the 
miserable working conditions in the Konsum and issued statements claiming it would make 
improvements.  However, even if there were pay increases, money had little purchasing power in 
the DDR.  Accordingly, employees of the Konsum had to find other ways to compensate for their 
disadvantaged position.  The following section will demonstrate that these attempts to improve 
                                                
911 SWA: U2/SWA 1401, Beschwerde über das Verhalten der Verkaufsstellenleiterin der Verkaufsstelle Nr. 
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working conditions were probably never fully realized, since employees had to use their direct 
access to consumer goods to compensate for their low pay and dreary working conditions.  
Historian Jonathan Zatlin points out, “In the DDR, working conditions in retail stores had 
deteriorated by the mid-1980s to the point where theft was perceived by workers as appropriate 
compensation for being overworked and underpaid.”915   
9.3. Theft and Vitamin B 
In East Germany personal connections (Beziehungen, or what was sarcastically referred 
to as Vitamin B) and theft curtailed some of the harsh realities of living under the command 
economy for at least some of the people.916  Given the scarcity of consumer goods, these 
connections became extremely important for consumers and led to widespread incidents of 
corruption at Konsum distribution points.  In fact, like others working in East German retail, 
Konsum employees stole goods from the workplace for use at home or for sale on the black 
market.  This type of corruption was endemic in Soviet-style command economies.917  However, 
in spite of difficult working conditions, the perpetual scarcity of consumer goods strengthened 
the economic and political power of the Konsum and its mostly female workforce.  In fact, 
Konsum employees who were entrusted with distributing goods were in a privileged position; 
that is, they could ensure that friends and family had direct access to and better selection of 
needed products.  To quote Zatlin:  
The scarcity of key consumer goods increased the power of the institutions and 
individuals entrusted with the distribution of those goods.  Proximity to the party 
leadership or to the local distribution nexus – such as ties of family or friendship to the 
salesperson behind the meat counter at the neighbourhood grocery store – often 
guaranteed better and more reliable choices.  In this manner, the shortages forced the 
East German Mark into the role of a partially, rather than universally, exchangeable 
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goods, thereby robbing it of its quality of money.  Privilege and corruption began to 
replace the Ostmark as the coin of the realm.918   
 
 Konsum workers were held responsible and often criminally charged for what can either 
be interpreted as honest mistakes in inventory and monetary shortfalls or blatant thievery.  In 
either case, the employees were held liable for inventory and monetary shortcomings.919  In 
1948, the Konsumgenossenschaft-Lübben was short by 180,000 Reichsmark on its balance sheet.  
Accordingly, the party demanded that the auditing commission of this co-operative be checked.  
Shortly thereafter, arrests were made and its Vorstand was reshuffled.920  At the co-operative 
store in Altlandsberg, Frau Kurth was responsible for the disappearance of forty-seven kg of fat, 
seventy-five kg of oatmeal, seventeen kg of noodles, and twenty-two packages of sweets.  
Consequently, the criminal court in Cottbus sentenced her to time in jail.921  A report from 
December 1953 from the Konsumgenossenschaft-Köpenick-Berlin interpreted the corruption 
within this co-operative as the result of inadequate ideological training and political disloyalty.  
This report highlights the particularly meagre ideological consciousness of Frau G., who 
according to a complaint by a fellow worker, was putting goods aside for specific customers so 
that that they could later be bought “under the table” (unter dem Ladentisch).922   
The Konsum tried to combat theft and selling under the table by reviewing the 
responsibilities given to specific workers and raising their level of socialist consciousness by 
sending them to the Konsum schools for political and ideological training.923  In spite of these 
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Genossenschaftswesen, Bericht von Karl Draeger, 15.Juni.1948, 19-20. 
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efforts, rampant corruption persisted.  A year later at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Pankow, 
for instance, there was drastic shortfalls of money.924  Some Konsum employees were 
investigated as a result, and the subsequent investigation determined that a Frau L. (a manager or 
Leiterin) was manipulating the sales receipts.  An industrial tribunal transferred this case to the 
public prosecutor’s office (Staatsanwaltschaft).  Frau K. (Leiterin of the retail outlet 109) was 
held responsible for a 1,970 MdN shortfall and charged with selling goods without distributing 
receipts.  There were also criminal cases against two saleswomen – Frau M. and Frau M., at 
retail outlet 839.  They were responsible for a combined inventory shortfall of 13,500 MdN and 
charged with giving away highly valued items, such as radios.  In another case, they sold a piece 
of electronic equipment for 1.31 MdN instead of 131 MdN.  Frau S. (Leiterin of retail outlet 145) 
received a jail sentence for the shortfall or theft of forty MdN per day.  These examples illustrate 
one certainty and one possibility.  Sales personnel were held responsible for shortfalls in 
inventory and could face possible criminal sentences even if they were a result of honest 
mistakes.  But given the repetitive nature and the amounts stolen, the other, more likely, outcome 
is that these aforementioned cases were examples of actual corruption and that retail workers 
were taking advantage of their position.925  To interpret this “corruption” as resistance or 
opposition is perhaps aggrandizement.  However, it can perhaps be accurately described as 
selective participation, since these women were depriving the state and the Konsum for their 
personal advantage while ignoring the ideological norms imposed on them.    
Being a successful East German consumer required that one learn to understand how to 
navigate the system either by waiting in long lines, writing letters of complaint to the authorities 
(Eingaben), fabricating scarce items, or cultivating connections to people with access to 
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resources through gifts or bribery.926  Konsum employees, therefore, had real power over their 
customers by controlling their access to needed and desired goods, making it necessary for the 
consumer to maintain cordial relations with Konsum employees.  In two interviews conducted in 
2011, both Herr Fitzkow and an anonymous interviewee stressed the worth of having close 
relations with sales staff in the Konsum in order to improve one’s chances of acquiring desired 
goods.927  The anonymous interviewee described relations between customers and clients as 
generally normal in larger shopping outlets.  However, in smaller centres, in which there were 
often shortages of specific and highly sought after products, there was a great deal of selling 
under the table to friends, relatives, and regular customers.  She described these relations as 
“systemic” and as “one hand washing the other” or “Vitamin B.”928  As she admits, “I also 
profited from Vitamin B.  My stepmother was a saleswoman in a Konsum produce store, so I was 
always able to get bananas for my children.”929     
The following Eingaben clearly illustrate the importance of relations with Konsum sales 
staff.  To quote an anonymous letter writer,  
I lived in Marienbrunnen and shopped as a member of the Konsum at your retail outlet 
128.  I cannot understand why there is never any butter there.  On Saturday 26 October at 
midday, I was there and wanted to buy some butter, but all I received was a curt reply: 
“There is no butter!”  Since I couldn’t go back again on the same day, I again went back 
on Monday the 28 October.  That day, I got the same reply: “There is no butter, not until 
Thursday!”  Although I was upset that I had to go back a third time, I was actually 
angrier about the tone used by the salesperson.  Unfortunately, I cannot write my name 
because I again want to shop at sales outlet 128 and I don’t want to be treated in such a 
curtly and unfriendly way.930 
 
                                                
926 Crew, "Consuming Germany and the Cold War," 1. 
927 Author's interview with Ullrich Fitzkow, Brunkau, Germany, 18 April 2011. 
928 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
Germany, 27 June 2011. 
929 Ibid. 
930 SWA: U2/SWA 1401, Eingabe an die Konsumgenossenschaft Hauptstelle Leipzig, Industriestr. (date 
not given). 
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The intriguing part of this Eingabe was that the customer deliberately chose to remain 
anonymous out of fear of retaliation and of losing the good favour of the sales personnel. 
 Consumers recognized and lamented the privileged position of Konsum employees.  In an 
Eingabe addressed to the head of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Eisenach, the writer of the letter 
requested that such privileges come to an end:  
I would like to turn to you for help with the following request.  Could you please look 
into the saleswomen’s working methods, which were, in my opinion, not fair?  In the 
previous week, on 31 October at this co-operative outlet, there were bananas for sale.  
Because I was at home, I was unaware of this.  When my friend came from work, she 
told me that there were bananas, so we went to pick some up.  When we got there, we 
asked the saleswomen if we could get some bananas.  She answered “there’s no more 
left.”  That was at 2 pm.  We could, however, not ascertain how the three shoppers that 
followed us were able to get three full bags of bananas.  In short, the saleswomen at this 
co-operative outlet were very brazen.  What is more, a girl was still able to get bananas at 
4 pm.  The fact was that the Konsum employees were very biased in the ways in which 
they supplied the customers with goods.  For these reasons, I ask you to look into these 
problems, and I expect improvements.931   
 
An Eingabe written by Frau F. in 1965 complained about the customers’ dependence on Konsum 
personnel for their access to goods.  In her words, “while shopping, one was almost always 
dependent on the favour and mood of the sales personnel.  In the interest of those who were not 
in the circle of acquaintances of the sales personnel, I request to have a discussion with the 
administrator responsible.”932  In a further example of corruption from January 1989, a customer 
complained about the unfair distribution of beer at retail outlet 715.  At this outlet, five crates of 
beer were delivered in the morning and another five in the evening.  To ensure the fair 
distribution of Wernesgrüner Pilsner, there was a sign: “please take only five bottles.”  However, 
this letter writer apparently observed that entire crates of beer were being sold.  The writer then 
                                                
931 Unknown, "Aus den Eingaben unsere Bürger: An den Verband der Konsum Genossenschaften der DDR 
Leiter des Büros des Vorstandes; Betr.: Beschwerde über den Konsum im Ort Lauterbach /ü Eisenach (Date not 
given)," in Die Marken Bitte!: Konsumgeschichten, ed. Manfred Kirsch (Berlin: Eulenspiegel Verlag, 2004), 74. 
932 SWA: U2/SWA 2531, Eingaben der Bürger, Konsum-Genossenschaftsverband, Leipzig, den 29.1.65. 
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raised a question: “why was there such profiteering?”933  Frau P. wrote a particularly direct 
Eingabe to the consumer co-operative in Zwickau in June 1990: 
I was not in agreement with Konsum retail methods.  The practice of selling goods under 
the table for specific members needed to be abolished.  I was sympathetic to the fact that 
it was not possible to have every product available for sale all the time, but I cannot 
tolerate it when the sales women deceive me.  For example, on Thursday afternoon I 
wanted to buy some sausages and meat for three people, but the meat saleswomen told 
me that there would not be a delivery until the following day, and I relied on this 
information.  However, the next day there was the same meagre assortment.  Still, 
another customer was able to buy fresh sausages.  She was the sister-in-law of one of the 
saleswomen.  It is no wonder that more and more people were starting to do their 
shopping in other stores.  Under these conditions, the Konsum retail outlets have no 
future.934    
 
The directness of the language in Frau P.’s letter is likely a signal of a shift in the 
discourse, as well as a reflection that she recognized that the DDR’s days were numbered.  
Philosopher Michel Foucault posits that “the production of discourse is at once controlled, 
selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is 
to avert its powers and its danger.”935  In this case and by the late 1980s, there seems to have 
been a degradation of the procedures governing discourse.  With some certainty, it can, therefore, 
be concluded that she had been harbouring this negative sentiment towards the Konsum and its 
employees for a long time and only felt confident to openly express her dismay during the final 
days of the East German state.  I would argue that this change in discourse demonstrates how 
broad shifts in late twentieth-century geo-politics played themselves out on a micro-level in East 
Germany.     
 Stasi and police forces were used to combat corruption in the Konsum.  In fact, in the late 
1980s, the Stasi was monitoring relations between Konsum employees and customers at a 
                                                
933 SWA: U64/242, Eingabe, Betreff: Verkaufsstelle Vettermannstraße VKE-Nr. 0715, 31. Jan 1989. 
934 SWA: U64/242, Eingabe an die Konsumgenossenschaft Stadt und Kreis Dorotheenstr. 24-26 Zwickau, 
3.6.90. 
935 Foucault, "Discourse on Language," 149. 
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Konsum outlet in Karl-Marx-Stadt (present-day Chemnitz).  This retail outlet was located on 
Sonnenstraße and was apparently as well stocked as other retail outlets, yet there were constant 
customer complaints about access to goods and customer treatment at the hands of the sales staff.  
The Stasi reported that sales personnel were not working in accordance with socialist principles; 
rather they were apparently involved in secretive, “unter der Hand” dealings with customers.936  
Consequently, the goods available to customers without contacts or close relations with sales 
personnel were severely limited, and they were forced to spend a lot of time in search of desired 
goods in other stores.  The Stasi was notified and the leading employees of this retail outlet were 
brought under further investigation.937  In 1981, the Stasi further reported further acts of theft 
being committed by a group of employees at the Konsum bakery in Grimmen.  Apparently, these 
workers were stealing various products amounting to 10,000 MdN per month.  The Stasi 
determined that part of the cause of this thievery and corruption was the high level of alcohol 
consumed during working hours.  It also profiled some of the workers at the Grimmen Konsum 
bakery, including their political affiliations.   Worker A was a member of the DBD and 
apparently overburdened.  Worker B had no party affiliation, but was deemed as loyal.  The 
administrator, a member of the SED, failed to carry out his or her duties and was unable to 
comprehend the severity of the problems in this bakery.938  Remember, perhaps the most 
powerful and coercive tool in the Stasi’s arsenal was not necessarily its hard power (prisons and 
munitions); rather, it was the ability to define identity, which gave the Stasi significant leverage 
over the citizenry.  Hence, Worker B was lucky to be deemed as “loyal” and not “disloyal.”  Yet, 
                                                
936 BStU - Karl-Marx-Stadt AKG Nr. 9341, Information über Hinweise aus der Bevölkerung zu Mängeln in 
der Arbeit der Konsum-Möbelverkaufsstelle Karl-Marx-Stadt, Sonnenstraße (Date not given – likely the late 1980s), 
405-06. 
937 Ibid. 
938 BStU - MfS BV Rostock AKG Nr. 558, Kreisdienstelle den Konsumbackwarenbetrieb Grimmen, 
3.4.1981, 14-17. 
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in spite of this threat, consumer-tacticians continued to use Vitamin B as a means for everyday 
life.       
Relationships and favours held real significance in the DDR.  Since Konsum employees 
controlled access to goods, this placed them in a relatively privileged position in a shortage-
economy, a position that they often used as compensation for being underpaid and for enduring 
difficult working conditions.  And because commodities were often bought, sold, and traded on 
the level of Eine Hand wäscht die andere (one hand washing the other), those without anything 
to barter experienced real hardships within the DDR’s favour-economy.  Therefore, the only 
avenue available to those without “connections” was to write Eingaben and complain directly to 
state authorities at the risk of becoming a Petze (tattle tale) and gaining the disfavour of the 
Konsum salespeople.  Nevertheless, after enough letters were written, Eingaben generally 
worked, as salespeople would then be ordered to quell the complaints.  However, this tactic was 
usually at the expense of the consumer losing the favour of the salespeople in the shop, resulting 
in a potential decline in customer service.  Not surprisingly, during an interview a former 
Konsum saleswoman defended the customer service in the Konsum, but admitted that there were, 
of course, unfriendly saleswomen.  She also noted “relations with Konsum staff were extremely 
important in order to get “in-demand articles.”939  Yet, Herr Fitzkow also describes his relations 
with Konsum staff as positive: “the sales-women made great efforts to serve their customers, 
even though the goods were simply often not there to deliver.  Yet, with such shortages, there 
was corruption.”940   
                                                
939 Author's interview with anonymous (former Konsum Saleswoman), Essingen, Germany, 2011. 
940 Author's interview with Ullrich Fitzkow, Brunkau, Germany, 18 April 2011. 
288 
 
 
 
9.4. Politicization of the workforce and workplace 
There was pressure placed on Konsum workers to engage in political activities and 
ideological work.  This participation in political and party life was evaluated and measured 
through attendance in political meetings and events.     
At the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Köpenick, it was estimated that out of fifty-one 
party members, only thirteen were actively involved in party life and political meetings in 
1957.941  During these meetings, the Konsum made efforts to explain to its workers that fleeing to 
West Germany was treasonous and advantageous to NATO.  The Konsum warned its workers 
that West German capitalism was exploitive and tried to explain to them that the “authoritarian 
system of West Germany did not have a future; therefore, there was no reason for a person to 
flee the DDR.”942  In spite of these efforts to convince workers that the DDR was the better 
Germany, the Konsum was impacted by so many of its workers fleeing to the West.943  
Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Mitte reported that six colleagues, four of whom were women, 
fled the DDR in 1957.  In 1958, this number increased to sixteen, 11 of whom were women.    
Accordingly, the Konsum authorities became alarmed and believed that these women had failed 
to recognize that the DDR was a country of peace and that only the socialist political and 
economic system could ensure prosperity and a life of happiness.  As a consequence, the 
remaining female Konsum workers had to attend lectures and discussions in women’s 
committees to make them aware of the problems facing West Germany.944 
                                                
941 LAB: C Rep. 904-035 Nr. 3, Einschätzung der Parteileitung über die Arbeit der Genossen, Konsum-
genossenschaft Berlin-Köpenick, d. 8.7.1957. 
942 BStU - MfS Zentralarchiv 2493/67, Bericht zur Vorstands – Sitzung am 8. Oktober 1958 über die 
Republikfluchten bis zum 30.9.58 in unserer KG-Mitte, 24-25. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid. 
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Workers and functionaries contributed to the politicization of their own workplace.  In 
fact, party members and candidates working in the Konsum were required to conduct 
conversations with their colleagues about the development and consolidation of the workers’ and 
peasants’ state, as well as to clarify political questions.945  Additionally, SED agitators were 
embedded into the workforce for the purpose of educating their colleagues while refuting any 
false opinions they might pose.  Another priority of this agitation work was to convince Konsum 
workers to join the party.  At the Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Pankow, for instance, agitators 
gave themselves the goal of gaining six candidates for party membership by the end of the year 
(1964).  In order to achieve this goal, the agitators held conversations with their colleagues who 
were not affiliated with any party.946   
9.4.1. Stasi observation of the Konsum workforce 
 The Stasi infiltrated the Konsum and kept records on the mundane activities of its 
employees.  The presence of the Stasi and its officers in workplaces was not routine, since there 
were simply not enough officers.  However, as this sub-section argues, the presence of informers 
who were unknown to workers were part of the routine and much more dangerous.    
 In 1954 in Wittenberg, an employee at the local Konsum store in the electronics 
department was evaluated as a positive promoter of socialist consumer culture amongst his co-
workers and customers and was described as quiet, polite, and courteous.  Through his work in 
promoting Konsum fashion shows, he had “demonstrated a positive interest in his consumer co-
operative.”  His file contains biographical information such as his being a member of the Nazi 
Party from 1938 to 1945 and being in an English POW camp from May to August 1945.  Since 
                                                
945 LAB: C Rep. 904-035 Nr. 3, Perspektivplan der Betriebsparteiorganisation der KG Köpenick für das 
Jahr 1957, Berlin, 7.12.1956. 
946 LAB: C Rep. 904-119 Nr. 5, Arbeitsentschließung der Betriebsparteiorganisation, Konsum-
genossenschaft Berlin-Pankow, 14.4.64.  
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his behaviour was apparently calm and disciplined, his biographical background did not, as the 
document states, “pose any disadvantage for him.”947  In another report from the Wittenberge co-
operative in 1954, an employee was given a positive evaluation for leading a musical group.  
This man apparently had “an open character and good relations with customers, and it was 
unknown if he had connections to the West and West Berlin.”948  To use Stephen Kotkin’s turn 
of phrase, it was “the ability to define who people were,”949 which made the Stasi a truly 
totalitarian and coercive instrument of state control.   
 Notably, these reports and biographies were often tainted with personal views and 
preferences, which led to a highly subjective dissemination of information about the workforce, 
the state of consumption, and the general mood of the population.  For instance, a Stasi-
informant code-named “Barbara,” who was born in 1944 in Bad Elster, became an apprentice at 
the Konsumgenossenschaft-Adorf from 1960 to 1963.  She trained to be an economist at the 
Konsum College for Domestic Trade from 1964 to 1967.  Then Barbara was recruited to spy for 
the Stasi on 6 January 1977.950  In 1982, Barbara was imbedded in the Konsum to report on the 
mood, loyalty, and opinions voiced by the administration and her co-workers.  She concluded 
that the current conflict in Lebanon was having a negative impact on the mood of the Konsum 
workforce, since her co-workers believed it could lead to a wider confrontation between the 
super powers and a worsening of the entire global situation during the early 1980s.951  The 
legitimacy of Barbara’s report is difficult to decipher.  To speculate, perhaps Barbara’s 
colleagues were genuinely concerned about the crisis in Lebanon; however, she may have simply 
been feeding her superiors what they wanted to hear.  Whatever the case, biases expressed within 
                                                
947 BStU - BV Schwerin, AIM 817/55 P, Beurteilung, Wittenberge Datum: 13.10.54. 
948 BStU - BV Schwerin, AIM 817/55 P, Beurteilung, Wittenberge, den 9.11.1954, 19. 
949 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: 224. 
950 BStU - BV-Karl-Marx-Stadt Oelsnitz XIV 1416/76 I/I, Auskunftsbericht Datum: 20.4.1978, 84-85. 
951 BStU - BV-Karl-Marx-Stadt Oelsnitz XIV 1416/76 I/II, Stimmungen und Meinungen, 28.7.82, 433. 
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the reports of Stasi informants had the potential to endanger workers and colleagues, and render 
the Stasi a less effective communications instrument between populace and state.  The masses of 
reports flooded the secret police service with endless amounts of useless information.  For 
example, a Stasi informant code-named Stähr reported to a Major Mühlberg about an employee 
at the Konsum restaurant in Oranienburg.  On 20 August 1979, Stähr reported to Mühlberg that 
he was successful in infiltrating this organization and establishing contact with an employee over 
the course of several visits to the restaurant.  Stähr’s report concluded, “This employee served 
various customers from the surrounding areas such as LPG farmers, tradesmen, and youth, 
although without close relations with them.  The employee was a passionate windsurfer and did 
not receive further holidays for the month of August.  He or she was very angry about this!”952  
The story of the windsurfing Konsum employee illustrates the wastefulness, ineffectiveness, and 
general uselessness of the vast majority of such reports.     
 In 1982, the Stasi determined that it was necessary to recruit more domestic spies 
(voluntary informers or Stasi informants, inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, IMs) to further infiltrate the 
Konsum.953  That year, the Stasi recruited a man codenamed “Theo Bergner,” who reported on 
his colleagues at the consumer co-operative outlet in Stahnsdorf (a small community just east of 
Potsdam).  His report dealt with a woman who was born in Stahnsdorf in 1943 and conducted 
technical work at the Konsumgenossenschaft-Stahnsdorf.  Bergner characterized her as modest, 
honest, and politically loyal; however, she had strong religious beliefs.  During a visit to her 
house, Bergner reported that she was in possession of religious relics.  She also had possible 
western contacts, but this was not certain.  She was in a long-term relationship with a man who 
                                                
952 BStU - Archiv der Zentralstelle: MfS - HA II Nr. 32768, Information zu (Name wurde verdunkelt) der 
Konsumgaststätte Zehlendorf Kr. Oranienburg, Berlin, 19.09.1979, 120. 
953 BStU - Archiv der Außenstelle Potsdam: BVfS Potsdam Abt. XVIII 189, Vorschlag zur Werbung der 
IMK/KW „Konsum“, Reg. –Nr.: IV/1173/83, Potsdam, 20.12.1982, 447. 
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Bergner described as a member of the working-class (Arbeitertyp).  Her daughter and her three 
illegitimate children also lived with them.954   
 This preceding denunciation is a clear example of the sinister side of selective 
participation, which was first discussed in the introduction.  Because of this IM, the regime was 
able to infiltrate social spaces, and breach what Günter Gaus might have described as niches, or 
the private spheres of family, personal, and sexual life.955  Moreover, the fact that this report 
highlights that the daughter had “illegitimate” children signifies the arbitrary, dangerous, and 
intrusive nature of such surveillance, and the lack of a private sphere.  In this sense, 
totalitarianism means not the complete control over private lives of individuals, but the state’s 
attempted claim on the private lives of individuals.  Yet, it also shows that active participation 
was necessary for Stasi control.  Ultimately, the drafting of such calculated reports would have 
almost certainly left its mark on the daily lives of colleagues, neighbours, and classmates and 
may have forced them to modify their behaviour in certain situations.956       
Bergner then reported on a second saleswoman, a twenty-year old living in Potsdam.  She 
was trained and studied at the State Co-operative in Potsdam (Genossenschaft KG Potsdam-
Land).  According to Bergner’s assessment, she was a so-called late developer, (Spätentwickler), 
and he characterized her as friendly and honest.  The assessment states:  
There were clear inconsistencies not to be overlooked, because she did not inform on a 
former colleague’s alcohol problems.  In September 1982, she will receive her 
qualification certificate to begin work as an administrator of a co-operative retail outlet.  
She is married and her husband is considered to be a member of the working-class, who 
has made a positive impression at a party gathering.  For her services, she had been 
                                                
954 BStU - Archiv der Außenstelle Potsdam: BVfS Potsdam Abt. XVIII 189, Mündlicher Bericht des 
IMK/KW „Theo Bergner“ vom 14.07.1982 zum Personal der Konsumverkaufstelle in Stahnsdorf, 146. 
 955 Gaus, Wo Deutschland liegt; Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy, 
1933-1945: 159. 
956 Stefan Wolle, Die heile Welt der Diktatur: Alltag und Herrschaft in der DDR 1971-1989, 1. Aufl. ed. 
(Berlin: Ch. Links, 1998), 153. 
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honoured with a trip abroad.  She is not affiliated with any party and it is believed that 
she had not conducted any negative political discussions.957 
   
Bergner determined that there was a positive partnership between the two saleswomen.  He 
concluded his report by noting that the women were neither garrulous nor did they engage in 
interests directly related to their workplace.958  The saleswomen likely suspected Bergner of 
having Stasi affiliations and purposefully remained silent in his company. 
 The cases explored in this section demonstrate the lengths that the Stasi went to in the 
gathering of information about mundane aspects in the lives of East German citizens.  As this 
sub-section has shown, Bruce is correct when he suggests, “What is remarkable about the Stasi is 
its penetration of the most ordinary, ostensibly nonthreatening, areas of East Germany...  It is 
difficult to imagine that a dictatorship with the range of instruments that the DDR had could not 
colour, in very real terms, the ordinary lives of East Germans.”959  He continues to speculate as 
to why some East Germans worked and became informants for the Stasi.  In his words, “some 
informants worked for the Stasi out of conviction, some for personal or material gain, some used 
the Stasi for personal vendettas, and many were coerced (a more appropriate descriptor than 
‘persuaded’).”960   
There are number of conclusions that need to be drawn from this sub-section.  First of all, 
the Stasi was willing to spend time and resources to report on Konsum employees.  These reports 
allude to the state’s attempts to infiltrate into the most humdrum and anodyne aspects of 
everyday life of its citizens and support my general arguments about totalitarianism and the high-
level of state infiltration into the private sphere. Furthermore, this sub-section has shown that 
                                                
957 BStU - Archiv der Außenstelle Potsdam: BVfS Potsdam Abt. XVIII 189, Mündlicher Bericht des 
IMK/KW „Theo Bergner“ vom 14.07.1982 zum Personal der Konsumverkaufstelle in Stahnsdorf, 146-47. 
958 Ibid. 
959 Bruce, The Firm: 11-12. 
960 Ibid., 14. 
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socio-political biographies of individuals became the preferred means of investigation and the 
primary starting point for either promotion or disciplinary action.  Therefore, the most powerful 
weapon at the Stasi’s disposal was its ability to literally define people in language and in terms 
of social categories established by the state.961  It is for this reason that one can define the DDR 
as a sort of “bio-state” in which political biographies carried enormous importance in social and 
power relations, especially when seeking career or political advancement.  Hence, it is extremely 
likely that there were real-life positive and negative consequences for the people mentioned in 
these aforementioned reports.  Finally, Stasi infiltration was arbitrary and dangerous for the 
employees of the Konsum and such infiltration demonstrates that the consumer co-operatives 
were neither independent nor autonomous spaces.  To apply this conclusion more broadly, free, 
neutral, and autonomous spaces, as this evidence demonstrates, likely did not readily exist 
anywhere in the DDR.      
9.4.2. Brigades  
Instruction brigades were commonly used in the SED system.  Originating in the centres 
of state and power, they consisted of (usually small) groups of instructors and workers of various 
statuses who were sent to the lowest levels of the democratic centralist hierarchy in order to 
conduct “fact-finding-missions.”962  When necessary, these brigades would offer suggestions for 
improvement or implement new regulations.  The primary purpose of these brigades was to 
motivate workers to increase productivity by promoting collective team efforts, personal 
initiatives and self-discipline, as well as competitions with other brigades.  In some ways, they 
were even seen as a mechanism for inculcating “socialist morality” by promoting the norms of 
                                                
961 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: 224-25. 
962 Thomas Lindenberger, "Creating State Socialist Governance: The Case of the Deutsche Volkspolizei," 
in Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. Konrad Hugo Jarausch (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 131. 
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the SED state to other brigade members and workers.963  Within the Konsum, the brigades 
functioned as small party organizations with the purpose of eliminating ideological uncertainties 
about the role of the socialist state and for producing cordial relations between the consumer co-
operative and the state organs.964   
From 1947 to 1948, brigades were formed and introduced in the SBZ, and their numbers 
rapidly expanded.  By the end of 1950, there were more than 98,000 brigades, with 663,000 
workers.  In the course of the 1950s, the brigade movement began to flourish to such an extent 
that they became a fixed part of the workplaces of economic enterprises from the 1960s right 
through to 1989.  Their numbers expanded greatly in the Honecker period (1971 to 1989).  By 
1988, 5,500,000 people (nearly two thirds of all workers) were members of a brigade.965  The 
size of brigades ranged from small cells of a few workers to thirty members or more.  Within the 
brigades, the problems with working conditions were discussed and reported upwards to the 
higher branches of the factory.  The brigades were used as a tool to solve various problems with 
working and living conditions.  For some, the brigades offered the inter-personal relations of a 
social group.966   
The brigades were charged with developing the political and ideological life of non-party 
members within the Konsum, ensuring that workers participated in ideological and technical 
training and the building of socialism.  In this sense, the members of the brigades were to act as 
models of orderly, socialist behaviour.967  For example, a VDK brigade was placed in the 
Konsumgenossenschaft-Berlin-Mitte in 1959.  It sought to increase the productivity of this co-
                                                
963 Fulbrook, The People's State: 225.  
964 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/2.029/86, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker, Büro Dr. Erich Apel 
und Wirtschaftskommission beim Politbüro - Beschluss über die Aufgaben der Parteiorganisationen in den 
Konsumgenossenschaften bei der Lösung der vom V. Parteitag der SED gestellten Aufgaben, date not given, 18. 
965 Fulbrook, The People's State: 225.  
966 Madarász, Working in East Germany: 156. 
967 LAB: C Rep. 904-138 Nr. 1, Entschließung der BPO der Konsumgenossenschaft Köpenick, Berlin, den 
14.12.1953. 
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operative, strengthen its political capacity, enhance its youth work, and improve the working 
qualifications of its members.968  As of November 1959, nearly ten percent of all Konsum 
workers were honorary members of the socialist work brigades.969  Additionally, during the late 
1950s, the socialist brigades strove for an improved work ethic and general workers’ morale 
within the Konsum.  These brigades had to ensure that co-operative property was protected and 
properly cared for while the wishes of customers were met by providing a wide variety of 
consumer goods.  All the while the intent was to improve professional qualifications.  The 
saleswomen and the brigades were to exchange working experiences with each other, as well as 
to help and support each other through mutual assistance.  The overall objective of the brigades 
was to increase the productivity of the entire Konsum retail network in order to better supply the 
population, and, more generally, to improve the overall strength of the consumer co-
operatives.970    
In the early 1960s, there were sixty workers’ brigades in the Konsum, which were given 
the title of “socialist brigade.”  According to a Stasi report, the brigades were successfully 
completing their work within the retail outlets.  However, these brigades were experiencing 
difficulties in demonstrating socialist life and learning amongst their fellow workers, and the 
brigades apparently lacked a clear connection with the Konsum’s administration.971   
                                                
968 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/133, Handel, Versorgung und Außenhandel.  Berlin, June 5, 1959 
Bericht: Über den Brigadeeinsatz in der Konsumgenossenschaft Berlin-Mitte, 1-2. 
969 LAB: C Rep. 904-138 Nr. 6, Informationsbericht für die Zeit vom 28. Oktober bis 3. November 1959. 
970 SWA: U64/336, Die Konsum-Genossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Date not 
given - probably 1959 or the early 1960s), 34. 
971 BStU - MfS Zentralarchiv 2493/67, Analyse Konsumgenossenschaft - Mitte, Berlin den 8.11.1960, 36. 
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Illustration 43: A Konsum youth brigade in 1977 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, the brigades were used to create a communal spirit, as is 
(perhaps) apparent in Illustration 43,972 and to take disciplinary action against other group 
members.  Tensions arose when the brigades incorporated educational and controlling roles and 
rules, which allowed for the reproach of fellow workers for tardiness, absenteeism, and 
carelessness at their job posts.  The brigades also encroached on the members’ personal lives; for 
example, when somebody’s child did not perform well at school, the brigade would be informed 
and make an effort to intervene.  In certain situations this may have been helpful, but many felt 
(correctly) that they were under surveillance by their colleagues.  Yet many former members 
maintained that they had positive memories of their brigades.973   
Historian Thomas Lindenberger states, “Instruction brigades can be regarded as 
containing a central element of [what Michel Foucault describes as] governmentality under state 
socialism.”974  More plainly, the SED attempted to manage and produce the appropriate 
behaviours in an effort to craft self-governing citizens by using disciplinary control at the 
                                                
972 SSC: 30878/1131, A Konsum youth brigade in 1977. 
973 Madarász, Working in East Germany: 29. 
974 Lindenberger, "Creating State Socialist Governance," 134. 
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workplace.  In this sense, governmentality is about people actively, willingly, and voluntarily 
participating in the structures that dominate them by being self-governing and self-disciplining in 
the ways those institutions expected.975  In order to secure the new power structures of the SED-
state, previously autonomous power centres or nuclei needed to be dissolved, and long-
established social and property relations had to be replaced with socialist ones. Lindenberger 
further suggests “during this process the SED had to establish a firm grip on the people going 
through this transformation in order to install a durable link between the power centre and the 
individuals.”976  In other words, the brigades were a tool of social pressure and political control 
in the workplace.  Moreover, this pressure forced workers to modify and monitor their own 
behaviour so that they could actively participate in the socialist state and consumer culture (i.e., 
governmentality).  With all that said, it seems as though the attempts of the SED to politicize the 
workplace were easily ignored by those uninterested in pursuing career advancement.  This was 
the recollection of a former Konsum saleswoman.  In a 2011 interview, she stated:  
The political role was continually present, although I had no interest in it.  I was simply 
an employee of this organization.  It was a job and a way to make money.  Yet on 
account of this politicized workplace, workers intentionally placed a considerable 
distance between SED managers and themselves.  Amongst workers, there was 
considerable solidarity, especially amongst female employees.  Although I felt a sense of 
loyalty to my co-workers, I was not particularly loyal to the political facets of this 
organization.977 
 
 Even though this interview took place over twenty years after the fall of the Wall, the 
ubiquity of the Konsum and the largely unchanging products it sold shaped the cultural memory 
of the DDR for both its employees and consumers.  Historian Paul Betts posits that “there was 
little variety of goods and little brand-name competition; many of the products introduced in the 
consumer rush of the ‘60s stayed in production until 1989 with little or no change in content or 
                                                
975 Ibid., 127. 
976 Ibid., 126. 
977 Author's interview with anonymous (former Konsum Saleswoman), Essingen, Germany, 2011. 
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form.  Regardless of how monotonous this may have been, the aesthetics of sameness was 
crucial in shaping the DDR’s collective memory.”978  In the case of the anonymous worker, her 
employment within this organization indicates that her interaction with the Konsum became an 
historical marker that shaped her memory of East German socialism.  It is for this reason that the 
Konsum is such an important avenue of study, since it acted as a site and unchanging space that 
was, in many ways, directly linked to the memories of the majority of the East German 
population.     
9.5. The democratic dictatorship? Co-operative democracy in the workplace 
There is evidence suggesting that Konsum members held the formal right to vote in 
leadership elections and on economic policy.979 This section examines the democratic 
participation in the Konsum.  The SED, for its part, also used Konsum elections “to increase the 
influence of the party within the elected organs of the consumer co-operatives, so that the politics 
of the party are explained, and for the political mobilization of the consumer co-operatives.”980  
In other words, both citizens and state were attempting to manipulate elections for their own 
ends.      
 
Illustration 44: An example of the membership book, which was the primary piece of identification for voting 
in Konsum elections981 
                                                
978 Paul Betts, "The Twilight of the Idols: East German Memory and Material Culture," The Journal of 
Modern History 72, no. 3 (2000): 754. 
979 Rönnebeck, Die Konsumgenossenschaften der ehemaligen DDR: 26-27. 
980 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/2.029/86, date not given, 13. 
981 Kirsch, Die Marken Bitte!: 27-29. 
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For voting identification, the membership-book had to be approved by an election official 
and marked with an election stamp.  During the selection process, voters could use a closed 
polling booth.  The member with the most votes was elected.  The election of the membership 
committees and the Konsum delegates was done on separate ballot sheets.  According to the 
document Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, the high 
voter turnout was a sign of the strong membership participation in co-operative life, and of 
members’ trust in the honorary functionaries of the membership committees.  In the last election 
(date not given but appears to be 1959), 3.2 million members participated; a number that 
exceeded ninety percent of the members.  They elected around 127,000 members to the 
Verkaufsstellenausschüsse (retail-outlet-membership-committees) and as delegates, among them 
were 87,000 women.  Additionally, there were 25,000 farmers elected in the countryside – 
apparently this was a sign of the growing strength of co-operative activity.982  While there were 
regular elections, party members were most likely the only potential candidates for election to 
high management positions within the Konsum.   
Already in the early 1950s, women were doing very well in Konsum elections.  In 1950, 
there were 7,572 elected representatives in the Verband-sächsischer-Konsumgenossenschaften, 
and 4,887 of these were women.983  The 1952 election results at a consumer co-operative in 
Berlin demonstrated that women were elected into administrative positions.  Five men and two 
women were elected into the Vorstand, six men and two women were elected into the 
Aufsichtsrat, twelve men and sixteen women were elected into the Genossenschaftsrat.  In total 
twenty-three men and twenty women gained elected positions within the Konsum.  While men 
dominated the two upper branches, these numbers demonstrate that women were actively 
                                                
982 SWA: V8/2247, Entwurf Statut der (Dorf-, Stadt-) Konsumgenossenschaft (Date not given), 30. 
983 Burchard Bösche and Jan-Frederik Korf, Chronik der deutschen Konsumgenossenschaften (Hamburg: 
Zentralverband deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften, 2003), 33. 
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involved in the various administrative branches of this organization.984  In Mecklenburg, co-
operators from Liessow and Cambs stood for the 1956 committee elections.  The co-operator 
from Liessow was female, and she won the election.985  These numbers demonstrate a 
willingness on the part of the régime to give women access to real power within the lower- to 
mid-level administrative positions through elections.   
 Yet to be elected into the administrative branches of the Konsum one needed the proper 
credentials and biographical background in the form of antifascist resistance, working-class 
heritage, and membership in the SED.  For instance, Otto Leopold was a member of the 
executive of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig.  He was born in Leipzig in 1901 to a working-
class family.  In his youth, he was involved in retail trade.  After the First World War, he joined 
the KPD and then became a relentless fighter against “capitalist reactionaries.”  From 1933 to 
1945, he fought against the Nazis.  Given his background, Otto Leopold proved his eligibility to 
become an executive member of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig.986  Another example was 
Charlotte Sänger who was born in 1907 and the child of a Leipzig worker (Arbeiterkind).  In her 
early youth, she was actively involved in the workers’ movement.  She was a member of the 
SED and dedicated to the co-operative movement.  Then, she became an active functionary in 
the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig and was elected to its supervisory committee (Aufsichtsrat) 
on 6 May 1950.987  Hans Janke was born in 1901 in Landsberg and was the son of a tailor.  He 
was an active functionary of the working-class movement in his youth.  In 1945, he joined the 
SED.  On 1 April 1947, he was elected to the supervisory committee of the Konsum-
                                                
984 LAB: C Rep. 901 Nr. 328, Bericht an das Sekretariat, Berlin, den 14.10.52, 5. 
985 Kirsch, Die Marken Bitte!: 44. 
986 SWA: 2342/1, Otto Leopold, 1. Vorstandsmitglied der Konsumgenossenschaft Leipzig. 
987 SWA: 2342/1, Charlotte Sänger geb. Keil, geb. 6. Juli 1907. 
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genossenschaft-Zwickau.988  From these biographies, we can speculate that elections were used 
to push aside politically unreliable members, such as Social Democrats.    
 A case in point is the elections of various Konsum administrative positions over the 
period from 9 January to 2 March 1975 – the purpose of which was to ensure that suitable cadres 
were elected into the leading organs of the Konsum.  During the process of these three elections, 
the Konsum had to promote and demonstrate the fulfillment of the resolutions of the Eighth SED 
Party Congress.989  The most suitable candidates were those with ties to the working-class and 
the party.  These candidates also had to demonstrate that they had political knowledge and were 
active proponents of the socialist project.  Above all, these elections were to increase the 
influence of women and youth.  Ultimately, the elections were also to prove that the Konsum 
realized the resolutions of the Eighth Party Congress of the SED.990   
Konsum elections had multiple political and propaganda objectives.  According to 
documents from the Stasi archives from 1980, there were scheduled elections for the various 
leadership positions of the Konsum, which were reported to have been held on 17 and 18 
January, from 23 February to 9 March, and from 15 March to 30 March 1980.991  As the 
document clearly states, “the elections were held to deepen the members’ understanding of the 
Konsum as an antifascist mass-organization, which contributed to the strengthening of socialism.  
The elections were to also prove that collaboration and friendship with the Soviet Union was the 
decisive reason for the assurance of peace in the world and the continuing prosperity of the 
                                                
988 SWA: 2342/1, Hans Janke, Obermeister in Böhlen geb. 13.9.1901. 
989 BStU - Archiv der Zentralstelle: MfS SED-KL 551, Direktive über die Vorbereitung und Durchführung 
der Wahlen leitenden Organe der Konsumgenossenschaften, 3. 
990 Ibid., 7. 
991 BStU - Archiv der Zentralstelle: MfS SED-KL 599, Direktive zur Vorbereitung und Durchführung der 
Wahlen der leitenden Organe in den Konsumgenossenschaften und Konsumgenossenschaftsverbänden der Bezirke, 
2. 
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DDR.”992  Furthermore, the Konsum elections were used to promote political slogans, the 
resolutions of the Central Committee of the SED, the electoral announcements of the National 
Front, and SED ideology.993   
A further conclusion from the archival material cited in this subsection is that elections 
were used to promote the discourse of the SED party congresses and the everyday lexicon of 
East German socialism (many of these terms were translated directly from Russian and drawn 
from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).  The following are a few examples of some of 
the more common phrases, metaphors, and slogans found in the material pertaining to Konsum 
elections: massenpolitische Arbeit or politischen Massenarbeit (ideological work), Frauenarbeit 
(women meeting the obligations of their professional work and societal duties in combination 
with motherhood), Bodenreform (land reform), Klassenfeind (class enemy), Die führende Rolle 
der Partei der Arbeiterklasse (The Party of the Workingclass), Antifaschistischer Schutzwall 
(antifascist protection wall – the East German name for the Berlin Wall), Einheit von 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik (unity of economic and social policy), and Schöner unsere Städte 
und Gemeinden - Mach mit! (Do your part! Volunteer for the beautification of our cities and 
communities!).994  Some of the particularly popular slogans during the 1989 local and Konsum 
elections were Hohe Leistungen zum Wohle des Volkes und für den Frieden (high productivity 
will ensure the well-being of the people and peace), alles für die Verwirklichung der Beschlüsse 
des XI. Parteitages der SED (everything for the realization of the resolutions of the Eleventh 
                                                
992 Ibid., 6. 
993 SAPMO-BA: DY/30 8994, Information über die Wahlergebnisse der Konsumgenossenschaften bei der 
Durchführung der Kommunalwahlen am 7. Mai 1989.  
994 For futher explanation on the pecularities of German spoken in East Germany See: Jan Eik, DDR-
Deutsch: Eine entschwundene Sprache (Berlin: Jaron Verlag, 2010). 
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Party Congress), and Vorwärts zum 40. Jahrestag der DDR!” (onward to the 40th Anniversary of 
the DDR).995  
9.5.1. Verkaufsstellenausschüsse (consumer committees) 
Members could participate in and be elected to the Verkaufsstellenausschüsse (consumer 
committees).  At least on paper, consumer committees, under the elected leadership of the 
Konsum members, were actively involved in the administration of a given retail outlet and were 
considered (at least according to membership statutes) the most important organ of the Konsum.  
These elected officials were responsible for the development of the democratic self-awareness of 
the members, for dealing with the criticisms directed at the Konsum, and for ensuring the 
satisfactory supply of members and customers through co-operative trade.  These committees 
were elected yearly by the membership of the given outlet through fair, secret ballot elections.  In 
every retail outlet, at least five members had to be elected to a committee.  The committee then 
elected a head administrator from within.  The committees had to meet at least twice a month and 
were responsible for assuring that members actively participated in the development of consumer 
culture and supported the introduction of new working methods within their retail outlet.  The 
committees served as a sort of “transmission-belt” between the members and the workers of their 
given retail outlet and ensured that membership complaints, suggestions, and ideas were taken 
into consideration by the retail outlet’s workforce and administration.996  In this sense, the 
committees became, metaphorically speaking, lighting rods of consumer complaints.   
The consumer committees were committed to the development of the relationship 
between members, workers, the parties and mass-organization, the committees of the National 
                                                
995 SAPMO-BA: DY/30 8993, Programm der politischen Massenarbeit der konsumgenossenschaftlichen 
Organisation in Vorbereitung der Kommunalwahlen 1989 und des 40. Jahrestages der Gründung der DDR, 152.   
996 SWA: V8/2247, Entwurf Statut der (Dorf-, Stadt-) Konsumgenossenschaft (Date not given), 28. 
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Front, and the LPGs.997  For example, during the preparations of the 1958 co-operative elections, 
the party stressed that:  
The most important leading organs of the co-operatives were the consumer committees.   
They have the most direct contact with the members and were the most effective tool in 
membership control.  It was therefore necessary to ensure that more party members from 
the working-class and farmers were elected into these positions.  These newly elected 
officials had to immediately begin their party tasks.”998  
 
   
Illustration 45: A shop window promoting the elections to the consumer committees in 1954 in Rostock999 
The Democratic Women's League of Germany (Demokratischer Frauenbund 
Deutschlands, DFD)1000 attempted to have its own members elected to the consumer committees 
in order to have an avenue by which to influence the Konsum along with its retail and 
distribution policies.  In 1955, at an SED meeting, women noted the success of the consumer 
committees in the establishment of a factory store: “We fought for half a year to lengthen the 
opening hours of the Konsum store so that our women could take part in social life and still 
procure their purchases.  Three days a week the Konsum firm is open until 7:00pm, and the 
Konsum store in the city of Radeberg is open until 7:00pm on two days as well.”1001  For a 
                                                
997 Ibid. 
998 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/133, Handel, Versorgung und Außenhandel. Berlin (Date not given), 6. 
999 AKB: FA 10 - Schaufenster und Fassadengestaltung zu gesellschaftlichen Höhepunkten und politischen 
Themen, Verband Deutscher Konsum-Genossenschaften, Warenhaus Rostock, 1954. 
1000 The DFD was established as a mass women’s organizization in March 1947 and attempted to re-
educate women in the spirit of antifascism.  It was one of the members of the National Front and sent representatives 
to the Volkskammer. 
1001 Comment by Anneliese Kraft: Sachbearbeiterin für Sozialpolitik VEB Sachsenwerk Radeberg Bezirk 
Dresden in Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Zentralkomitee, Frauen schaffen für das neue Leben, 25, as 
quoted in Pence, "The Myth of a Suspended Present," 150. 
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further illustration of DFD influence in the Konsum, on 24 July 1973 the two mass-organizations 
joined forces to write an Eingabe to the president of the VDK, Dr. Fahrenkrog.  In this letter, 
they requested the modernization of cash registers in order to guarantee quicker service for 
customers.  The motivation for the request was to avoid further confrontations with displeased 
customers over having to wait in line for so long, which the Konsum employees could no longer 
accept.1002  Historian Katherine Pence has stated that “as mass-organizations tied to the SED, the 
DFD and the Konsum tried to shape women as consumers who maintained faith in the régime’s 
policies and helped the régime overcome shortages by filling in where goods were in short 
supply with their own extra labour and management skills.”1003   
    The members of these committees were active in all of the Konsum’s restaurants and 
retail outlets.  Day by day, they volunteered numerous hours of their free time to undertake 
tedious work (Kleinarbeit) for their co-operative.  Their pay was not monetary; rather, it 
apparently came in the form of the flourishing of the co-operative, of which they were (at least 
according to a Konsum archival document) “extremely proud.”1004  Members had to ensure that 
there were adequate working conditions and a suitable assortment of goods for sale.  At the end 
of the year, they were also asked to volunteer to clean the shop and do inventory.  The members 
also helped in other practical ways.  If there were personnel shortages, these volunteers were 
asked to step in.  Of course, there were other advantages to being a member, since it was most 
likely easier for the volunteers on these committees to gain better access to the goods sold in 
their retail outlets, as well as firsthand knowledge when new goods became available.  
                                                
1002 TSM: BV Suhl - Konsum, Nr. 1157, Eingabe an den Herrn Präsidenten Dr. Fahrenkrog, 24. Juli 1973. 
1003 Pence, "From Rations to Fashions," 455-56. 
1004 SWA: U64/336, (Date not given - probably 1959 or the early 1960s), 32. 
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Furthermore, voluntary functionaries had better access to the Konsum’s educational network and 
cultural activities, such as choirs, dance groups, theatre productions, and music groups.1005   
 In speaking about the shop committees, VDK President (1967 to 1991), Heinz 
Fahrenkrog stated in a 1975 report: 
Their primary function is to represent the interests of the members and to see to it that 
the shop and restaurant staff live up to the standards of work expected of them by the 
members and customers, which means that they had to remain in constant contact with 
the members, to know their opinions, and at the same time to work together with the staff 
on comradely terms, not only giving them good advice but also helping them through 
practical deeds.  This also means helping out in a pinch and getting members to help 
when it comes to redecorating or remodelling a shop.1006   
 
At least 200,000 Konsum members were members of the shop committees, as well as the 
advisory committees in the branch department, the co-operative councils, the auditing 
commissions and the executive.  Fahrenkrog continues:  
These members had exerted a direct influence on the development of their co-operative 
organization as the members’ elected representatives.  All these representatives were 
elected by direct and secret ballot.  In addition, hundreds of thousands of members took 
advantage of the members’ meetings and delegates’ conferences of consumers’ co-
operatives and associations to express their interests, demands and constructive 
criticisms on how to improve the sales and supply services of the co-operatives.1007   
 
To quote him again at length, Fahrenkrog postulates:  
It was interesting to note who attended these meetings.  Most of the people attending the 
meetings were interested members.  But occasionally the burgomaster of the town or 
community in question takes the floor to elucidate the economic and communal tasks of 
the community.  The chairman of the local branch of the Democratic Women’s League 
of Germany often takes advantage of the opportunity to discuss relevant problems, 
because the majority of those present were women.  Thus, members’ meetings were, in 
many cases, forums of the community or city district concerned.  It goes without saying 
that the members themselves took the greatest advantage of the meetings to discuss 
problems and to put forward suggestions.  At such meetings the members can arrive at a 
common position on certain questions, which they then put through vis-á-vis the sales 
staff of the shop in question.  But the members’ meeting can also call on the executive to 
                                                
1005 Ibid. 
1006 AKB: 1114/A12, Dr. Heinz Fahrenkrog, President of the Union of Consumer Co-operative Societies of 
the GDR, The Consumer Co-operative Societies in the German Democratic Republic, 41. 
1007 Ibid., 50. 
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include a certain problem it wanted dealt with on this committee’s agenda.  Each 
member also had the opportunity to go directly to the executive and speak to the director 
during the calling-hours or to his shop committee.  Complaint books were accessible to 
customers in all co-operative establishments.1008 
 
Given Fahrenkrog’s position, this account likely idealizes the assemblies and describes how the 
regime or the president wanted them to appear.  Reading between the lines, the source reflects a 
common pattern, namely the idealized appearance of how things were supposed to have been 
rather than how they actually were.    
Voters were able to use the consumer committees and their elections as a means by which 
to express their displeasure with consumption and the state and possibly gain a voice in a 
dictatorial state.  The majority of those elected to the consumer committees were women.  
During the elections to the retail outlets in early September 1985, 151,165 members (among 
them were 128,706 women) were elected to 14,931 small party cells (Grundorganisation).1009  
Prior to elections, the candidates for consumer committees had to partake in discussions and 
meetings with workers and voters, during which voters were allowed to vent.  For instance, prior 
to the election of consumer committees in Berlin on 21 and 22 January 1988, multiple members 
used the opportunity to express their displeasure with and criticize the Konsum’s assortment of 
goods, the debasement of baked goods through transport, industrial packaging, and insufficient 
labelling, and pricing.1010  And during elections for 7 May 1989, voters demanded improvements 
to retail conditions, as well as more customer-friendly store hours.1011       
  Based on the aforementioned Fahrenkrog quotation and the general evidence presented in 
this sub-section, this voluntarism and democratic participation in the Konsum was likely used as 
                                                
1008 Ibid., 42. 
1009 SAPMO-BA: DY/30 8990: Information zur Wahl der Verkaufsstellenausschüsse und Beiräte in den 
Konsumgenossenschaften, 9. September 1985, 233. 
1010 SAPMO-BA: DY/30 8993: Information über die Wahlen der Verkaufsstellenausschüsse und Beiräte, 
Berlin 25 Januar 1988, 174. 
1011 SAPMO-BA: DY/30 8994, Information über die Vorbereitung der Kommunalwahlen am 7. Mai 1989 
durch die Konsumgenossenschaften der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 135-36. 
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a forum to exert social pressure and control by monitoring the mood of the population and 
recording the presence or absenteeism of members at meetings and Konsum sponsored activities.  
Knowing this, East Germans purposefully volunteered in order to benefit themselves.  By 
officially volunteering and having their volunteer hours registered at the Konsum, they were 
demonstrating that they were active and committed socialist citizens.  The attendance records 
were then used to their individual advantage when developing the proper biographical credentials 
(a great advantage when trying to acquire consumer goods, such as an apartment, car, and so on).  
This collective voluntarism was also a means by which to establish good relations and secure 
favours, which in many respects became the real currency used in the DDR.   
9.6. Conclusions 
 According to Witho Holland, “the inclusion of the Konsum in the centrally planned 
economy and the system of democratic centralism offered the consumer co-operatives numerous 
possibilities for self-responsibility in determining their economic contributions.”1012  As Holland 
claims, they were, at least by the late 1980s, given a semblance of independence.  Although the 
Konsum’s economic plans were designed to support and legitimize the SED system, its semi-
independence allowed members and workers to make real contributions in determining their 
design and implementation.1013  Holland further suggests, “The consumer co-operatives of the 
SBZ and DDR had co-operative characteristics, which were in accordance with co-operative 
law.”1014  What is important here is that the Konsum’s legal structures allowed for members and 
workers to make real (democratic) contributions to running this organization.  Dr. Burchard 
Bösche (an executive within the Hamburg based Zentralverband deutscher Konsum-
genossenschaften) states, “The consumer committees, comprised of ten to fifteen members, were 
                                                
1012 Holland, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: 64. 
1013 Ibid. 
1014 Ibid., 78. 
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democratically elected and helped formulate basic policy within the retail outlets, as well as 
ensuring that these shops ran and functioned properly.  Nevertheless, the SED completely 
dominated the upper levels of this organization.”1015  That is, the president, the executive, and the 
leading functionaries were all members of the SED.  Consequently, the Konsum was under the 
direct control of the party, even though there was some democratic activity in the lower levels of 
the organization within the consumer committees.1016   
There are a number of other conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence presented 
in this chapter.  With respect to Konsum democracy and elections, Aschhoff and Henningsen 
aptly state “[East German co-operative] members, of whom there were several millions, were 
able to take part in a rudimentary type of self-administration in retail outlet committees and 
councils.”1017  Aschhoff and Henningsen are correct in arguing that the Konsum elections were – 
at times – relatively fair and free.  Yet the SED and the Konsum used elections as an instrument 
by which to ensure that the right types of people, usually party members but not always, were 
able to attain administrative positions, while purging those considered unsuitable candidates 
(usually former social democrats) by not allowing them to run in elections.  Further, the party 
always controlled the message or slogans of a given election, such as the sustained friendship 
between the Soviet Union and the DDR or supporting and promoting the objectives of the most 
recent SED congress.  As such, Konsum elections became a forum through which socialist 
discourse and political metaphors were promulgated.   
East German co-operatives may, in fact, have been more progressive than western co-
operatives.  In Katarina Apelqvist’s 1996 article, “Strategies for Shared Power between Men and 
                                                
1015 Author's interview with Dr. Burchard Bösche, Hamburg, Germany, 26 July 2011. 
1016 Author's interview with anonymous (former DDR school teacher and Konsum employee), Berlin, 
Germany, 27 June 2011. 
1017 Aschhoff and Henningsen, The German Cooperative System: 45. 
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Women in Co-operatives,” she argues that women have been integral in the development of 
“western” co-operatives; however, they continue to play a subordinate role within the movement, 
with restricted access to status and power.  Women’s lack of power in the co-operatives was 
most strikingly apparent in the decision-making organs of the ICA.1018  In her words,  
Irrespective of the country, co-operatives were essentially managed by men.  In fact, 
gender imbalance in co-operatives was one of the striking contradictions between co-
operative theory and practice, weakening co-operative identity, credibility and the 
possibilities to fulfill co-operative purpose.  The present co-operative order has been 
engineered by men, for men.  Consequently it is based on male values, norms and 
priorities.  Admittedly there were women within these male hierarchies but their 
influence and opportunities for development were restricted.  Furthermore, their salaries 
were lower than men’s even when they did the same and comparable work.1019   
 
In another article published in the same issue by Maria-Elena Chaves, the author argues that “the 
little statistical evidence presently available on women co-operators in decision-making positions 
shows that women were not yet adequately represented in the ranks of power, policy and 
decision-making.”1020  Finally, Johnston Birchall has argued, “for generations women have 
played a vital, but invisible, role in co-operatives... they have constituted the loyal and 
hardworking backbone of the movement [but] have been, and still are, kept in subordinate 
roles.”1021   
Of course, these are opinion pieces and the authors do not use substantial quantitative 
data to buttress their arguments.  With the Konsum, however, women did dominate, at least 
numerically, especially in the retail outlets and in the factories.  And to an extent, women were 
also able to use the consumer-committees and the rudimentary democracy that the Konsum 
offered to its employees to have their voices heard in the realm of East German consumer culture 
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1019 Ibid., 33. 
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and in the workplace.  With that said, further study is needed that contrasts female co-operative 
work in West Germany with that in East Germany.  In Part IV, avenues for future research are 
discussed in greater detail.   
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10. Final thoughts 
 
During the Wende, there was a collision of East and West: Frauen, Ossis, Konsum (Women, East 
Germans, and Consumer Co-operatives) versus “Männer, Wessis, Handelsketten (Men, West 
Germans, and sales chains).  
Sigrid Hebestreit, an employee of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Weimar1022 
 
Following the Wende, the HO and others went kaput, but the Konsum remained.  This made us 
proud.   
Martin Tänzer, a former deputy from the Department of Commerce1023 
 
 
Illustration 46: An advertising image produced by Erich Schmitt in the 1960s celebrating the long history of 
consumer co-operatives in Berlin  
The slogan attached to this image is written in exaggerated Berlin accent: “Also ick bin schon die dritte 
Jeneration von uns, die im KONSUM kooft (I belong to third generation, who has shopped in the 
Konsum).”1024  
                                                
1022 Bollwahn, Frauengenossenschaften-Genossenschaftsfrauen: 25-26. 
1023 Bösche, "7.2. Interview with Manfred Reimann and Martin Tänzer," 82. 
1024 Erich Schmitt, "Konsum Berlin 1899 - 28.Juni - 1999,"  (Berlin: Konsum Berlin). 
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This dissertation discussed the roles of the Konsum, while alluding to the nature of power 
relations in East Germany, Soviet-style socialism, and the tensions between the modernist and 
totalitarian elements of the socialist construction in East Germany.  What is more, this 
dissertation is the first English, in-depth study of the Konsum; for this reason, it is my hope that it 
will make an original contribution to the historiography of the SBZ and DDR.  It examined the 
ways in which the Konsum contributed to the SED’s highly modern and totalitarian aspirations to 
create a socialist society comprised of new socialist citizens.  In examining the SED’s ability to 
use the Konsum to infuse ideology into everyday life, this study provides new understandings of 
the ways in which the party’s actions affected its citizens, and the ways in which citizens 
responded to, averted, and manipulated the SED’s politicization of their daily lives.  To this end, 
the study has drawn attention to the state’s incursion into the mundane aspects of everyday life in 
the realms of education, work, and consumption.  To substantiate this examination, I have 
referred to numerous archival sources and interviews with East Germans associated with the 
Konsum.     
10.1. What was the Konsum? 
 It is difficult to classify and define the Konsum, especially given its ambivalent character 
as an economic and political mass-organization, but also as an organization that was important to 
the daily lives of its millions of members all the while maintaining some co-operative 
structures.1025  According to the statistics, the Konsum was something of a success story during 
the Soviet occupation (1945 to 1949) and the lifespan of the East German state (1949 to 1990).  
Indeed, the Konsum was an important retail and trade institution, with a turnover rate of forty 
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billion MdN, 2.3 billion MdN in net profits, and 6.6 billion MdN in fixed assets in 1989.1026  In 
spite of these apparent successes, archival sources and witnesses give conflicting perspectives in 
respect to the economic and political importance of the Konsum, making it problematic to 
distinguish between party rhetoric and actual East German co-operative practice and productive 
capacity.  However, from the sources available and in all the ways I have been suggesting, it is 
possible to recognize that the SED attempted to use the Konsum as a propaganda instrument.  
Eingaben and interviews provide a relatively representative picture of the reaction of the 
citizenry, which was generally venting or feigned compliance for individual gain.  
 Historian Ulrich Kurzer implies that by the 1960s the political and educational influence 
of the Konsum had been somewhat downgraded; at this time the Konsum began to focus instead 
almost exclusively on its economic role, namely supplying of the population.1027  I disagree with 
this argument.  In my view, what Kurzer is likely picking up on are shifts in political slogans and 
discourse.  And even if the Konsum focused more exclusively on supply, consumption was so 
highly politicized that it is not possible to differentiate between politics and economics since they 
were one and the same in the DDR.  As Helmut Lehmann, member of the SED Central 
Committee, proclaimed in mid-1947, “the consumer co-operative has to make clear to women 
that every product she purchased was a political product.”1028  For this reason, I have 
emphatically argued that the Konsum’s basic economic roles were always interwoven with the 
political objectives of education, persuasion, and pacification.  This meant that the Konsum’s 
basic function as a political mass-organization or as a “transmission-belt” of SED discourse was 
relatively static, although there were marked shifts in the messages, slogans, and styles of the 
propaganda.  
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 To return to the idea of Althusser’s conceptualization of an Ideological State Apparatus, 
“if the ISAs ‘function’ massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their diversity is 
precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by which they function is always in fact 
unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling ideology, which is the 
ideology of ‘the ruling class.’”1029  The ideology (the ideas, the language, worldview, 
organizational structure, symbols, and meanings) at the core of the Konsum was always that of 
the ruling SED.  Nevertheless, the Konsum was still a contested terrain between the people and 
the state, substantial numbers of members on one hand and the administrators, party officials, 
and security informants on the other.   
The Konsum was, above all, a state-retailer and state-controlled distributor in DDR 
society.  But to complicate this, the state played a dangerous game by gambling much of its 
fledgling legitimacy on the allocation of consumer goods to its citizens and, by extension, the 
Konsum’s performance.  In other words, as a state distributor, it delivered overly stylized and 
exaggerated propaganda promises that the command economy could rarely deliver.  Ironically, 
then, whenever an East German patronized a Konsum outlet, he or she was hit with a dose of 
ideology heavily contrasted with the austere realities of daily consumption.  
10.1.1. Totalitarian, progressive, and modern instrument   
Were the Konsum and, more broadly, the DDR, totalitarian, modern, and progressive?  
One must answer, albeit cautiously, in the affirmative.  The DDR was a state that had 
progressive and modern ends, although they were conceived through totalitarian means.  East 
Germans, however, experienced the means and ends in different ways.  Some felt the full weight 
of the East German security services (Konsum workers and students were no exception to this), 
while others were able to take advantage of and use the state’s progressive rhetoric as a weapon 
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to have their demands met.  The Konsum clearly demonstrates this.  In short, the paper trail the 
Konsum left behind encapsulates the extent of the permeation of the SED-party-state into the 
experiences of work, education, and consumption to achieve both modern and totalitarian ends.  
For instance, the Konsum promoted the régime’s modernizing tendencies, especially through its 
support of female employment and education, while monitoring its consumers, members, and 
employees.     
Whenever citizens shopped in co-operative sales outlets, participated in the Konsum’s 
cultural activities, political meetings, elections, and educational courses, they were exposed to 
and participated in the power structures of the SED.  Konsum workers and members were almost 
certainly influenced to some degree by the influx of SED ideology into their places of work and 
their consumption practices.  This notwithstanding, the state was not always able to infiltrate the 
spaces that East Germans demarcated for themselves.  Konsum documents confirm that many 
citizens became consumer-tacticians by appropriating state-party-rhetoric for the fulfillment of 
their own ideas, aspirations, and agendas during the forced sovietisation of eastern Germany and 
the forty-year rule of the SED.1030   
Within the context of this dissertation, totalitarianism means that the system exposed 
people systematically to state ideology and got them, especially the Konsum leaders, members, 
workers, and consumers, to use its language in a symbolic gesture of outward conformity.  
Perhaps the purpose of totalitarianism, therefore, is to ensure a performance of compliance 
(something akin to James Scott’s public transcript), even though the majority of citizens were 
likely only engaged in such posturing to either avoid confrontation with the armed-wing of the 
state, or to gain personal advantage.  When East Germans failed to uphold the veneer of outward 
conformity, the state, or as shown in this dissertation, the Stasi would directly intervene by 
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codifying the suspected person with a range of categories, which had real and significant 
consequences in respect to one’s career and education.   
10.1.2. A junction of politicized consumption, observation, and propaganda 
Independent initiative and agency were constant deterrents to the SED’s economic and 
political goals.   Everyday reality in the DDR was, on the one hand, a mixture of ideologically 
driven intervention and observation (totalitarian), and, on the other hand, the unpredictable 
actions of individuals reacting, manipulating, and opposing these state-driven initiatives through 
selective participation.  To placate these demands and gain support for the socialist system of 
rule, the SED instructed the Konsum to improve the population’s access to desired goods.  In 
fact, Stasi documentation clearly demonstrates that the party was reporting on and reacting to 
individual demands for improved consumption.  In this sense, the Stasi was acting as a liaison 
between state and consumers, which was a truly unique role for an Orwellian secret police force.  
In other words, the SED wanted the Konsum to foster an enjoyable consumer culture to promote 
and legitimize its rule, whereas the Stasi wanted to use the Konsum as a means to monitor the 
mood of the population while simultaneously creating an enjoyable consumer culture to quell 
and remove any possible motivation for dissension.  In order to increase the population’s 
commitment to the SED, the party ordered the consumer co-operatives to produce goods that 
would please its customers.1031  As previous chapters have shown, the party attempted to 
demonstrate the success of its planned economy in the Konsum shop window displays.     
Throughout the entire history of the DDR, consumption was always a symbolic political 
issue.  The Konsum attempted to maintain and promote the East German state narrative by 
propagating symbols of common DDR identity and socialist discourse through consumption, 
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which was, as the state correctly believed, a key to garnering consensus amongst its citizens.  
Within the sphere of East German consumption, there were always intense debates and 
consequences for the SED, since the SED controlled the production and design of commodities 
for daily consumption.  The governing bodies of the state were involved in the development of 
goods ranging from butter and sugar cubes to women’s clothing and children’s socks, with the 
intent to ensure that all of these goods symbolized SED ideology, modernity, and, most 
importantly, the successes of a highly-industrialized socialist society.1032  As discussed 
throughout this dissertation, the images of antifascism, modernity, and industrial progress were 
crucial to the establishment of an East German national narrative designed to break from the 
legacies of Nazism.  The Konsum, therefore, attempted to promote and support the SED’s 
modernist state-narrative by guaranteeing employment and a modest level of consumption, with 
generally satisfactory access to cheap staple goods such as meat and bread.   
A substantial number of women experienced socialism through consumption and 
employment within the Konsum retail outlets.  Thus, the state’s political legitimacy was, at some 
level, based on the female shopping and working experiences at Konsum stores.  Unfortunately 
for the Konsum and the SED, these female consumers compared their standard of living with the 
West rather than with other Eastern Bloc countries, though the DDR had the highest standard of 
living within the Soviet Bloc.  Consumption became central to the conflict between the two 
German states during the Cold War.  In fact, attempts to improve consumption within the 
Konsum stores were designed to demonstrate to East Germans that their lives were improving 
and that the socialist system was overtaking the West.  Ultimately, these attempts failed and by 
1989 East Germans showed that they were no longer invested in the socialist experiment.      
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10.1.3. Women’s organization and workplace  
 
The SED and Konsum officials perceived women as consumers, mothers, workers, and 
supporters of the socialist state (Frauenarbeit).  Women were able to use their memberships and 
status as female socialist workers to actively participate in the Konsum elections of the Vorstände 
(executive committee) and Aufsichtsräte (supervisory committee).1033  In turn, the state used co-
operatives as a tool to politicize female consumption, female education, and female employment.  
This was in sharp contrast to the postwar experiences of West German women, who were, to 
make a broad generalization, expected to return to their prewar realm of the kitchen, church, and 
children (Küche, Kirche, und Kinder) – to accept, in sum, the re-emergence of long-standing 
gender roles.  Internal party documents cited throughout this dissertation demonstrate the party’s 
willingness to apply pressure on the Konsum to include women in wage labour, political life, and 
managerial positions.   
The Konsum’s role in integrating women was always central.  In fact, this suggests that 
the organization – in spite of the wider geopolitical and cultural shifts – remained intact and 
alludes to the static and monolithic nature of this organization and its approach to women.  
10.1.4. Mass-organization and propaganda apparatus  
From the perspective of the party, the Konsum was a mass-organization.  More 
particularly, the SED believed that under socialist conditions the Konsum had developed from a 
consumer co-operative into a socialist co-operative and a mass-organization.1034  According to 
Wilhelm Kaltenborn, however, “the co-operatives should not be defined in this manner, since 
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they were not an effective mobilising force, and their propaganda efforts were unsuccessful.”1035  
He further argues, “Individuals were able to ignore propaganda and resist the totalitarian aspects 
of the régime.”1036  According to Martin Bergner, a former Konsum economist and current 
spokesman for the Zentralkonsum (the successor organization of the VDK), “the Konsum was 
not involved in propaganda; rather it was a familiar organization that maintained its co-operative 
integrity.”1037   
This dissertation has militated against Bergner and Kaltenborn’s reasoning for the simple 
reason that all consumption in East Germany was politically and propagandistically charged.  
More specifically, the Konsum was able to control the politicized message of consumption and 
deliver SED propaganda to target groups (Zielgruppen), including women, youth, and rural 
inhabitants in an attempt to bring them ideologically closer to the régime.  As evidence for this 
argument, I have referred to politicized membership meetings and cultural activities, as well as to 
the propagandized shop window displays.  More importantly, as an institution that was in control 
of a third of East German retail, the Konsum was in the powerful position of controlling the ideas 
and ideology behind socialist consumption in nearly every community in East Germany, 
regardless of size.  The Konsum’s omnipresence consisted of an outlet in nearly every town and 
village totalling 21,000 retail outlets and 544 department stores, as well as 399 stores that sold 
agricultural goods.1038  Through the control of the circulation of goods, the Konsum was in a 
position to influence the ideas that were embodied in the commodities it sold and produced, and 
ultimately the people who sold, produced, and consumed them.1039  Ironically, with economic 
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shortages and unfulfilled consumer desires, the message delivered to consumers and members 
often led to frustration.1040   
Even though the Konsum was ubiquitous, its blatant propaganda displays in thousands of 
Konsum retail outlets went, presumably, largely ignored.  For example, a former Konsum 
saleswoman asserted that “the propaganda displayed in the Konsum did not have an impact on 
me and it was not an effective form of propaganda.”1041  Of course, it is impossible to measure 
exactly the impact of propaganda on its targeted receivers.  Instead, I have attempted to argue 
that the entire Konsum organization and the forms of consumption it promoted and provided 
were evident in the propaganda displays, which reified the socialist project and propagated the 
broader antifascist state narrative.  In this regard, the Konsum’s propaganda was widespread, but 
its impact was mixed.  According to the statutes of rural and urban consumer co-operatives, one 
of the primary tasks of the Konsum was the mobilization and education of a growing 
membership for the following aims: the struggle for peace, the democratic unity of Germany, the 
“building of socialism” (i.e., Sovietisation of the DDR in the 1950s), the fulfillment of the 
Konsum’s tasks in relation to the state’s economic plans, and the continual strengthening of the 
alliance between the working-classes and the working farmers.  Mention is also made in archival 
documents that the Konsum had to popularize and implement the politics of the SED in all areas 
of political, societal, and economic life.1042   
Nonetheless, members were assigned a number of rights and there were democratic 
practices, although mostly in the lower levels of the Konsum’s administration and within the 
membership committees.  Furthermore, during the monthly membership meetings, members had 
the right to criticize the performance of the Konsum and its functionaries, as well as to make 
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suggestions for improvements that could be used in the interest of the organization.  These 
criticisms, ideas, and suggestions were all to be passed onto the various organs of the Konsum, 
including the Kreisverband (district association), Bezirksverband (regional association), and the 
VDK.1043   
The Wende, literally meaning change or turn, marks East Germany’s transitional period 
from the socialist political system and planned economy to a market economy and democracy 
from around 1989 and 1990.  During this short period of time, there was a general examination 
of all DDR mass-organizations; it was conducted by the West German Ministry of the Interior in 
order to determine if the given mass-organization was tightly connected with the SED, and 
whether its property needed to fall within the authority of the Treuhand (an agency charged with 
managing, and, if possible, privatizing the property of the former DDR).  On 17 October 1991, it 
was determined that the Konsum, although it did have a mass membership and served many 
functions of a mass-organization by serving as a sort of school of “socialist democracy,” was not 
a political mass-organization like the Free German Youth, the Free German Trade Union, the 
German Democratic Women’s League, and the German cultural League.  The Konsum did not 
have a bloc of representatives in the Volkskammer (Parliament of the DDR) and was thus 
considered a separate organization and private enterprise.1044  Moreover, thanks to many of the 
co-operative legal structures maintained by the Konsum following its re-founding in 1945, it was 
recognized as a private industry that remained under the ownership and control of its 
members.1045  Ultimately, this meant that the Konsum was allowed to remain intact.  Yet the 
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question remained as to whether or not the Konsum could survive as an independent and private 
enterprise following the Wende.1046   
10.2. The Konsum in the post-Wende period 
The Wende included the Peaceful Revolution (Friedliche Revolution) in the autumn of 
1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, democratic elections to the People’s 
Chamber (Volkskammer) on 18 March 1990, and the formal unification of East and West 
Germany on 3 October 1990.  However, this did not complete the process of unification, which 
is still underway and is often referred to as the post-Wende period (Nachwendezeit).  To this day, 
the successor of the Konsum – the Zentralkonsum – and its co-operatives remain competitive in 
some towns and cities of the former DDR.  The Zentralkonsum continues to serve a membership 
base of around 286,500 members.1047  For instance, the consumer co-operative in Eilenburg was 
able to survive the Wende.  It has since found a retail niche in which it sells many former East 
German products.1048  In Weimar, the local co-op is the largest private employer.  Konsum 
Dresden is the largest grocery market in the city and the significant private employer in the city.  
In Leipzig, the local co-operative won an award as supermarket of the year, and in 2006 it hosted 
a fair with more than 40,000 guests.1049  Currently, there are a number of former Konsum co-
operatives that continue to operate in the countryside – the largest of which is the PUG VARIO 
Kauf eG in the Altmark (a region of northern Saxony-Anhalt).  It operates stores in the former 
districts (Kreis) of Klötze, Gardelegen, Stendal, and Halberstadt.  The adjustments needed for the 
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survival of these co-operatives was difficult and their very survival was especially precarious 
during the initial years of the post-Wende period.1050  
10.2.1. The Konsum adjusts to the free market 
The changes brought about by the Wende led to radical transformations for the Konsum, 
especially the conversion from the command economy to the free market and the introduction of 
supply-and-demand price controls.  This meant a substantial number of smaller and unprofitable 
outlets were closed in order to allow for the survival and the modernization of larger and 
potentially more profitable stores.1051  During this transitional phase, the Konsum’s surviving 
industries had to compete against West German firms.  Given the bankruptcy of several 
consumer co-operatives, it is hardly surprising that the number of Konsum outlets and employees 
declined.1052  By the time the régime began to collapse in 1989, the Konsum over-employed 
240,000 workers.1053  Following the Wende, the co-operative stores had to eliminate the common 
East German practice of over-employment, because, on average, each store had seven 
employees, which was three times that of a similar operation in West Germany.  In reality, due to 
the loss of profit, the consumer co-operatives could no longer pay for such a large workforce.  
Thus, from 1990 to 1992, the consumer co-operatives shed three quarters of their former 
personnel.1054  The remaining personnel had to be re-trained for the new tasks and 
responsibilities of running a business in a western-style market economy, including becoming 
familiar with computers.1055  In fact, the top administrative branch of the Konsum (the VDK) 
reacted to the new supply and demand economic realities by closing unprofitable stores and 
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offering a new assortment of goods with new prices, but in most cases the DDR’s retail network 
was overwhelmed by the new pricing system.1056  The modus operandi of the Konsum was 
useless in the new market conditions.  For that reason, during this transitional period, the 
administration of the VDK focused on fulfilling its provisional contracts in order to avoid panic 
and to maintain the loyalty of its members.1057   
The VDK reacted quickly to the rapidly unfolding economic and political transformation 
of the DDR.  The Konsum’s planned course of action, however, was unable to keep pace with the 
rapid tempo of change.  In the search for new methods of survival, the consumer co-operatives 
had to develop various concepts at various administrative levels to ensure that the organization 
had a future.  For example, every co-operative had to find a new wholesaler (this meant having 
to buy and sell an entirely new assortment of goods to customers), all the while improving 
shopping conditions, and calculating prices on the basis of the market principle of supply and 
demand.1058  The VDK perceived the political and economic changes as an opportunity to 
fundamentally restore and renew the co-operative organization.  The VDK’s goal was nothing 
less than the establishment of an efficiently run firm that provided affordable and 
environmentally sound products.1059   
10.2.2. Membership loss and eventual stabilization  
Many customers and members no longer wanted to shop at the Konsum following the 
Wende because of the frequent shortages and the endless hours of waiting in line.1060  Between 
1991 and 1996, the consumer co-operatives lost over a fifth of their members; the highpoint of 
this decline was in 1993.  That year, in the recently reunified German state, there were sixty-
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seven consumer co-operatives: twenty-eight of which were in the west with 600,000 members 
(Dortmund-Kassel alone had 500,000) and thirty-nine in the east with two million members.1061    
The loss of approximately 30,000 members meant the haemorrhaging of approximately 
1.5 billion MdN of in-store capital.  By 1998, the consumer co-operatives had only a fifth of their 
original members.1062  In the countryside, the Konsum’s business plan was the preservation of 
rural co-operative stores.  However, in the Altmark (an historic region in what is today north-
central Germany, comprising the northern third of Saxony-Anhalt), which is sparsely populated, 
a number of larger stores such as METRO, Edeka, and REWE established themselves.  EDEKA 
and REWE are West German co-operatives, but not consumer co-operatives; private shopkeepers 
own them co-operatively.  The smaller Konsum centres were unable to compete with these larger 
retailers.  The consequence of this was the closing of a number of stores that reduced the 
standard of living in smaller towns.1063  Nevertheless, there are fourteen surviving consumer co-
operatives in the former DDR, with a combined membership of over 300,000, over 4,000 
employees in almost 500 stores, and a turnover rate of 400 Million Euros.  Nearly half of the 
leading positions within these co-operatives continue to be filled by women.1064  Moreover, the 
Konsum committed resources to the expansion of its successful tourism branch and to the 
creation of new travel agencies.  In fact, the Konsum was eventually able to expand into West 
Berlin and took over 122 West German co-operatives.1065  Some of the Konsum co-operatives 
and factories have successfully adapted to the market economy.  For instance, the consumer co-
operatives in Magdeburg and the surrounding area still produce baked goods.  The two largest 
former Konsum factories continue to profitably produce brushes and Rostfein (a brand of coffee).  
                                                
1061 Fairbairn, "Wiederaufbau und Untergang der Konsumgenossenschaften," 196-98. 
1062 Laschewski and Schulze, Konsum im Wandel, 42: 32-33. 
1063 Kirsch, Die Marken Bitte!: 49. 
1064 Kaltenborn, ">>Die Entwicklung der Konsumgenossenschaften nach 1990<<," 185-89. 
1065 Bösche, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der Wende von 1989/90: 54-55. 
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In Thuringia, two more subsidiaries of the VDK have flourished: the Berghotel (Mountain Hotel) 
in Oberhof and the Romantik Hotel Dorotheenhof (Romantic Hotel) in Weimar.1066 
Since the Wende, the Konsum has adopted a multi-pronged approach to advertising and 
communication with its members and consumers.  The Konsum continues to have instant name-
recognition for former DDR-citizens, especially amongst those who lived in the countryside, by 
drawing upon its long history as a quality retailer for the working-class.  Some customers 
believed and continue to believe that the Konsum shops go beyond merely capitalist profit and 
continue to function as reliable retail outlets.  Not surprisingly, after the Wende, the Konsum shed 
its ties with East German political discourses and adopted largely western-style images of 
advertising.  Nevertheless, as can be seen in the following advertisements, the Zentralkonsum 
continues to promote its long history and, at times, the role it played in the DDR. 
 
Illustration 47: The Konsum-Berlin promoting its long history through the image of the opening of a self-serve 
retail outlet in Berlin in the early 1950s1067 
 
 
Illustration 48: The new Konsum-Berlin membership card being advertised in front of old Konsum rebate 
stamps1068 
                                                
1066 Kirsch, Die Marken Bitte!: 15. 
1067 Konsum Berlin 1899 - 28.Juni - 1999,  (Berlin: Konsum Berlin). 
1068 Advertsing for Konsum Berlin, (Date not give, likely the 2000s). 
330 
 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 49: A contemporary meat advertisement from the Konsum-Leipzig which does not promote its co-
operative business structure1069 
 
 
Illustration 50: A Zentralkonsum image indirectly promoting its female workers. 
The information loosely translates as “Petra Schumann-Abend, 52 years of age, began her studies at the retail 
college in Leipzig.  Since then, she has remained a loyal employee of this organization.  In 2002, she was 
elected to the executive committee, and since 2004 she has been a company spokeswoman.1070 
 
As suggested by these images, the Zentralkonsum has developed multiple advertising 
strategies.  In one sense, the Zentralkonsum has become a standard retailer that targets customers 
primarily concerned with attaining goods at low prices.  Thus, in many ways, the 
Zentralkonsum’s advertisers target price-conscious consumers with typical advertisements that 
draw attention to quality products at competitive prices.  Secondly, the Zentralkonsum targets the 
consumer who is aware of its co-operative operating structure and working-class history, 
especially by promoting its patronage refund, political independence, self-organization, 
democratic structures, green contributions, and bio foods.  In other respects, Zentralkonsum 
advertising targets East Germans with images of old Konsum stores and products.  In so doing, 
                                                
1069 Dana Micke, Constanze Treuber, and Steffen Uhlmann, "Konsum Leipzig: Leben & Genießen," W & 
M-Extra: Zentralkonsum, 18. 
1070 Ibid. 
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the Zentralkonsum is tapping into the phenomenon of Ostalgie, which is a German term playing 
on the words of Ost (east) and Nostalgie (nostalgia) and referring to a romanticization of life in 
the former DDR.  Finally, as seen in Illustration 47, the Konsum promotes and advertises its 
equal opportunity employment practices.  In the years since the fall of the Wall, the Konsum has 
expanded into new branches of retail, marketing, and the administration of real estate.1071    
Ironically, Ostalgie is by and large expressed in East Germans’ longing for the material 
culture of the former DDR.  That is, East Germans sought to maintain their former identities 
through the rejection of Western products in favour of DDR brands.  Another component of 
Ostalgie was the high proportion of workingwomen.  For most East Germans, the high 
percentage of women in the workforce was a source of pride.  Indeed, as Stitziel describes, “For 
those who indulged in Ostalgie, East German women’s active roles in the spheres of 
consumption and especially production served as the basis for claims that East German women 
were more ‘emancipated’ than their West German counterparts.”1072  This quotation by Stiziel 
has given us something to think about, because this longing is not for East German society, but a 
society East Germans would have wanted (i.e., with the foundations of gender equality that were 
already established during the DDR).  With consumption, it is clear that East Germans are not 
really interested in being able to stand in line for East German products of low quality.  Instead, 
it seems that they desire East German products produced by East Germans, which reflect the 
brighter aspect and ideals of their now extinct state.   
10.3. Lessons learned and future research 
 I came to this topic because of an initial interest in the Soviet occupation and the 
interaction between Germans and Russians in the immediate postwar years.  My views were 
                                                
1071 Kaminsky, "Verband der Konsumgenossenschaften der DDR," 740. 
1072 Stitziel, Fashioning Socialism: 168-69. 
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shaped by my previous education, experiences, and interests including the writing of a master’s 
thesis on the 17 June Uprising.  Along the way, I encountered topics and issues that were, though 
not necessarily new to me, much more nuanced than what I now see as the crude binaries of 
compliance and resistance.  As is evident in my footnotes and citations, the authors that brought 
me to this perspective were Fulbrook, Scott, Bruce, and Foucault.  These authors affected my 
thinking in this fundamental way: the idea that that at least outward participation was a necessary 
component of individual agency, defiance, and the completion of life goals in a totalitarian 
society (it is a counter-intuitive notion that one had to participate in order to resist).  My 
conclusions in the end are different/more nuanced than before I engaged with my sources 
because I now see multiple motivations in the language games and motivations in the 
development of the sources used in the formulation of this project.  And being a non-German 
meant I had to pay constant attention to understanding nuances of culture, language, and 
behavior; such examples included developing an understanding of the linguistic styles of the 
DDR and the basic functioning of the East German state and the origins and development of its 
political, consumerist, and economic culture.  At the same time my perspective as an outsider 
may also have helped me to ask questions and see things that those directly involved would not 
have, since many historians of East Germany have, by and large, overlooked the Konsum.  In the 
end, my interpretations in this dissertation reflect my own vantage point are still grounded in 
sources and evidence; and, my hope is that my views will complement those of others and add to 
the history and interpretation of state-citizen relations, totalitarianism, participation, discourse 
analysis, consumption, and, more generally, East German historiography. 
This dissertation offers a number of conclusions that pushes the East German 
historiography in new directions.  For instance, the Konsum helped the ruling Soviets and 
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German communists implement a Soviet-type society in a portion of postwar Germany.  In this 
sense, understanding the Konsum is useful for an examination of the Soviet occupation and the 
system of rule that was to be imposed on Germans for roughly the next four decades.  More 
generally, this study has contributed to the study of daily life and individual agency in the 
German Democratic Republic.  It has exposed the extent to which the Konsum underpinned and 
solidified SED-rule, even though it was deemed a private, membership-owned, co-operative 
organization in the wake of the Wende.  The most explicit example of subservience to the SED 
was the Konsum’s attempts to garner legitimacy for the SED through an enjoyable and abundant 
consumer culture.  Such a consumer culture was also designed to reflect the state narrative of the 
DDR, namely that it was a modern, socialist, collectivist, and communist society.  But, in many 
respects, the shortfalls of DDR consumer-culture had the opposite effect and convinced many 
East Germans that the West was the better and more viable alternative to the forms of 
consumerism discussed throughout.  Finally, the Konsum should be considered a mass-
organization that purposefully inculcated its employees and members with the discourse and 
symbolism of the East German state.  In so doing, it became a highly politicized workplace, 
while still maintaining some elements of a traditional German co-operative.    
The methodology of this research was based on the blending of archival material, 
secondary sources, and interviews in light of the ideas associated with totalitarianism, 
modernism, and selective participation.  This research and source analysis, moreover, presents a 
novel departure from the secondary sources cited in this work by illustrating the possible 
motivations for certain actors, whether state authorities or individuals, to make certain statements 
and employ specific types of behaviours and discourses.  Given the tensions of my conceptual 
framework (attempted totalitarianism versus selective participation), the sources might lend 
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themselves to alternate interpretations.  I have, therefore, purposefully portrayed the East 
German state as a régime that was riven with contradictions and paradoxes.  Specifically, the 
state oppressed its citizens, yet it also educated them, gave them jobs, and handed them a gamut 
of opportunities ranging from leisure activities to reporting on their fellow citizens.  Although 
intended to be a rational distributor of goods, the Konsum was a component of the command 
economy that (paradoxically) contributed to the creation of a barter economy in which the West 
German Mark and personal favours were the real currencies of value.  This dissertation has 
further attempted to portray a spectrum of attitudes and loyalties to the state, including devotion, 
loyalty, opportunism, and rejection.  And even though this state could be highly repressive, it 
would also respond to pressure – or in the case of Eingaben – voices from below.  Because the 
régime was responding to pressure from below, it shows the intellectual limits of totalitarianism. 
I have, therefore, used the term – attempted totalitarianism – to describe what I clearly see as a 
hyper intrusive surveillance state and a party that was attempting to have total control and 
ideological influence over all aspects of life.  Of course, the régime was never able to accomplish 
this.       
For future research, an extended use of interviews might be used to round out and 
eliminate some of the uncertainties inherent in East German primary sources and archival-based 
research.  Of course, interviewees are not without their biases, since people lived varied 
experiences during the DDR dictatorship and continue to have personal motivations for 
expressing certain utterances to the interviewer; nevertheless, a broader pool of interviews from 
the state and the citizenry, as well as intergenerational, gender-based, and locational approaches, 
might alleviate some of the discrepancies between archival sources and interviewees.  To make a 
further point about archival sources, the Konsum left behind a plethora of documents throughout 
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the former DDR, which are now found in city, state, federal, and Stasi archives.  These 
documents could potentially be used in future research endeavours dealing with the ways in 
which dictatorships communicate with citizens and to come to wider conclusions about relations 
between East and West Germany, the International Co-operative Alliance and its relationship 
with Eastern Bloc countries, state-citizen relations, consumption, and the Cold War.  It is my 
hope that this dissertation will be a contribution to such projects.   
The core contribution of this dissertation rests on the central argument that the Konsum 
became an ideologically and symbolically charged junction, where employment and education, 
as well as the attainment of goods and services at the Konsum stores, intersected with political, 
economic, and material concerns.  In spite of its ubiquitous nature and extensive reach, the 
Konsum’s blatant propaganda displays and ideological messages in thousands of Konsum retail 
outlets, during working hours, and political meetings, went, presumably, often ignored.  At least, 
this was the sentiment expressed in interviews conducted for this dissertation.  It also seems that 
propaganda was so stark in other areas of East German life that Konsum propaganda was rather 
mild and even went largely unnoticed.  Be that as it may, the Konsum became a highly 
politicized workplace in which employees were both propaganda targets and propagandists who 
were under constant pressure to conform to various political demands, such as joining the party, 
partaking in political meetings, undergoing highly politicized educational courses, and 
proselytizing customers to the ideology of the SED.  This role as a conduit of ideology mutated 
the co-operative system until it was transformed into a hybrid organization, incorporating 
elements of a political mass-organization while outwardly maintaining some features of the 
traditional and economic fundamentals of the English and German co-operative movements.  
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Indeed, instead of being a co-operative, the Konsum was more of a microcosm of the former East 
Germany. 
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11. Appendixes:  
11.1. Maps  
 
Map 3: DDR in central Europe1073 
 
 
 
Map 4: East German Länder 1945 to 19521074 
                                                
 1073 DDR-Europe, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DDR-Europe.png, (August 2012). 
1074 Bruce, Resistance with the People: xv. 
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Map 5: The districts (Bezirke) of German Democratic Republic in 1952 to 1990.1075 
  
                                                
 1075 DDR Verwaltungsbezirke farbig, http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bezirk_(DDR) (August 2012).  
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Map 6: the extensive network of consumer co-operatives throughout the DDR1076 
  
                                                
1076 Ludwig, "Die Anfänge nach 1945," 17. 
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11.2. Presidents of the VDK 
 
Power within the Konsum and, by extension, the VDK was concentrated in the hands of 
its presidents.  According to the Guide to mass-organizations of East Germany, the Co-operative 
Congress (Genossenschafstag) was technically the highest organ of the Union of the Consumer 
Co-operatives.  It determined the fundamental guidelines of the Konsum and elected the 
Genossenschaftsrat and the Revisionskommision.  The resolutions of the co-operative congress 
were technically binding.1077  However, real power within this organization was centralized 
under the auspices of the VDK and its president.  According to Witho Holland, “the members of 
the VDK and its presidents were elected, and were neither Seiteneinsteiger (somebody who got 
in through the back door), nor were their prominent positions appointed by the SED.”1078  
Holland also claims “none of these men were involved with the Stasi nor given special 
privileges.”1079  Nevertheless, the following brief biographical sketches reveal a pattern.  
Specifically, these presidents had long standing connections to the KPD reaching back to the 
Weimar Republic (1918 to 1933).  Many of them had what the SED would define as working 
class heritage, and the first president of the VDK, Georg Handke, even had anti-fascist 
legitimacy on account of his imprisonment at the hands of the Nazis.  In a “biography-state” like 
the DDR, proof of one’s antifascism was extremely important for advancement into the upper 
echelons of power.  To put it another way, these presidents actually embodied the values that the 
state and Konsum were proselytising, namely antifascism, working class heritage, and female 
emancipation.       
                                                
1077 Becher, Mand, and Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR., Handbuch 
gesellschaftlicher Organisationen in der DDR: Massenorganisationen, Verbände, Vereinigungen, Gesellschaften, 
Genossenschaften, Komitees, Ligen: 106. 
1078 Holland, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: 116. 
1079 Ibid. 
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  The president of the Konsum was given the following responsibilities: establishing 
guidelines for the economic work of the co-operative network, educating and training workers 
and functionaries, negotiating with the SMAD and the SED, and developing relations with other 
political and economic organizations.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the president was 
able to make personnel suggestions, albeit subject to approval by the SED.1080  Given these 
responsibilities, the president was a critical position, since the incumbent acted as the symbolic 
and operational junction between the party and the lower organizational branches of the 
consumer co-operatives.  On a daily basis, the president was constantly facing contrary pressures 
emanating from party leaders and central economic planners from above and the demands of the 
co-operative membership and workforce from below.  The position was, therefore, the critical 
juncture in the vertical relationship of power structures in the co-operative organization.  The 
presidential position was also the hub where SED communications were interpreted, ignored, or 
implemented.  According to historian Jeannette Madarász, “the crux of the matter was how these 
central decisions were translated into real measures and, at this point, a good works director 
would be able to inject his or her own agenda...  There were many more examples of such 
creativity that ensured a factory’s success.”1081  Most work directors recognized that there was 
nothing to be gained through the involvement of the central authorities; therefore, many of them 
and their management teams were completely satisfied with solely fulfilling their obligations to 
the plan.  In order to accomplish this, they utilized whatever methods were deemed necessary, 
including semi-legal initiatives such as building unofficial supply networks, paying additional 
wages to the workforce, and falsifying the bookkeeping.  Again, if the central authorities became 
                                                
1080 "SAPMO-BA: DY30 IV 2/2.022/111, SED Zentralkomitee: Sekretariat Paul Merker, 12 Dezember 
1946, Grundsätze für einen Zonenverband der Konsumgenossenschaften," 26. 
1081 Madarász, Working in East Germany: 82. 
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aware of these less-than-legal initiatives, it could have been potentially disastrous for the 
Konsum’s management and workforce.1082   
The first president of the VDK was Georg Handke, serving from 1949 to 1952.1083  
Handke was the son of a locksmith.  At the end of 1918, he became a member of the Spartacus 
League and the KPD.  In 1934, he was arrested and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment.  
He spent his incarceration in Ziegenhain, Rockenberg, Butzbach, Kassel-Wehlheiden, and 
Zwickau, including seven years in solitary confinement.  In 1945, the US Army freed him.  
Because of his imprisonment, Handke was a legitimate antifascist.  From July 1945 to 1948, he 
served as President of the Department of Trade and Supply.  Following his tenure as president of 
the VDK (1949 to 1952), he became ambassador to Romania.  From 1958 to 1962, he was a 
member of the Central Committee of the SED.1084  Handke was succeeded by Margarete 
Wittowski.    
Wittowski was a political economist, communist, and vice president of the VDK from 
1950 to 1951 and president of the VDK from 1952 to 1954.  She was born to Jewish parents in 
1910 and later became involved in the Zionist movement.  In 1933, due to the Nazi seizure of 
power, she immigrated to Switzerland and returned to Germany following the end of the Second 
World War.  Upon her return in 1946, she quickly joined the SED.  During her presidency, she 
stressed, “The consumer co-operatives were to aid in the politicization of towns.”1085  Following 
her tenure as president, Wittowski also held a number of other significant posts, including 
membership in the People’s Chamber and membership in the Central Committee of the SED.1086 
                                                
1082 Ibid., 48. 
1083 Herbst, Ranke, and Winkler, "VDK," 1114. 
1084 Dieter Hoffman, "HANDKE, GEORG ULRICH," in Wer war wer in der DDR? Ein Lexikon 
ostdeutscher Biographien (Ch. Links Verlag, 2010). 
1085 Ludwig, "Vom Dorfkonsum zum >>Komplexen System der Landversorgung<<," 39. 
1086 Hoffman, "Wer war wer in der DDR?." 
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Historian Mark Landsman suggests that in some ways Wittowski was a consumer advocate and 
reacted to pressure from below.  In fact, she charged the Konsum with gaining a better 
understanding of consumer demand.  In her words, “our workers, though they possess sufficient 
purchasing power to satisfy their demand, do not find the goods they desire to purchase.”1087   
Wittowski’s successor was Gerhard Lucht.  He was born to working-class parents on 10 
June 1913 in Berlin.  In 1931, he joined the SPD and was a soldier in the Second World War.  
Following this he became a member of the KPD and in 1946 a member of the SED.  In 1946, 
Lucht led the organizational establishment of consumer co-operatives in Sachsen-Anhalt, 
eventually becoming President of the Landesverbandes Sachsen-Anhalt der Konsumgenossen-
schaften.  In 1954, he was “elected (gewählt)” the president of the VDK – a position that he held 
until 1963.  While Lucht may have been elected, he clearly had the right credentials (i.e., a 
working-class background and SED membership), and he most likely ran against other men and 
women with similar family backgrounds and status within the party.  During his tenure as 
president, Lucht also became a member of the People’s Chamber (Volkskammer).  In October 
1963, he left the Konsum to become the Minister in charge of the Department of Trade and 
Provision until 1965.  Thereafter he was responsible for the administration of Kreis 
Strausberg.1088   
There is archival evidence indicating that Lucht wanted to use the Konsum’s propaganda 
apparatus to aid in the SED’s drive to completely transform the countryside.  The party believed 
that the socialist transformation of agriculture was one of the most difficult components of the 
transformational period from capitalism to socialism, since this process required the overturning 
                                                
1087 Mark Landsman, "The Consumer Supply Lobby: Did it Exist? State and Consumption in East Germany 
in the 1950s," Central European History 35, no. 4 (2002): 491-92. 
1088 Gabriele Baumgartner and Dieter Hebig, Biographisches Handbuch der SBZ/DDR 1945-1990, vol. I 
(München: KG Saur, 1996), 495-95. 
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of centuries-old property relations and consumption habits.  These rural retail practices were 
replaced with the Konsum’s modern retail network.  During the course of this transformational 
process, the class structure of the countryside was to be fundamentally transformed.  The 
implementation of such a far-reaching transformation required the collaboration of all the 
available Konsum resources.  Accordingly, Lucht, in his speech at the Eleventh Congress of the 
Co-operative Council of the VDK, declared “it was with great honour that consumer co-
operatives helped to resolve these difficult problems during the socialist transformation of the 
countryside.”1089   
Archival documents indicate that Lucht actively fulfilled the demands of the party and 
tightly bound the Konsum to the state.  During his presidency, the consumer co-operatives 
became a component of the SED’s propaganda and ideological apparatus and transformed 
themselves from a working-class organization (referring to the period from approximately 1850 
to 1933) to a mass-organization (ideologically driven membership organization) of the workers.  
This development was possible – as Lucht maintained – through the extensive “democratic” and 
antifascist co-operative work of workers under the leadership of the working-class.  His 
transformation of the Konsum into a mass-organization meant that it had to – like all other mass-
organizations – recognize the leading role of the SED and implement the political tasks set forth 
by the party.1090  To directly quote an archival document from the Department of Political 
Economy, 
In self-critical ways, Comrade Lucht (president of the VDK) had demonstrated the 
weaknesses of our co-operative movement.  According to him, the co-operative 
movement needed to be strengthened in accordance with political agitation 
                                                
1089 Köppert, "Ein Kampfprogramm zur weiteren Festigung des Bündnisses der Arbeiterklasse mit der 
werktätigen Bauernschaft," 50. 
1090 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/133, Handel, Versorgung und Außenhandel.  August 8, 1959 
recommendations written by Gehard Lucht, president of the VdK, entitled Empfehlungen zur Vorbereitung, 
Durchführung und Auswertung des IV. Genossenschaftstages, 29. 
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(massenpolitische Arbeit).  The ideological clarity – particularly amongst the white-
collar workers – needs to be achieved through educational work.1091    
 
Here it is important to understand that Lucht was at the helm of the Konsum during the period in 
which this organization produced and disseminated a great deal of highly politicized internal 
documents, publications, and shop window displays – 1954 to 1963.  By extension, it can be 
safely concluded that he further transformed the Konsum to the role of a political mass-
organization or, to a lesser extent, a conduit of political slogans.  The role of the Konsum was 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 and the combination of consumption and propaganda was 
the primary theme of Chapter 7.       
 Further archival sources suggest the subservience of Lucht and the Konsum to the 
demands of the party.  On 8 August 1959, he clearly stated:   
The Konsum is no longer a working-class organization; instead, it has become a mass-
organization of the workers.  This development was possible through the wide, 
democratic co-operative work of the workers under the leadership of the working-class.  
Like all other mass-organizations, the Konsum had to recognize the leading role of the 
SED. The comrades in the Konsum were required to carry out the political and 
economic tasks set forth by the party.1092 
 
This document could be interpreted as Lucht’s acquiescence to the pressures placed on him by 
the SED.  Ultimately, it is difficult to determine his actual intentions from this source.  What is 
clear, however, is that he internalized the language and political discourse of Soviet communism, 
which may have allowed him to conduct actions in the interests of the Konsum, as well as protect 
his personal position without directly challenging the authority of the party.  
 When Lucht became minister for the Department of Trade and Provision in 1963, Dr. 
Hilmar Weiß, who was originally an accountant at the Consumer Co-operative in Kreis-Suhl, 
                                                
1091 SAPMO-BA: DY30/IV 2/6.02/74, SED Abteilung Wirtschaftspolitik, Bericht: Über die Zonen-
konferenz der Konsumgenossenschaften in Berlin am 14.9.1948, 94-95. 
1092 SAPMO-BA: DY/30/IV 2/6.10/133, Handel, Versorgung und Außenhandel.  August 8, 1959 
recommendations written by Gehard Lucht, president of the VdK, entitled Empfehlungen zur Vorbereitung, 
Durchführung und Auswertung des IV. Genossenschaftstages, 10. 
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succeeded him as VDK President.  Weiß had a three-year-tenure as president of the VDK.1093   
Dr. Heinz Fahrenkrog, serving as president of the VDK from 1967 to 1990, succeeded him.   
Fahrenkrog was the son of a tradesman and born on 16 May 1926 in Wernigerode (a 
small city of about 35,000 in Saxony-Anhalt).  From 1946 to 1948, he was active in the 
KPD/SED, FDGB, and the FDJ.  His Konsum career began as a retail outlet administrator of the 
Konsumgenossenschaft-Oschersleben from 1945 to 1950.  From 1961 to 1964, he was trained as 
an economist at the SED controlled college: Karl-Marx-Parteihochschule.1094  He later became a 
departmental administrator within the VDK and then general director of the Konsum’s larger 
“konsument” department stores from 1964 to 1967.  In 1967, he became president of the VDK 
and a member of the People’s Chamber.1095    
Like his predecessors, President Fahrenkrog subordinated the Konsum to the needs of the 
state and the planned economy.  He stated in a 1975 report that the co-operative movement in the 
DDR enjoyed full freedom with the exception of the following areas:   
- Laws of the state: The co-operatives are obligated to abide by the laws valid in the 
DDR.   
- Taxes: The co-operatives are obligated to pay taxes in accordance with pertinent 
provisions.  
- State planning: The co-operatives must take into account the requirements of the 
planned economy.1096     
 
He stepped down as president in 1990 due to ill health; nevertheless, he had successfully led the 
Konsum through the first difficult months following the fall of the DDR.1097  He was succeeded 
by Werner Wolf (1990 to 1992).1098   
                                                
1093 Holland, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: 116. 
1094 Die Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: 9. Wahlperiode,  (Berlin: Staatsverlag der 
Der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1987). 
1095 Holland, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: 116. 
1096 AKB: 1114/A12, Dr. Heinz Fahrenkrog, President of the Union of Consumer Co-operative Societies of 
the GDR, The Consumer Co-operative Societies in the German Democratic Republic, 31. 
1097 Holland, Die Konsumgenossenschaften in der DDR: 116. 
1098 Herbst, Ranke, and Winkler, "VDK," 114. 
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 It should be noted here that biographical information on the Konsum presidents is 
fragmentary.  There are some brief biographical sketches of them in works such as Wer war Wer 
in der DDR? (Who was who in the DDR?).1099  Also, one can find some of their internal 
correspondence in the archives listed in the bibliography.  Yet, given their central position in 
such a large organization, it is surprising that other historical studies that deal with the Konsum 
do not include wider discussions of their roles.  Be that as it may, it is important to understand 
that their role is vital to comprehending the centralized governing structure of the Konsum and 
why this organization was subordinate to the SED.  With that said, an avenue for future research 
could be a further examination of how these presidents dealt with and circumvented pressure 
from above (the SED) and below (membership and consumers) and how each president’s tenure 
may have differed from their predecessor and successor.   
  
                                                
1099 Černý Černý, Wer war wer in der DDR? Ein Lexikon ostdeutscher Biographien (Berlin: Ch. Links 
Verlag, 1992). 
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11.3. Interviews 
 
The Research Ethics Office at the University of Saskatchewan approved these semi-structured 
interviews. The interviews followed basic themes relevant to the research topic. The questions 
were intended to guide the participants and to garner their thoughtful responses.  As is often the 
case, the discussion went outside the expected scope of the interview questions. The respondents 
were encouraged to tell the stories they regarded as most important.  The basic themes of the 
interview and some associated questions or considerations included but were not necessarily 
limited to the questions in sub-section 11.3.2. 
 
11.3.1. Ethics Approval 
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11.3.2. Interview Questions 
 
1. Personal Questions 
 
What is your age?  
 under  
 20 – 39  
 40 – 59  
 over  
 
Sex  
 male  
 female  
 
Where did you live in East Germany?  
 Rural Municipality  
 Small town or village (less than 750)  
 Medium town (750 to 1,499)  
 Large town (1,500 to 2,999)  
 Small city (3,000 to 5,999)  
 City (6,000 plus)  
 
What is/was your occupation in the DDR?  
 
2. The Various Roles of the Union of the Consumer Cooperatives of the DDR /  
 
a. Political  
What was the political role of this organization?  
 
Was it a tool for building socialism?  
 
What was its role as a mass-organization?   
 
Please compare and contrast the role of this organization in the city in contrast to the 
countryside.   
What was its international role?  
 
Was it an organ of central party control? 
 
b. Propaganda b.  
What was its propaganda role?  
 
Did the propaganda displayed in cooperatives sales outlets have any impact on you?  
 
In your view, was it an effective propaganda apparatus?  
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3. Perspectives on the Union of the Consumer Cooperative Movement of the DDR  
 
a. Participation  
What was your status within this organization?   
 
Were you a member?  
 
When applicable, please describe your role as a staff member, consumer, manager, elected 
official in this organization. 
 
What types of goods did you buy at the cooperative outlets?  
 
Did you ever eat in cooperative restaurants?   
 
Who ate there? 
 
Were the cultural (music, theatre) activities in these restaurants enjoyable? 
 
Did you ever participate in cultural or educational activities sponsored by this organization?   
 
b. Perceptions  
What were your general impressions of this organization?   
   
From your vantage point, please describe this organization’s role in comparison with other Mass-
Organizations. 
 
What is your understanding or impressions about the goals and objectives of this organization? 
 
Was the local cooperative perceived as a tool of the state, or simply a retail store?  
 
Was the cooperative perceived as a tool for the building of socialism?  
 
4. Organizational Culture / Organisatorische Kultur 
 
a. Working Environment / Arbeitsbedingungen  
Please describe the working relationships among staff, between staff and members, between staff 
and managers, between members, among managers and leaders. 
 
Was there a continual Stasi presence at the workplace within this organization?   
 
Did the East German Cooperatives have the same values and objectives of the régime? 
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5. Community Cohesion  
 
Please describe the ways in which the local cooperative sales outlet or cooperative restaurant was 
connected to the local community. 
If possible, please describe some of the activities that took place in the Konsum stores and 
organizations.   
 
Please describe some the local projects, initiatives, and activities of the East German consumer 
cooperatives. 
 
6. Personal and Shopping Experiences and lasting impact of the Consumer Cooperatives of 
the DDR 
 
a. Loyalty  
Please describe if you felt any sense of attachment or loyalty to this organization.   
 
What was the primary motivation for acquiring membership in this organization?  Was this 
motivation political or economic?  If political, please define the political advantages of 
cooperative membership.   
 
Please describe your personal sense of loyalty to this organization in comparison with other 
mass-organizations.   
 
How important was the patronage refund for you?  
 
b. Personal Experiences  
Do you have any colourful stories or anecdotes that you might like to share?  
 
Did you ever send Eingaben (protest letters) to this organization?  
 
How do you remember these times?  
 
Would you define your contact with this organization as positive or negative?   
   
Was the Konsum something important for you?  
 
7. Women / Frauen 
 
How were women treated by this organization?  
 
8. Education 
 
Please describe your educational experience in this organization.  
 
9. Shopping Experience and Customer Service  
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How was the customer service?   
 
Could you please describe your relationship with sales personnel? 
 
Were the distribution practices fair?   
 
As a customer, were you treated fairly by the sales staff?   
 
Could you regularly purchase what you wanted?  
 
Were you generally pleased or disappointed with the shopping experience in the consumer 
cooperative retail outlets?   
11.3.3. Interviews Cited 
 
Anonymous (Former DDR Konsum Saleswoman) Interview by Mark McCulloch, Essingen 
Germany, 2011. 
Anonymous (Former DDR School Teacher and Konsum Employee) Interview by Mark 
McCulloch, Berlin Germany, 27 June 2011. 
Dr. Burchard Bösche, Vorstandsmitglied - Zentralverband Deutscher Konsumgenossenschaften, 
Interview by Mark McCulloch, Hamburg Germany, 26 July 2011. 
Martin Bergner (Former Economist for the Konsum and Current Spokesperson for the 
Zentralkonsum), Interview by Mark McCulloch, Berlin Germany, 18 August 2011. 
Ulrich Fitzkow (Civil Engineer), Interview by Mark McCulloch, Brunkau Germany, 18 April 
2011. 
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12. Bibliography of sources cited 
 
12.1. Archival sources 
 
For this dissertation, various primary source documents from city, state, and regional archives 
have been consulted to examine specific aspects of DDR society.  The perspective of the régime 
has mostly been provided by the various holdings from the LAB and the SAPMO.  The files of 
the SWA and the BStU (Stasi archive) yielded insights into the relationship between the 
Konsum, the state, and the population.  My access to the BStU was especially fortunate given 
that institution’s centrality in the history of the former East Germany.  More specifically, the 
potential of the SWA and its collection of Eingaben and educational reports have been largely 
untapped.  The AKB houses literature produced by the Konsum, including newspapers and 
periodicals.  As these publications indicate, the Konsum excelled at disseminating the official 
point of view.      
Combined, these sources draw out some of the complexities of a not only social, political, and 
economic circumstances in the SED-state, but they also highlight the nature of communication 
and discourse between the state and the people; these interactions, in others words, have shed 
light on varying degrees of acquiescence, resistance, negotiation, and compromise.  It is my hope 
that the list of archival materials will give the reader a better sense of what I looked at by 
indicating fruitful and, in many cases, largely unexplored materials.  I have, therefore, listed the 
archive names in full, as well some of their most useful holdings. 
AKB   Archiv Konsumverband Berlin (Archive of the VDK housed at the current 
headquarters of the Zentralkonsum in Berlin)  
 
BStU  Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes  
The East German secret police archive in Berlin contains files regarding 
the infiltration of the Stasi into the Konsum workforce and Stasi 
observations of consumption and consumers within Konsum stores in 
order to gauge the mood of the population. 
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LAB   Landesarchiv Berlin – Berlin State Archives  
C Rep. 904-35 Grundorganisation SED Konsum-
genossenschaft Berlin 
C Rep. 904-119 Grundorganisation SED Konsum-
genossenschaft Pankow  
C Rep. 904-138 Grundorganisation SED Konsum-
genossenschaft Prenzlauer Berg 
C Rep. 904-200 Grundorganization SED – 
Kaufhallenverband Berlin  
These holding shed light on the everyday functioning of the Konsum in 
various districts of Berlin.  In addition, they make evident the leading role 
of the SED within this organization.  
 
SAPMO-DDR Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganizationen der DDR – The 
archive of Parties and mass-organization of the DDR housed in Berlin 
Lichterfelde  
DY 30 - ZK der SED, Abt. Wirtschaftpolitik  
DY 30 - ZK der SED, Abt. Handel, Versorgung, und Aussenhandel  
DY 30 - ZK der SED, Sekretariat Paul Merker 
 These holdings contain a wide range of correspondence between the SED 
and the Konsum.  They demonstrate the intentions of both organizations 
and the ways in which they communicated and interacted with each other.  
 
SSC Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Chemnitz – the Chemnitz Branch of the Saxon 
State Archive 
Bestand (File) 30878 contains thousands of interesting photos 
pertaining to the consumer co-operatives in Chemnitz from 1877 to 
1996. 
Bestand (File) 30878 contains files from the Abteilung Handel und 
Versorgung 
 
SSL  Sächsisches Staatsarchiv Leipzig – Leipzig branch of the Saxon State 
Archive  
 
SWA  Sächsisches Wirtschaftarchiv is a regional archive in Leipzig which 
houses the files of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Leipzig from 1884 to 1990 
and the files of the Konsumgenossenschaft-Zwickau from 1873 to 1990.  
At this archive, one can find files pertaining to the ideologically charged 
relationship between women, politics, and consumption.   
 
TSM   Thüringisches Staatsarchiv Meiningen 
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12.2. Archival sources cited 
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der Abteilung Int. Verbindungen für das Jahr 1963. 
361 
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SSL: 20237 Bezirkstag und Rat des Bezirkes Leipzig Nr. 1896, Entschließung der 6. 
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Jahre 1957, Konsumgenossenschaft Stadt Leipzig – Vorstandssekretariat. 
362 
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given). 
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SWA: U2/SWA 2318, Analyse über die massenpolitische Arbeit im I.62, Konsumgenossenschaft 
Leipzig Nord, 9.4.62. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2318, Bericht über die durchgeführten Mitglieder-Versammlungen 1961 der KG 
Leipzig Südwest, den 2.5.1961. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2318, Betr. Ihr Schreiben v. 28.2.63 kulturelle Massenarbeit, Konsum-
Genossenschaft Leipzig Süd, Der Vorstand, 14.3.63. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2318, Einschätzung der durchgeführten Mitgliederversammlungen im Monat 
April, Konsumgenossenschaft Leipzig Mitte, Leipzig, den 13.5.1961. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2318, Einschätzung der massenpolitischen Arbeit der Konsumgenossenschaft 
Leipzig – Süd im I. Quartal 1961. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2318, Mitgliederversammlungen im Monat April, An den Konsum-
genossenschaftsverband Bezirk Leipzig, 12.6.61. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2341/2, Referat zum 12. Jahrestag der Gründung der Konsumgenossenschaften 
am 18.12.1957. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2531, Eingaben der Bürger, Konsum-Genossenschaftsverband, Leipzig, den 
29.1.65. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2625, Jugendförderungsplan 1962, Konsumgenossenschaft Leipzig Südwest, 
den 13.4.1962. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2801, Betr: Stadtbezirk Südwest, Spätverkausstelle, An die Konsum-
Genossenschaft Stadt Leipzig, 17 April 1962. 
SWA: U2/SWA 2801, betr.: Beschwerde, An die Konsumgenossenschaft Leipzig, den 
31.8.1962. 
SWA: U2/SWA 3297, Protestresolution der Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung zur barbarischen 
Aggression in Kambodscha, Konsumgenossenschaft Stadt Leipzig, den 5. Mai 1970." 
SWA: U64/128 (date not given). 
SWA: U64/240, Erklärung des Genossenschaftsrates des Verbandes der Konsum-
genossenschaften der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Berlin, de. 25. Oktober 1989. 
SWA: U64/242, Betrifft die Eingabe vom 03.06.90 von Frau P. 
SWA: U64/242, Eingabe an die Konsumgenossenschaft Stadt und Kreis Dorotheenstr. 24-26 
Zwickau, 3.6.90. 
SWA: U64/242, Eingabe, Betreff: Verkaufsstelle Vettermannstraße VKE-Nr. 0715, 31. Jan 
1989. 
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SWA: U64/336, Die Konsum-Genossenschaften in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 
(Date not given - probably 1959 or the early 1960s). 
SWA: V8/2010, Befähigungsnachweis zur Leitung einer Vst bzw. Gst des sozialist. Handels, 
Berlin den 28. November 1960. 
SWA: V8/2010, Lehrplan der BA der Gewerkschaft Handel, Nahrung und Genuß Altenburg vom 
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SWA: V8/2017, Beschlüsse-Anweisungen-Informationen des Verbandes Deutscher Konsum-
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SWA: V8/2043, Beurteilung, der Koll. W., Leipzig, am 6.1.1956. 
SWA: V8/2043, Beurteilung, die Koll. M., Leipzig, am 6.1.1956. 
SWA: V8/2043, KGV Bezirk Dresden Abteilung Kader/Schulung, Dresden, den 11. Dezember, 
1954. 
SWA: V8/2043, Literaturverzeichnis, Leipzig, den 13. April 1954. 
SWA: V8/2043, Schule: Pol. Massenarbeit/Kader/Schulung, Leipzig, den 9.8.1954. 
SWA: V8/2059 Bd. 1, Frauenförderungsplan für das Jahr 1962 des KGV Bezirk Leipzig. 
SWA: V8/2059 Bd. 1, Konzeption für die Berichterstattung vor der Revisionskommission des 
Bezirksverbandes am 16.10.1963. 
SWA: V8/2209 Beschlüsse-Anweisungen-Informationen des Verbandes Deutscher Konsum-
genossenschaften, - Lehrgänge an den konsumgenossenschaftlichen Schulen im Jahre 
1963, Berlin, den 7. September 1962. 
SWA: V8/2247, Entwurf Statut der (Dorf-, Stadt-) Konsumgenossenschaft (Date not given)." 
TSM: BV Suhl - Konsum, Nr. 1157, Eingabe an den Herrn Präsidenten Dr. Fahrenkrog, 24. Juli 
1973. 
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